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


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MURAT HALSTEAD.

THE STORY OF CUBA

HER STRUGGLES FOR LIBERTY ...
THE CAUSE, CRISIS AND DESTINY

OF THE
PEARL OF THE ANTILLES

BY
MURAT HALSTEAD

GRAPHICALLY ILLUSTRATED WITH NUMEROUS TYPICAL PHOTOGRAPHIC
REPRODUCTIONS AND ORIGINAL DRAWINGS, INCLUDING
THOSE OF THE UNITED STATES BATTLE SHIP MAINE

SIXTH EDITION—REVISED TO DATE

AKRON, OHIO
THE WERNER COMPANY

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CUBA



THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THE first words that invite the eye in a book are the last written. When the preface is prepared the work is finished. This volume is up-to-date, but the story of Cuba is not all told. The tragedy goes on. The triumph is to come. The logic of all history contemplates the conclusion we confidently declare. It is, that the end of foreign domination over the discoveries of Columbus and his followers, draws near. Cuba is the splendid stage on which is performed the last act of the drama of Spain in America. It is Spain's war with her children. All nations are spectators—our own with the greater share of interest and sympathy. It is as the first President Harrison wrote of our revolution—"hard, hard indeed, is the struggle for liberty and the contest for independence!" There is to the student of the Cuban story, a series of surprises in the revelation of the immensity of the Island, the riches of her resources, the certainty of her rights and the cruelty of her wrongs, the marvelous position she holds in the tropical seas; and there comes, with the enchantment of her "fatal gift of beauty," beyond the endowment of Italy, the conviction that the people who should inherit this land, are honorably and bravely represented in the

rebellion, and that the righteousness that exalts a nation is in their cause of liberty.

There are hundreds of books about Cuba. Many are meritorious. We have gathered from those that are authorities, or that excel in the picturesque, and carefully credited, characteristic passages, that confirm or illustrate ; but above all other writings, in whatever form given, acknowledgments of obligations are due to the newspapers—the New York *Journal, Herald, World, Sun, and Mail and Express*, whose correspondents, adventurous and courageous, are the able and the only historians of the war. The author remembers them as comrades in difficult good works, and with pride in the association, inscribes to them this sorrowful story, of the fairest of islands that shall grow lovelier yet in liberty. They have honored the press and served the country.

INTRODUCTION.

THE Story of Cuba is a tragedy. The beautiful island, when found by civilized man, was peopled by a gentle race, kindly, innocent, indolent, loving ; living on fish and fruit, corn and sweet potatoes, under the shade of royal palms, in orchards of pineapples and oranges ; the very wilderness brilliant with flowers, and birds of glittering plumage ; the guileless tribes happy and harmless as if they were chosen children of God, dwelling apart in Paradise.

These dainty savages were seized and held, and perished in servitude to the fierce, remorseless adventurers, who, in the passion of empire and greed for gold, were insensible to the considerations of humanity and the charity of Christianity, and into the bitter gloom of whose selfishness there entered no soft sentiment of mercy and no ray of the enlightenment of good will to men or of the generousities of statesmanship.

Then followed African slavery as a benevolent mitigation of the barbarism that consumed the poor Indians in their tenderness and timidity ; and it is a Cuban tradition that the sharks that now swarm on the shores of the Island were introduced by following the slave ships from the waters of Africa to devour the victims that, overcome by the torments of the terrible voyages, were flung into the sea.

For a century Cuba was the base of operations of the

expedition of the conquering Spaniards in tropical America, and for another century the fleets, with the spoils of the conquest of the West, sailed from her harbors, and then, for a century, the West Indies became the scene of a tremendous contest for naval supremacy by England, France and Spain. After England won the mastery of the ocean, Napoleon, losing the sea power at Trafalgar, attempted to coerce all continental Europe into his schemes of aggrandizement, and Spain, resisting his pretensions, was crushed for a time by his imperial genius, but closed with him in a war to the knife, that endured until the conqueror was conquered; but not until after parcelling out his American possessions, and then the crumbling of Spanish dominion in the New World began.


Before our revolutionary war—it was in 1762—Havana was besieged and captured by the English, and the episode of their occupation of her harbor, and opening it to commerce, stimulated the Cubans to marine enterprise; but though they had been long faithful, and began to prosper after the fall of the French empire, and had a right to share the progress and dignity of Spain, to which they were loyal in affection through her misfortunes, they were swiftly reminded of colonial disabilities; and then came the conflicts that are culminating in the condition of the Island, the richest that the seas encircle, where the Spaniards and their children are carrying on a war of desolation that is ruining both.

The higher class of the public men of our country have always been interested in Cuba, and she has had a charm for our people in proportion to the elevation of their intelligence. The logic of Spanish history is the loss of Cuba. The same causes that cost Spain,

Mexico, and Peru, and Chili, and Bolivia, Central America, Venezuela, and the rest, mean also that the long struggle of the Cubans for liberty will close in triumph. With Cuba's destiny in the hands of her own people, she will obey the irresistible attraction of our Union to be one of the United States.

With the advantages of recent personal observation of the situation in Cuba, receiving polite attentions and extensive information from the Spanish authorities, and enjoying the confidence of Cubans, and the candid expression of their interpretation of events, it is with a sense of duty to the veracity of history, that I propose to recite with sincerity the Cuban story of four hundred years.

MURAT HALSTEAD.



MAP OF CUBA, SHOWING OPERATIONS OF THE INSURGENTS, ALSO THE RELATIVE AREA OF LONG ISLAND.

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HAVANA

THE STORY OF CUBA

CHAPTER I.

FIRST EVENTS AND EARLY INFLUENCES.

The Discovery—Columbus Enchanted—His Dreams—Beauty of Earth, Ocean and Sky—The Gentle Natives Smoke Cigarettes—Some Slow Centuries—The British Conquest—Dawn of Revolution in the Ever Faithful Island—The Slavery Embarrassment—Thomas Jefferson and Charles Sumner—A Despotie Political Economy.

WHEN Christopher Columbus found Cuba he was in the midst of his wonderful dream of the Indies, and all the world had for him become enchanted. He sailed on his immortal voyage, believing that he would find the beautiful country of which he had read in the story of Marco Polo, and as he sailed from island to island, finding each new discovery more romantic than the last, he interpreted all the incidents to confirm his belief that he was nearing Cipango, and would very soon have the opportunity of delivering the letters, with which he was equipped from Ferdinand and Isabella, to the Great Khan. He and his followers asked the simple natives, whether meeting them in their canoes or under their fruit-trees, for gold, and thought the responses meant that *a great country* was close at hand, and that could be none other than the mysterious land of whose fabulous riches the most famous of wanderers, who had traveled furthest East, had told.

The Island that he called Isabella, for the beloved sovereign of Castile, his benign patroness, proved espe-

cially captivating to the great navigator, and he wrote of it: "Everything is green as April in Andalusia. The singing of the birds is such that it seems as if one would never desire to depart. There are flocks of parrots that obscure the sun. There are trees of a thousand species, each having its particular fruit, and all of marvelous flavor."

Inspired by his eastern romance, he detected in the air "spicy odors," and enjoyed a fragrance from the blossoming groves, that he said "was the sweetest thing in the world," and there were many precious trees of which he knew nothing, but that they would be of great price in Spain; and that was so, both of the wood and of the fruit. The GREAT LAND, a little way over the exquisite waters, of which he heard continually, was CUBA, and when at last he saw it on the morning of the 28th of October, 1492, he was not surprised, but his soul was sailing along the shores of Japan, half around the world away.

He was in the midst of the season of rains in the Indies he was discovering, and in the very month destined to celebrity for awful hurricanes in that region, but the ocean was as silk under his adventurous prow, the water was almost transparent as the air, and places of anchorage were chosen by the appearance of the bottom of the sea. At first view the Cuban mountains reminded the discoverer of those of Sicily, so lofty were they in the crystal sky. He sighted land near Neuvitas del Principe, and thought he found "noble and profound rivers," whose shores were overhung with blooming trees, and he was struck by the extraordinary wealth of color of the flowers, and the majesty of the royal palms. He called the Island Juana, for Prince Juan, and then, when

Ferdinand died, the name was changed to Fernandina, and then Santiago, and then for the Holy Virgin ; but the old Indian name, Cuba, conquered all competition, and has asserted itself triumphantly for four hundred years ; typically, we may trust, after the sorrowful centuries of its final American destiny.

As Columbus sailed along the splendid shores, he fancied he was about to find the city where the Great Khan dwelt, and sent expeditions of inquiry, and as they sought the kingdom of the far East, they were particularly anxious for gold—a few ornaments made of that metal appealing to the imagination. The messengers hunting the Khan—who was only 13,000 miles away—made a great discovery, that of the Indians smoking tobacco, nearly in the form that is the favorite indulgence of the Cubans to this day—the cigarette.

The exaltation of mind of the Discoverer influenced every scrap of his writings. The wings of his fancy were broad and free as he followed his false clue. The realities around him surpassed the creations of fancy, and there was an ineffable harvest of glory, but it did not enter into his visions that he had found a hemisphere. The nature of the people of this marvelous land, dwelling in houses built of palms, and living on a bill of fare of fruits afforded nowhere else, seemed to the great Genoese, whose romances compete with his history in their benignity, to be admirable material to become children of the Church, and he beheld in the riches unfolded before his eyes the resources that should enable him to snatch the Holy Sepulchre from the grasp of the infidel.

The first idea impressed upon Columbus by Cuba was, that it was indeed an island, and then his conviction

was formed, and never departed from him, that it was a continent, and it was not circumnavigated until 1508, when it was ascertained to be almost the same size as England. His point of first contact was on the north shore of the second province, as the Island is now organized from the east end. His westward voyages did not reach the extremity of the land in that direction. He rounded the eastern point, encountered the high land of Hayti, and, fascinated by the Caribbean Sea, touched in a later voyage the South American coast.

He knew not what he had done, but had scanned the northern coast of the southern continent, and Cuba remained the most superb land he personally found in the New World he gave Spain ; and it is more deeply identified with his memory than anything else he revealed to mankind, and richer than Cipango itself, as the tropics are richer than the temperate zones.

The first three centuries of Cuban history did not, in a marked degree, develop the elements of discord between Spain and her richest colony, that in the latter half of her fourth century have proven so irrepressible and disastrous. The story of the Island for the earlier centuries would have been tedious had it not been for the incidents of external contention by which she was interested and influenced.

A volume appeared in New York, in 1850, that is regarded by the Cuban revolutionists as correctly defining their cause as it was at that time ; and the argument of this work, "Cuba and the Cubans," was that the Island had been under martial law for a quarter of a century ; the captain-general having been, in 1825, invested "with the whole extent of power granted to the Governors of besieged towns." This has been the

state of the Island for nearly three quarters of a century, and it is the phrase of felicitation among the insurgents that now after one year's war they "besiege all the towns"—that is by land—the Spaniards holding only the soil of the country they cover with troops, and the cities commanded by their fleets. It is the Cuban boast, therefore, that they have "limited" the territory of the operation of martial law.

In the stories of Cuba after her first three hundred years, the importance of the United States, the great power close at hand, is continually manifest. This passage, from "Cuba and the Cubans," page 52, is an example:

During the second period of democratic, or what was called constitutional government, which commenced in 1820, the Masonic societies came into vogue as they did in the mother country. They adopted different plausible pretexts—though to speak the truth, they were little more than clubs for amusement and revelry. One of them, called the "Sociedad de Bolivar," went so far as to discuss whether, in case of a Columbian invasion, it would be more expedient to avoid a collision in the presence of the slaves, by giving way peaceably before the invading army. Happily for Cuba, and certainly in consequence of the judicious interference of the United States, which foresaw in the preservation of its tranquility the advantages of a fruitful commerce, the invasion did not take place. And if the Island has since had to lament the gradual encroachments of the executive, in all the several branches of its politics and administration, it has also been preserved from the sanguinary results which the premature establishment of ultra free institutions has produced in all the numerous countries which once formed the dominion of Spain in America. For the difficulty of annexation, from the lesser influence the United States then possessed among nations, and the controlling importance of the shipping interest in that country.

The trouble here, as it is plain to see, was slavery and the natural opposition of the slave holders to "the premature establishment of ultra free institutions." However, the book we quote undertook to show that the

freedom of Cuba would certainly come speedily, and in that made a miscalculation of at least forty-five years.

The question of the annexation of Cuba to the United States was subordinated on both sides—until the abolishment of slavery by the ten years' war, closing in 1878—to the consideration of the slave questions, and but for this Cuba would have escaped from Spain without aid long ago.

Senator Lodge cleverly, in his speech before the Massachusetts State Convention, read a few lines that were "written in order to be precise" as follows :

For myself I cannot doubt that in the interest of both parties, Cuba and Spain, and in the interest of humanity, also, the contest should be closed. This is my judgment on the facts so far as known to me. Cuba must be saved from its bloody delirium or little will be left for the final conquerors. Nor can the enlightened mind fail to see that the Spanish power on this Island is anachronism. The day of European colonies has passed, at least in this hemisphere, where the rights of men were first proclaimed and self-government first organized. [Applause.]

The words were Charles Sumner's, spoken in 1869, when the ten years' war had been going on one year—the same length of time the present warfare has raged. Mr. Sumner was, of course, hindered in his sympathies with the Cuban rebellion of that time because the rebels were largely slave holders, and it was not given him to see that when the conflict pending, as he spoke, was over, Cuba should be free in the sense that there would be an end of slavery on her soil.

We may go back to the far-seeing statesman, Thomas Jefferson, who found, when the Louisiana Purchase was proposed, that the constitution which he sought to construe with a sharp outlook for the suppression of doubtful powers, was broad enough to permit the nation to

buy the mouth of the Mississippi, and we find him writing, as recently quoted in the United States Senate by Mr. Vest of Missouri :

Napoleon will certainly give his consent without difficulty to our receiving the Floridas, and with some difficulty possibly Cuba.

That he would give us the Floridas to withhold intercourse with the residue of the colonies cannot be doubted. But that is no price, because they are ours in the first moment of the first war, and until a war they are of no particular necessity to us. But, although with difficulty, he will consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and the other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column in the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it *Ne Plus Ultra*, as to us, in that direction. We should then have only to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation, and I am persuaded no constitution was ever before so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government. As the *Mentor* went away before this change, and will leave France probably while it is still a secret in that hemisphere, I presume the expediency of pursuing her with a swift-sailing dispatch was considered. It will be objected to our receiving Cuba that no limit can then be drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a navy to defend it.

It was clearly in the mind of Jefferson that Spain might listen to reason and part with Cuba, as France with Louisiana. In the days when Jefferson and Sumner wrote the passages given, the dark problem of slavery confronted us in nearly half our own States, and complicated the issue of the acquisition of territory with that of the extension or the restriction of slave soil in the republic.

The Cuban filibustering expeditions of a former generation, attended, as they were, with the loss of valued lives and the transmission of an inheritance of excitements

and hatreds, were distinctly to provide for the admission of more slave States into the American Union. With slavery abolished throughout America, we can contemplate Cuba without a shadow of slave power to obscure the vision ; and there is the greater reason why the enfranchisement of her whole people should be established and her self-government absolutely achieved, while it is the true contention that the better form of that accomplishment is her annexation as a State to the United States, as Texas was annexed.

There was a narrow policy, involving the greatest men of their day and generation in our country, that would have excluded Texas—the France of America—and that could have abandoned the golden opportunity to acquire California, but the common sense of the common people was wiser far than the statesmanship of the giants of those days, Clay and Webster.

It is fortunate that Cuba did not fall into our hands as a slave State, for when the slave power was so great in our government, and a greater peril than we were aware, it must have increased our difficulties, and our sovereign State idea would, at the same time, have taken evil shape. But that is all over. Our free Union, as it stands, is “one and inseparable,” and just as certain as that is so, is the fact that the States are imperishable quantities, never to be subtracted from the sum. Our State method of self-government is that which Cuba wants—the style of autonomy she needs—and the pressure of our mighty forces upon her ways in affairs political, would steady the State to accept her share of our destiny.

Cuba, it will be remembered, was of slow growth, and aroused from the stupor of centuries by the British

occupation of 1762. "Cuba and the Cubans" says of the protracted paralysis of the Island :

The truth lies in the fact that after having exhausted the Indian population, the Island was only held as a military post on the way to the mines of Mexico, with little else to occupy its reduced population than the raising of cattle on lands not appropriated. To the latter years of the past century, commerce was not only confined to Spanish merchantmen but to the periodical voyage of the fleet belonging to the East India Company. Foreign trade has only been authorized in the present century, when the European wars, forcing the Spanish flag from the seas, an encroachment of contraband trade made it impossible to oppose it.

The commercial restrictions were antiquated, and, of course oppressive, and extended to all the relations of Spain and the Spanish provinces. At the opening of the nineteenth century, the now alienated children of Spain claimed that her attitude was one of nobility, actuated by patriotic impulse, and Cuba, repeatedly invaded as a Spanish province, was true to the old colors ; but her loyalty did not affect the steady encroachment of the fatalities of the colonial system of Spain, or the indurated and deadly prejudices of her political economy.

CHAPTER II.

EUROPE AND AMERICA AND THE INDIES.

British Conquest of Cuba—American Revolution and Cuban Insurrections—Americans Interested in Cuban Affairs—The Lopez and *Virginus* Massacres—Terrible Scenes of Bloodshed—Cuban Martyr's Letter to his Wife.

ONE of the most remarkable things in the history of Cuba is the length of time that it was but sparsely populated, and that the value of the Island, on account of the surpassing riches of its soil, was, if not unknown, surprisingly unappreciated.

The West Indies, as territories disputed by European powers, were conspicuous in the record of the eighteenth century, and before that they had for a century and a half been famous for pirates, innumerable harbors favoring the concealment of lawless wanderers; and the Spanish treasure ships were attractive prey. There were fierce hatred and jealousy of Spain by England and France, and it was their theory, as the Spaniards had not acquired through Columbus a title to the New World, that the commerce of Spain was to be appropriated by others whenever opportunity offered. The Spanish protected their ships as well as they could, and one of the long-standing orders was that vessels on their way from Mexico to Spain should stop at Havana; and the situation of that city was so commanding, her growth was out of proportion to the general progress of the Island, and her relative importance steadily increased.

Some of the most famous British seamen were charged by the Spaniards with piracy, and their proceedings were certainly rather irregular.

The conquest of Havana, and other important points in Cuba, by the English, in 1762, was a striking feat of arms; and why they gave up the splendid booty within a year, has never been quite explained; but it cannot be said the English did not get something for what they gave.

It was from the French West Indies that the fleet sailed that helped Washington and Rochambeau at Yorktown, and caused the surrender of Cornwallis by beating back, after many broadsides, the squadron that sailed from New York for his relief, and it was a marvelous combination to bring the French from Gaudeloup to the capes of Virginia at the same time that Washington marched away from the Hudson with his French allies, to catch the southern army of England between the James and York rivers, where Cornwallis found himself after his fiery march through the Carolinas. It was necessary to plan the outlines of this expedition in Paris, and the detail at Dobb's Ferry; and at that time Paris was further from Yorktown, whether by way of New York or the Indies, than New York is now from Australia; and this holds good if we omit the wires through which the nations talk between the continents.

The French, during our war of the revolution, were strong competitors with England at sea, and indeed they never gave up the primacy of the ocean to the British till after Trafalgar, and they do not entirely believe it yet; but Rodney won a victory over the French fleet in the leeward islands, almost as important as the last blow Nelson struck, and the splendid French

armament that fought off the British from the capes of Virginia and made captives of a British army was no more.

The presence of the British for a year in Cuba imparted energy to the commerce of the island, and the labor of black slaves began to be productive of sugar. Indeed, slavery and sugar substantially came together, and Cuba received a large accession of valuable people from Hayti when the insurrections and massacres there relegated that superb land a long way toward barbarism, with only the compensations of a rude form of freedom. At the turn of the centuries, when Napoleon shook up the nations, Cuba was faithful to Spain—becoming the ever faithful island—and when the Spanish-American empire fell into ruin, Cuba remained the last and richest of the gigantic inheritance bequeathed by the Italian navigator, who was rewarded by returning in chains from San Domingo, over the line on which he had sailed to make his immortal discovery.

There were insurrections in Cuba in 1823, 1829, 1835 and 1844, regarded with increasing interest and sympathy by the American people; and in 1850 occurred the famous Lopez and Crittenden expedition. Narcisso Lopez was a native of Venezuela, who reached the rank of major-general in the Spanish army, married a wealthy Cuban lady, was detected as interested in an insurrectionary movement, and escaped to the United States, where he was devoted to plans for the liberation of Cuba, and, in 1850, sailed from New Orleans in the steamer *Pampero* with three hundred men. The second in command was a W. S. Crittenden, a graduate of West Point and Mexican War hero, though but twenty-eight years old.

There was hardly a pretense of disguise in our Southern States, of the object of the expedition, and the details of it were recklessly given, so that the Spanish authorities were warned, and as they knew Lopez meant to land in the eastern part of the island, letters were sent purporting to be from Cuban patriots, persuading him to land in the western province, where a rising would be prepared to support him.

Lopez fell into the trap. He stopped at Key West to take coal, and landed, as the Spaniards had planned, at Bahia Honda, and marched into the interior, where the insurrection was to take place, and Crittenden remained at the seaside as a base of operations.

Hearing nothing from Lopez, and knowing, therefore, his movement was a failure, Crittenden made a desperate attempt to escape in open boats, but was discovered and captured by the Spanish Admiral, Brestillo.

The United States consul was appealed to for assistance, but declined to interfere ; and did not even, it is said, visit the unfortunate men, because he was alarmed for his personal safety, and there was no doubt at all of the nature of the expedition.

The proceedings were prompt. Crittenden and fifty men were shot in groups of six under the walls of Fort Atares, Crittenden refusing to kneel with his back to the firing party, according to the Spanish fancy, but faced them erect, saying he kneeled only to God ! The reports are, that the bodies of the victims were treated with frightful indignities.

Lopez found some sympathizers, but there was no demonstration in his favor, as he had expected, and after two skirmishes, he surrendered, and was executed

with the garrote at Havana, not being permitted the death of a soldier. Forty-nine of his men were shot, and one hundred and six of them held in servitude, loaded with chains, seven months in Spain.

This bloody business caused intense feeling in the United States, and the death of the gallant Crittenden was bitterly lamented and resented.

Captain Joseph Fry, of the ill-fated *Virginus*, is widely known as "The Cuban Martyr." He was a native of Florida, born at Tampa Bay, June 14, 1826, and was a confederate officer of high courage and capacity.

He was at Port au Prince, Oct. 7, 1873, with the *Virginus*, and took on board war material, 500 Remington rifles, 600 sabres, 400 revolvers, and many other articles of unmistakable war material. There is no more serious question of the character of the expedition than of the nature of the cargo, though some of the men seemed of an irresponsible sort. While the *Virginus* was on the way to Cuba, the Spanish gunboat *Tornado* appeared, and Captain Fry attempted to return to Jamaica, and urged his ship to the utmost, burning fat, and firing up to such an extent that the pursuers in the night located the ship by the flame from her chimneys. The *Virginus* and *Tornado* were built by the same British firm for blockade-runners. The *Tornado* proved the better boat on this occasion, and gradually came within range. Various causes were assigned for the failure of the *Virginus* to show speed, and there was a story of treachery, but as she had not been docked for fourteen months, and needed scraping at least once in six months, there was no need of treason in the engine-room to account for her capture.

There was a dreadful panic on the doomed vessel. The war material was lifted out of the hold by a crane and flung overboard, though there was enough left in the fragments of cases to show what the "merchandise" that was thrown into the sea had been. Many of the party opened their trunks, and threw away everything they regarded as suspicious, and the whole vessel was in wild disorder. The first shot from the *Tornado* fell wide, but the second struck the smoke-stack of the fugitive, and she was stopped, and surrendered, the captain protesting that his papers were regular, that the *Virginus* was "an American ship, carrying American colors and papers, with an American captain and an American crew," and that the passengers were going to Costa Rica. He, therefore, protested in the name of the American government against detention. The Spanish captain said the *Virginus* was "a pirate ship," and ordered the American colors pulled down and the Spanish colors run up—and it is said the lowered flag was trampled upon.

The *Tornado*, with her prize, made for Santiago de Cuba, arriving there Nov. 1st, and the fierce demonstrations of the volunteers alarmed Captain Fry, who does not seem until then to have realized his situation, and he is reported by his friends there to have said: "If I die, it will be for the Cuban cause." The court martial of those recognized as Cuban insurgents was a matter of form, and the decision that the prisoners must be shot to death was soon reached.

The Spanish official report of the execution of the patriotic generals who were the leading passengers of the *Virginus* is the following :

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, NOV. 4, 1873.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE CAPTAIN-GENERAL :

At 6 o'clock this morning, were shot in this city, for being traitors to their country, and for being insurgent chiefs, the following persons, styling themselves "patriot generals": Bernabe Varona, *alias* Bambeta, General of Division; Pedro Céspedes, Commanding General of Cienfuegos; General Jesus Del Sol, and Brigadier Washington Ryan. The executions took place in the presence of the entire corps of volunteers, the force of regular infantry, and the sailors from the fleet. An immense concourse of people also witnessed the act. The best of order prevailed. The prisoners met their death with composure.

"BURRIEL."

There were a few friendly spectators at the execution, which took place in what was appropriately known as the "slaughter-house." Ryan wore a blue shirt with a silver star. The victims were shot in the back, and the bodies beheaded, the heads displayed on spikes, while the trunks were trampled by horses. A correspondent of the New York *Herald*, named George W. Sherman, was imprisoned four days for attempting to sketch the scene. The American consul attempted to protest, but was restrained in his house by a guard. One account, by an American present, says the people were not in a mood of noisy approbation, but were "excessively quiet."

Then came the court martial in the case of the captain and crew. The American consul saw Captain Fry—who was without delay convicted by the alleged court and ordered shot—make his protest, as a preparation for death; and the captain signed it two hours before he marched to the "slaughter-house." It was November 7, 1873. At 4 o'clock in the afternoon the condemned officers and crew of the *Virginus* were marched by fours to the shooting place, passing and saluting the American consulate, where the flagstaff was bare.



BUTCHERY OF THE CREW OF THE VIRGINIUS.

Captain Fry bidding his men farewell.

Captain Fry was of the last group in the procession and shot first, being the only man, though the soldiers stood only ten feet away, who fell dead at the opening volley. The majority of the condemned, as the firing proceeded, were wounded, and killed as they writhed on the ground, the favored method of dispatch being firing rifles in the mouths of those who were disabled. The number killed was fifty-three, and ninety-three more were under sentence. Among the executed was the second engineer, who made a declaration to the Spaniards that he had meddled with the engine and caused the capture. He was marched with the rest, prevent his comrades from knowing that he had been favored, and shot by mistake, making frantic protests. He probably had not told the Spaniards the truth, and got the just award for his treachery.

At this time General Grant was President of the United States; General Sickles Minister to Spain; the famous orator Castelar, President of Spain, and he, it is believed, ordered the execution not to take place; but, if so, the order did not reach Santiago in time.

There came help, after the captain was shot with his crew, from an unexpected quarter, and the incident is the one gleam of white light in this dark chapter. The British steamer *Niobe*, Captain Sir Lampton Lorraine, ran in at full speed from Jamaica, starting in such a hurry she left some of her crew ashore, and the captain was landed in Cuba before his ship was anchored, and demanded that the massacre should be stopped. He claimed to represent the United States as well as England, it is said; and he even threatened to bombard the city. His vigor caused a suspension of the sentences

still remaining to be executed, and the lives of the prisoners not already put to death were saved. On his way home Sir Lampton Lorraine stopped at New York, where he was honored with an invitation to hold a reception, which he declined, and by way of saying to him, "You're a brick," a silver brick from Nevada was presented him bearing this inscription, "Blood is thicker than water. Santiago de Cuba, November, 1873, to Sir Lampton Lorraine, from the Comstock Mines, Virginia City, Nevada, U. S. A." For some reason not clear, the House of the American Congress laid a resolution of thanks to Sir Lampton on the table.

January, 1874, President Grant sent a special message about the *Virginus* case to Congress, noting that the ship was correctly cleared and had a right to fly the American flag, and that no "state of war existed." The Spaniards contended the *Virginus* was not entitled to the character given by her papers. By an arrangement, which General Grant said was "moderate and just," the vessel and survivors were surrendered to the United States and this was "calculated to cement the good relations which so long subsisted between Spain and the United States." The ship with the American flag flying was delivered at Bahia Honda, but she was unseaworthy and, struck by a storm on the way to New York, was sunk off Cape Fear. Her surviving passengers were given up to the United States at Santiago de Cuba, December 1, 1873.

There was a vast amount of feeling in the United States about the *Virginus* massacre, but the trouble was the technical rights of the Spaniards prevented any practical measures being taken to call them to account for the shocking barbarity of the wholesale executions; but the painful

circumstances have been well remembered. It was the undoubted filibuster record of the steamer that caused the marked coolness of the message of President Grant.

Captain Fry wrote a farewell letter to his wife the night before his execution. "Wherever," says the *Baltimorean*, in first publishing this letter, "the story of the *Virginus* outrage shall go, the story of this letter will go to. It is a letter that many an eye will weep to read, and that any man at such an extremity might envy the power to write."

ON BOARD THE SPANISH MAN-OF-WAR, *La Tornado*,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, NOV. 6, '73.

DEAR, DEAR DITA:—

When I left you I had no idea that we should never meet again in this world, but it seems strange to me that I should to-night, and on Annie's birthday, be calmly seated, on a beautiful moonlight night, in a most beautiful bay in Cuba, to take my last leave of you my own dear, sweet wife! and with the thought of your own bitter anguish, my only regret at leaving.

I have been tried to-day, and the president of the court martial asked the favor of embracing me at parting, and clasped me to his heart. I have shaken hands with each of my judges, and the secretary of the court and interpreter have promised me, as a special favor, to attend my execution, which will, I am told, be within a few hours after my sentence is pronounced.

I am told my death will be painless; in short I have had a very cheerful and pleasant chat about my funeral, to which I shall go a few hours from now, how soon I cannot say yet. It is curious to see how I make friends. Poor Bambetta pronounced me a gentleman, and he was the brightest and bravest creature I ever saw.

The priest who gave me communion on board this morning put a double scapular around my neck and a medal which he intends to wear himself. A young Spanish officer brought me a bright new silk badge with the Blessed Virgin stamped upon it, to wear to my execution for him, and a handsome cross in some fair lady's handiwork. They are to be kept as relics of me. He embraced me affectionately in his room with tears in his eyes.

Dear Sweetheart, you will be able to bear it for my sake, for I will be with you if God permits. Although I know my hours are short and few, I am not sad. I feel I shall always be with you right soon, dear Dita, and you will not be afraid of me. Pray for me and I will pray with you. There is to be a fearful sacrifice of life from the *Virginus*, and as I think, a needless one, as the poor people are unconscious of crime, and even of their fate up to now. I hope God will forgive me if I am to blame for it.

If you write to President Grant, he will probably order my pay, due when I resigned, paid to you after my death. People will be kinder to you now, dear Dita, at least I hope so. Do not dread death when it comes to you. It will be God's angel of rest,—remember this. I hope my children will forget their father's harshness, and remember his love and anxiety for them. May they practice regularly their religion and pray for him always. Tell —, the last act of my life will be a public profession of my faith, and hope in Him, of whom we need not be ashamed, and it is not honest to withhold that public acknowledgement from any false modesty or timidity. May God bless and save us all.

Sweet, dear, dear Dita, we will soon meet again. Till then adieu for the last time.

Your devoted husband,

JOSEPH FRY.

The adventurous life and heroic death of Captain Fry, and his farewell letter, made a deep and lasting impression upon the American people and Cuban patriots, and his pathetic history is written in song and story.

Major Moses P. Handy witnessed the surrender of the *Virginus*, going out from Key West as a stow-away on the *Despatch*, the vessel appointed to receive the surrender. The Major gives the following account of the newspaper men.

Every New York journal sent correspondents to the front. The New York *Herald* was represented at first at Key West by W. B. Stephens and Karl Case, who were reinforced by James A. Cowardin and "Modoc" Fox, and finally by J. A. McGahan, one of the most famous

of war correspondents, who came from the European station on one of our men-of-war, and Julius Chambers. The *Tribune* bureau was in my charge, and we also had Ralph Keeler at Santiago de Cuba and W. P. Sullivan, now a New York broker, at Havana; McGahan, Stephens, Cowardin, Case and Fox are now dead.

The race between the correspondents for news was very hot. Every man as the representative of his newspaper was on his mettle, and enterprise was at a premium. McGahan had the advantage of being ward room guest on a man-of-war. Fox was paymaster's yeoman on the *Pinta*, the fastest boat in the navy. When we learned that the *Virginus* was to be surrendered, we all realized that that event would end the campaign.

The *Despatch* made for Bahia Honda. The circumstances of the surrender are thus related by the major:

It was about noon when we passed an old fort called Murillo, commanding the entrance to the harbor. Speed was then slackened, and the vessel crept cautiously along the narrow, but clearly marked, channel which leads to the smooth water where the *Virginus* was supposed to be lying.

As soon as the *Despatch* was sighted from the shore, the Spanish flag, bearing the crown, notwithstanding the republic abolishing that monarchical emblem, was flung to the breeze. We discovered a black sidewheel steamship lying about a mile beyond the fort. It was the *Virginus*. No other craft, except two or three coasting steamers, or fishing smacks, was then visible, and it was not until we were about to come to anchor that we discerned a Spanish sloop-of-war lying close under the shore, about two and a half miles away.

Very soon a boat from the Spanish man-of-war came alongside of the *Virginus*, and immediately the Stars and Stripes were raised by Spanish hands, and again floated over the vessel which carried Ryan and his unfortunate comrades to their death. At the same moment we saw, by the aid of field glasses, another boat let down from the Spanish vessel. It proved to be the captain's gig, and brought to the *Despatch* a naval officer in full uniform who proved to be Señor de la Camera, of the Spanish sloop-of-war *Favorita*. He stepped briskly forward, and was met at the gangway by Captain Rodgers and Captain Whiting. After an exchange of courteous salutations, Commander de la Camera

remarked that he had received a copy of the protocol providing for the surrender of the *Virginus*, and that the surrender might now be considered to have taken place. Captain Whiting replied that under his instructions the following day was named for the surrender, and that he could not receive it until that time. Meanwhile he would thank the Spanish officer to continue in possession. Nine o'clock on Tuesday morning was then agreed upon as the hour, and after informing the American officer that there was coal enough on board of the *Virginus* to last six days, salutes were exchanged and the Spanish officer retired.

The next morning, half an hour ahead of time, the gig of the *Favorita* came over to the *Virginus*. It contained oarsmen and a single officer. As the latter stepped on deck, a petty officer and half a dozen men, who had stood watch on the *Virginus* during the night, went over the side and remained in a dingy awaiting orders. At 9 precisely by the bells the American flag again flew to the flagstaff of the *Virginus*, and at the same moment a boat containing Captian Whiting and Lieutenant Marix put away from the *Despatch*. As they ascended the accommodation ladder of the *Virginus* the single man on deck who proved to be Señor de la Camera, advanced and made a courteous salute. The officers then read their respective instructions, and Captian de la Camera remarked that in obedience to the requirements of the government and in execution of the provisions of the protocol, he had the honor to turn over the steamer *Virginus* to the American authorities. Captain Whiting accepted, and learning that a receipt was required, gave one in due form. A word or two more was spoken and the Spaniard stepped over the side, signaled to his oarsmen, and in ten minutes was again upon the deck of his own vessel. Beside the surrendering and receipting officers, I was the only witness of the ceremony.

The *Virginus* was extremely dirty and in bad form, her engines disordered, and she was leaking. On the way to a northern port the ship foundered; Major Handy says:


It was the general opinion among the naval officers that the *Sania* had endeavored to belittle the whole proceeding by smuggling the *Virginus* out of Havana, by selecting an obscure harbor not a port of entry as the place of surrender and by turning the duty of surrender over to a surveying sloop, while the *Tornado*, which made



GEN. B. DE VARONA.



GEN. WASHINGTON RYAN.



GEN. PEDRO CESPÉDES.



GEN. JESUSDEL SOL,

THE VIRGINIUS MARTYRS.

the capture, lay in the harbor of Havana and the *Isabella la Catholica*, which had been selected as convoy, steamed back to Havana under cover of the night. The American officers and American residents in Cuba and Key West agreed that our government ought to have required that the *Virginus* should be surrendered with all the released prisoners on board either at Santiago de Cuba, where the *Tornado* brought in her ill-gotten prey and where the inhuman butcheries were committed, or in Havana where she was afterward taken in triumph, and greeted with the cheers of the excited Spaniards over the humiliation of the Americans.

The difficulty the administration of General Grant had to respond to the public excitement about the *Virginus*, was the clear truth that she was, when captured, engaged in an unlawful enterprise.

Major Handy tells in this connection the story of the mysterious disappearance of Ralph Keeler, a magazine writer of celebrity, turned war correspondent, whose taking off the major charges to the Spaniards, saying:

Keeler was probably dead at the moment when his instructions were filed in the telegraph office. He disappeared as effectually as if the earth had opened and swallowed him. How, why or when he died his friends never knew. It is believed, however, that he was another victim of the hatred which in those days inflamed the Spanish breast against every citizen of the United States. Circumstantial evidence indicated that he was assassinated by Spanish volunteers, and I have always thought of my genial and gifted colleague as one of the murdered Americans now vaguely remembered as the victims of the Spanish bloodthirstiness in the matter of the unavenged *Virginus* incident.

There are many chances for the mysterious departure to the unknown of correspondents serving in the midst of the precarious conditions of civil war, but the murders which the volunteers certainly committed were affairs of the streets, theatres or hotels, and lacked no circumstance of notoriety. There seems to be a blood

madness in the air. In the late February in Havana a madman seized a rifle with sabre attached and assaulted a young man who had asked him an innocent question, knocked him down and stabbed him to death with the bayonet, sticking it through him a score of times, and then cried, "Cable my queen that I have killed a rebel!" The statement that this murderer was insane, was distinctly in some sense true.

It is not, we must say, a correct use of words to say the the United States was degraded by the *Virginus* incident. In proportion as nations are great and dignified, they must at least obey their own laws and treaties. When Grant was President of the United States and Castelar was President of Spain, there was a reckless adventure and shocking massacre, but we were not degraded because we did not indulge a policy of vengeance.

LIFE OF CAPTAIN JOSEPH FRY, THE CUBAN MARTYR.

BY JEANIE MORT WALKER.

On Santiago's placid bay
The town of Santiago lay ;
And in her walls a deed was done—
The foulest e'er the sun shone on.
O Cuba ! rarest, brightest gem
That decks Atlantic's diadem !
O star of constellation bright
That beams upon our ravished sight !
When yet the earth was fresh and young,
And stars their matins scarce had sung,
And still the heavenly echo rung,
With lavish hand then nature flung
A shower from her richest store—
Which on her breast and brow she wore—
Of gems that ransomed kings of yore,
Which fell beside the western shore

Of green Atlantic's swelling flood,
And there began to grow and bud,
Till soon was seen a group of isles
Which wear their mother Nature's smiles ;
Cherished and blest beyond the rest
Of those who claim the mother's breast !
As parents still love most the face
Where their own features they may trace,
Of this fair islet galaxy,
Which studs the fairy summer sea,
Most grand of all, my theme is seen—
Lo ! Cuba—great Antilles' queen.
Here zephyrs whisper through the palms,
With odorous breath of spice and balms ;
The orange, rich in golden hue,
Hangs ripe and tempting to the view ;
The bulbul, from his fragrant nest
Upon the green Acacia's crest,
With quivering wing and swelling throat,
Pours forth his rippling, pearly note ;
And as he calls his absent mate
From 'mid the stately feathery date,
He weaves, with silvery voice and strong,
For her a wreath of gems of song.
Its massive elephantine leaves
The staid banana here upheaves ;
And far above the garden wall—
Adobe-built, and stout and tall—
Its verdant banners wave on high,
In rythmic bend to zephyr's sigh ;
While, from the distance-softened height,
With vines and cocoa-plumes bedight,
The mellow tinklings faintly sound,
As though in light and fragrance drowned.
The train, with bells and trappings gay,
Toils up the steep and devious way ;
While sauntering idly in the rear,
Lags slowly the swathy muleteer.
The warm, voluptuous tropic day,
Which knows no fall nor year's decay,

With sense-intoxicating power
Bids all enjoy the golden hour,
Unchecked by thoughts of future woe,
Of blighting blast, or field of snow ;
For here the summer knows no death,
The gentle spring no dying breath ;
No early grave ingulfs the bloom
Nor hides their sweetness in the tomb.
Like fair twin souls, from sin set free,
And radiant in eternity,
The favored children of the year
All live and reign immortal here.
Here find they what vain mortals seek,
And that of which the poets speak—
A heaven on earth ; 'tis here it lies,
For them a mundane Paradise.
Amid the scene depicted here,
And mirrored in the waters clear
Of Santiago's placid bay,
The town of Santiago lay.

A prisoner from his grated cell
Looked out upon the briny swell,
And in his breast an echo found
For ocean's heaving, sobbing sound.
And as he watched the dying day,
And caught the sun's expiring ray—
He sat and gazed with yearning eye
Upon the soft cerulean sky.
He saw Night draw her curtains dark
O'er sleeping sea and anchored bark.
The eyes of heaven—the gleaming stars—
In pity watched him through the bars.
He looked out on the glorious night
And thought on Him—supremely bright—
The Architect of skill divine
Who did the starry dome design,
Which roofs this balmy southern night
Replete with incense and delight—
Most grand that he has since his birth

Beheld, and 'tis his last on earth !
But in this solemn, dying hour,
He fears not death nor human power ;
He looks his fate full in the face,
Supported by his Savior's grace.
Yet still his brave heart fondly turns
To where his hearthstone fire burns,
And where are gathered those for whom
He'd laugh at danger scorn the tomb.
He thinks of her—his bosom's wife—
And of his children, more than life ;
Regrets, for this alone, his end,
That it with pain their hearts should rend :
And now, with heart still fond and true
He writes his sad, his last adieu.

The night is o'er, the morning breaks,
But not a heart among them quakes.
A martyr band, and he their chief,
They stand unmoved by fear or grief.
At sharp command the column starts,
And on they move, those patriot hearts,
With steady step, unblenching eye ;
Thus nobly move they on to die.
And as they pass the Consulate
Which marks Columbia's flag and State
Though powerless to save him now,
He greets it with a loyal bow.
And now they reach a massive wall
Where lies imbedded many a ball ;
For other victims on this spot
Have died beneath the murderous shot.
At the wall's base, a ditch their lies,
Where drops the doomed one as he dies ;
And here the hapless victims halt,
And kneel beside the waiting vault ;
The guard steps back—a breathless pause—
A deadly aim each soldier draws.
The signal comes—a flash—a roar—
And Freedom's sons lie red with gore !

As Rachel, lone and childless left,
And of her own by death bereft,
Wept sore, and comfort still refused,
Columbia ! mourn thy flag abused,
Thy children bound by foreign chain,
And by the ruthless alien slain.
O, where those sacred ashes lie,
Weep o'er the grave of noble Fry !
No more from out his grated cell,
He gazes at the briny swell ;
His children, wife, and native shore
Shall see his loving face no more.
His voice is now forever hushed,
Quenched by the stream of life that gushed
From out his body, wounded sore,
But painless now forevermore.

Shall butchers' scenes like these act still ?
Insult our flag, our brethren kill ?
From widows, mothers, stricken homes,
From rural plains, from city domes,
From friendless orphans' severed ties,
From graves where buried honor lies,
From north to south, from east to west,
One answer comes—one sole behest :
The answer will be verified
When Freedom's banner, hailed with pride,
Shall o'er the beauteous island queen
Where now red murder's flag is seen
And o'er bold Fry's forsaken grave,
Forever in sad triumph wave.

CHAPTER III.

ORIGIN AND CONDUCT OF CUBAN WARS.

Spanish Passion for Cuba—Growth of Cuban War Spirit—The Ten Years' War Compared with the Present—Gomez and Campos in Both—Tacon's Tyranny—Slavery Abolished—"Book of Blood"—*Edinburg Review* on War of '68-'78.

It has seemed that in proportion as the Spanish have lost their colonies their passion for Cuba grew, until latterly Spain has seemed to live and die for the island, and the more certain appears the drift of destiny and the logic of history, that she and Cuba must part, that they are of incompatible temperament and irreconcilable policies, the more fierce and relentless is the determination of the people of the Peninsula to hold the Cubans, at all cost, for all time, under their sovereignty. The danger of Spain in letting go is the extent to which she has committed her life to the contest. If she will perish with the departure of her possession, it must be so because she will have it so.

Spain chose to selfishly use Cuba—to govern the Island through swarms of office holders, to arbitrarily order the course of her industries, and get the advantage of the products of the Island in the promotion of her own manufactories and commerce. She crushes manufactories in the Island that the sugar and tobacco money may go for the Spanish manufactures and the extension of the commerce of Cadiz and Barcelona.

Here are two capital mistakes, one political, the other economical, and between them is immense injustice and intolerable oppression. The favored culture of sugar and tobacco has also been fruitful of difficulties that first appeared in comparatively mild forms of disorder, until at last the question arises in the present state of the country, whether the liberty denied to petition, remonstrance, argument—to warfare within the lines of civilization—can be won by carrying fire with the sword, and rearing the edifice of independence upon a smoking desert. This is a great matter—whether the tree of liberty will thrive and bloom growing in bloody ashes; and the stories of personal outrages and the romantic fictions, that are given to the world in the official reports of the Spanish Government, and in the gossip of the Cubans, that though full of true incidents is yet distorted and discolored, until the weariness of misunderstanding overcomes the faculties of perseverance and discrimination, and so much is said that little is known—should cease to be of the highest interest.

The present war in Cuba is the second and enlarged edition of that which raged from 1868 to 1878, originating in the same grievances of the Cubans and the same abuses of government by the Spaniards. The ten years' war was of like character with this, in the conduct of hostilities, and the leading men on both sides in the two wars are the same. There were the roving bands of insurgents and pursuing columns of Spaniards a quarter of a century ago as now; the same strong Spanish lines across the Island—the same deadly skirmishing and deadlier fevers—the same deplorable incidents, exasperation and exhaustion.

Martinez Campos and Maximo Gomez were the great figures at the close of that war as at the beginning of this, but there is the change always to be considered that the area of strife is extended, and the destruction of life and property has been vastly augmented. Then but three of the six provinces were partially laid waste, now the whole extent of the Island is devastated. There is about the same proportion of forces now as then. Both armies have in numbers been multiplied by three, and the insurgents have gained in confidence, and in the freedom with which they apply the torch. Then they were comparatively conservative in dealing with the plantations that they occupied—now, when they have traversed the lands that are the sources of wealth, they have become destroyers, until we may assume—indeed we cannot do otherwise—that the sugar and tobacco crops are at an end while the war lasts, and the whole country is frightfully impoverished, and seems falling into an abyss.

When we consider how intense were the sufferings in the ten years' war, how numerous the losses, and compare what was done then with what is going on now, we cannot fail to see that this war is so destructive, so consumes men and money, and annihilates industry, that it cannot endure—that one year now is equal in extirpation of civilization and the consumption of all the resources engaged, to five of the long war; and upon this basis of calculation we come to the conclusion that in some way the war has but about one year to run.

Recently a Cuban sympathizer presented in a brief communication the corner-stone of the substantial Cuban grievances, as follows:

Should the Cubans allow the grinding of cane and gathering of tobacco, it would mean the exporting of that merchandise, amounting to, approximately, \$80,000,000. It is well known to those who are engaged in the Cuban trade that about every dollar's worth of merchandise that Cuba exports finds its way back again in other merchandise from all parts of the world. This means that fully \$80,000,000 of goods would go through the custom houses inwardly, leaving with the Spanish treasury the usual custom house dues on the same, which, for ten years previous to the present trouble, yielded \$20,000,000 per annum. Here is just where the shoe pinches the Spanish foot. The destruction of the sugar crop, etc., thus means to the Spanish treasury a loss of between \$20,000,000 and \$25,000,000 instead of the paltry \$450,000, as the Spanish minister would have the people of this country believe.

A Cuban lecturer declares that Spain derives from Cuba from \$50,000,000 to \$60,000,000 annually, which is rather vague for business, and yet all the profit she gets is indirect, through the personal government carried on by transitory favorites, often both corrupt and incompetent, and if able and anxious to do well, subjected to a system of selfish extortion, far in excess of the resisting forces of individual integrity.

In Clarence King's pamphlet, "Shall Cuba be free?" he very clearly sketches the first flagrancy of discordant relations between Spain and Cuba—the time in the administration of Tacon, sixty years ago. Mr. King says: "General Tacon was the instrument of Spanish greed in Cuba, a soldier of violence and ignorance, who came to the captain-generalcy embittered from a failure to encompass Spanish ends in South America. Tacon was a true type of the Spanish oppressor, born with a contempt for all other than force and hardened by the omnipotence of his Spanish commission." It was when this soldier was in full power that the news of the Constitution, proclaimed in Spain, reached Cuba, Sep-



GENERAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS,
Former Governor General of Cuba.

tember 27, 1836, and a movement was made by Cubans to secure their just share of the liberties accorded Spaniards, but Tacon ordered that there should not be the slightest change without his express orders. Now Tacon was serving under a royal commission that contained this language: "for the important end of preserving in that precious Island (Cuba) his legitimate sovereign authority and public tranquility through proper means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his council of ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by royal ordinances are granted to the governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this His Majesty gives to your Excellency the most complete and unbounded power."

There was nothing that Tacon was not authorized or that he scrupled to do, and his action in putting his foot on the liberties of Cuba was confirmed by the Spanish Cortes in these terms:

The Cortes, using the power which is conceded to them by the Constitution, have decreed: not being in a position to apply the Constitution which has been adopted for the Peninsula and adjacent to the Ultra Marine province of America and Asia, these shall be ruled and administered by special laws appropriate to their respective situations and circumstances, and proper to cause their happiness consequently, the deputies for the designated provinces are not to take their seats in the present Cortes.

The ten years' war in Cuba the more interested the United States because we had abolished slavery by the war process, and the same work was done in Cuba in the same way, only that the slaves were more active than with us, in the use of arms to secure their freedom. The Manifesto of the Cuban

revolutionary party that has been most extensively circulated in the United States says that before the outbreak in 1868, the reform party, which included the most enlightened, wealthy and influential Cubans, exhausted all the resources within their reach to induce Spain to initiate a healthy change in her Cuban policy. The party started the publication of periodicals in Madrid and in the Island, addressed petitions, maintained a great agitation throughout the country, and "having succeeded in leading the Spanish Government to make inquiry into the economical, political and social condition of Cuba, they presented a complete plan of government which satisfied public requirements as well as the aspirations of the people. The Spanish Government disdainfully cast aside the proposition as useless, increased taxation, and proceeded to its exact-tion with extreme severity."

It is not unusual as the present war is discussed with Spaniards, for them to admit that the Cubans, in 1868, had real grievances, and fought well, as they say, to gain a true reformation. The same men now affirm there is nothing honest in the present war to fight about.

Mr. Clarence King says slavery was practically killed by the ten years' war, and "Campos only bound Spain to publish the death notice. The main concession for which the insurgents accepted peace was the promise of constitutional reform. As a matter of fact, there promptly followed four royal decrees as follows: June 9th, entitling Cuba to elect deputies to the Cortes, one for each 40,000 people; June 9th, dividing the Island into the present six provinces; June 21, instituting a system of provincial and municipal government, followed on

August 16th by the necessary electoral regulations. But the system was immediately seen to be the shadow without the substance of self-government. The Provincial Assembly could nominate only three candidates for presiding officer. It was the inevitable governor-general who had the power to appoint, not necessarily one of the three nominees, but any member of the Assembly he chose. But all this provincial machinery is in reality an empty form, since expressly by law the governor-general was given the power to prorogue the assemblies at will. The deputies have never been able to accomplish anything in the Cortes. Moreover, the crux of the whole financial oppression—tariff, taxes, and absolute control and expenditure of the revenue—remained with Spain."

The revolutionary manifesto says, the compact Spain proposed with the Cubans through Campos, the acceptance of which closed the struggle—Campos duly returning to Spain and Gomez retiring to San Domingo—"was a snare and deceit." Cuba being "granted the liberties of Porto Rico, which had none," and the manifesto continues:

"On this deceitful ground was laid the new situation, throughout which has run a current of falsehood and hypocrisy. Spain, whose mind had not changed, hastened to change the name of things. The captain-general was called governor-general. The royal decrees took the name of authorizations. The commercial monopoly of Spain was named coasting trade. The right of banishment was transformed into the law of vagrancy. The brutal attacks of defenseless citizens were called 'componte.' The abolition of constitutional guarantees became the law of public order.

Taxation without the consent or knowledge of the Cuban people was changed into the law of estimates (budget) voted by the representatives of Spain.

"The painful lesson of the ten-year war had been entirely lost on Spain. Instead of inaugurating a redeeming policy that would heal the recent wounds, allay public anxiety, and quench the thirst for justice felt by the people, who are desirous to enjoy their natural rights, the metropolis, while lavish in promises of reform, persisted in carrying on, unchanged, its old and crafty system, the groundwork of which continues to be the same, namely: To exclude every native Cuban from every office that could give him any effective influence and intervention in public affairs; the ungovernable exploitation of the colonists' labor for the benefit of Spanish commerce and Spanish bureaucracy, both civil and military. To carry out the latter purpose it was necessary to maintain the former at any cost."

The chapter of historical indictment of Spain, charging upon her the blood of Cuba, that is most lurid is "The Book of Blood—An Authoritative Record," and it does not need that the words "Book of Blood" should be printed in red ink, as is the rule, to make it horrible. It, according to the title page, records "the policy adopted by modern Spain to put an end to the war for the independence of Cuba," and the date of publication is 1873, showing that it was issued in the midst of the ten years' conflict, and purports to give the earlier parts of the story of that protracted struggle.

"The Book of Blood" opens with a reference to the *Virginus* massacre, and promises a rough sketch of the carnival of blood that took place "during the governments of Generals Lersundi, Dulce, Caballero de Rodas,

Ceballos, Pieltain and, last but not least, Jovellar, those three last being representatives of the Spanish Republic." This remark about the representatives of the Spanish Republic requires the comment that in the contests for liberty in Spain there has not been the brotherly disposition one would expect in the inhabitants of the Peninsula to share with those of the Island, and the sense of wrong thus aroused in Cubans has been a very influential element in feeding the fires of insurrection. The bulk of the dreadful book is occupied with the names of the dead who have died for the cause of Cuba. The frightful lists have every appearance of authority, and are fortified by convincing documents.

There is a reserve in paragraphs of the preface which is all the more startling because standing in the midst of denunciations without qualification. We quote:

We adjoin a note of those delivered by the captain-general to the military courts as guilty of treason. We do not know the exact fate of those unfortunates. It is known, however, that many of them have mysteriously disappeared, and their families are sure that they have found an obscure grave in the burial grounds of the Cabaña or El Principe.

We do not pretend to give a table of the crimes committed in Havana and elsewhere, such for example as those at the theatre of Villanueva, the coffee house of the Louvre, the butchery of Cohner, Greenwald and many like cases: or the transcendently treacherous killing of Augusto Arango under a flag of truce. Neither shall we attempt to catalogue the murders committed by the brutal soldiery in the country, the indiscriminate slaughter of defenseless men, women and children, the rapes, the obscene mutilations and the cruelties of every kind perpetrated in our unhappy country by the scourges of America: those are personal crimes which we do not deem just to charge upon a whole people.

The "Book of Blood" claims for the Cubans all the humanities, and says that at the beginning of the war they took many Spanish prisoners at Bayamo and paroled

them, but were rewarded by treachery and cruelty ; and the indictment reads :

Meanwhile in all parts of the Island no Cuban taken prisoner of war was spared ; to a man they were shot on the spot as so many dogs. Nevertheless, up to August, 1869, many Spanish prisoners of war were captured and not executed by the Cubans.

Then the insurgent General Quesada, threatened retaliation, and in October, 1869, when the war had lasted a year, and the Spanish adhered to the policy of shooting prisoners, the matter was "brought to the notice of the Cuban leaders," and it was ordered that sixty-seven men who were in the Cuban army and had engaged in a conspiracy "to revolt under circumstances of peculiar atrocity" should be executed, and they "were accordingly executed." The conspiritors had enlisted with the purpose of turning over to the Spanish General Puello the rebel chieftains. The official organ in Havana said: "Our officers and the Cubans compromised in the counter-revolution were shot, thus sealing with their lives their devotion to their beloved mother-country."

It is necessary in this connection to give the celebrated Valmaseda proclamation :

Inhabitants of the country ! The re-enforcements of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived ; with them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the government of the metropolis.

You know that I have pardoned those that have fought us with arms ; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found me in the unexpected protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those I have pardoned have turned against us again.

Before such ingratitude, such villany, it is not possible for me to be the man that I have been ; there is no longer a place for a falsified neu-

trality ; he that is not for me is against me, and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry :

1st. Every man, from the age of fifteen years, upward, found away from his habitation, (finca) and does not prove a justified motive therefor, will be shot.

2d. Every habitation unoccupied will be burned by the troops.

3d. Every habitation from which does not float a white flag, as a signal that its occupants desire peace, will be reduced to ashes.

Women that are not living at their own homes, or at the house of their relatives, will collect in the town of Jiguani, or Bayamo, where maintenance will be provided. Those who do not present themselves will be conducted forcibly.

The foregoing determinations will commence to take effect on the 14th of the present month.

EL CONDE DE VALMASEDA.

Bayamo, April 4, 1869.

Secretary Fish, in a letter to Mr. Hale, Minister to Spain, May 11, 1869, protested "against the infamous proclamation of General, the Count of Valmaseda." *Diacio de la Mariana* of Havana is quoted as saying, May 9th :

"Said proclamation *does not even reach what is required* by the necessities of war in the most civilized nations."

There has been much bitter denunciation of Spain in the conduct of the Cuban wars, that has not had the vitality of the terrible preface of the "Book of Blood," because that which gives power to the volume is the astonishing array of specifications—names, dates, circumstances—furnished in many cases by Spanish authorities.

The *Edinburg Review* of January, 1873, contains an elaborate statement of the grievances and hostilities in Cuba, throwing light on the long war, which is the pivot on which the histories of Cuban sorrows turn. The *Review* says :

The revolution in the mother-country in September, 1868; which drove the Bourbon dynasty from the throne, seems to have precipitated the insurrection in Cuba. It was natural that it should have stirred men's minds in the colony at a time, especially when all were looking forward eagerly to the inauguration of political reforms, or to an attempt to shake off the pressing weight of Spanish rule. The first hope seems to have been that the new government would ameliorate the condition of the colony, in which still a not unimportant party clung to the desire for such reforms as would enable them to remain connected with the country of which they had so long formed a part. This hope was disappointed, and the insurgents did not wait long before they took action.

The standard of revolt was at length raised by Carlos Manuel de Cespedes, on his estate of Demajagua, at a short distance from the town of Yara, in the eastern department. Cespedes was known as an able lawyer and wealthy planter, and he was not slow in attracting to himself a respectable following. At first he found himself at the head of but a small number of patriots, and all his more trustworthy slaves, the latter of whom he liberated on the spot. He was soon joined by his friend, Aguilera, and the two then decided that they would never abandon the cause until they had freed the Island from Spanish rule, and rendered it independent. Their army was small and ill-provided; at first it consisted of but 147 men, with but forty-five fowling-pieces, four rifles, a few pistols and the long country knives, or machetes, as their sole armament. In three days the districts of Bayamo, Manzanillo, Jiguani, and Las Tunas joined the insurrection, and Cespedes's army was increased to the number of four thousand men; at the end of the month it numbered over nine thousand.

The first steps of Cespedes had been to seize the town of Yara. On the 13th, three days after the outbreak, the insurgents came into collision with the government troops, and got the best of the encounter. On the 15th they prepared to attack Bayamo, an important town of ten thousand inhabitants. On the 18th the town fell into their hands, and Cespedes established in it the revolutionary government. The leaders had published at Manzanillo, with the date of October 10th, a Declaration of Independence, which document runs as follows :

In arming ourselves against the tyrannical government of Spain, we must, according to precedent in all civilized countries, proclaim before the world the cause that impels us to take this step, which, though likely to entail considerable disturbances upon the present, will ensure the happiness of the future.

It is well known that Spain governs the island of Cuba with an iron and blood-stained hand. The former holds the latter deprived of political, civil, and religious liberty. Hence the unfortunate Cubans being illegally prosecuted and sent into exile, or executed by military commissions in time of peace ; hence their being kept from public meeting, and forbidden to speak or write on affairs of State : hence their remonstrances against the evils that afflict them being looked upon as the proceedings of rebels, from the fact that they are bound to keep silence and obey ; hence the never-ending plague of hungry officials from Spain to devour the product of their industry and labor ; hence their exclusion from public stations, and want of opportunity to fit themselves for the art of government ; hence the restrictions to which public instruction with them is subjected, in order to keep them so ignorant as not to be able to know and enforce their rights in any shape or form whatever ; hence the navy and the standing army, which are kept in their country at an enormous expenditure from their own wealth, to make them bend their knees and submit their necks to the iron yoke that disgraces them ; hence the grinding taxation under which they labor, and which would make them all perish in misery but for the marvelous fertility of their soil.

CHAPTER IV.

SPANISH STORY OF THE TREATY OF ZANJON.

Was the Famous Compact that Closed the Ten Years' War Fairly Drawn and Honorably Executed, or a Sham with Nothing for Cuba in it?—The Side of Spain Set Forth on the Highest Authority, with Citations of the Reform Laws and the Liberal Autonomist Circular.

THE principle interest the ten years' war has for Americans, after the bloody chapter of the *Virginius* Massacre, is in the nature of the treaty by which it was closed, and the extent to which that compact was observed or disregarded; the good faith that was in it or was lacking; its terms and the policy that was its consequence. This is but another way of stating that upon the fact of the nature and observance of the treaty of Zanjón turns the justice or the wantonness of the war now raging in Cuba. If that treaty was fair, if it was honest, and has been honorably observed, the Cuban insurrection was unwarranted; if it was a cheat, and its administration a scandal, the insurrection was demanded, and, upon the presumption of Cuban manhood, inevitable.

We have given the Cuban indictment of Spain on this subject, not in detail but in substance and full force, and that there may be fair play, we present the Spanish side, and are enabled to do it on the highest authority. We have from one in the confidence of the Spanish government and zealous and able in the defense of Spain—his country—this summary:

Article 3d. The only political condition set forth in the treaty says : The Spanish government will promulgate in Cuba the laws in vigor in Porto Rico. Two months less two days after Maceo left Cuba, all the laws were enforced, and since then, following the pace of the liberal and democratic reform in Spain, both Cuba and Porto Rico are to receive liberal laws exactly like those of Spain. The Island is represented by sixty-four senators and deputies, the enfranchisement being given to those paying \$25.00 taxes down to those who pay only \$5.00, until the Home Rule bill was voted just before the Revolution started.

The Spanish minister recently communicated to his government the desire that there should be placed in convenient form, and translated into English, the text of the various legal enactments showing the true character of the laws relative to Cuba adopted within the years since the treaty of El Zanjón, and the assistant colonial secretary has addressed to His Excellency, Don Enrique Dupuy de Lome, a statement, from which we quote the essential points of the defense with which Spain confronts the public opinion of the world :

STATEMENT BY THE ASSISTANT COLONIAL SECRETARY OF
SPAIN.

Since the conclusion of the peace at El Zanjón the political régime of Cuba has been entirely transformed, such full liberty having been established, and so generous a policy of assimilation having been introduced there, that no other example could certainly be cited of so much having been done by any mother-country for its colonies in so short a space of time. I say this in reference to the laws, and this, surely, has nowhere been more eloquently recognized than in the address of the Junta of the Autonomist party to the people of Cuba at the commencement of the insurrection.

The law of July 4th, 1870, declared that children born after that date, of parents who were slaves, those who had already, or should subsequently, reach the age of sixty years, and those who had served, or assisted, the troops during the insurrection in Cuba, were free. They all remained under patronage, the patron having the rights of a guardian

until the emancipated person had reached the age of twenty-two years. In the capitulation of El Zanjón, the insurgents stipulated only for the freedom of those slaves who had served in their ranks.

The law of February 13th, 1880, put an end to slavery in the island of Cuba, declaring all, without distinction, to be free. The patronage was to last for five years, and to be discontinued from the expiration of the fifth until the eighth year (1888), when it was to be entirely abolished.

Two years, however, before that time had expired, the negroes were set at liberty by the decree of October 7th, 1886, which declared the patronate terminated. The last vestige of slavery was thus obliterated.

It thus appears that, in this highly important point, the laws enacted for Cuba granted more than had been called for by the capitulation of 1878, and that what was offered by that instrument was carried out before the time therein provided for had expired.

CONSTITUTION.


The Constitution of 1876 was promulgated in the island of Cuba on the 7th day of April, 1881. All public liberties and all the rights of citizenship were thereby granted to the island, and it is to be observed that this promulgation involved for the island the following essential change in its political régime: laws were thenceforth enacted for it by the representatives of the nation, whereas it had previously been governed by direct orders from the crown.

Since that time Cuba has been represented in the Cortes of the nation by its senators and representatives.

The royal decree of October 19, 1888, provided for the enforcement of the law concerning criminal prosecution. In this law provision is made for a highly important reform, *viz.* : the institution of oral trials in public, which had very shortly before been established in Spain.

Among the principal political laws whereby the principles of liberty inscribed in the Constitution have been developed, the following may be cited :

By the royal decree of November 1st, 1881 (*Gaceta* of November 10th), the law of June 15th, 1880, was made to embrace the island of Cuba. That law regulates the right of meeting proclaimed in Article 13 of the Constitution, every peaceful meeting being authorized, provided that notice be given twenty-four hours beforehand to the Governor of the Province concerning the place, purpose and time of the meeting.



CANOVAS DEL CASTILLO,
Prime Minister of Spain.

ENRIQUE DUPUY DE LOME,
Spanish Minister to the United States.

(73)

HANNIS TAYLOR,
United States Minister to Spain.



The law of the Peninsula of January 7th, 1879, was made applicable to Cuba by the royal decree of April 7th, 1881, and when that law was amended in a more liberal sense by the law of July 26th, 1883, the additional liberty thus provided for was extended to Cuba by the decree of November 11th, 1886. The principle was maintained that the provisions of the common law are sufficient to punish offenses of the press, and that the ordinary courts are sufficient to take cognizance thereof.

THE LAW CONCERNING THE CIVIL REGISTER, AND THE LAW CONCERNING CIVIL MARRIAGES.

The former of these laws, which bears date of January 8th, 1884, and the latter, which bears date of November 13th, 1886, were supplementary in providing for the religious toleration which is proclaimed by the constitution in its 11th Article.

PROVINCIAL AND MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION.

The provincial law of June 21st, 1878, and the municipal law of the same date, are organic laws. The colonial provinces were assimilated by these laws to the European provinces, for said laws were the same that were then in force in the peninsula. Representatives and town boards were provided for where only the historical municipalities with their alienable offices, and a whole régime of privileges had previously existed. The local services were placed in charge of the representatives. The services, included roads, canals (both for navigation and irrigation), provincial public works, works of beneficence and instruction, together with the management of all the provincial funds. To the town boards were granted similar powers with respect to highways, sewers, water, markets, slaughter-houses, fairs, vigilance, guard duty, and municipal government.

REFORMS IN THE RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE.

These reforms have also been extended to Cuba. Universal suffrage not having been granted, solely owing to the great difficulty existing everywhere where the negro race is in the majority, or where it may exert a decisive influence in elections. The law concerning voters in election for representatives in the Cortes, which was promulgated by the royal decree of December 27th, 1892, provides that every citizen twenty-five years of age, who pays the sum of five dollars in taxes to the State,

shall have the right to vote, and this right is enjoyed by negroes as well as white persons. All the quotas paid for various reasons are computed, and the sum thereof is that which serves as a rule in determining this right.

In this law there are likewise provisions which secures the representation of the minority in elections of representatives to the Cortes. This is a very important reform, and its extension to the election of representatives and members of town boards is one of the many reforms proclaimed in principle by the "basis" of March 15th, 1895, the enforcement of which is now pending.

The provisions relative to education form a highly important group.

OFFICIAL EDUCATION.

As long ago as 1880 autonomy was granted to the University of Habana, and such ample provisions were granted to it that but one university in the peninsula (that of Madrid) enjoys privileges equally great. The power to appoint both male and female teachers, up to a certain grade in the island, was subsequently granted to the rector of that university. Institutions of secondary education were organized in 1883, and high schools were organized throughout the island. Finally, in 1887, freedom of education was proclaimed to the same extent and in the same manner as in the peninsula.

There is thus no reason in Cuba to complain of the illiberality of the laws. If there has been any shortcoming in respect to morals, the nation is not to blame; none but the colonial provinces are to blame for this; if we proposed to seek comfort in comparisons, it would not be necessary to look for them in South America, in the countries that have emancipated themselves from the Spanish mother-country, because examples (some of them very recent) of acts of violence, anarchy and scandalous outbreaks could be found in the States of the Union itself.

In respect to another matter, a great deal of foolish talk is indulged in. From the statements of some people it would appear that Cuba does nothing but contribute, by the taxes which it pays, to alleviate the burdens of the peninsular treasury; whereas, in reality, just the contrary is the truth. The nation has, of late, guaranteed the conversion of Spanish debts in Cuba, which took place in 1886 and 1890. Owing to these operations, and to the fact that all taxes which did not

have to be met directly by its government have been rigorously eliminated from the budget of Cuba, it was possible to reduce the Cuban budget from forty-six and one-half millions of dollars, which was its amount at the close of the former war (for the fiscal year 1878-79), to a little more than twenty-three millions of dollars, as appears from the budget of 1893.

The financial laws have been assimilated, and if the system of taxation has not been entirely assimilated, this is because of the fact that direct taxes are very repugnant to the popular feeling in Cuba, especially the tax on land, which is the basis of the Peninsular budget. It appears, however, that our Cuban brethren have had no reason to complain in this respect. The direct tax on rural property is two per cent. in Cuba, whereas in Spain it is seventeen, and even twenty per cent. It is evident that every budget must be based upon *something*; in Cuba, as in all countries in which the natural conditions are similar, that something must necessarily be the income from customs duties. Notwithstanding this, it may be remarked that in the years when the greatest financial distress prevailed, the Spanish Government never hesitated to sacrifice that income when it was necessary to do so in order to meet the especial need of the principal agricultural product of Cuba. Consequently the Spanish commercial treaty with the United States was concluded, which certainly had not been concluded before, owing to any fault of the Spanish Government. Under that treaty, the principal object of which was to encourage the exportation of Cuban sugar, which found its chief market in the States of the Union, many Spanish industries were sacrificed which have formerly supplied the wants of the people of Cuba. That sacrifice was unhesitatingly made, and now that the treaty is no longer in force, is due to the fact that the new American tariff has stricken sugar free from the list.

Attention may also be called to the fact that the colonial provinces alone enjoy exemption from the blood tax, Cuba never having been obliged to furnish military recruits.

The disqualification of the Cubans to hold public office is purely a myth. Such disqualification is founded on the text of no law or regulation, and in point of fact there is no such exclusion. In order to verify this assertion it would be sufficient to examine the lists of Cuban officers, especially of those employed in the administration of justice and in all branches of instruction. Even if it were desired to make a comparison of political offices, even of those connected with the functions which are

discharged in the Peninsula, the proportion would still be shown in which Spaniards in Cuba aspire to both. The fact is that a common fallacy is appealed to in the language habitually used by the enemies of Spain, who call persons "Peninsulars" who were not born in Cuba, but have resided there many years and have all their ties and interests there, and do not call those "Cubans" who were born there and have left the Island in order to meet necessities connected, perhaps, with their occupation. This was done in the Senate, when the advocates of the separation of Cuba only were called "Cubans," while those only who refused allegiance to the Spanish mother-country were called patriots.

In conclusion, I will relate a fact which may appear to be a joke, but which, in a certain way, furnished proof of what I have just said. When Rafael Gasset returned from Habana, he came and asked me for some data showing the proportion of Cubans holding office under our Government. I asked him, as a preliminary question, for a definition of what we were to understand by "Cuban" and what by "Peninsular;" he immediately admitted that the decision of the whole question was based upon that definition, and I called his attention to the fact that here, in the Ministry of the Colonies, at the present time, there are three high governmental functionaries. One is a representative from Habana, being at the same time a professor in its University, and another, *viz.*, your humble servant, is a Spaniard because he was born in Habana itself. Is the other man a Peninsular, and am I not a Cuban?

GUILLERMO.

Assistant Colonial Secretary of Spain.

This has all the force and all the fault of an official paper, and is the most complete condensed presentation of the Spanish defense for alleged failure to comply with the obligations undertaken on behalf of the government, when the Cuban revolutionary leaders gave up the fight in 1878 under the persuasion of Martinez Campos, and Maximo Gomez retired to San Domingo.

The response to this elaborate citation of law is that Cuba got the show of power to protect herself, and Spain held the reality in the captain-generalcy with unlimited capacity for the exercise of all the potential-

ities of military despotism, and clung tenaciously by force of arms to the injurious political economy, that was the fatality in the case and with it all the dullness and selfishness of the Spanish system. There has been an improvement of legal phraseology, but, the system is the same.

We have from the Spanish minister, and state the origin of the paper that there may be no question of authority, a translation of the reform bill voted in the Cortes in Spain last year, and not enforced on account of the rebellion, "but which" his excellency says, "will be promulgated in the Island as soon as a part of it is pacified." It would seem from this that there is not a portion of Cuba pacified large enough to experiment with, and that is the fact, for the forces of the revolution pervade all the Island outside the cities by the sea, those held by garrisons in the interior, and the camps and bivouacs of the Spanish troops. The Reform bill seems to have been an effort to do something with limitations that held hard to the old ways.

There was proposed, as a measure of pacification—for the elements of the ten years' strife were manifestly mustering for another struggle—that there should be certain changes of importance, and a copy of the law from the Colonial Department of Spain is before us, beginning with this solemn official form :

COLONIAL DEPARTMENT—LAW.

ALFONSO III., by the grace of God, and by the Constitution, King of Spain; and, in his name, and during his minority, the Queen Regent of the Kingdom:

To all those who may see and hear these presents, be it known : that the Cortes have decreed, and we have sanctioned, the following :

Article 1st. The system of government of the Island of Cuba, and its civil administration, shall be readjusted on the following basis :

Basis 1st.—The municipal and provincial laws now in force in the Island shall be modified in so far as may be necessary to the following ends :

All questions relating to the constitution of municipalities, and to the aggregation, segregation and demarcation of municipal districts, shall be determined by the council of administration after considering a report made by the respective provincial chamber of deputies.

The provincial law shall also be modified in all such points as this "basis" shall designate as coming within the jurisdiction of the Council of Administration.

All questions relating to the constitution of town-councils, to matters pertaining to elections, competency of nominees, and the like, shall be determined by the provincial chamber of deputies.

It will be observed that the word *readjust* is used as the key to the intention of this instrument. The date arranged was perhaps the most critical in the history of the Island—March 15, 1895. The war-cry had been "sent forth" February 24, 1895.

In the Council of Administration, if anywhere, was the healing capacity for "modification" and "readjustment," and it was agreed that this council should be constituted as follows :

The governor-general, whether permanent or provisional, shall be President.

The governor shall appoint by royal decree fifteen councillors.

The council shall have a secretary's office, with the personnel necessary for the transaction of business.

Every member of the council shall, as such, have the right to vote.

To hold the office of councillor, in addition to a residence of four years in the country, some one of the following qualifications is required :

To be or to have been president of the Chamber of Commerce, of the Economic Society, or of the Planters' Club.

To be or to have been rector of the university, or dean of the college of lawyers of the capital of a province, for a period of two years.

To have been for a period of four years before the election one among the fifty largest taxpayers in the Island, whether on real estate, or for the exercise of a profession.

To have exercised the functions of senator of the kingdom or deputy to Cortes in one or more legislatures.

To have been once or more than once president of one of the provincial chambers of deputies of the Island ; to have been for two or more terms of two years each a member of the provincial commission, or for eight years a provincial deputy.

To have been for two or more terms of two years *alcalde* or mayor of a capital of a province.

To have been councillor of administration for two or more years, previous to the promulgation of this law.

Whenever the council may deem it expedient it may summon to its deliberations, through the medium of the governor-general, the heads of the administrative department, who shall not therefore, however, have a vote.

The council shall be composed, in addition to the above-named members, of fifteen councillors, elected according to the same census as are the provincial deputies.

The council of administration shall decree whatsoever it may deem expedient for the conduct of the public works throughout the Island ; of the telegraphic and postal communications, both by land and sea ; of agriculture, industry and commerce ; of immigration and colonization ; of public instruction and of beneficence and health ; without prejudice to the powers of supervision and other powers inherent in the sovereignty reserved by the laws to the national government.

It shall make up and approve the annual budget, making in it the necessary appropriations for the above-named departments.

The administrative council, it will be seen, under this plan, must be composed of the official class, and fifteen members are appointed by the governor and a like number elected under restrictions, as in case of the provincial deputies; and the law that is the promise of liberty, if order prevails, provides—

It shall be incumbent of the governor-general, as the supreme head of the government of the Island, to execute all the decrees of the council.

There would not seem to be much danger that radicalism could break forth in a council, constituted as we have seen, but the iron hand is nigh, as follows :

Whenever the governor-general shall judge any decision of the council to be contrary to the laws or to the general interest of the nation, he shall suspend its execution and shall himself take such provisional measures as the public needs—which would otherwise have been neglected, because of such suspension—may require, immediately submitting the matter to the minister of the colonies.

If any decision of the council shall injure unduly the rights of any individual, those who by their vote have contributed to its adoption shall be held responsible for the indemnification or compensation of the person so injured by the courts, which shall have jurisdiction in the matter.

The governor-general, after the consultation with the advisory council, may suspend the council of administration or without that redress may decree the suspension of its members if there remains such members of them as shall be necessary to its deliberation:

First.—When the council or any of its members transgress the limits of their legal powers to the prejudice of the governmental or judicial authority, or to the risk of a disturbance of the public peace.

Second.—For delinquency.

And, in addition, that there may be no mistake as to the absolutism of the master, the “basis” proposes that

When in his judgment the resolutions of his majesty’s government might be productive of injury to the general interests of the nation or to the especial interests of the Island, he may suspend their publication and fulfillment, informing the minister concerned of such suspension and of his reasons for making it, in the speediest manner possible.

To superintend and inspect all the public departments.

To communicate directly concerning international questions with the representatives, diplomatic agents and consuls of Spain in America.

To suspend the execution of capital punishment, whenever the gravity of the circumstances may require it, and the urgency of the case is such that there is no opportunity to apply to his majesty for pardon, after consulting with the advisory council.

To suspend, after consultation with the same council, and on its

responsibility, whenever extraordinary circumstances prevent previous communication of the government, the guarantee expressed in Articles 4th, 5th, 6th and 9th, and paragraphs 1st, 2nd and 3rd of Article 13th of the Constitution of the State, and to apply the riot act.

As the supreme head of the civil administration of the Island it shall also be in the province of the governor-general:

To maintain the integrity of the administrative jurisdiction, in accordance with the ordinances governing questions of jurisdiction and powers.

To promulgate the general orders necessary for the carrying out of the laws and ordinances, communicating them to the colonial department.

That nothing may be wanting to make the dominance of the great office of the Island complete and conclusive, it is declared as if it were a boon for order :

The governor-general shall be the representative of the national government in the island of Cuba. He shall exercise, as viceregal patron, the powers inherent in the patronato of the Indies. He shall have the supreme command of all the armed forces, on land and sea, stationed in the Island. He shall be the delegate of the minister of the colonies, of state, of war and marine, and all the other authorities of the Island shall be subordinate to him.

It cannot occasion surprise in countries where the people have some authority that this programme was found unsatisfactory by those already rising in revolution, because they regarded the treaty of Zanjón as administered, if not in itself, inadequate.

And yet those who held in Cuba that Spanish rule there could be so liberalized as to make insurrection wholly without warrant, issued a circular, using this language as to the policy of reform of which we have just recited the remarkable limitations.

The Liberal Autonomist party having always condemned revolutionary steps must now condemn, and does so condemn, with a better reason for it and more decidedly, the revolt started on the 24th of February, when reforms had just been voted with the concurrence of our representatives by the Cortes, and *the importance of these reforms can hardly be overrated*. It has been recognized by all who give them a fair consideration, without prejudice or malice, and even by those who were fiercely opposed to them at the beginning.

If so much can be said of that which in the American atmosphere seems so little—what objection can be made too strong to the forms of misgovernment that it was considered the decree of reform was to remedy?

In the Autonomist circular to which we refer, and which it is the Spanish fashion to regard as of the largest moment, the party much praises itself, saying :

The Autonomist party condemns perturbation because it is a legal party that has faith in the means afforded by the constitution, in the effectual agency of work, in the indisputable force of ideas; and affirms that revolutions, when not made under entirely exceptional circumstances, produced only at long periods in history, they are terrible scourges, great calamities for civilized countries, which by means of peaceful evolution, of reform in fundamental laws, of progress, and of the presence of public opinion, succeed in realizing all their reasonable purposes, and all their legitimate aspirations. Moreover, our party is necessarily Spanish because it is essentially and exclusively autonomist; and colonial autonomy, which is originated by the reality of a colony, of its wants and peculiar requirements, implies the entity of a metropolis in the fullness of its sovereignty and historical rights. This is the reason why our party from the beginning did inscribe on its standard liberty, peace and national unity as its mottoes.

Certainly this is a superbly expressed programme, and the Autonomists go on to say rebellion was threatening order and liberty, and had already (April, '95)—

Caused the suspension of constitutional guarantees, thus preventing the free use of rights we had obtained, so ample indeed, that the very promoters of disorder have been using them at pleasure in favor of their own purposes ; and we are not yet under martial law, with all its consequences, because the illustrious governor, who, in showing coolness and calm energy, is entitled to deep gratitude on the part of Cuba, has preserved and communicated to the supreme government the confidence deserved by sensible Cuban people, and would not restrain public liberty to any more than a strictly necessary extent.

In consequence of the rebellious outbreak, our constitutional rights, the value and effectual agency of which have been proved by the very secessionists in their unrestricted actions, always under the protection of laws that they were endangering and discrediting, are at present suspended and at the mercy of military authorities, now fortunately addicted to a prudent and humane policy.

If the new régime adopted by the Cortes could have been established in full peace, and under the circumstances that were created in favor of concord and progress through liberty, it would have caused its beneficial effects to be felt immediately, preparing the way for further progress ; but it could never produce such results if it were established under the influence of anxiety, anger, resentment, and indignation prevailing in civil wars, or of renewed mistrust and suspicions. All work intended to obtain administrative, financial and tariff reforms, demand peace as a first condition, and it will have to be postponed for time indefinite.

We had already secured the abolition of slavery, the rights instituted by the Constitution, such as speech, free meeting, free association, free education and religion, in the same degree and with the same guarantees as in the Peninsula ; public trial by jury, and civil marriage ; all the modern civil and criminal laws of the mother-country, a most important point to a people that had lived until lately under laws made before the present century ; the abolition of differential and export duties, the reduction of over 35 per cent. of fiscal taxes, which had been increased in consequence of the last war ; the public and official acceptance by all parties of a large portion of our administrative plan, and the abandonment of the useless principle of assimilation to adopt those of political individuality and partial self-administration whose normal development must lead to the full realization of our platform. And instead of these improvements and further progress that the country reasonably expects, what can the pretended liberators offer to us ? The horrors of civil war, the armed contest among the very natives

of the country, which perhaps in no distant time might become a strife of the worst description; and after that, a more complete ruin and a fatal move backwards in the way of civilization.

This document, in association with the programme of reformation which we have presented, is fully and fairly the Spanish case—the “readjustment” and the “modification” actually decreed. The representation of it at the beginning of the present war of which the liberal Autonomists thirteen months ago said in the pronunciamiento, we have quoted, “in faithful warning” to those committing themselves to the current of the revolution, was this:

All signs are leading to the belief that the rebellion, limited to one portion of the Eastern province, has succeeded with but few exceptions, in getting only those men who belong to the most ignorant and miserable classes, who are the victims of the lamentable want of advancement in which they were left to live in that fine section of Cuba as an easy prey for agitators, having no cohesion or discipline, for which reason it is expected that they will have to disband or surrender. To this end, will have co-operated, besides the forces rapidly accumulated by the metropolis, the sensible and liberal policy of the government and of its highest representative, and the general disposition of the country, indifferent to the satanic incitations of the stubborn, while loyal to their ideals of order, progress and liberty. It cannot be doubted that the pacifier to whose ability was due the re-establishment of peace, and of the constitutional régime in 1878, has come once more to solve the present problems in the same spirit of noble, righteous and generous confidence in the people. But in the present crisis, the same as in all others, it belongs to the people to make the greatest and most persistent effort, following the lines of that dignified policy and even acting in advance of emergencies, in order that peace be soon restored, that disagreements and diffidence disappear, that constitutional régime be reinstated, and that the new administration system of the colony be inaugurated in the same righteous and harmonious spirit in which the two governing parties of the metropolis bound themselves to maintain it, while we promised to abide by it if loyally respected. This is the only way to secure its fruitful and beneficial effects, and an eradication of abuses which are universally condemned.

The conclusion of this manifesto is in these stately terms :

The Liberal party of 1868 retired and left its place to the revolutionists of Yara, because after the reporting committee had finished its work, it was found that the legitimate expectations of said party had been frustrated and the most solemn promises of the metropolis had been postponed. The Liberal party of 1878 that, being more fortunate, has seen how those promises were kept, will not lower its flag or leave its place to those who come to spoil the results of our labor, to make us recede while on the path to calm progress, to ruin the land and to darken the prospects of our future with the horrible spectre of poverty, anarchy and barbarism.

Havana, April 4, 1895.

This manifesto, it should be specially marked, actually vindicates the war of '68-'78, and claims the fair execution of the treaty.

The Autonomists have been disappointed, for the war has spread far beyond the bounds of former high-watermarks of insurrection—indeed, over the whole Island—and the great Pacificator has gone home confessedly beaten. The Liberal Autonomist party and all its policies set forth in this eloquent and plausible address have totally failed.

This presentation of the alleged "readjustment" on which Spain relied for the Pacification of Cuba, and of the calculations of the necessary application of forces to produce order, are the more impressive because made from Spanish documents not yet familiar to the people of the United States, and they show with greater strength than the stories of a thousand incidents of the horrors of the war, the causes of the prostration of the Spanish cause in Cuba.

CHAPTER V.

THE SPANISH WAR POLICY.

The Way the Present War Opened and how it Progressed—Personal Characteristics of Prominent Figures—Campos, Weyler, Gomez the Maceos and Garcia—The War Shifted to the West End—The Prize of the Victor Praised in Prose and Poetry.

GENERAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS had great celebrity for his success in closing the war of 1868–1878 by the convention known as the Treaty of Zanjón. He is conspicuous in the gallery of the captain-generals that is an attraction in the Spanish palace at Havana, and there his figure is slender and his attitude alert as he was twenty years ago. He was the first man thought of in Spain when the rebellion broke out in Cuba in February, 1895, to put it down; but he found it a much more serious affair than he had before encountered, and he so far recognized the belligerency of the Cuban insurrectionists as to attempt carrying on war in a civilized way. The struggle gradually assumed far greater proportions than he had imagined possible, and his enemies charged that his tenderness in dealing with rebels was the great fault that filled insurgent ranks. That, however, was a gross injustice to a competent soldier. There is a great deal of intense politics in Havana, and soon all the politicians except a few moderates were against him. Then he was recalled, and his successor, General Weyler, is believed by all Cubans to have been indebted for the appointment to his rep-



D. VALERIANO WEYLER.

utation for severity. Now Campos does not deserve his good name for benignity, nor Weyler the fullness of his fame for brutality and barbarism. They have had a greater task assigned them than is understood, for the Spaniards have not realized that they have lost Cuba and that all the captain-generals henceforth are foredoomed failures. The failure of Weyler must be swifter than that of Campos.

The likeness of General Weyler is given in full uniform with all his decorations. When he landed in Cuba, the cannon sounding, the flags flying, the brass bands playing, the sun shining, the Spaniards cheering, and walked in the street one block to the palace square through masses of people, guarded by firm lines of soldiers, he wore all the bravery that the picture shows, and, in addition, a sword and hat from which floated a tall and fluttering white plume. He had been told there was a plot to assassinate him at this time, but took the chances coolly. The Spaniards have had some experience of dynamite thrown by anarchists, and a bomb might have been hurled from a housetop or a window upon the new captain-general. The Cuban revolutionists declared they could not afford to do it, for if they became assassins they would lose the sympathy of all civilized people. In the palace on business he is dressed with extreme simplicity, in black clothes with no mark of rank but a sash of red and yellow around his waist.

Mr. Rappleye, an American correspondent, who added art as a pen painter to his news service, drew this striking personal sketch of the captain-general whose failure in Cuba will be one of the decisive features of the progress of the Island to independence :

General Weyler is one of those men who creates a first impression, the first sight of whom never can be effaced from the mind, by whose presence the most careless observer is impressed instantly, and yet, taken altogether, he is a man in whom the elements of greatness are concealed under a cloak of impenetrable obscurity. Inferior physically, unsoldierly in bearing, exhibiting no trace of refined sensibilities nor pleasure in the gentle associations that others live for or at least seek as diversions, he is nevertheless the embodiment of mental acuteness, crafty, unscrupulous, fearless and of indomitable perseverance.

He is one of the most magnetic men in whose presence I have ever stood—yet not attractive. His overwhelming personality is irresistible—yet he is unpleasant of appearance. Campos was an exceptional man. Marin was commonplace. Weyler is unique. Campos and Marin affected gold lace, dignity and self-consciousness. Weyler ignores them all as useless, unnecessary impediments, if anything, to the one object of his existence. Campos was fat, good-natured, wise, philosophical, slow in his mental processes, clear in his judgment, emphatic in his opinions, outspoken and, withal, lovable, humane, conservative, constructive, progressive, with but one project ever before him, the glorification of Spain as a mother-land and a figure among peaceful, enlightened nations. Weyler is lean, diminutive, shriveled, ambitious for immortality irrespective of its odor, a master of diplomacy, the slave of Spain for the glory of sitting at the right of her throne, unlovable, unloving, exalted.

My journey through the forest of gold lace terminated before the closed door of General Weyler's official abode. There an adjutant, more bedizzened than the rest of the dazzling multitude, trod softly to the portico, gently opened the way, retired again without a word, and we were alone in the presence of the man.

And what a picture ! A little man. An apparition of blacks—black eyes, black hair, black beard, dark—exceedingly dark—complexion ; a plain black attire. He was alone, and was standing facing the door I entered. He had taken a position in the very centre of the room, and seemed lost in its immense depths. His eyes, far apart, bright, alert and striking, took me in at a glance. His face seemed to run to chin, his lower jaw protruding far beyond any ordinary indication of firmness, persistence or will power. His forehead is neither high nor receding ; neither is it that of a thoughtful or philosophic man. His ears are set far back ; and what is called the region of intellect, in which are those mental attributes that might be defined as powers of observation, calculation, judgment and execution, is strongly developed.

The grand old man of the war is Maximo Gomez, a man of the greatest military capacity that has been displayed in this war, and that will give him a permanent place among the great captains. He is, of course, charged by the Spaniards with selling out to them when Campos played pacificator at Zanjón, but his little farm in San Domingo and his wife and children earning their living as music teachers and seamstresses, while his son, at the command of the father, protects mother and sisters, and holds a clerkship, does not look like enrichment by bribery—to say nothing of returning to plunge again into war in Cuba against, as he well knows, tremendous odds. The year of the military life of Gomez, just closed, has been not only the most brilliant in his long life, but it will rank high as a series of military achievements in which great things were accomplished by small means. There is no praise of accomplishments in war more exalted than that.

Before us is a letter, dated Manzanillo, March 12, 1895, from Herminio C. Leyva to Bartolome Masso, showing no less clearly than the manifesto of the Liberal Autonomists the absolute assurance of speedy success, with which the Spaniards disregarded the lessons of the ten years' skirmishes without decisive results, and accepted the challenge of the Cuban separatists to another trial of arms. Now the separatists stood on the ground which we have shown from Spanish reports to be firm and well taken—that the alleged reforms, whatever they might have seemed as concessions and readjustments to the Spaniards themselves, gave the reformation into the hands of the official class, the primal curse of Cuba because foreign

—and to the captain-general, shorn of no shred of his arbitrary power, but as always an absolute military despot. Leyva wrote to Masso :

Before leaving Manzanillo, I want to make the last effort to prevent bloodshed amongst brothers. You are still in time to avoid it, and if you do not do so, every drop of blood that is shed will serve to stain your name in history.

True patriotism, Mr. Masso, is like bravery, grand, sublime ; but just because both are really great, they should not be mistaken for rashness, as this would belittle them and even drag them about the ground.

You are a man of intelligence and heart ; I am sure of it, even without having had the pleasure of your frequent society, and now appeal to those two qualities of yours, asking you to meditate and use them at least in favor of that large number of inexperienced Cubans driven by you to insurrection with a patriotic idea (this is evident to me) but under an impression that is entirely mistaken ; for the mothers of said men will in the future, curse your name when the present situation has been made clear to all, if you insist in leading them to a useless sacrifice, as the campaign undertaken by you, besides being quite unjustified, must now prove fruitless and even injurious to the happiness of our country.

You may see, and I tell you so again, after our interview at “La Odiosa,” that other provinces are not helping you ; on the contrary, they will oppose yours, for the country has already understood that Cuba’s welfare is not to be secured by war, and as war would be a sort of political suicide, and there is no civilized country that will commit suicide knowingly.

Moreover, think and consider that Spain has ample means to quell the revolt in a short time ; troops are coming from Puerto Rico, eight battalions have left the peninsula, and as many more as may be wanted will come.

The insurgents have no war material, and you need not expect any from abroad, I assure you. Then one half the number of men you have on the field are without arms, and will return to the towns as soon as the government troops begin operations against you.

Julio Sanguily is a prisoner in La Cabana, Juan Gualberto Gomez surrendered, Yero is in San Domingo, Guillermon is ill with hemorrhage and surrounded by troops in the Guantanamo mountains ; Urbano San-

chez Hechavarria and two of his brothers are in Mexico. What can you expect under these circumstances?

So the time has come, in my opinion, for you to prove to the whole world that you are a true patriot, by laying down the arms; a course that, far from discrediting you in politics, would exalt your name to the high position in which I wish to see it forever.

We do not need to recite the contrast there is between this utterance of March, '95, and the leaves of history written in blood and fire, through the whole extent of the Island during the year following which witnessed the complete defeat and humiliating retirement of the Pacificator Campos; and on the succeeding days there has been shown the discomfiture of Weyler who has, irrespective of all the stories of outrage and all the announcements of triumph, failed at a more rapid rate than his predecessor.

The Maceos look so much alike, it is fortunate one wears a full beard and that the other does not. They are mulattos and full brothers, and Antonio is the cavalry leader who has the greater celebrity, and, next to Maximo Gomez, the largest share of the glory of the war. It is understood to be the Cuban's best chance to strike for liberty when he is on a horse and has a machete in hand. Then he rides in for war to the knife, and that is the way the Maceos are fond of fighting.

The Spaniards make much of the conspicuity of the Maceos, in the efforts to persuade people that the insurrection is an affair of black men chiefly, and means the conversion of Cuba into a larger San Domingo. The Maceos are said to be, and no doubt truly, very ambitious to advance the black race, and it is the Spanish policy to counteract them by giving black men in

the Spanish army that sort of consideration that Mr. Lowell described in sketching Englishmen in their way with Americans, as a "certain condescension."

It is believed the veteran soldier, General Calixto Garcia, who bears on his forehead a scar that shows hand-to-hand fighting with sabres, joined the Cuban forces in March, and it is considered that he is an accession of importance to the patriotic cause. The Cuban forces have in the ranks as brave men as are anywhere produced, but they do not have many generals of both experience and capacity, and there is no doubt of the warm welcome Garcia received when he joined the fighting men.

The greatest surprise in the course of the war in Cuba is that the scene of it should have been shifted from the east end, which has long had the reputation of being rebellious, to the west end, which never, until after Maximo Gomez and the Maceos flanked Havana and entered Pinar del Rio, had been supposed to be accessible to an enemy. When the central board of the Liberal Autonomists addressed the people of Cuba a year ago, opposing a resort to arms, they opened with the sharply defined expression of the confidence the partisans of Spain positively felt :

Although the revolutionary onset is doomed to suppression—being already isolated and limited to our Eastern province, it has given rise to political and financial difficulties so serious for the present and for the future, that notwithstanding its lack of strength, it has succeeded in creating intense excitement in the peninsula, and suspicious fears in the countries that have dealings with ours.

It was the inability of Campos to justify this confidence that drove him defeated to Spain. The west end



ANTONIO MACRO.

has become the seat of war, and there the Maceos have carried out the policy of devastation, ruining many of the finest plantations in the world. And then the innumerable little islands southward, and the harbors, afford incomparable facilities for the filibuster, and there are ambuscades in the midst of a plenteous land for the insurgents.

Thus is more than doubled by the invasion of the rebels, the difficulties and dangers to the Spaniards, of the enterprise of conquest they have undertaken. In a work on the "Pearl of the Antilles," written by Antonio Gallenga in 1873, we read of the war as it then raged :

The Sierre Maestra, or main chain, running along the whole southern coast from Cabo Cruz to Punta de Mayzi, rises to a height of 8,000 feet, *i. e.*, on a level with the loftiest Apennines. What culture there was in this region is rapidly disappearing. Many of the landowners, with such wealth as they were able to save from the wreck of their estates, have migrated to the United States, to Jamaica, or other British possessions; others have sold their slaves and cattle to the planters of the western, or Havana, department; and even in those districts from which, out of sheer exhaustion, the scourge of war has been removed, agriculture and industry find it difficult to revive, owing to the want of public confidence, as well as to the utter absence of capital and labor.

The western department has remained untouched throughout the struggle. Havana has little reason to distress itself about the Cuban insurrection. This prosperous, pleasure-loving city can afford to make itself as easy about Céspedes and his rebels as New York ever was to the skirmishes with the Modoc or other Red Indians on the borders of the remotest territories, or Milan with respect to Pallavicini's attacks on the brigand fastnesses in the Basilicata. Indeed, as I have before hinted, the Havana people have had not only nothing to lose, but simply too much to gain, from the calamities by which two-thirds of the Island have been laid desolate.

All is now sadly changed for the Spaniard, and the proud and brilliant city of Havana. The war has roared and flamed at her gates, and even her milk and water supplies have been threatened, and her vegetable gardens have been robbed by rebels, and the writer has seen half an hour from the great city the flag of the rebellion flying from a hilltop. It is by comparing the present conflict with that which was compromised eighteen years ago, that we can measure with an approximation to accuracy the development of the insurrectionary movement.

And we can hardly appreciate the passions aroused, if we do not bear in mind the splendor of the prize over which the bloody contention goes on. We read, in "Bailou's Cuba" (1854), before the habit of civil war was fixed in the soil of the Island and blood of the people :

The virgin soil of Cuba is so rich that a touch of the hoe prepares it for the plant; or, as Douglass Jerrold says of Australia, "Just tickle her with a hoe, and she laughs with a harvest." So fertile a soil is not known to exist in any other portion of the globe. It sometimes produces three crops to the year, and in ordinary seasons two may be relied upon—the consequence is, that the Monteros have little more to do than merely to gather the produce they daily carry to market, and which also forms so large a portion of their own healthful and palatable food. The profusion of its flora and the variety of its forests are unsurpassed, while the multitude of its climbing shrubs gives a luxuriant richness to its scenery, which contributes to make it one of the most fascinating countries in the world. Nowhere are the necessities of life so easily supplied, or man so delicately nurtured.

The richest soil of the Island is black, which is best adapted to the purpose of the sugar planter, and for this purpose it is usually chosen. So productive is this description of land that the extensive sugar plantations, once fairly started, will run for years without the soil being even turned, new cane starting up from the old roots, year after year, with abundant crops. This is a singular fact to us who are accustomed to

see so much of artificial means expended upon the soil to enable it to bear even an ordinary crop to the husbandman. The red soil is less rich, and is better adapted to the planting of coffee, being generally preferred for this purpose, while the mulatto-colored earth is considered inferior, but still is very productive, and is improved by the Monteros for planting tobacco, being first prepared with a mixture of the other two descriptions of soil, which, together, form the richest compost, next to guano, known in agriculture.

We should add to this the words of the poet Longfellow, on the poetry of Spanish America, in the *North American Review* for January, 1849:

Cuba, that garden of the West, gorgeous with perpetual flowers and brilliant with the plumage of innumerable birds, beneath whose glowing sky the teeming earth yields easy and abundant harvest to the toil of man, and whose capacious harbors invite the commerce of the world. In the words of Columbus, "it is the most beautiful land that ever eyes beheld."

And the lines of James M. Phillippo, inspired by the Cuban sky, sparkle even beside the prose of a great poet :

Ye tropic forests of unfading green,
Where the palm tapers and the orange glows,
Where the light bamboo weaves her feathery screen,
And her tall shade the matchless ceyba throws:

Ye cloudless ethers of unchanging blue,
Save, as its rich varieties give way,
To the clear sapphire of your midnight hue,
The burnished azure of your perfect day.

CHAPTER VI.

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PRESENT CUBAN WAR.

The Press of Cuba—Its Limitations—An Assault on American Senators—The Comic Style of Abusing Uncle Sam—Interview with Captain-General Marin—His View of the Zanjón Reforms and Rebel Ingratitude—Refers to the Ten Years' War and to the Robbers—The Retiring Captain-General does not get a Hearing in Havana.

THE journals of Havana are, under the pressure of the military authorities, semi-official in their utterances. It is the theory of the authorities that the press of the great city of Cuba is unanimous in its attachment to the government, and the prevailing harmony of journalism is the subject of felicitation. Of course, the liberty of the Press does not exist under the conditions of martial law. Fancy a Cuban journal attempting to vindicate the rebellion—to praise the character of the leaders of it—to accuse the authorities themselves of high crimes and misdemeanors! Such a publication would be a challenge to instantaneous and mortal combat, and the first issue of such a journal would be the last.

In reviewing the speeches in the Senate on Cuban affairs, by Mr. Cameron of Pennsylvania and Mr. Call of Florida, there was an expression of a resentment in the journals of concord towards the public men of the United States, who presumed to espouse the cause of the revolutionists. The leading journal of Havana, the *Diario de la Mariana*, treated its readers to a very abusive article relating to Senators Call and Cameron, under the

caption "Blockheads." It had held Mr. Call as an invincible champion, but "there is always a match for every bully," and in the Senate there was "another adjuster of foreign lands in the person of Mr. Cameron, who is shod and clothed, and we don't know if he gets any money, which would be hard to collect, from the Cuban filibusters."

The *Diacio*, after some very personal observations, remarked: "We will have to call the attention of the North Americans to the formidable invasion that idiotic politics has made in their parliament, if only that they may put a stop to the shamefully ridiculous position in which the Yankee legislators and their similars are placed before the eyes of the people who have sound and good minds;" and the able editor closed the instructive effusion by saying: "Spain is quite serene, but energetically disposed not to consent, that this or any other strange government, violating the laws of nations, shall try to mix in a matter so much our own as this war of Cuba."

The comic journals of Cuba are Spanish of course; while the insurgents have no method of getting into circulation even their state papers other than such as Anarchists possess in Russia. There may be secret printing places, but that which is hot for the Cuban cause is usually in manuscript. One of the favorite themes of the cartoonists who serve the official class in Cuba is "Uncle Sam," and he would not be recognized, except by the stars and stripes with which he is decorated. He does not seem to be in any way related to our Brother Jonathan. He is a lank, elderly gentleman of breezy postures, with ample hair and slender limbs and disheveled coat-tails, or he is a very fat person, closely resembling a pig, always with stars on his hat and

stripes on his stomach. The Spanish idea imparts to "Uncle Sam" a tremendous mouth with ample digestion, a bulbous, disreputable nose, broken teeth and bad manners towards colored people of both sexes. "U. S." is either conducting himself with familiarity toward a black woman, or handing a torch to a black man, bidding him go and burn canefields or houses, and he is doing this with a diabolical leer.

This style of art is seen also in personifying insurrection in a brutal black man whose lips are excessive, imposing his attentions upon a slender, graceful figure—a young white woman who represents Cuba, and regards him with horror. A black man is always equipped with a knife with which he is assassinating a Cuban woman, or a big blacking brush with which he is supposed to be blotting Cuba from the map. This is of course an appeal to racial feeling, and indicates a degree of it one would not suspect from the ease of the black people on the promenades and in the various public functions of Havana life.

The suggestion is of course that the rebellion in Cuba is going the way with that of Hayti, which resulted in the memorable desolation by fire and massacre. There seems to have been a time in the Island in the course of the present war when the crop of art was more extravagant than in the period when we gave it close examination, for there were several Uncle Samuels of more flagrant bad form and scandalous associations than any in recent issues of the *Don Quixote*—the old numbers being pasted on bulletin boards and hung up before shops to attract customers. Perhaps these were of the gentle times of Campos, of which so much is heard now that he is gone.

The newspapers of Havana have had a most precarious and hazardous field of enterprise, and it is due them to say that as a rule they are conducted with ability and dignity and are decent and make the best of a troubled situation. They are large, well printed, and display fairly the intelligence that is permitted to get into print. Their office equipment is good, and they have neither the remarkable merits nor faults of those whose enterprises are carried on with the scorching energy characteristic of American journalism.

The restrictions that exist in Cuba to sending Americanisms to America by telegraph have become tolerably familiar, and it may be interesting to illustrate the newspaper methods of the Spaniards to record an experience in offering news to a newspaper of Havana. Captain-General Marin occupied the great office, after the departure of Campos, until the arrival of Weyler, and was so polite as to talk with me very freely and express himself in an interesting way. He stated the case of Cuba as he understood it forcibly and handsomely, and my report of the interview was cabled to New York just as it was prepared. A Cuban journalist took a copy of it, and proposed to publish it in the paper to which he was attached, regarding it as a matter of particular interest. He was very glad, indeed, to get it, but it never appeared. Just as it was about to be given to the people of Havana, an unseen hand snatched it away, as if to yank it to oblivion.

This talk of General Marin is valuable as the clearest and most consecutive statement that has been made of the claim of the Spaniards that they rule reasonably and are fighting in the cause of good government.

The refusal to have this appear in Havana only increases its interest for the general public.

When I was shown into Captain-General Marin's private room in the celebrated palace, he came forward—a grave man with iron-gray hair and strong, kind face, and the interpreter gave him a flattering account of myself and friends, naming public men, saying I could be trusted with historical matters, adding that talking to me would be having speech, through the newspaper I represented, with the people of the United States, and that when I was in Washington city, a few days before, there was a general complaint that the actual state of affairs in Cuba was but indifferently known. The general had just come in from the front, and his first word was one of inquiry of what in particular I wished to be informed, and was told that the people of the United States were deeply interested to know what the situation in Cuba was; to hear upon responsible authority the cause of the rebellion and the extent of it. They felt that a crisis in the affairs of the Island was at hand; they were interested to know his judgment as to the measure of success of his own campaign; and, looking to the new administration as a transition, were concerned to have expressions as to the state of the country from the officer in command between Campos and Weyler.

General Marin said he was pleased to have the opportunity of talking to me, knowing that I was the representative of that part of the press which was serious in matters of state in the States, and not of the press of a frivolous nature. And he recognized the United States as a great mass of serious people. Although he was very busy, he was willing to rob himself

of some of his time to talk with one who would speak to the States. He said :

As for the character of the war, it was not like any other contest. There was offered in it a chance for the mob to join a loose, undisciplined army of irresponsible disorderlies, and it was anarchy in a state of semi-organization converting the country people through terrorism into destroyers of property and into spies. It was so far anarchism as to promote all devastation and fill the land with every form of violence and outrage.

The country people at large did not fear the Spanish troops because they were disciplined and observers of the laws and of civilization, were orderly, responsible and humane. Consequently, the people were not frightened into giving information to the Spanish army, but they were compelled, through fear, to serve the insurgents as informers on the least provocation, or without any. The country people were accused by the rebels of loyalty to the government, and were abused, if not killed, and their property destroyed. When the insurgent forces arrived at a town, which they never held, they recruited all the idle and evil men, and the captain-general added that he was glad the good citizens did not join them. So much so, that he mentioned that the ex-rebel chief, Marcos Garcia, mayor since the last war of Sancti Spiritu, has not agreed with the insurgents who destroyed towns and scared the people by threatening that if they allowed the garrisons to be in their midst, they were to be punished with fire and sword. Therefore, as the country was so large and the towns so distant from each other, it was a hard matter to garrison the places that needed protection, and at the same time put in the field large armies.

The rebels had no responsibility for any such thing as civilization. They were the destroyers, while the Spaniards were the preservers.

It did not occur to a Spanish army, even when fighting in a foreign country, to destroy towns. The Spanish troops were always willing to fight and were always brave and had all the resources of an established government and were always in their place. They attacked the rebels wherever found and always beat them, though the insurgents often had the greater numbers.

The rebels had the peculiarity of considering their retreats victories. They had no idea of war as an orderly business. Now, war was an art and the insurgents had no idea of it. They had no knowledge of the honor of arms.

Maximo Gomez tries to show the world that he is conducting a civilized campaign and does make a pretense as to something of that sort after his own fashion ; but that is of little effect on the bulk of his followers, as such ideas as he professes do not get into their heads.

Here the captain-general repeated that the rebellion was a semi-barbarously organized anarchy, and that he was a man who respected ideas. In the last war or rebellion, when the best of the people were mixed in it, there had been an idea behind the attempted revolution, as Cuba had not then all the liberties Spain enjoyed. But for this war there was really no cause, and in his opinion Cuba was as free as any other country.

She enjoyed a free press, representation in the Cortes, franchise, laws and an equal footing with the mother-country.

Maximo Gomez, not being a Cuban, but a foreigner—a soldier of fortune—and Maceo, a mulatto with ambition and a purpose, were natural leaders of anarchism, with nothing to lose.

The captain-general was asked if he could indicate what the policy of his successor, General Weyler, would be, and he replied the policy of the general would undoubtedly be one of great activity and energy ; that he would find much to do. He had himself initiated a policy of pressing hard upon the rebels with good effects.

General Marin was informed of the anxiety in the United States about the probable duration of the war, and was asked if he could give any impression as to the time in which it might possibly be brought to a finish. It was stated to him also that his reply to this question would be regarded in the United States as important.

The General said a definite date for the close of the war could not be fixed, though there was no doubt in the world of the ultimate success of Spain in re-establishing her authority all over the Island. "The trouble as to time was that after the last semblance of war had disappeared still the country would be disturbed by bandits, and it would possibly be found that getting rid of them would be tedious."

It still seems curious that this moderate and clear exposition of the cause of Spain, eagerly sought for publication by *La Discussion*, a leading Havana journal,

should have been suppressed in Cuba. One captain-general, however, differs from another in policy as in glory, and two days after the interview with Marin we listened to the thunders from the forts of the salutes that greeted General Weyler ; and Gomez was then so near Havana that it was said he could count the guns and interpret their dull boom quite as well as the Spaniards themselves.

CHAPTER VII.

LEADING QUESTIONS OF RACES AND CRIMES.

The Blacks as Soldiers and in Caricatures—Preoccupation on Both Sides in Cuba with the United States—Habits of Exaggeration—Governor-General Weyler Interviewed and Defends his Policy—Too Much Attention to Wild Stories—Brutalities of Bandits—The Machete the Sword of Cuba.

REPRESENTATIONS of blacks as the rebels-in-chief and cane-burning demons with forked toe-nails, as they are constantly caricatured in the dreadful Spanish sheets alleged to be humorous, are not consistent with the professions of General Weyler, who has invited the distinction of treating black men with consideration. Negro soldiers are often on guard at the gates of the government palace, and I have seen black workingmen, with personal errands, presenting themselves in their workday clothes at the door of the governor's reception room, and quickly admitted.

When General Weyler was asked what his policy towards the negroes was, he said, "Just the same as to others." He was not favorable to discrimination as to color, and when engaged in the war of 1868-1878 his cavalry escort was of black men, a fact, he said, "showing his esteem for them as soldiers."

The combatants on both sides in Cuba are surprisingly preoccupied with the United States, dwelling in conversation upon the peculiarities of the people and the purposes of the nation. The Spaniards are not, as a

rule, prepossessed in our favor, but irritated by the impression that we are a perpetual menace. They suspect when they do not know, that an American is a sympathizer with the Cuban rebellion, and if one of our people is strong in his Spanish talk, it occurs to the average Spaniard that he is doing it with some selfish and probably deceptive and hostile design. The Spaniards are angered by the intense interest the Cubans take in what is going on in the United States. It is not permitted to give space in the journals of Havana to the proceedings of the American Congress that relate to the condition of the Island. One day there came, by way of Tampa and Key West, a Savannah paper, containing a column of information about one of the resolutions and discussions in the Senate of the United States. I was attempting to send by cable signed editorials elucidating Cuban matters, and proposed a reference to the contents of the Savannah paper, and to state the misapprehensions that all parties in Cuba entertained as to the true intent and meaning of what was going on at Washington. I should not have expected to be allowed to print such incendiary matter as this was from the government standpoint in a Havana paper, but could not see the harm of sending it by wire for purposes of journalism in New York ; and it did not occur to me there would be objection to the discharge of a high explosive at that distance from Havana, but there was. My disquisition did not depart from the "Pearl of the Antilles," and was lost to the North American world.

There is something touching and pathetic in the credulity of the Cubans regarding the matters most vital to them. I say Cubans without qualification, for they are all—with such rare exceptions, that we do not

need to note them—against the continuation of the rule of Spain. Their distinctions are in degrees of desperation. The present generation at least, has grown up in an atmosphere of rebellion, and politics means conspiracy. They have not lived generously on the news of the day, as the Americans and Englishmen and Frenchmen do, also the Germans, Austrians and Italians in a lesser degree, and their faculty of discrimination is not trained. The space that should be occupied exclusively by facts is largely reserved for fancies.

I was present when some shocking news was told by an eye-witness, who had been personally engaged in a bloody affair, and there were those at hand filled with excitement, asking leading questions, when a cool gentleman, an American, with perfect command of the Spanish language interposed, saying: "Let us get this story as it is; do not try to get him to tell it any worse than it is; it is bad enough." Nothing can be stated too wild to find believers, and exaggerations are heaped upon each other until the truth is lost even in outline. A romance that the Spanish minister had used money to get up a riot in Washington found ready believers; so will the wild fancy that Senator Sherman was once in the slave trade! There were full particulars one day of a furious engagement near Havana. There had been a heavy government train, so the tale was told, on the way through the disputed country, attacked and captured by Maceo, when a Spanish column came along and the insurgents retired with cartridges and other spoil, but left thirty wounded in the hospital, all of whom were murdered! All the details any one could desire were furnished. There was no

train, no fight, no murder—nothing at all! “Perfectly trustworthy” correspondence by secret lines of communication arrive stating highly important matters altogether imaginary. There is so much confidential information, “highly unimportant if true,” that the human understanding is bewildered, and a great deal of it finds its way into print.

The Cuban stories are rather more fantastic than the Spanish official reports. This is the result of military repression, with its smouldering hates and rivalries and jealousies, and the elaborate hypocrisies, the sinister finesse of malignant politeness—a part of the penalty of tyranny.

It is the Cuban custom when stating the grievances that caused the war, to neglect the more substantial grounds of dissatisfaction with the Spanish form of government, and tell of personal affronts and outrages, and both sides are free in charging against antagonists the supreme crime of barbarous and fiendish treatment of women. General Weyler has, above all, been assailed with accusations of brutalities that are incredible. It would be indelicate to hint the class of crimes that one is assured have more than anything else distinguished his career, and the Cubans are surprised if you dare to doubt the authenticity of their animosity. They go on to implicate entire Spanish regiments in criminalities so hideous that to the sober understanding they seem preposterous; and yet are insisted upon to the last detail of infamy. Consideration for human nature invites incredulity.

The Spaniards are equally facile in their accusing conversation, and with the list of offenses the Cubans charge upon them they return upon the Cubans; and

the first thing in the indictment on their side, too, is that women have been abused. General Weyler invited questions and answered freely touching the tales told of himself. I do not refer now so much to the general tempest of detraction, but to the especial wonders of cruelty; and he was fiercely earnest in denouncing all representations of his enemies as false, and said it was strange indeed that he should be attacked by the American newspapers for what he did not do, and at the same time those papers had only sympathy for the rebels who committed all they imputed to others. They were themselves the firebugs, the murderers, the destroyers, the ravishers; and the pretense of patriotism covered it all. He was charged with having dozens of prisoners shot every morning—the rifle firing heard just at day-break—a crash of rifles—a morning ceremony—the bodies of the dead had been seen—the disposition of the bodies had been made known! “All this was imposture and false entirely,” said Weyler. “Why,” said he, “Campos killed three and I have killed none! not one!! And I shall kill no one unless it may be some guilty leader who has been proven to deserve death.”

I could not doubt the truth of what the captain-general told me about the killing of prisoners—for those who said there were dozens shot daily named no one, and could not tell what prisoners, if any, were missing. There could be no reason for shooting obscure men in secret save mere killing, and it has not come to that. The prisoner-shooting stories located at the fort were not so, and yet they turned up every day, always about the same. The foundation for the persistent rumor seemed to be that loaded rifles were discharged

in the morning. General Weyler said that not only had he not ordered any executions, when no one else had a right to do it, but he would deal severely with officers who killed prisoners without his express order. There have, however, since been executions by shooting at the fort, not consistent with Weyler's statement. But one who meant to have men shot as a daily lesson would be very unlikely to assume the personal responsibility for the executions and proclaim it to the newspapers of the United States and all civilized lands. The monster Weyler is said to be would boast of his bloody work—make a merit of assassination, never deny a crime, but with the fallen fiend declare: "Evil be thou my good." He has, however, the habit of the Island, of credulity that receives every tale of horrors committed by the enemies as "the truth and nothing but the truth," and he confounds the sanguinary and incendiary incidents of the operations of the organized insurgents with the killings and robberies and burnings by the bandits—the bands of mere outlaws—who add greatly to the aggregate of the mysteries and miseries of the war.

The general was asked of what military advantage it would be to the insurgents to be recognized as having belligerent rights, and he answered, "none at all," on the contrary they would have to stop their house burnings and outrages of women, and he intimated that was all they knew how to do.

The Cubans have so strong a case against Spain of misgovernment it is a pity to mar or shadow it by obscuring that which is substantial with clouds of romance. It is the misfortune of environment that

they do so, but they think it is only self-defense for them to be as romantic as the Spaniards whose literary labors in preparing history for bulletins are as incessant as they are inaccurate and ineffectual. I happened to have information that was reliable of the preparation of one Spanish bulletin that was written four times before it was permitted to go, and it was not passed until all resemblance to the truth had been rubbed out. This peculiarity is not confined to Spanish official literature in Cuba. It is one of the familiar jests that, according to the bulletins, three times the number of insurgents engaged during the Carlist war were killed in action and counted dead on the field.

Spaniards and Cubans do not do themselves justice, in the torrents of reproaches and accusations with which they characterize each other, and express the fierce intensity of the hatreds they have cultivated for generations, and that are now inflamed to a degree unknown in former times.

One reason for the extraordinary indulgence of animosity, is found in the consciousness of all concerned, that the affairs of the contested island are in an extremely critical state, and that if conclusions cannot be reached, Spanish industries and the opulent commerce of the country will be totally destroyed.

Those who have followed closely and intelligently such histories as are attainable of the course of events in Cuba, are informed that much importance is attached to the depredations of the bands of miscreants now haunting all the provinces, and whose occupation is simply that of murderous thieves.

The fact that the Island is infested by these scoundrels is not purposely made prominent by the combat-

ants, who are organized, bear arms and profess to be fighting in a civilized way. The Spaniards charge the outrages the vagabonds are guilty of to the rebels, and the rebels charge them to the Spaniards, and the whole truth is not mentioned on either side, for it would wipe away some of the bloody chapters of popular literature. If a lot of fellows are found by Spaniards with telegraph wires around their necks, dangling to trees or telegraph poles, the cry is : "Here is evidence of the horrible barbarism of the insurgents. See what Gomez or Maceo have been about ! These are innocent men, because they loved dear Spain !" If the insurgents ride that way the suspended corpses naturally shock their sensibilities, and they point out the testimony that the "butcher and brute Weyler" has been having patriots murdered. The truth is that the ghastly spectacle marks the scene of the close of the career of some bandits, or means that the bandits have been assassinating some country people who were passing that way, or that hapless travelers have been massacred for their clothing or that which they might have in their pockets.

Some of the newspaper men, in the days when they were occasionally permitted to pass the Spanish lines, made narrow escapes from robbers who have no sentiments as to the dominion of Spain or the independence of Cuba, but have taken to the road to live by criminal courses, protected by the prevalent disorder. These wretches do more than all the troops in arms, however vicious and uncontrollable many of them are, to give the inhabitants of the desolated Island a bad name, and add the fame of frightfully evil deeds to the general disaster and augment to awful proportions the horrors of war.

Early in April there was news from Havana of the execution by the garrote of five men, and the cable, unrestrained this time by the censors, told of the terrors of the execution, and millions read the hideous story, believing that the ruthless Spaniards were putting to death, ignominiously, brave men whose crime was patriotism. In fact, the garrote was employed to strangle a group of murderers who engaged in robbing a farmhouse, were taken red-handed and with the spoil they had gathered.

It suits the Spaniards very well to say these men were rebel brigands, and it serves the Cubans a purpose in harmony with their passionate desires to admit the construction, that the Spaniards have been guilty of another massacre.

The military conditions of Cuba unfortunately lend themselves to this sort of mutual misrepresentation. The columns of Spaniards and insurgents are in motion nearly all the time, and all the roads are unsafe, while many fugitives are fleeing far and near, hoping to find places of refuge. The brigandage that is rife all over the Island, save the towns, where there is at least military law, is one of the most deplorable of the misfortunes of the war, and will be of the lingering results of the struggle hardest to eradicate. Whether the Spaniards or the Cubans are asked, and the inquiry is incessant, how long the war will last, the answer from both sides is substantially the same. It is impossible to say how much time will be required to put down the gangs of robbers, as there is really no cure for them except to hunt them and kill them.

The machete is the sword of the Cuban soldiers, and will be famous forever. It is not the delicate weapon



CHARGE OF CUBAN CAVALRY
Armed with the Machete

sometimes pictured, nor the mere cane-knife that flourishes in the accounts of the warfare in "the Pearl of the Antilles."

It is a heavy, straight sword, usually with a horn handle, and without a guard, with a fine edge on one side that curves to a point. The back of the big knife is square and solid, the prevalent idea that there is a double edge being an error. The scabbard is plain, firm leather, and the belt that supports it is, as a rule, narrow. There are competing machetes on the market, one made in New England and the other in Old England, and they are alike good stuff. The scythe-blades American farmers attach to a wooden handle, and call a corn-knife, closely resemble the machete in looks and use as an agricultural implement, only the scythe is not often straight, and the edge is on the inner side of the curve.

The primary object of the machete is not cutting sugar-cane, as supposed by the average citizen, though it serves that purpose excellently; it is in cutting paths through tropic vegetation. It is impossible to travel in an uncultivated part of Cuba, or along a narrow road, as most of the roads are, without something to cut away the shrubbery, the vines, the wild pine and cactus, and the thousand thorny boughs and bushes. The rebels, hastening across the wild regions, make way for themselves with machetes, and the most effective stroke is upward, shaving away the prickly verdure, striking the dense, upreaching limbs as hedges are roughly trimmed; and there is developed in this habitual hard labor wonderful muscular force and expertness in delivering a blow with the big knife, taking an ascending sweep. This weapon becomes perfectly familiar, and to save

an excessive strain, it is keen as a razor and heavy as a cleaver. It is about the length of a dress-sword, but there is variation, according to personal strength and taste, of several inches, and that is not held important, for the knife is not used as a fencing-sword or a stabber, and is in no way like the rapier, or the steel with which the Romans conquered the world by thrusting under their shields and upward with the heavy dagger called the sword of Rome.

The Cubans handle the machete so constantly that they do it gracefully and deftly, cutting open green cocoanuts with a single blow, and without spilling a drop of the milk or touching their fingers ; and, it is said, in battle the Spanish rifle-barrels are sometimes clipped off, while it is a common incident for a soldier to lose an arm at a blow. The most dreaded cut, the one when the blade rises—the same motion as in trimming thorn-bushes—is the more terrible blow because it is queer, and seems uncanny, and to be a diabolically cunning and tricky style of fighting.

There is a peculiar, wild, shrill cry the Cubans give that announces a machete charge—a “rebel yell,” sure enough, fierce and prolonged—and it means going in at the high speed of horses, for “war to the knife,” and there is no doubt and no wonder that the Spaniards are alarmed always by that battle-cry. There has been more hand-to-hand fighting in Cuba than in any other war of modern times.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ORDERS AND ADMINISTRATION OF WEYLER.

A Vigorous and Comprehensive Series of Orders, Declarations, Decrees and Commands, and Promises of Restoration of Order in these Provinces on the 15th of March—The Difference between the Proclamation and the Performance—The Weyler Administration Signally Fails—The Daring and Success of the Maceos—A Hard Blow at a Sore Time and Place.

THERE has been world-wide controversy over the policy of Captain-General Weyler. The universal Cuban view is singularly simple and radical. It is that Campos was retired because he would carry on war with methods not inconsistent with civilization, and that Weyler was appointed to be barbarous. The definition of the truth about this is important, and the task of being just one that is serious and almost novel, because on this point partisanism is at a scorching heat, and a spirit of moderation is denounced as treason to patriotism, or uniting disorder with cowardice. We have at hand a complete set of Weyler's orders up to the end of March, the first dated Feb. 10, 1896, and give such portions of them as are characteristic and have caused excitement and comment. That is to say, we produce the extracts that possess a degree of popular interest. The first of the Weyler orders, addressed to the inhabitants of Cuba, after a reference to "the difficult circumstances of the present time," concluded :

I take charge of my duties with the expectation ever constant in me of preserving its possession for Spain, determined, as she is in this pur-

pose, to spare no kind of strenuous exertions, of which she is giving evident proofs.

For the accomplishment of said purpose I rely upon the bravery and discipline of the army and navy, the unshaken patriotism of the corps of volunteers, and very particularly the true assistance that will be tendered by the loyal inhabitants, born here or in the peninsula.

It is not to be said here, for you already know it, that although I am always liberal to the vanquished, and to every one who renders any services to the cause of Spain, I shall not be found wanting in determination and energy, which are my characteristics, to punish with all the severity sanctioned by law those who may help the enemy in any way, or try to abate the dignity of our national name.

Laying aside for the time being all political ideas, my honorable mission now is to end the war, considering you only as being Spaniards, who will help me loyally to vanquish the insurgent; but I shall be no impediment when her majesty's government, knowing what you are and what you deserve, and also the state of tranquility that may be attained by these provinces, grants to you, in due time, those reforms deemed proper in its estimation, doing this with the good will of a loving mother toward her children.

Inhabitants of Cuba, assist me with your efficient co-operation, and by so doing you will protect your own interests, which are identical with those of the fatherland.

Long live Spain !

Long live Spanish Cuba !

Your Governor-General,

VALERIANO WEYLER,

Marquis of Tenerife.

Havana, the 10th of February, 1896.

On the same date there was an address issued to the volunteers and firemen—the firemen are a highly organized and armed force—saying :

It is gratifying to me to have been appointed your chief, for I meet again those volunteers and firemen who fought with me in the last war, and who, with their bravery, energy, and patriotism, saved order, protected the towns and villages, and contributed powerfully to preserve Cuba for Spain.

This was followed by an exhortation to continue to do well, and a promise of "perfect attention" to that which volunteers and firemen might do.

In an address to the "Soldiers in the Army of Cuba," the captain-general paid, rather unexpectedly, this tribute to his predecessor :

My hope is, that while under my orders, you will continue giving proofs of the courage and endurance which are peculiar to the Spanish soldier, and that you will win new victories, to be added to those obtained by you under the command of my illustrious predecessor, his excellency Captain-General Martinez de Campos.

February 19th, the captain-general addressed the people, stating the fixed determination of Spain to "overcome the insurrection, and having referred to his "personal character" as an element in affairs, he added :

It must be quite clear to you that the state attained by the insurrection, and the incursion lately made by the principal ringleaders, in spite of active pursuit by our columns, are in some way the effects of indifference, fear, or discouragement on the part of the people, for it is hard to understand why some should remain passive while their plantations are set on fire, or otherwise destroyed, or how some Peninsulars can sympathize with the insurgents.

It is by all means necessary to oppose such a condition of affairs, and to reanimate the spirits of the citizens by making them perceive that I am equally determined to tender efficient protection to the loyal and to apply the law with all its severity against those who help or exalt the enemy, or try to abate the honor of Spain, or that of the army of volunteers.

Then it is also desirable that those who are on our side show their good disposition by their own actions in such way that no ground be left for doubts, proving that they are Spaniards, for the defense of the fatherland demands some sacrifice on the part of her children.

An order appeared in which the general-in-chief of the army in operations assumed, according to the code of military justice, the judiciary authority belonging to his civil capacity, and this was therefore decreed :

All prisoners taken by the troops during an engagement with the enemy will be submitted to summary proceedings, for which all judicial formalities shall be avoided that are not absolutely indispensable to pass judgment.

And the captain-general added the declaration :

No capital sentence shall be executed until I have received the testimonials of the sentence, which must be sent to me immediately, except when there is no communication, and the sentence refers to the crime of insult to a superior officer, or military sedition, which will be executed, afterward giving me information to that effect.

February 25th there was a requisition for ten per cent. of the number of horses used for running cabs, stages and tram-cars. This, which had special application to Havana, to be executed immediately by a committee of military officers.

March 3d was issued a circular about the election of members of the new Cortes, whose functions commence 11th of May next, and it was decreed that :

In order that the next elections be made with complete liberty of action, and with total absence of anything contrary to the extant principles of legality, you should bear in mind the following instructions, which I deem necessary to carry out what her majesty's government has directed. One of said instructions—perhaps the most important of all—is that you resolutely prevent any interference with the free will of the electors, and you will be entitled to the gratitude of the government if you use your prudence and diligence to realize that purpose, preventing any possible violence or coercion being committed against the voters.

The captain-general earnestly recommended all officers to "stimulate the electors to make use of this right," but "be sure that the authorities depending on the administration will absolutely abstain from exerting any action that may affect the independence of the voting,"

The election decree concludes:

I trust that your prudence, tact and energy will cause the precepts of law to be respected by facilitating the freest use of suffrage, and not leaving unpunished any transgression that may be committed in reference to the elections.

However, there was no danger there would be a rush to vote the "ensuing May" anywhere within the jurisdiction of the government against the government!

March 4th a long decree was issued stringently regulating the sale of petroleum, because the insurgents used it for incendiary purposes.

March 8th it was officially made known by decree of the captain-general:

That, after being pressed and defeated by our troops, the largest rebel bands that were in the provinces of Pinar del Rio and Havana are at present demoralized and moving east, for which reason now is the time to undertake an energetic pursuit against the small parties of bandits, rather than of insurgents, remaining in said provinces.

Then followed elaborate instructions very carefully devised—the main thing being to reinforce the troops with the civil guard to stop the ravages by the rebels in the western province—a precaution that shows the captain-general was aware of the impending danger that has given him the gravest anxieties and inflicted upon the Spanish cause the most disheartening losses.

The decrees of the captain-general show the intensity of his temper—the emphasis of his method, his precision of phrase, and energy of expression, with the fixed resolution to be thoroughgoing in every respect. His appearances on paper are quite formidable, but the notice that the rebels were being hotly pursued was followed by an aggressive campaign by the Maceos in the western provinces, demonstrating the failure of the captain-general to enforce his authority even in the neighborhood of Havana.

The captain-general addressed to the generals of the army corps, civil and military governors, and chiefs of columns and military commanders, the following severe instructions :

The towns and villages must help in the work of their own protection, and see that no guides are wanting for the Spanish troops. They should also give all possible information in regard to the enemy, if they are in the neighborhood, and not let it again happen that the latter be better informed than ourselves.

The energy and severity employed by the enemy will mark our own course of conduct, and in every case you will proceed to arrest and place subject to my disposal, or to submit to the courts, all those who by any of the orders which have been expressed, should help or show their sympathy to be with the rebels.

After public spirit has been reanimated, you should not forget the convenience of adding strength to the corps of volunteers and guerillas that may be in the district, without failing to organize a guerilla band of twenty-five citizens for each battalion of the army, and to propose to me whatever you deem proper, directly or through the authority upon whom you depend, to realize my plan. But this should not lead you to consider yourselves authorized to decide anything which is not prescribed by law or by decree, unless it is urgently demanded by circumstances.

I trust that you will abide by these instructions, and tender your faithful concurrence to the development of my thoughts, for the benefit of the Spanish cause.

Havana, Feb. 19th, 1896.

VALERIANO WEYLER.

This order was regarded by the Cubans, sympathetic with the rebellion, as extremely menacing and vindictive, as it was plainly seen the purpose was forcing those most anxious to pursue a neutral position to take sides—with, if they acted according to their sentiments, terrible consequences to themselves. The news of the Weyler appointment had appalled the Cubans and those able to do so, and, unable to enter the insurgent army, were fleeing to Mexico by hundreds on every steamer while he was crossing the Atlantic. The declaration of February 19th increased the panic, and the public distress was agonizing.

Stringent decrees were at once issued threatening:

All those who invent or propagate by any means, news which may either directly or indirectly favor the rebellion, will be considered as guilty of a misdemeanor against the safety of the fatherland. As is stated in Art. 223, case 6th, of the Code of Military Justice, inasmuch as they so facilitate the operations of the enemy.

The propagation of false news was placed in the list of crimes with those of burning houses and destroying railroads and telegraph and telephone lines, and also:

Those who consent to serve the enemy as guides if they do not report immediately to the authorities to show that they were compelled by force, or at once prove their loyalty by giving the troops any information asked of them.

This touched one of the sorest points of the Spaniards, whose greatest and incurable trouble is, the rebels are constantly perfectly informed of the movements of the Spanish columns that have to grope their way, for, as a rule, the inhabitants do not tell on the insurgents and are vigilant and untiring to report all the activities of the Spaniards.

The rigor of the military law was applied "to those who by means of carrier pigeons, rockets or other signals, send news to the enemy." And in such cases the captain-general said that capital punishment or prison for life "be applicable by law, shall be tried in summary proceedings." The Spaniards attached much importance to the use of carrier pigeons, though they could hardly have done more than suggest possibilities of furtive communication.

This following command caused a great sensation :

All rural inhabitants of the Sancti Spiritus district and of the province of Puerto Principe and Santiago de Cuba, will make their concentration at the towns having any division, brigade, column, or other troops of the army, and then get documents of personal guarantee, within eight days after the present decree has been at the nearest township.

Most rigorous regulations as to "passes" in the country were proclaimed, and it was ordered that :

Storekeepers established out in the country will empty their shops, and the chiefs of columns will take such steps as may favor the success of operations in regard to buildings or other property, which while not being of considerable value, may afford shelter to the rebels in the interior of the woods or on the open country.

The country stores were ordered to be emptied, because they were a great resource for the rebels.

Conceding the vigor of the orders of the captain-general, and the intimate knowledge they show of the state of the Island, as well as his keen general intelligence, we have to announce that the failure of his administration was early declared by events that were unavoidable.

He was forced to reply to the sugar makers, who called and begged to know when they could grind cane.

Of course he was confident, as ever Campos was, that he could soon accomplish great results, and, at least, speedily restore order in part of the Island. It was his policy first to find the army, for he said Campos had attempted to get along without a chief-of-staff, and had not kept books, so there were many troops missing. This had caused the rumor to go far that 15,000 Spanish soldiers had disappeared.

"Aha!" said some Cubans, "they have come over to us;" and "Aha!" said others, "they are dead, or they are fraud soldiers put on the roll to steal with!" But Campos had not kept books, and Weyler found the missing men. There were also reinforcements sent to arrive in time to support him, and it was his policy to press the insurgents to the utmost. He did not spare orders to rush the troops into action, and thought for a time his ideas were being carried out hopefully. He pointed out on his maps where his columns had the main forces of the rebels surrounded, and later he had them "more surrounded." He had them moving east, and he was overtaking them. "See here," said he, pointing to the centre of the province of Pinar del Rio, southwest of Havana, "they were, and, here," sweeping his hand along the map eastward far as southeast Matanzas, "they are; and they must go further." They were bound for the woods of Santa Clara, he said.

This was his state of mind, and apparently the military situation, when the sugar planters called and wanted to know what they could depend upon. It was an all-important question. If the Spanish government could not protect the sugar interest, the Island ceased to be of value, and was no longer, in a commercial sense, worth holding. It was not a question of the direct tax-

ation on sugar, but of the trade of the Island—the shipment of nearly one million tons of sugar, to pay for the imports on which the duties were laid amounting to eighteen million dollars a year. The captain-general hesitated, but pressed for a business reply, and feeling some of the confidence he desired to inspire, he ventured to say, he could promise that by the 15th of March they might count upon it that cane grinding would be safe in the three western provinces, and he hoped also in a part of Santa Clara! This was very satisfactory, and published, produced surprise and cheerfulness. Why, of course, if that was all there was of the rebellion, it would soon be over! The captain-general, to do him justice, had to hedge a little. He said the sugar men were too enthusiastic; he was not quite certain, but he was greatly and confidently expectant that he would have three provinces, and, possibly, part of another, in order by the middle of March. The promise, however, that sugar should be ground safely all over the west end by March 15th was fixed in the public mind, and regarded as a test of the comparative power of the contending forces to manifest themselves in the open country. The Spaniards were assaulting the insurgents, who were large bodies of marauders roving about, using incendiarism and the terrorism of robbery and murder to compel the secret service of the country people—who would be good Spaniards if it were not that they were in fear, and caused by panic to be criminals. All that was required was a strong head and heart and hand, such as Weyler possessed, and the legitimate authorities would soon regain their accustomed and ancient sway!

On the other hand, the rebels had to say that they



SUGAR CANE PLANTATION

actually held all the Island but the seaside towns under the guns of ships of war, and the garrisoned places; and all the garrisoned towns were substantially besieged. The sugar and tobacco interests were for the time destroyed, and would not be allowed to revive while they were sources of Spanish revenue. Now this was not a matter of contention between the official bulletins and the Tampa and Key West grapevine dispatches, over the results of skirmishes here and there in "the woods." This was a large matter and something positive. It was business. There was a time fixed in which something palpable was to be done. Whichever way the fortunes of the miserable war should decide the answer to be, there could be no doubt as to the material and determining fact. There was exultation among the insurgents that their enemy had invited so conspicuous a trial of strength, at a time and place and in a way, too, that gave them advantages. At this moment the armies of Gomez and Maceo had passed the fanciful line of the Spaniards and were going east, and the friendly intelligence from their columns was that they could not get Cubans to fight a great battle, and were sorely troubled by the care of wounded men, and had upon the whole to get away from the hotly contested places and go into retirement in the fastnesses of the forests and swamps and mountains, to see what the rainy season would do for them! There was the regular report that Gomez was broken down and thinking of trying to escape from the Island to his home in San Domingo, and that the Maceos were his rearguard. They were to be regarded as fortunate to have crossed "the trochu!"

The first act of desperate warfare was the hanging of

a Spanish planter near Havana, who had been guilty of carrying on farming operations without concern as to the insurgent policy. He was killed, and his cane burnt, and it was proclaimed the act of a small band of desperados left behind for acts of assassination, arson, and robbery to keep up a sham of warfare and frighten the timid. The work of destruction was carried on, however, and when the fateful 15th of March had passed it was demonstrated that sugar making was at an end. There was not a district in the Island in which it was safe to "grind." In the first and foremost event in magnitude of the administration the captain-general had failed to keep his word ; and the strong Weyler, like the weak Campos, had been unable to fix lines of limitation on the surging sea of rebellion. Wherever the captain-general had drawn a mark and said "thus far and no further," the waves had rolled over the forbidden territory. It was soon seen that the Maceos had not retired from the west end. Gomez might be "Oriented," but Maceo was not, and then the question arose whether the daring rebels would not be caught and crushed by the superior Spanish forces ; and that is constantly threatened.

Again the Spanish columns were used to form a fence of steel across the Island, and once more the rebels rode about the country at their pleasure. Again the burning cane fields reddened the southern sky as beheld from Havana. Again there were merciless burnings in all the provinces where military protection had been promised, and the priceless tobacco plantations of the west end were utterly ruined. And still the Maceos were enabled to elude the regular troops, and strike at villages and towns, gaining supplies ; and the broader the

swath of destruction the greater the number of recruits for the army of independence. The captain-general at one time said he wanted no more men from Spain—had enough to carry out his policy ; and he had, of course, if this was a war of numbers, a clash of military organizations of the modern kind. But it is a war of skirmishers, precisely the sort of war in which Spaniards and their tropical children have always distinguished themselves, and the rebels are resisting the army in the jungles of Cuba, and in the broad plantations, too, by their remarkable mobility, as the Seminole Indians in the everglades of Florida baffled our regulars. The captain-general, after a further study of the situation, concluded he wanted a few more batallions of cavalry, and they will not be able to cope with the veteran insurgents, while Maceo, receiving, we presume, the cartridges landed from the *Bermuda* in strange security from the Spanish cruisers, suddenly changed his tactics and had startling success in aggressive movements just at the time and place where his blows inflict the greatest possible damage to the Spanish cause, but in doing so he may have held Spaniards in too light esteem, for there is an unusual tone of confidence in the cables that he is hard pressed.

CHAPTER IX.

THE FORCES NOW ENGAGED IN CUBA.

The Conduct of the War—Spanish Force Almost 200,000 Armed Men—65,000 Cubans in Arms, but Poorly Armed—Cavalry a Most Important Factor—Sanitary Regulations Lessen Spanish Loss by Sickness—Opinions of Experts—Suggestions of Strategy—Statistics of the Population of Combatants.—Women in the Army for Protection.

THE Spanish army in Cuba, at the beginning of this war, numbered 17,000, and amounted, with the reinforcements, Jan. 1, 1896, to 119,000. Since that date there have been large accessions, so that taking account of losses there are, of Spanish regulars at the seat of war, not less than 130,000. There is to be added 63,000 volunteers guarding the various cities, and with the military police and the navy, the Spanish force pressing upon Cuba exceeds considerably 200,000 armed men.

The resources of Spain in population are :

Spain's total population.....	18,000,000
Number having no profession, of which 6,764,406 are females and 1,963,113 are males.....	8,727,519
Men engaged in agriculture.....	4,033,391
Women engaged in agriculture.....	828,531
The industrial census is insignificant compared to the agricultural.	
Public office-holders.....	97,257
Prisoners.....	64,000
Professors and school-teachers (male).....	24,642
“ “ “ (female).....	14,490
People attending school (male).....	1,009,810
“ “ “ (female).....	719,100
Physicians.....	20,474
Lady Physicians.....	78

Literary writers (male).	1,171
“ “ (female)	74
Actors and actresses	3,497
Servants (male)	89,958
“ (female)	319,956
Professional beggars (male)	39,279
“ “ (female)	51,946
Priests and friars	43,528
Nuns	28,549
Spaniards who read and write (male) . . 3,417,855 }	6,104,470
“ “ “ “ “ (female) . 2,686,615 }	

The population of Cuba is between 1,600,000 and 1,700,000, and there are not less than 50,000 men serving the Cuban cause in the field, and they claim 65,000, an enormous proportion of the available population.

A Spanish military expert in a Madrid journal, has given a very interesting and generally accurate, though manifestly prejudiced, account of the character of the war. He says :

Had we in Cuba a large force of cavalry when the revolution started, things would have taken another turn. It is to be regretted that nothing has been done to remedy this defect.

What are the tactics employed in the present war? Is there anything new about them, anything extraordinary? Not a thing.

In this, as in the last war, the only means of action is the horse. They ride incessantly here and there, and when their horses are tired, they seize any they come across. They frequently rest during the day, and march at night, in as light order as possible, carrying only a hammock, a piece of oilcloth, cartridges, machete and rifle. They live by marauding. The country people feed them, and help them so far as they can, and where these insurgents don't find sympathy, the machete, the torch and the rope are good arguments. In the woods they find good shelter, places for storage and for hospitals.

They are divided in groups, more or less numerous, to which they give the pompous names of regiments and brigades, and they never accept fight unless their number is far superior to that of our troops. They place themselves in ambush, selecting narrow passages in the woods,

fords and lagoons. They always run after firing, and if pursued, they leave a small body charged with firing on their pursuers, while the main body advances rapidly and then stops, and, by circling around, get to the rear of our troops and harrass them. When they go a long distance, they divide into small parties, make the journey at night in the woods, and then the several groups assemble, until necessity compels them to part again, and meet anew on a preconcerted spot. Their infantry is always in loose order, hiding among the bushes, and always protected by the cavalry. At times a group separates from the main body, the mission being to attract the attention of the government troops, while the main body charges "*al machete*." Such are the insurgents of Cuba, and their ways of fighting.

Let us, the expert says, consider the best means of being rid of them, and he makes these propositions, showing the nature of the war raging.

1st. Deprive them of mobility by seizing their horses, and then prevent them from getting others.

2d. Deprive them of their resources by destroying all the fruit trees, and killing all the cattle.

3d. To end the espionage, concentrate the population of the country, and punish severely those who serve the insurgents as spies, messengers or correspondents.

4th. See that they do not receive munitions of war or provisions, by watching closely the coast and the environments of the cities, especially the points near railroads.

5th. Divide and demoralize them, so far as possible, with a vigorous and constant persecution, especially with calvary and infantry, mounted temporarily on horses.

6th. Prevent them from having any advantage in combats, by suppressing all detachments not of absolute necessity, to give the columns freedom of play, and in case the rebels divide into parties, in like manner divide the troops to pursue them.

7th. Stop their tactics of ambush and their false retreats, by means of constant flanks, either double or simple, and do not pursue them without echeloned reserves.

8th. Prevent them from passing freely from one province to another by use of long lines of troops, duly garrisoned and fortified, and with easy means of communication established in all of the largest part of its length.

9th. Prevent them from surrendering and then returning to the field of war again.

10th. To demoralize the insurgents, make a point of capturing their chiefs and their confederates, who, while not in the fighting ranks, are ready to help them whenever the opportunity occurs.

The final recommendations of this writer are to conduct operations with secrecy, to carry on correspondence in cipher, with the keys often changed ; to forbid newspaper correspondents to be with troops, and to take possession of all carrier pigeons ; and he says :

“It must not be forgotten that the organization of a good body of guides and confidents, remunerated liberally and with guaranty of secrecy, is indispensable in all wars, and in this of Cuba more especially.”

There arrived in Cuba from Spain, during the war from 1868 to 1878, 166,228 soldiers. In 1869, 29,717 arrived ; in 1875, 26,401 ; in 1876 there were 36,355 arrivals. The whole number were not in the Island at one time. The losses in the field and by sickness were large, and also the returns to Spain on the expiration of service.

The following figures are official, and the terrible showing is made that out of 90,245 Spanish soldiers in Cuba, in 1877, there were 17,677 deaths.

	Died.	Per cent.
In 1869, of 35,570.....	5,504	14.56
In 1870, of 47,242.....	9,395	14.82
In 1871, of 55,357.....	6,574	13.61
In 1872, of 58,708.....	7,780	14.56
In 1873, of 52,500.....	5,902	13.00
In 1874, of 62,572.....	5,923	18.22
In 1875, of 63,212.....	6,361	13.60
In 1876, of 78,099... ..	8,482	14.44
In 1877, of 90,245.....	17,677	17.40
In 1878, of 81,700.....	7,500	10.89

The yellow fever was especially violent in 1877, as will be remembered, and broke out in the United States the following year. The Spaniards claim that they have so improved the sanitary state of the army that they lose fewer men now with 130,000 men on the rolls than they did in the former war with one-third that number; that is, they lose now four to five per cent., when in former years the loss was near twenty per cent., and they give these figures.

The dead by actions of war in the previous war was $8\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.; the sick $9\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

Of the infantry and cavalry 1,017 officers perished, and other arms of the war, 250.

The marine infantry had 3,240 loss, crews of warships, 1,758, and volunteers, 5,000.

The losses of officers in relation to the troops was 5 per cent. in actions of war, and 12.3 per cent. in sickness.

One reason for the betterment of the sanitary condition of the Spanish army is the vigorous enforcement of regulations forbidding the excessive indulgence in fruit, which was the habit of the men newly arrived. This, with their exposure on muddy roads and grounds, in the hot and rainy season, caused the pestilence to be so fatal.

This is very important, especially from the Cuban point of view, as they depend a good deal on the "friendly fever," as they grimly call it, saying it is a strong ally of the cause of liberty. In the manifesto of the Cuban revolutionary party to the United States, signed by Enrique Jos Varona, we read of the ten years' war, "Blood ran in torrents. Public wealth disappeared in a bottomless abyss. Two hundred thousand Spaniards perished. Whole districts of Cuba were left

almost without male population." The whole number of men lost, and the amount of money spent are overstated; but all excesses of estimate removed, the aggregates are appalling, and show how ruinous the misgovernment of Cuba is, both to the peninsula of the home country and the Island that fights to be free.

In the calculations that the thoughtful will make in the contemplation of the figures, it should be noted and studied that the war that broke out in 1895 is far more expensive in money and destructive of life than that which closed in 1878. The losses of this war as compared with that are three times as great. This proportion stands, if applied to the extent of the country wasted, the sugar and tobacco fields burned and trampled, and the combatants engaged on both sides. With this in mind, the rate at which the Spaniards and Cubans are rushing in the strife of mutual destruction to ruin becomes frightfully evident.

THE CUBANS GOOD HORSEMEN.

The strength of the Cuban insurgents, the secret of the surprising fight they have made, surrounded as they are by the Spanish fleets and armies, is in their horses and swords. Many thousands are as good horsemen as the world has seen—equal to the Cossacks or the cowboys—and the Spaniards, when mounted, are no match for them, for the Spanish peasantry do not live on horseback. The insurgents have a few thousand good rifles and are well provided with pistols, but they have never had a fair supply of cartridges. The best modern arms are but clubs unless the ammunition is expressly manufactured for them. This, and the fact that the Cubans cannot take care of their wounded except by

carrying them to hiding places, is the explanation of the often elusive policy of rebel commanders in the field. The stroke of business that it is the joy of the Cubans to perform, is to harrass and develop the Spaniards with a skirmish fire, picking off the officers by sharp-shooting, and, if a favorable opportunity offers, to ride in, sword in hand—and the sword is the dreadful machete, a weapon capitially drawn by the artist. On a horse, with this tremendous knife uplifted, the Cuban rebel is at his best, and there never was cavalry more formidable. It is this horseback and machete method of fighting that the mulatto brothers, the Maceos, prefer and that has made them terrors as well as heroes.

AMBUSCADES FREQUENT AND EFFECTIVE.

The nature of the warfare between many columns of Spaniards and squadrons of insurgents, cavalry and companies of footmen is such that there are numerous incidents of ambushade skirmishes that are games of hide-and-seek, and of deadly encounters hand to hand, and also of long-range firing, when the Spaniards have the advantage, through abundant cartridges, of making the most smoke and having the greatest obscurity in which to prepare picturesque reports. The insurgents have become experts in barricades and devices of rough fortifications for their protection, which may be forgiven them as fighting men, for there never was a war not utterly savage in which the wounded were so ill-cared for.

WOMEN IN THE CUBAN FORCES.

There has been so much that is imaginary in regard to the Cuban war made to serve as true to fact, that



WOMEN CAVALRY.



some of the really queer things occurring are not respectfully received. At first no one believed, who had not seen them, that there were women in the Cuban army; but there is no doubt about it. They are not at all miscalled Amazons, for they are warlike women and do not shun fighting, the difficulty in employing them being that they are insanely brave. When they ride into battle they become exalted and are dangerous creatures. Those who first joined the forces on the field were the wives of men belonging in the army, and their purpose was rather to be protected than to become heroines and avengers. It shows the state of the Island that the women find the army the safest place for them. With the men saved from the plantations and the murderous bandits infesting the roads and committing every lamentable outrage upon the helpless—some of the high-spirited Cuban women followed their husbands, and the example has been followed and some, instead of consenting to be protected, have taken up the fashion of fighting.

CHAPTER X.

THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

Cubitas the Capital—A Letter from the President—Proclamation and Letter from Gomez, the Hero of the War, and a Letter from Maceo.

THE patriots of Cuba locate their government at Cubitas, and claim its permanency there since about six months after the beginning of the war, which was declared Feb. 24, 1895. The recommendation of the place is that it is beyond the range of Spanish artillery, and where it cannot be reached by the forces of the government without extreme agility and effort along mountain paths and passes, through endless ambuscades; and then there would be nothing important found, the few papers being easily removed, and possibly destroyed without much loss, save in matters of form.

There have been several reports that Spanish expeditions were on the way to capture this capital, but perhaps there would be a demand for guides that could not be met. There has been a strong suspicion that the capital city was like the headquarters of General Pope's army, "in the saddle," and this was not necessarily said in derision or serious disrespect, for it is certain the real objective point of Spain in putting down the rebellion is not the capital, but the camp, as the head of the rebellion is not the president, but the general-in-chief.

This is but a parallel to General Grant's policy in Virginia, which was not the taking of Richmond, but the destruction of General Lee's army.

Recently a letter has appeared in the journals, dated "Executive Headquarters, Republic of Cuba, Cubitas, March 17th. This paper, published in the New York *Times*, closes :

You ask me for my views regarding annexation. The fact that I am, and for nearly twenty years have been, an American citizen, and more proud of it than of anything else connected with earthly things, should in itself be sufficient to give a proper idea of my feelings upon that question.

Cuba is properly American—so much so as is Long Island—and I believe there can be but one ultimate disposition of it—to be included in the great American sisterhood of states. I am not authorized to speak for Generals Gomez and Maceo, or, in fact, for any of the other leaders of the rebellion, but I do know that each and all are intensely American in hope and sentiment. In closing, let me again thank your paper, in the name of the people of Cuba, for its noble stand in the holy cause of liberty. And allow me to extend, through your influential journal, an invitation to the American government to send a representative to Cubitas.

SALVATOR CISNERAS-BETONCOURT,

President.

It will be noticed that the Cuban president claims to be a citizen of the United States! Some of these gentlemen have latitudinarian views of the obligations of citizenship.

Maximo Gomez, the generalissimo of the army of liberation of Cuba, issued a proclamation last December, which is very characteristic of the man, and most interesting for its expression of individuality, rugged force in definition of policy, and the most particular and striking vindication of his character that has anywhere appeared. In the beginning of that year Jose Marti, the president of the Cuban revolutionary government, called at the door of Gomez's humble house in Monte Christo, San Domingo, and honored him by depositing in his hands the command and organization of the army

of the liberation of Cuba. In opening his proclamation he says: "When, at seventy-two years of age, I decided to abandon my large family, in whose company I was living calmly and happily; when, in a word, I was embarking myself on the coast of San Domingo to come back to my idolized Cuba, I could not hide the emotions that took possession of me, nor could I make allusions to the magnitude of the colossal enterprise that I was about to undertake. Born, educated, and having spent the greater part of my existence on the field of battle, it was not possible for me to ignore the question as to what kind of men would form my army, and against what kind of an enemy I had to fight in order to fulfill what I had promised on my word of honor, that if I did not die, I would have Cuba as soon as possible among the free nations."

He added it was impossible that the expressions of Spanish resentment against him and the reflections of the Autonomistic party should fail to reach his ears. The Spanish claimed that he was a traitor. He does not deny having served as a major in the Spanish reserve, but having resigned when the glorious outcry of "Yarra" was raised, he feels he was free to join Cuban forces.

In respect to the Autonomistic party, which calls him an adventurer, he says, "Ah! The men who fought for half a score of years to give them a nation, honor, and liberty; an adventurer? The one who gained with his own blood the first rank in that army which filled the world with admiration for its persistency and courage; an adventurer? The one who abandoned his own happy land without accepting the rich booty to which the shameful peace of the Zanjón invited him; an ad-

venturer? The one who could have offered as an excuse for his non-return his many years and the consequent fatigue, he who abandons everything and flies to occupy the place that his own brothers had reserved for him? Ah! He cannot be an adventurer, who, loaded with years and troubles, remembers still, as if were his own, the vow made by Cespades and Agramonte, twenty-seven years ago, 'to vanquish or to die.'"

But these offenses he feels are mitigated by the fact that his army is filled with physicians, lawyers, merchants, engineers, farmers and mechanics, who when necessity obliges, know how to change the tools which give them their living for the machete and the rifle, a race whose acts make him forget all ingratitude.

Up to December he has been busy with the organization, and sees how far the army of liberation, composed of 50,000 men, may reach. "I have," he said, "complete confidence in my general staff, am sure of the support of the Cuban colonies in foreign countries, who collect about \$300,000 monthly. I never think of belligerency to attain victory; if they recognize it, all right; if they do not, we will achieve the liberty of Cuba.

"It does not matter to me that 120,000 soldiers are sent here by the government; of these, 50,000 are only unhappy beings sent here as military show; 20,000 from 20 to 25 years old whom I classify as half troop, for they only give results as detachments and there remains 40,000 good men from 25 to 40 years old, while it is not necessary to mention the 10,000 who belong to the number of the deceased either by bullet, dynamite, machete or sickness."

It entered into Gomez's calculation that Spain might send 40,000 additional men, making 80,000 good sol-

diers against him, but he does not believe soldiers trained to operate in Europe can attain results in Cuba, because of its gigantic mountains, the impenetrable thickets, the doleful plains, and the secret paths.

His "soul grows sad" in thinking of the "criminal government that sends thousands and thousands of men, who come, like an innocent flock, to find their death in a country which they do not know," where everything and every one is against them, and not knowing the infamy which they are to defend.

He exclaims: "Unfortunate government, where are you going to replace that youth the nation loaned you? Do you not understand that you cannot conquer an army that fights of free will? . . . Are you not horrified with the load of responsibility of burying in Cuba 10,000 Spaniards; but what can we do? They have made up their minds to fight, and we will fight, though I cannot realize what is going to become of so many people when the government will have no more with which to negotiate loans, like the one lately made in Paris, at five per cent. and half of brokerage, where the national treasury has had to give as a guarantee Cuba, when the French can obtain millions at one per cent. with common guarantees.

Gomez believes that the Spanish soldiers will not fight without their pay, and that if he successfully passes the winter, and strikes that army in the summer, because of hunger and their destitute condition, entire battalions, and some of the forty-two generals of the Spanish army, with their deep military knowledge, will pass over to his side and increase his army.

The Cuban army, he says, will open their arms and accept every one who is willing to live in Cuba, happy

and tranquil ; but until that happy day arrives he finds himself, as general-in-chief, obliged to dictate painful measures to assure the execution of his plans. It is necessary, he claims, to destroy the railroad lines, to cause the Spanish soldiers to make long journeys; to fatigue them and wear them out; to destroy by fire such places as might help the enemy: to burn the sugar cane and destroy the plantations, and he advises those who are not with the revolution to go to the cities. Spain will be the responsible party for the desolation. He promises to treat prisoners with respect, and to meet the cowardly conduct of the Spanish in shooting his officers by pardoning theirs.

In conclusion he says: "What will be the future of these unhappy people if the Spanish are triumphant? The rural elements being absolutely destroyed, their cities having been the scene of the most frightful misery; with the debt of the past war and that of the present, which will amount to as much as \$500,000,000; having to maintain an army of 50,000 men, in order to annihilate the Cuban race so that they will not think of repeating the disaster, every one who is able to do so will emigrate before so much misfortune; and there remains no solution but to turn their eyes towards the revolution, thus after a few years making Cuba, which is a young and rich people, the most enviable country on earth. In its government they will have a place in which all the honest men may find a home without its being necessary to say from whence they came; a government which constitutes itself without debt, without any compromise, and upon the basis of republican liberty, has to be prosperous, rich and happy, because they follow the doctrines of Christ.

“ And we will conquer and be free, cost what it may, or happen what will, and though we have to raise a hospital in each corner and a tomb in each home.”

A letter from Gomez, dated March 15th, said to have been written near the Matanzas border, was secured by John T. Rays, an American on the staff of the rebel commander-in-chief, and delivered by him to an insurgent mail-carrier, at a point not more than twelve miles from the city of Havana.


Gomez dwells upon the debts of Spain, and the ability of Cuba to meet anticipations soon after its independence, and he is charged with saying :

We are not looking for English sympathy. We know that England has long had her eye on Cuba, and I am firmly of the opinion that but for the grand message of President Cleveland with reference to Venezuela, the custom houses of our Island would now be controlled by the Bank of England, and thousands of red-coated soldiers would be assisting Spain.

This may be Gomez, but it has not quite the sound of him. As to General Weyler, we find this the attitude of the rebel chieftain :

He is nearly worn out and hoarse from proclamations and speeches, and his military judgment is far inferior to that of General Campos, and we have marched with even greater ease from one section of the country to the other.

Weyler's coming has benefited the Cuban cause in many ways. His record was against him, and the world knew that Spain intended to be cold-blooded and inhuman when she sent him. The people of Cuba knew this also, and thousands of men who were not inclined to join one side or the other while General Campos remained, are now bearing arms with our flag. The majority of Spaniards are not fiends and butchers by any means, and when a human devil is sent to lead them in the work of murder and outrage, they naturally refuse to follow him. Although massacres have occurred and although homes have been ruined and



GENERAL MAXIMO GOMEZ.



womanhood outraged by order of Weyler, the lovers of liberty may thank God that he was sent to command Spain's army in Cuba.

We are charged with burning homes, destroying railroads and bridges, and laying growing fields waste—and the charges are in a measure true. We have carried out such plans, believing that in such a cause, and against such an enemy, we were right. But no man can truthfully say that we have outraged God and love and humanity, even for liberty's sake. I am here to lead an army against Spain, against her army, her towns, her revenues, and I shall wage it so long as the Almighty Father gives me strength.

A letter from Maceo is also published, and he says, dating from Pinar del Rio :

When I last marched my army into Pinar del Rio, and when General Gomez followed, so did almost the entire land force of the enemy, and her navy was all ordered to the Pinar del Rio coast line. While they were watching us at this end of the Island, three of the best expeditions of the war made successful landings in the far east.

Let Spain send her reinforcements. She could not with 25,000 reinforcements put down this rebellion.

Although we are daily receiving arms and ammunition, we are constantly compelled to turn away, but it will not always be so, and I will venture to say that within two months we shall have 75,000 fully armed men in the field. We could have double that number if we had the arms for them. We are praying for belligerency and for arms and for artillery. Give us these, and before the year 1897 comes round you will witness a Cuban president installed in the captain-general's place at Havana.

God bless Cuba and God bless the American people.

ANTONIO MACEO,

Lieutenant-General.

The verification of the letters of the Cuban chiefs is an uncertain business, but it is known that the insurgents in the field do have communication with their friends in the Cuban cities and this country, and there are constant surprises at the success of their dangerous mail service.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PLAY OF PRESIDENT PIERCE FOR CUBA.

American Interest in Cuba and English Jealousy—The Famous Conference at Ostend in 1854, between Buchanan, Mason and Soulé, the Ministers to England, France and Spain—Mr. Marcy's Warlike Letters and Soulé's Courtly Ways—Cuba we must have, in Peace if Possible, by War if Necessary, was the Policy of Pierce—The Famous Manifesto by Three Ministers—A Record of the Past Applicable to the Present—Buchanan's Nomination for the Presidency.

It is an agreeable task to give the credit due to the American soldiers for the conquest of Cuba by the British in 1762. The reinforcements that arrived at Havana from New York were essential to the success of the immense expedition that had almost exhausted its strength in the siege of the Moro, when the provincials sailed through storm and were saved from shipwreck to the rescue. The records of their gallantry and sacrifices are but fragmentary, yet the magnitude of their deeds, though worthy the admiration of their race and age, were insufficient to win the gratitude or secure the justice of the king in whose name they took service and gained a prize rich as the other India.

This was the period of American loyalty to England. Great Britain and her American colonies had together triumphed over the French, who abandoned the contest for North America when they burnt their fort at the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela, and sailed down the Ohio to the land where the floods of the Mississippi overcome the tides of the Gulf.

Together they were conquerors of Cuba, though the Island was bravely and bitterly defended. We say the conquest of Cuba, because the surrender of Havana substantially included all. If our fathers could then have rested on a ratified paper beginning "We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution for the United States of America"—if there had been the rule of fundamental law rather than the caprice of a monarch and the favor and folly of his flatterers, Cuba would have been ours then and forever; and it should be considered now as one of the appeals to the equity of empires whether we did not acquire, through the blood the grandfathers of the American nation shed and the bones they laid in the soil of Cuba, certain inalienable preëmption rights that entitle us, under lineal inheritance and irrepealable immemorial laws, written and unwritten, to possess the Island and preserve it from ruin. A preëmption right is that to purchase certain lands in preference to others, and with the history of Cuba an open book before us, we may without immodesty assert the endurance of the privilege, and Spain, as a part of her indemnity, should claim from Great Britain the prize money carried to England from Havana, where even the bells of the churches had to be ransomed. We did not get the silver and gold, and may insist upon our right of preference to the land.

It has always been the understanding that the ultimate manifest destiny of Cuba belongs to her people

as our people, for the grasp of Spain in time must relax on the gem of the Gulf as on Mexico and Peru and Florida and Hayti, and the rest. More than once those we helped to batter the Moro and bombard Havana into submission appeared on the scene where we aided them to victory with sentiments and policy to our disadvantage, and we have discovered repeatedly in that region the evidence of English-speaking opposition, not to say animosity; and even now the British empire would regard it a diplomatic and sea power master-stroke worthy of the last century, to promote the materialization of a League of the West Indies under European protection, if the direct dominance of England should seem too positive a form of proceeding. Such a confederation signifies a barrier before us, and the imperial abrogation of the Monroe doctrine would be the shrinkage of our pretensions, including the abandonment of a policy in which we have cherished a generous sentiment and indulged an elevated pride for more than seventy years.

The Astor Library contains an old pamphlet with the title page; "Remarks on the Cession of the Floridas to the United States of America, and on the Necessity of Acquiring the Island of Cuba by Great Britain." The author is J. Freeman Rattenbury, Esq., and the date of publication 1869. This passage expresses the truculent spirit of the pamphleteer and hints at hostilities in more important quarters:

Should the American government, inflated by their partial successes in the last war with Great Britain, determine upon taking violent possessions of the Floridas, Spain *must*, however reluctantly, resent the insult, and call upon her allies for assistance against the common enemy of their Alliance, and we shall not, I presume, refuse the summons;

we have already a subject of deep interest to discuss with the United States, the unexpiated murder of Arbuthnot and Ambruster* which, notwithstanding the feeble efforts of the administration to palliate, in opposition to the manly and indignant feelings expressed in the motion of the Marquis of Lansdowne, remains a foul charge against the American character, and an insult to our own.

We quote again Mr. Rattenbury: "The people of Cuba," he said, "anticipated from the weakness of Spain, and her decreasing influence on the American continents, the possibility of her cession, as was the case with Florida to the United States," and upon this he becomes thus expansive:

The people of the United States, dreading the proximity of our arms, are actively nourishing this apprehension of evil and are ready to aid the first manifestations of a desire to throw off the sovereignty of Spain. But for the intolerable egotism of the people of the Union, and for the contempt they have excited by their vanity and ambition, Cuba would have long since unfettered her dependence upon the Spanish Monarch, and have thrown herself into the federal embrace of the North American Union.

*In 1817—two years after the battle of New Orleans, it will be observed—Andrew Jackson took the field to put an end to the devilry of the Seminole Indians. Spain did not cede Florida to the United States till 1819, and we did not take possession of it till 1821. The Seminoles made incursions from Spanish territory into our own. Jackson seized the Spanish fort, St. Mark, and found a Scotchman there named Arbuthnot, and at Suwanee he seized Ambruster, both British subjects. They were convicted by court martial of inciting savages to hostility, and Jackson hanged them, though the court (military) had only sentenced Ambruster to be whipped. Then Jackson marched into Pensacola in spite of Spanish remonstrances. These proceedings caused much angry excitement in England and there were threats of war. There was a great row in Congress and Jackson threatened to cut off the ears of certain insolent senators. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State, defended him. It was on account of the use of the incident of the Arbuthnot and Ambruster executions for abuse of Jackson when he was a candidate for the Presidency, that there was intense feeling. Jackson was the first governor of the territory of Florida and he imprisoned the departing Spanish governor for trying to carry away papers, and the attempt to censure Jackson in Congress for this arbitrary act failed. General Jackson was a positive character.

During the presidency of Mr. Jefferson, while Spain bowed beneath the yoke of France, from which there was then no prospect of relief, the people of Cuba, feeling themselves incompetent in force to maintain their independence, sent a deputation to Washington, proposing the annexation of the Island to the federal system of North America. The President, however, devoted to French influence, vainly calculating upon the triumphs of that nation on the ruins of the British power, until the important victory of Trafalgar dissipated the delusion, declined the proffered acquisition.

While I hazard the opinion that the people of Cuba will be adverse to the sovereignty of Great Britain, coupled with the restrictions of our colonial policy, I am far from believing that they would feel disinclined to the transfer of their allegiance, provided our possession of the Island should leave them, in their present situation, free to the commerce of the world. Advancing in the scale of consequence by becoming tributary to the first commercial and maritime nation of Europe, secure in property and liberty, under our protection the Island of Cuba would increase in population and in wealth with a rapidity unequaled, and would amply repay the British government for its fostering care and protection, while its rich mountains and fertile plains would present to the redundancy of our population a delightful refuge from the misery of poverty and despair.

It is our bounden duty, it is our imperative policy, to anticipate the rivalry of the United States, and by erecting a power capable of contending with them in their own hemisphere, prevent the destruction of our commerce, which will otherwise inevitably follow our neglect of those precautionary measures, for, in spite of the infatuated indifference which marks our policy toward the republic, in spite of the apathy with which we view their rapid progress in wealth and power, hereafter the contest for the empire of the sea will be between England and the North American Union, a warfare suited to the prejudices of their people, and the character of their country.

Not in this spirit, perhaps, but to this effect—in diplomatic phraseology—possibly Great Britain may reappear in the affairs of Cuba. This English writer gives uncommon force to the Cuban annexation movement in the time of Jefferson, who, though censured for French affiliations, did well in the transaction of the Louisiana

Purchase, and as Senator Hoar says, he comes down to us with the Declaration of Independence in one hand and the Louisiana Purchase in the other; and we might as well give him our distinguished consideration without disputation. It was not certain he had the chance to gain Cuba without costly complications. It should be remembered, too, that Jackson's victory at New Orleans confirmed our title to the lands sold by Napoleon; and the English contention, if they had won at New Orleans, would have been that Napoleon had no right to sell the mouth of the Mississippi. They gave that up, however, when they returned shattered from New Orleans, where they suffered an astounding disaster, to recuperate on the way home at Havana, which their country once gained in "the game of the iron dice," and their king passed it along like a snuff box. If they had held that prize instead of fooling it away in alleged diplomacy, very many things would have been changed. If it had been ours in 1815, the British New Orleans fleet and army would not have landed on the continent.

It is most interesting to trace the shifting currents of influence by which Louisiana and Florida became ours without excessive offense to Spain. We never took advantage of her to the provocation of war, while Cuba, whose surpassing fertility made her the prize beyond comparison to be desired, incessantly attracted to us in peace and war, was always repelled through partizan timidity if not by rude blundering. That which on the Island was alluring to one class of our statesmen was repulsive to another. We refer to the existence in our Southern States, and in Cuba, until abolished by the sword, of the institution of slavery.

Vice-President Wilson, in his "Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America," introducing the episode of the Ostend Manifesto, a momentous paper, says :

When the Spanish colonies in America became independent they abolished slavery. Apprehensive that the republics of Mexico and Colombia would be anxious to wrest Cuba and Porto Rico from Spain, secure their independence, and introduce into those islands the idea, if they did not establish the fact, of freedom, the slave-masters (of the United States) at once sought to guard against what they deemed so calamitous an event. . . . But after the annexation of Texas there was a change of feeling and purpose, and Cuba, from being an object of dread, became an object of vehement desire. The propagandists, strengthened and emboldened by that signal triumph, now turned their eyes toward this beautiful "isle of the sea," as the theatre of new exploits; and they determined to secure the "gem of the Antilles" for the coronet of their great and growing power. During Mr. Polk's administration an attempt was made to purchase it, and the sum of \$100,000,000 was offered therefor. But the offer was promptly declined. What, however, could not be bought, it was determined to steal, and filibustering movements and expeditions became the order of the day. For no sooner was President Taylor inaugurated than he found movements on foot in that direction; and, in August, 1849, he issued a proclamation, affirming his belief that an "armed expedition" was being fitted out "against Cuba, or some of the provinces of Mexico," and calling upon all good citizens "to discountenance and prevent any such enterprise."

Reference is had in Wilson's History to the ill-fated Lopez expedition, which was, of course, in the interest of the formation of more slave states in the United States, and it was that influence that made the most of the tragedy. August, 1854, President Pierce instructed Secretary of State Marcy to cause a conference of the ministers of the United States to England, France and Spain—Buchanan, Mason and Soulé—to be held with a view to the acquisition of Cuba, in this emulating the success of Polk with Texas, regaining imperial domains.

Mr. Marcy, secretary of state, August 16, 1854, addressed Mr. Soulé, minister to Spain, a letter stating he was directed by the president "to suggest a particular step from which he anticipates much advantage to the negotiations with which you are charged on the subject of Cuba." Mr. Soulé of Louisiana was minister to Spain for that express purpose and was a man of remarkable talents, courtly accomplishments, striking presence and of rare persuasive capacity. His eye and voice were fascinating, and he was well chosen for the work cut out as his task. Mr. Marcy proceeded to make the president's suggestion in these terms: "It seems desirable there should be a full and free interchange of views between yourself, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Mason, in order to secure a concurrence in reference to the general object."

The idea was that the ministers should consult together, compare opinions as to what might be advisable, and adopt measures for perfect concert of action in the negotiations with Madrid. The president had full confidence in Mr. Soulé's intelligence, and yet he thought, said Mr. Marcy to him, "that it cannot be otherwise than agreeable to you and to your colleagues in Great Britain and France, to have the consultation suggested, and thus bring your common wisdom and knowledge to bear simultaneously upon the negotiations at Madrid, London and Paris." Whenever the interview took place, Mr. Soulé was desired to communicate to the government "the results of opinion or means of action to which you may in common arrive through a trustworthy confidential messenger, who may be able to supply the details not contained in a formal dispatch." The precaution to provide that some things

should not be put on paper will be observed as in character with the entire proceedings. In extensive despatches Mr. Marcy had advised Mr. Soulé : " It was believed by the president that there was no hope, by pursuing the ordinary course of negotiation, of arriving at such an adjustment of our affairs with Spain as could be satisfactory to this country. If she could be induced to give a fair consideration to our complaints for injuries perpetrated, and offer a full reparation for them, yet the more difficult matter—an arrangement in respect to the future—would still remain to be made," and " preparatory to resorting to an extreme measure, he thought it would be expedient to make a solemn and impressive appeal to Spain, by an extraordinary commission ;" and " if, in her infatuation, Spain should determine not to regard it, but persist in maintaining the present order of things, not only the people of this country, but the governments of others, would see, in such a course on the part of the United States, an anxious desire and a settled determination to exhaust all peaceful means for redress and future security."

There is in this unmistakably the contemplation of war with Spain, unless she gave up Cuba peaceably. Mr. Marcy proceeded to assure Mr. Soulé " that in considering this measure, it did not occur to the president, or any of his advisers, that the institution of an extraordinary commission in a case so unusual, and of such great importance, could warrant an inference that our minister at Madrid had not faithfully and ably done his duty, and given satisfaction to the government. Such an inference is repelled by the fact that he was to have been included in the commission, and placed at its head, if it could be said to have any gradation."

But, there had interposed events in Spain such that she was in a transition state, and so the conclusion was reached at Washington, "before its administration shall have resumed a stable and tranquil condition, it would not be opportune as to time, or of any practical utility, to press particular demands on the consideration of the Spanish government."

The Spanish revolution had changed the aspect of things, and it was more important to look to the future than the past. The president's views were unchanged, of course, but he desired "additional hopes of success in the great objects contemplated," and thought the new government should not be pressed; "but even at this crisis" Mr. Marcy was bound to say, "few subjects of greater moment can be pressed upon it than the management of Cuba. To this subject, as bearing upon the interests of the United States, and in its present condition threatening the peace of two countries, you will direct your particular attention." The process was changed, but the policy was unrelenting. It will be observed that the peace of the two countries was threatened; several back logs were kept in the fireplace! Mr. Marcy gives space to thoughts about the condition of Spain in a semi-confidential way, and adds, "These remarks are intended to apply, not only to the lesser questions between two governments, but equally to the greater and higher ones, more especially what concerns the relation of Cuba to the United States." The president had thought it might be well he should be clothed by Congress "with additional power with reference to our relation with Spain;" this "in anticipation of sundry eventualities which may present themselves in the recess of Congress." It was, however, concluded the

better way to defer an "extraordinary commission," and "extraordinary powers" for the president, and shift the scene of activity from Washington.

Mr. Soulé, under date of Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 15, 1854, wrote to Mr. Marcy :

I had not been more than two days at the Pyrenees, when I received the despatches numbered 18 and 19, which Colonel Sickles had in charge from you to deliver in my hands. They informed me of the course which it was the wish of the president I should pursue in the ascertainment of the best mode through which could be accomplished the main object of my mission, *viz* : the acquisition of the island of Cuba from Spain.

The Ostend conference was the substitute for the extraordinary commission. The one object was Cuba. The conference met at Ostend the 9th of October, 1854, continued in conference three consecutive days, and adjourned to Aix-la-Chapelle, where notes were prepared. It was "infinite satisfaction" that "cordial harmony" marked every step, and the sentiments of the three ambassadors were unanimous on all points! Mr. Soulé said, in a letter to Mr. Marcy, transmitting the joint report: "The question of the acquisition of Cuba by us is gaining ground as it grows to be more seriously agitated and considered. Now is the moment for us to be done with it;" and he added, "if it is to bring upon us the calamity of a war—let it be now, while the great powers of this continent are engaged in that stupendous struggle which cannot but engage all their strength and tax all their energies as long as it lasts, and may, before it ends, convulse them all. Neither England nor France would be likely to interfere with us. England could not bear to be suddenly shut out of our market, and see her manufactures par-



THE QUEEN REGENT OF SPAIN AND HER CHILDREN.

alyzed, even by a temporary suspension of her intercourse with us. And France, with the heavy task now on her hands, and when she so eagerly aspires to take her seat as the acknowledged chief of the European family, would have no inducement to assume the burden of another war." This was improving the Crimean war.

The memorandum agreed upon by the three ministers in extraordinary conference assembled, was the embodiment in form of the suggestions set forth in the letters of Marcy and Soulé. This portentous document presents very forcibly the value of Cuba as an acquisition by the United States, irrespective of the primary purpose to strengthen slavery in our country.

The first business when the need of swift action while Europe was engaged in the Crimean war—and Spain, in a revolutionary and transition state, became the inspiration of the policy of the administration, was that our peaceable intentions should be carefully set forth—especially the generosity of offering the Spanish a greater sum of money than Cuba was worth to them; and then, if they would not listen to reason, we were to act upon the presumption that there could be no repose for the Union until Cuba was included in our boundaries. If Spain acted in a stubborn manner and upon a "false sense of honor," we must act in accordance with the law of self-preservation—and prevent the flames from a burning house destroying our home. We would be "unworthy our gallant forefathers," and commit "treason against our posterity," if we permitted "Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo." The study of these papers, it must be admitted, affords some explanation of the excessive sensibility that Spain shows to the shadow cast by America upon Cuba. The manifesto is so in-

teresting in its application to present conditions that its complete production is required to make intelligible the whole story of Cuba, and we give it here :

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, Oct. 18, 1854.

Sir: The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the president in the several confidential despatches you have addressed to us respectively, to that effect, we have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which we are most happy to inform you has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of \$.

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people, both of Spain and the United States, are so deeply interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank and public. They should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the world.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, as those of the United States in the purchase, of the Island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances we cannot anticipate a failure, unless possibly through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion, and for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.
2. The probability is great that the government and Cortes of Spain

will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then, 1. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members and that it belongs naturally to that great family of states of which the Union is the providential nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some thirty thousand miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and the Pacific states, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, not possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by our government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coast begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this Island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to the American people.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that foreign powers, in violation of international law, would inter-

pose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the Island. Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible governments, that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant power to irresponsible agents, who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the Island. This is rendered impossible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials, who, to attain their ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish government at home may be well disposed, but experience has proved that it cannot control these remote depositaries of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world cannot fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the Island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted.

She cannot but see what such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the Island would affect it in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortez. Their prosperity would date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.

France has already constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasburg, *via* Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads through her northern provinces to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by remunerating prices, would teem with cereal grain,

and her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first nations of continental Europe—rich, powerful, and contented.

Whilst two-thirds of the price of the Island would be ample for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might with the remaining forty millions satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold upon her own bourse at about one-third of their par value ; whilst another class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own government for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new sources of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they may be realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again return.

Cuba, in her palmiest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the expense of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave a deficit, chargeable on the treasury of Spain, to the amount of six hundred thousand dollars.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the Island is an encumbrance instead of a source of profit to the mother-country.

Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba cannot fail to stimulate and keep alive that spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the

people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the president is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is an age of adventure in which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the Island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it—a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature with states as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent state, who desired to blend their destinies with our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest

in a just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the questions, does Cuba, in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the question, whether the present condition of the Island would justify such a measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger, or actually to consume, the fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue between the United States and Spain. A long series of injuries to our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana under circumstances which, without immediate redress, would have justified a resort to measures of war in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish government has deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates, and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign nations, are constantly exposed, than the circumstances of that case. Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to extreme measures.

But this course cannot, with due regard to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences, and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN,
J. Y. MASON,
PIERRE SOULÉ.

HON. WM. L. MARCY, *Secretary of State.*

It was a good while before the people of the United States ceased to be too much surprised to have clear understanding of the full purport of the Ostend manifesto, and of the Cuban policy of slavery extension, of which it was an expression.

There was a strange frankness about the proceedings of the three ministers, out of our diplomatic line or method, if we had one that could be defined. The whole proceeding, it is easy to see, was mortally offensive to Spain, and the offer to purchase the Island only made the insult the keener. The touch of our presidential strategy, it must be confessed, was rather clumsy to be acceptable.

At this time Stephen A. Douglas was the "Young America" and "manifest destiny" man of the democracy to succeed Pierce in the presidency, and the words "manifest destiny" meant Cuba. There were strong articles in the reviews, and the idea was abroad that Douglas was to be president, and Cuba ours, as a matter

of course. But there was a destiny not manifest to Mr. Douglas, and it was the nomination and election, in 1856, of James Buchanan, the first signer of the Ostend manifesto, to be president of the United States. Mr. Soulé was prominent in the Cincinnati convention that nominated Buchanan, and Breckinridge and the Pierce administration was favorable to the succession of Buchanan, who was expected to press the annexation of Cuba at all hazards, and he would have done so, no doubt, if the questions that resulted in war among ourselves had not diverted our tendencies.

There is reason to think the deciding influence that elevated Buchanan to the great office was the Cuban enterprise. If it had not been for that, Young American Douglas would have been president, and there would have been incalculable changes, of which it is very vain to speculate.

It seemed for some years that Mr. Douglas was the one man in the country sure to be president. He was immensely popular in the Northwest and had a strong hold in the South. He had a grand voice and was a brainy man in the cultivation of his reputation among the people.

His first great stroke in Congress was his speech for the restoration of the fine imposed by a crank judge in New Orleans upon General Jackson before he beat the British, for his declaration of martial law, and he had Jackson's blessing for that. He made great progress for a young man, and was vigorous and aggressive as a speaker and a man of policy. He had done, his share in exciting attention to the position of Cuba relative to the United States, and shaping the course of his party to the immediate annexation of the Island.

The cabinet of Mr. Pierce was strongly southern in tendency, and the president was firmly for the rights assumed by the leaders in that section. The Ostend conference took the direction of Cuba's destiny, so far as we were concerned, out of the hands of Mr. Douglas, and Mr. Buchanan was so placed as to get the usufruct of it. The South did not sustain Douglas at Cincinnati when Buchanan came to the front, and the southern crisis came on, Douglas siding against the sectional extremists of his party on the ultra doctrine that loomed behind the repeal of the Missouri compromise, and going further than prudence counseled in confronting Lincoln in their celebrated debates. The result was the slaughter of Douglas in the Charleston convention, the division of the Democratic party, the election of Abraham Lincoln, and the great war of the states and sections.

The personal power of Douglas was very considerable. He had qualities very different and, as an executive man, superior to those of Buchanan, who was a polished gentleman but not a natural leader as Douglas was. Unquestionably, Douglas would have been president instead of Buchanan or instead of Lincoln, probably both, if it had not been for the help Buchanan got from his Cuban affiliations, and the development of a southern policy that Douglas could not be depended upon to consent complacently to make his rule of life the performance of his purposes. As president he would have been too formidable for a faction of his party.

CHAPTER XII.

ENGLISH FAILURE IN THE WEST INDIES.

The Testimony of the Eminent Historian, James Anthony Froude—
The Mismanagement of the English Islands by Free Trade Orators
—Negro Predominance—The Spanish Islands are Peopled with the
Children of Spaniards—Black Labor and Beet Sugar—Cuba and
the United States, as an Englishman puts the Questions of Destiny.

THE most instructive work on the West Indies is that of James Anthony Froude, who visited those islands ten years ago with all his prejudices and powers, and gave the result to the world in an attractive volume. His complaint, which runs through the work, is that the orator demagogues of England, and he refers expressly to Mr. Gladstone, had misgoverned the colonies and impaired the empire. "The West India Colonies," says Froude, "had once been more to the English 'than casual seedlings' left to grow or wither according to their own strength."


More than any other writer, Froude has illuminated the questions we must have in mind in contemplation of the problem of the annexation. He goes to the bottom of history at once, saying the West Indies "had been regarded as precious jewels which hundreds of thousands of English lives had been sacrificed to tear from France and Spain. The Caribbean Sea was the cradle of the naval empire of Great Britain. There Drake and Hawkins intercepted the golden stream that flowed from Panama into the exchequer at Madrid, and furnished Philip with the means to carry on his war with

the reformation." And "in those waters the men were formed and trained who drove the armada through the channel into wreck and ruin. In those waters the centuries which followed, France and England fought for the ocean empire, and England won it—won it on the day when her own politicians' hearts had failed them and all the powers of the world had combined to humiliate her, and Rodney shattered the French fleet, saved Gibraltar and avenged Yorktown."

We have here one of the historical pictures for which Froude's writings are famous, and behold in the West Indies one of the centres of imperial influence upon the world. He has not a high opinion of the black man who needs first, according to this political philosopher, to be saved from himself—and the West Indies should have been governed on the model of the Eastern Empire of England, and not according to the politics of eloquence. And presently Froude comes to the source of wealth in the Island, saying :

Once the West Indies had a monopoly of the sugar trade. Steam and progress have given them a hundred natural competitors; and on the back of these came the unnatural bounty, the new beet-root sugar competition. Meanwhile the expense of living increased in the days of inflated hope and "unexampled prosperity." Free trade, whatever its immediate consequences, was to make everybody rich in the end. When the income of an estate fell short one year it was to rise in the next, and the money was borrowed to make ends meet. When it didn't rise, more money was borrowed; and there is now hardly a property in the Island that is not loaded to the sinking point. Tied to sugar-growing, Barbadoes has no second industry to fall back upon. The blacks who are heedless and light hearted, increase and multiply.

Here is a lesson in political economy profound as the picturesque in history from the same hand is brilliant;



VIEW NEAR SANTIAGO.

and the sketch of Havana which follows is very striking and true, and has application to the Cuban policy.

Havana is a city of palaces, a city of streets and plazas, of colonnades and towers, and churches and monasteries. We English have built in these islands as if we were but passing visitors, wanting only tenements to be occupied for a time. The Spaniards built as they built in Castile; built with the same material, the white limestone that they found in the new world as well as in the old. The palaces of the nobles in Havana, the residence of the governor, the convents, the cathedral, are a reproduction of Burgos or Valladolid, as if from some Aladin's lamp the Castilian city has been taken up and set down again upon the shores of the Caribbean Sea. The buildings are on the old massive model, and however it may be with us and whatever the eventual fate of Cuba, the Spanish race has taken root there, and is visibly destined to remain. They have poured their own people into it. In Cuba alone there are ten times as many Spaniards as there are English and Scotch in all our West Indies together, and Havana is ten times the size of the largest of our West Indian cities.

Froude touched the torment of the Island when he said: "A few years since the Cubans born were on the eve of achieving their independence like their brothers in Mexico and South America. Perhaps they will yet succeed. Spanish, at any rate, they are to the bone and marrow, and Spanish they will continue." Here we strike an error, and the mistakes of this writer are rock-built. The Cuban is not the Spaniard. He is an evolution. He has been taught the value of liberty in a hard school, and when he has the force to accomplish it, he is prepared for enfranchisement and Republican government.*

* Froude, writing of the Union Club in Havana, and startled by the names of gentlemen there that represented the grand old houses of Spain, this which is an example of accuracy occurs: The house of Columbus ought to be there also, for there is still a Christophe Colon, the direct linear representative of the discoverer, disguised under the title of the Duque de Veragua. A perpetual pension of

It is the forced conclusion of this historian that the English did well by Havana when they abandoned it after they captured it in 1762, and he goes on "the Spaniards have done more to Europeanize their islands than we have with ours. They have made Cuba Spanish—Trinidad, Moninica, St. Lucia, Granada, have never been English at all, and Jamaica and Barbadoes are ceasing to be English. Cuba is a second home to the Spaniards, a permanent addition to their soil. We are as birds of passage, temporary residents for transient purposes with no home in our islands at all. Once we thought them worth fighting for, and as long as it was a question of ships and cannon, we made ourselves supreme rulers of the Caribbean Sea; yet the French and Spaniards will probably outlive us there." Then comes the point that the French and Spaniards in the West Indies will probably "*Remain as Satellites of the United States.*"

And next we have, page 293, this powerful testimony from one certainly not disposed to flatter us :

The opinion in Cuba was and is, that America is a residuary legatee of all the islands, Spanish and English equally, and that she will be forced to take charge of them in the end, whether she likes it or not. Spain governs unjustly and corruptly; the Cubans will not rest till they are free from her, and if once independent, they will throw themselves on American protection.

The most comprehensive and apt testimony of all is this, pages 316 and 317 :

\$20,000 per year was granted to the great Christophe and his heirs for ever as a charge on the Cuban revenue. It has been paid to the family through all changes of dynasty and forms of government and is paid to them still. But the Duque resides in Spain and the present occupation of him, I was informed, is the breeding and raising bulls for the Plaza Toros at Saville.

THE AMERICANS ARE THE FREEST PEOPLE IN THE WORLD ; BUT IN THEIR FREEDOM THEY HAVE TO OBEY THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE UNION. AGAIN AND AGAIN IN THE WEST INDIES MR. MOTLEY'S WORDS CAME BACK TO ME : "TO BE TAKEN INTO THE AMERICAN UNION IS TO BE ADOPTED INTO PARTNERSHIP." To belong to a crown colony of the British Empire, as things stand, is no partnership at all. It is to belong to the power which sacrifices, as it has always sacrificed, the interest of its dependencies to its own. The blood runs freely through every vein and artery of the American body corporate. Every single citizen feels his share in the life of his nation. Great Britain leaves her crown colonies to take care of themselves, refuses what they ask, and forces on them what they had rather be without. If I were a West Indian, I should feel that under the stars and stripes I should be safer than I was at present from political experimenting. I should have a market in which to sell my produce where I should be treated as a friend ; I should have a power behind me and protecting me, and I should have a future to which I could look forward with confidence. America would restore me a home and life ; Great Britain allows me to sink, contenting herself with advising me to be patient. Why should I continue loyal when my loyalty was so contemptuously valued ? But I will not believe that it will come to this.

The English historian goes on to declare that the planters of the West Indies ceased to be useful to England, and adds :

We practiced our virtues vicariously at their expense ; we had the praise and honor, they had the suffering. They begged that the emancipation might be gradual ; our impatience to clear our reputation refused to wait. Their system of cultivation being deranged, they petitioned for protection against the competition of countries where slavery continued. The request was natural, but could not be listened to, because to grant it might raise infinitesimally the cost of the British workman's breakfast. They struggled on, and even when a new rival rose in the beet-root sugar, they refused to be beaten. The European powers, to save their beet-root, went on to support it with a bounty. Against the purse of foreign governments the sturdiest individuals cannot compete. Defeated in a fight which had become unfair, the planters looked and looked in vain to their own government for help. Finding none, they turned to their kindred in the United States ; and there, at

last, they found a hand held out to them. The Americans were willing, though at a loss of two millions and a half of revenue, to admit the poor West Indians to their own market. But a commercial treaty was necessary; and a treaty could not be made without the sanction of the English government. The English government, on some fine-drawn crotchet, refused to colonies which were weak and helpless, what they would have granted without a word, if demanded by Victoria or New South Wales, whose resentment they feared.

There could not be a more destructive denunciation of the British colonial system or a more admirable presentation of the advantages that we possess. We have room for states, and Cuba is at the gates of the Gulf that is our southern boundary, and belongs, in spite of Spanish monopoly, to our commercial system. No Englishman could speak with higher authority on this subject than James Anthony Froude, and no one has uttered more weighty words for the cause of the annexation of Cuba to the American Union. This is the policy of patriotism.

The following extract, from a message of President John Quincy Adams, notes the state of public interest in Cuba at the time Spain was losing her great colonies on the continent :

The condition of the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico is of deeper import, and more immediate bearing upon the present interest and future prospects of our Union. The correspondence herewith transmitted will show how earnestly it has engaged the attention of the government. The invasion of both those islands by the united forces of Mexico and Colombia, is avowedly among the objects matured by the belligerent states at Panama. The convulsions to which, from the *peculiar compositions of their population*, they would be liable in the event of such an invasion, and the danger therefrom resulting of their falling, ultimately, *into the hands of some European power other than Spain*, will not admit of our looking at the consequences, to which the Congress of Panama may

lead, with indifference. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon this topic, or to say, more than all, our efforts in reference to this interest will be to *preserve the existing state of things.*

The italicized lines show the tender places in the public mind of that time.

In a volume, "Cuba and the Cubans," heretofore quoted, pleading the cause of Cuba, and giving in historic form the grievances her people held against Spain, and glimpses of destiny, we read :

It is certain that the government of the United States did not hesitate to sympathize with the Greeks in their struggle for liberty, and were only prevented by a constitutional objection from granting them substantial national aid. To preserve a settled state of things, the United States, as has been shown, promptly interfered to prevent the invasion of Cuba by Mexico and Colombo. How far the same government ought now to interfere, again to preserve things from change, or how far it ought to forward the change, it is not necessary to discuss here.

Spain is too weak much longer to hold her Cuban possessions. It needs but to strike the blow, and independence is achieved to the Island. In this instance the first step is emphatically half the journey, and that step will not long be delayed.

Cuba has the power, as well as the will and wisdom, to be free. It cannot be kept forever in bonds, endowed as she is with a population of 1,200,000; with a revenue of \$20,000,000; with the intercourse and light attending \$60,000,000 of outward and inward trade; with a territory equal to that of the larger states; with a soil teeming with the choicest productions; with forests of the most precious woods; with magnificent and commanding harbors; with an unmatched position as the warder of the Mexican Gulf, and the guardian of the communication with the Pacific; Cuba, the Queen of the American Islands, will not consent always to remain a manacled slave; and when the chains are to break, the United States can no more say, "Cuba is naught to us," than Cuba can detach herself from her anchorage in her portals of the American sea, or her sentinelship over against the entrance of the thousand-armed Mississippi.

Then arises the question, what is to become of Cuba? She will re-

main independent ; she will come under the protection of England, or she will form one of the confederated United States.

So far as the interests of Cuba are concerned, a connection with England of the advantageous character which that country would inevitably grant to the Island, or annexation to the United States, would be more for its welfare and prosperity, than for her to maintain the position of solitary independence. It is rational, then, to suppose she would adopt one of the two remaining positions.

That Cuba should ever fall under the power or influence of England is a thing simply out of the question. The United States cannot permit any European power to erect a Gibraltar that will command both north and south, and which can at any moment cut in two the trade between the Gulf and Atlantic states, and break up at pleasure the sea communication between New Orleans and New York. In a military point of view, Cuba locks up in a closed ring the whole sweep of the Mexican Gulf. Its 700 miles of coast is one mighty fortress ; each one of its hundred hill-crowned bays is a haven of shelter to an entire navy, and an outpost to sentinel every movement of offense, and to bar out every act of hostile import.

Standing like a warder in the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, yet stretching far to the east, so as to overlook and intercept any unfriendly demonstration to either of the great thoroughfares of South America or the Pacific, it is in a position to overawe the adjacent islands, and watch and defend all the outside approaches to the Isthmus routes to the Pacific, while it guards the portals of the vast inland sea, the reservoir of the Mexican and Mississippi trade, the rendezvous of California transit, and, what has not yet been duly heeded, the outlet of a new-born mineral wealth, which is yet to control the mineral markets of Christendom.

In short, it makes a complete bulwark of the Mexican Gulf.

This is all true now, except the non-fulfilment of the prophécý of speedy release—which was written half a century ago—from the yoke of Spain, and there has been the immense change of the abolishment of slavery in the United States and Cuba, perfecting the preparations for the annexation of Cuba on the lines of liberty.

The testimony of the English historian, that his countrymen are not competent to take care of Cuba, is

important and pertinent, and will be more and more seriously regarded. The latest thing is a league of the West Indies with European protection, but the Island has a nobler destiny, and what it is any atlas of the Americas displays.

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CHAPTER XIII.

THE CITY OF HAVANA.

Life in the Capital of Cuba during the War Time.—Hotel Apartments and Furniture—Breakfasts—Barber Shops—Bar Rooms—Narrow Streets—The Double Standard—The Water Jug—A Hot Weather Town—A Tender-Necked People—The Casino and the Castle and the Royal Palms in the Garden.

HAVANA has many marks of antiquity and of a place where the expenditure of money has been lavish. It is largely a city of palaces on streets that would be regarded as alleys in New York. There are elegant marble structures on narrow and dirty thoroughfares, and many very respectable houses wretchedly situated. The people are not allowed to build as they please. There is an official engineer whose taste must be regarded. The habit of the builders is thick walls, high ceilings, tile floors and roofs ; solid and lofty porticos ; all expert preparations for hot weather, and yet the heat is not so formidable for its excess as its continuity. It is very rare the temperature reaches 90°—89° Fahrenheit is called the maximum and 50° the minimum. Cities in our Northern States show figures of 30° below zero and 105° above ; a range of 135°, while in Havana the degrees between the extremes are but 40. The even temperature of Cuba is accounted for by the relations of the sun and the ocean and the generous temper of the winds.

The view given of the city in this volume is one



MORO CASTLE

not familiar. It is Havana as seen from the opposite side of the harbor, the mouth of which is in the distance and the tower of Moro Castle on the right. The white lime stone, of which Havana is chiefly built, appears to advantage. The city is of remarkably massive structures. There has been much marble used, and the strong towers and colonnades are of imposing presence; and such is the strength of the walls and the scarcity of inflammable material, the roofs and floors being of tile, a great deal of bombardment would be required to do serious damage. The key of the city in a military sense is the fortress on elevated ground between the cemetery and the captain-general's garden, and that is always garrisoned by a most reliable regiment and equipped with modern artillery.

The view of Moro Castle that we give is not the one most popular, which displays the city also, but it is that seen on the left by the passengers on the New York steamers arriving and also on the right in departing. As we see the castle in this drawing, Havana is on the right, the harbor directly ahead, and the front of the fortification looks upon the Atlantic, the course to Florida being directly from the sail-boat, over the rocks on the extreme left; and there is said to be many caverns, through which the rush of the waves makes music; but the tides are not sufficient to cause a commotion, and the winds, therefore, are solely responsible for the agitation. In the caves, the sharks that haunt the Havana harbor are said to be at home.

Moro is not now regarded a very strong fortress. The real reliance for the protection of the harbor is in fortifications on the hills beyond, from which the British and Yankees, under General Putnam, pounded the

castle when they took the town and looted it, Lord Albemarle's share of cold cash being about £100,000.

One of the most striking features of the scenery of cultivated Cuba is the Avenue of Palms. The Royal Palm is the most stately of trees. The trunk is so tough that it will often turn rifle balls that would strike through an ordinary wood. The palms rarely attain the height of 100 feet, but their grace makes them seem taller. When the flaunting leaf in order falls, it brings with it some feet of green husk of the tree which, as it grows, sheds the lower leaf always, so that there is the elegant trunk with its splendid plumage held on high, feathery and brilliant. The cast off envelope is used to cover bales of tobacco and the whole tree is admirably adapted to the wants of the people. Standing in delicate grandeur along the roads, these palms remind one of the Lombardy poplars trimmed to a top-knot of foliage that line the turnpikes of France, but the palm seems to tell tales in whispers of Egypt and the Orient. Doubtless it was the palm in Cuba that confirmed to Columbus his fancy when he landed, that he had found Cipango or Cathay—lands of Asiatic mystery.

The once opulent planters of the Island were fond, in the days of pomp, of approaching their country palaces through avenues of royal palms, and now the solemn, neglected trees tell of the glories of the days that are gone.

One of the beauties of Havana, of the most venerable associations, is the chapel erected on the spot where the first mass was celebrated in the New World. The service was under a noble tree, one of the giants of the Cuban forests, the Cieba; and not that tree, but one of the kind, rises above the snowy marble of the chapel

and is reverently regarded. The location is between the palace and the landing.

Havana is paved with granite and harder stone blocks. The streets are excessively noisy, and, as a rule, unclean. It is thought remarkable in Washington city that dust arises within four hours after a shower. In Havana one hour after the streets are flooded, under the flaming sun and high wind, dust resumes its sway.

The most splendid residences in the city are of modest exteriors, but when you walk in, there are "marble halls" to remember in dreams, and areas surrounded with carved galleries, and floored as with solid snow, where the merchant princes and sugar and tobacco planters, before the evil days, sat in caned chairs and smoked under the stars.

There is not a fireplace to warm a room, or a window shielded with glass in the city, but there are openings from all sorts of structures on the streets—apertures guarded by bars of steel, often decorative, always strong, and each with two sets of curtains, and two of shutters; and there is one great charm, the highest achievement of architecture is ventilation.

The beautiful picture, from a photograph of the corridor of the Havana casino, is valuable for displaying the splendor of the cool interiors of the highest class of buildings the Spanish race have reared in the tropics. It has been said that the tropical Spaniard is an exaggeration of the Spaniard at home—the Spanish characteristics, made picturesque, appear. The general expression of Havana, as compared with that of the grand old cities in Spain, gives a hint of this.

My gigantic eastern window, twenty feet high and eight feet wide, has the brilliant narrow frame of col-

ored glass and two sets of shutters, the outer one with open work, by which the air may be regulated, and the inner of solid timber, behind which one might laugh a siege to scorn, if trouble came in that form. The shutters opened, the windows are festooned with lace curtains, and beyond, far out over the street, is a white balcony.

When I enjoy one of many rocking chairs on this marble projection, the snowy form of Isabella, shining in the light of the moon and the electric lamps, is straight before me, and far down the Avenue of Parks shines the light of the famous Moro Castle—not a powerful fortress, any more, they say, but a gloomy, picturesque structure at which the American girls passing that way will forever, no doubt, snap their Kodaks. This would be a fine place to burn Cuban tobacco. The window shutters and door are of blue frames and gray panels. The mighty walls are a mournful green with gold moulding running around the ceiling and the door and the windows, and separating the corners that are a deeper blue than the great expanse of colors, from the other shade. There are in this enchanted apartment, including the floor, four distinct blues and three greens; and I trace two other blue tints, and crimson and orange, and some specks of rainbow mixture in the spread on the bed, which one is supposed to pull over the knees when midnight cools the air in sultry midwinter! The Spanish yellow predominates in the upper and inner window curtains—but, as they are six feet beyond reach, one does not become familiar with them. There are scarlet trimmings around the canopies of mosquito curtains, that on a steel frame adorned with bronzes and mother-of-pearl, making the bed Oriental, as it were; and the

ribbon loops that hold back the gauzy curtains of the bed are vivid crimson. The splendid Spanish arms on broad, golden shields, are at the head and foot of the sumptuous couch ; and there are curtains trimmed with lace that hide the legs of the steel bedstead, and have the effect of pantalets.

I cannot make oath that the towering wardrobe, which has not a hook in it, and the elaborate washstand, and the superb commode are solid mahogany, but they should be ; and if a table with long, crooked, black legs, that stands against the wall, is not ebony, it is a fraud—and I do not care whether it is or not. There are so many frauds, so what is the difference ? Do not regard me as boastful about this bedroom, for it is but a type of the Cuban sleeping apartment.

As for the breezy balcony, upon which there is room for more than one rocking chair—but it is quite vacant because too lonesome for one—the marble balcony, so cool and white, from which I hoped to see the Southern cross, but cannot—the fault being in the latitude, I believe ; and as for the moon that climbs the divine sky of Cuba, we should say : “ Roll on, silver moon ; light the traveler on his way.” If it were as big and magnetic as it was before the war, before the world knew war in my time, I would go down and buy the fragrant flowers that they silently sell apparently far into the nights ; but perched in my bower, so to say, catch the faint perfume and behold the blush of the roses, and am carried away by precious memories to the “ land that is fairer than this,” and hear once again loved voices singing as long, long ago ; and the burden of the song is still, “ Beautiful star, thou art so near and yet so far.”

-The window shutters, mind, there is only a little col-

ored glass in the windows, as the shutters naturally fall into their places, and, as the gorgeous bed is located, when my eyes open to the morning light, it streams in, red as blood. The glass covering that particular spot is a perfect circle, and it is divided, like a globe, into zones, only there are no temperate zones. The torrid one extends over all the temperate regions, and is a rich red, while the frozen poles are intensified sky blue.

One must testify the regularity of the habits of the Cubans. There is sensitiveness to uniformity in the servants that gives one a hint of Chinese exactness. When I touch the button at the head of the bed at 7 o'clock in the morning, and feel bound by the iron rules in the air to do it, a bearded friend appears in 150 seconds, puts in a grim face on which there is no trace of a smile, and says one word, "Coffee?" I nod like a wooden man, and say, "Good morning." Five minutes pass, there is a light knock, and a man, dressed in undershirt, breeches and shoes, appears, and bears on a silver waiter two silver pots, one with the handle for the right hand, holding black coffee, and one with the handle for the left hand, full of hot milk.

There is a small roll of delicious bread and a smaller roll of good butter, and they never vary a hair's breadth; two oranges, all the juicy cells opened by the keen knife that has shaved the skin away and not shed a drop of orange blood. The notable thing about the two oranges, next to it that they are good, is that usually they are of the same size; but if one is larger than the average the other is that much smaller, and this is as invariable as if the oranges were weighed on scales that accounted for the hundredth part of an ounce.

The coffee and oranges and bread and butter are not

your breakfast. The breakfast hour is 11 o'clock, and that meal begins with olives and radishes and sardines and several other delicacies ; then comes a broiled fish, a wall-eyed perch, with a dash of Spanish colors in his skin, and after chops, or steaks, eggs, or one of many omelets. Then come cucumbers, slender but long, and cut in thick slices, with oil and vinegar, pepper and salt. With cuts of cucumber, surrounded by slices of tomatoes, both vegetables juicy, the general effect is that described by the pious colored man when he undertook to tell about cold fat possum and sweet potatoes, and failed, but mentioned in despair, it was just "too good." Perhaps the Cuban 11 o'clock breakfast does not conduce to energy, but rather to meditation, especially if it is mingled with Spanish claret.

There is exactness in the hotel service throughout. When the 11 o'clock breakfast and 7 o'clock dinner come off, the same people appear at the same round tables, and dishes are served in an order and according to a system that must have its traditions, history, laws and mathematics.

One may trust that whatever shall happen in the fields of battle in Cuba, or the Parliament of Spain, there will be nothing done that can disturb the peaceful and perfect order of the bedrooms and dining-rooms of Havana, the attractions, manners and customs of which must have grown, for they could not have been invented.

The very northern or southern cities, as a rule, have narrow streets. Only in the temperate zone do you find ample thoroughfares. One notes this peculiarity of close building in the most northern and southern of my personal observation, Reyjkavik and Havana—the

capitals of Iceland, that barely touches the Arctic region, and of Cuba, just within the tropical belt. The outer as well as the inner walls of the buildings are expected to shelter the people from excessive cold or heat.

In Havana the important business streets are remarkably narrow, one containing many fine shops being but twenty-five feet from house to house, and, in consequence, the sidewalks on some of the squares cannot be traversed by two persons side by side; and as the walks are a foot above the pavements, when one meets a pedestrian he has to put one leg over the curbstone and give room—that is unless both are slender and accommodating. There is so much of stepping off into the street done that it is important to do it gracefully, though the act itself is regarded as a matter of course. I have found it advantageous to glide behind a stout lady and follow her closely, the great majority of those she meets yielding her the wall and waiting with one leg off the sidewalk, until we have marched by in procession, as it were.

When one comes to a square, with the sidewalk broad enough for two single files of the populace to proceed in opposite directions, there is a cheerful sense of relief. The roadways are so restricted in these streets that three carriages cannot move abreast. If one has stopped, so that the hubs protrude over the sidewalk, which is fashionable, carriages cannot pass on the space unoccupied. Care has to be taken that two carriages waiting, one on either side of the street, shall not be located exactly opposite each other, for if they did there would be a blockade; and so on the great shopping streets carriages can move but one way. In many places awnings are spread from house to house



AVENUE OF PALMS, HAVANA

two stories high, covering the whole street, and useful in resisting sunshine or rain.

The cafés are especially large and handsome. It is curious to see in February the marble floors sprinkled with sawdust and dampened with a view to coolness, like beer halls in our own land in the thirsty days of July; and it is still more conducive to geographical reflection to eat in a hotel dining and breakfasting room on a level with the street, and find the favorite tables those nearest wide-open doors.

There are three money standards in this country—American gold, Spanish gold, and silver, and there is a great time in close calculations. I noticed a newly-arrived American citizen in a café, treating three friends to beverages of their several selections, and partaking of his own hospitality, and you will observe this means four drinks. Payment was made with an American five-dollar gold piece, and, settling the account, he received in change a five-dollar Spanish gold piece and forty cents,

He was so well pleased that he “treated” again, this time paying with the Spanish gold piece, and his change was five silver dollars and forty cents.

“Now,” said he, “I’m going to study out this thing and get up a scheme. It seems there is money to be made by taking to drink. The more liquor I buy, the more money I’ve got. This must be the double standard.”

There was twenty per cent. premium on American gold compared with Spanish, and twenty per cent. on Spanish gold as compared with silver, so my friend’s computation was correct. He had out of \$5.00 spent \$1.20 in drink, and still had \$5.80 in silver.

The money reformers and patriots here, I am informed, want "more money," in the sense of more kinds of money, and the financiers contemplate an extraordinary issue of paper. When that happens, my friend can pay for the drinks with a silver dollar and get back a paper dollar and a lot of change. Talking of the "double standard," why, the Cubans have the triple standard—two gold standards and one silver one, and, owing to our preservation of the "parity," our silver paper stands at a premium over Spanish gold, and American silver beats the Spanish two to one.

The average American barkeeper, no doubt, holds the Cuban brother in contempt, but he should not. They manufacture cocktails in Havana with great energy and rapidity. From the moment the compounder seizes two glasses and fills one with ice and swipes into the other the liquors and the bitters, and the sweets, and then, with a swinging motion, dashes the ice and fluids from glass to glass, clinking the crystal in a way that would delight a German's sense of sound, not a moment is lost, until after it is all in one glass and flung through a strainer into another that must be just brimming full, and then the assurance of the American appetite is expected to grasp the decoction with the same furious avidity with which it is compounded and well shaken before taken. It should not be forgotten that there is a large and very heavy glass and a small one. It is the latter from which you imbibe. The big one is planted, when its share of the work is accomplished, in the centre of the counter with a bang, and the final thwack is given with an air of triumph and jocose gesture.

The Cuban water jug is a delight, for, as a basis of

joys, Havana has an abundance of pure water and a monument to the engineer who laid out the works. The jug is a round, brown one, with two holes in it near the handle, which is on top. One hole is, perhaps, an inch in diameter, to pour the water in, and the other small, the size of the hollow of a large quill, and this is in a nob that marks the place. It is the old story of the bung and the spigot. Filled with water, the jug is hung on a long iron rod, swinging from the top of the workroom, and located in a spot that is draughty. The currents of air make the thick, porous jug "perspire," and the water is not ice water, but cool and wholesome. The Cuban way of drinking is not to touch the vessel with the lips, but to open the mouth and, holding up the jug, tip it until the water streams into the throat, making a curve and falling five or six inches, striking the root of the tongue.

A series of parks bisect the city. There are fine shade trees, and they rise from deserts of sharp sand. Once in place of sand there was turf, but it was thought the grass was objectionable, and the sod was cut away.

One of the old planter princes lives in a white marble mansion that is magnificently appointed, and in magnitude and sumptuous taste would take high rank if located on one of the best streets in New York city, and yet the New Yorker would call the dingy street before his doors and windows, all fortified with iron rods that are very handsome, disgusting names. This gentleman has a large family, and insists that his sons with their wives, and daughters with their husbands, shall all live under his ample roof; and he rejoices in many grandchildren. It is said the average of births in the house is one a month.

The café capacity of this city is enormous. There are hundreds that would be attractive in any city, all constructed to be airy, and they cook chicken almost as well as in Paris, and beat the Parisian salads. The lettuce is a dream, and as they dress it along with tomatoes, it allures one to excess. The claret is good, but the French have a patent on that which is pure as water ought to be, and adds the color of the rose to the fragrance of the vineyard. I have had here as tender beefsteaks as Delmonico ever served, and shall carry from this Island lasting regrets that the Spanish do not know how to cook fish. Fancy stewing a lovely silverside, and serving it with tomato sauce! Let me say, before possibly forgetting, a word about olives. They are small and juicy and delicate and refreshing, and take the sting of a cigarette out of one's mouth as nothing else can. The taste for little olives is one very easily acquired, and the trouble is the tendency to make a meal of them only. The Spanish have cultivated the omelet, and ought to make some compensation for spelling "eggs" "eggs"! The "grumbled e-g-s-s with onions" is a dish that stands trial, and prepares the stomach for serious employment. And, oh dear, the pineapples! Honey in the comb that melts, honey and all, in the mouth, and is so satisfying one wants to drop gently into slumber and have visions of the gardens of the gods! I do not dare more than hint at the mangoes and mames, and a brown pod of sweet cream that grows bigger than the average orange on bushes, and has a flavor that beats apple blossoms and clover fields. The dusky pod has a skin so thin that it is peeled with a spoon, and then one bulb is divided between three tall glasses—was the first time

we tried it—crushed and watered until it looks like ice-cream soda at Huylers. Ice was added—the Cubans have delicious ice—home-made. A silver spoon with a long handle was inserted, and, though the month was February, the atmosphere was August, and we had valuable thirsts quenched by quaffing the milky flood—no alcohol, thanks! This fruity apotheosis is fresh from the “divine sky” of Cuba, that, Dana says, yields pure gold. I did not think he told the truth that time, but he did. And this same vegetable is convertible, at night especially, into a cup of blooming snow, that is as vanilla ice-cream might be if it were translated and frozen in heaven.

I borrow this exquisite comparison from an account Joe Jefferson gave when he was so young it was a joke to play the part of an old man, in telling the ineffable heights to which the favorite Gulf of Mexico fish, the Pompino, ascended in the measure of merit. “The Pompino,” said Jefferson, “is just the shad translated and caught without a hook in Heaven.” But perhaps if one sought to find the limitations of the iridescent glories of the fruits of the tropics, a hint of the far-off line drawn upon the products that are the riches of everlasting summer, could be found in the story of Tom Corwin, who protested when a lady insisted upon pouring molasses into his coffee, that he feared she was making it “too sweet.” “Dear Mr. Corwin,” said she, “if it was all ’lasses, it could not be too sweet for you.”

The apples that grew in Ohio were good food for boys; and there are those living who, before the Mexican war, assisted the pigs in assimilating the superfluous crop, and kept their teeth white gnawing

pippins, who, even under the palms of Cuba, have grateful remembrances of the orchards of the Miami country.

The noisy streets of Havana are very trying. In this land of prodigious rains and a fierce sun, a pavement of wood could hardly fail to be offensive. The wooden pavement does not smell nicely in Paris or London, and here the odor would be alarming. I fear asphalt would become pulpy. Turnpikes in town, however well made, would increase the plague of dust. One day I had a streak of luck—was in haste—called a cabman and gave direction; and lo! he tore through the rattling streets at a speed equal to a jaunting car in Dublin when you have treated and tipped the driver. This is revolutionary, and I hope it will not be noticed by the authorities. I am told it never happened before.

The business men of this city are bearing themselves bravely under very depressing circumstances. Many cannot be making expenses, but are holding on hopefully, believing something will happen to close the war and allow a return to the conditions of prosperity.

The day I was wafted across the harbor in a sail-boat, "my winged boat, a bird afloat," and took a cab, accompanied by the administrator of the transportation, between the ship and the hotel, the people said it was cold, and looked upon those exposed to the inclemency of the weather with interest. The very coldest group of people I ever saw was in Venice, where the band played in St. Mark's Square, the festive Venetians out to hear the icy music were actually blue, and with chill despair gathered their cloaks around them and were as marble in dignity.

It was my impression until now that Italy was a



CORRIDOR IN THE CASINO, HAVANA

southern country as well as Cuba, but there is a difference. The "cold day" in Havana I was happy to be able to walk a few minutes without an overcoat and not find myself in a profuse perspiration, but saw the drivers of the cabs believed the air dangerously frigid. When the Cuban is in trouble he generally gets it "in the neck," and he thinks a cold spell seizes mankind by the throat. His protection from chills is a scarf wound about under the chin. It is fun to see the cabman muffled to the ears, his nose and brow only visible, driving with a hump in his back, feeling that the mighty North is taking liberties in the Land of the Sun.

It is only in exceptional cases that the Americans have the advantage of the Cubans in the services of barbers. We enjoy in Havana cool and spacious barber shops, with reclining chairs, and the barber is as deliberate, artistic, and courteous as anywhere the state of one's hair is highly esteemed. My barber here is almost the barber of my soul. He is tall and erect, with military bearing, and, when I take his chair, lights a cigarette and puffs with evident pleasure while he adjusts a faultless towel and applies the lather with gravity and elaboration, and I behold under his nose a spark and an ash, that is momentarily expected to alight on my nose! But this apprehension has never been justified. When the time comes to handle the razor, the cigarette is removed, a long jet of the precious smoke passes into space, and the mowing machine is so deftly applied, that where there was a field of gray stubble there is soon a satin lawn.

This city has sentiment in it. The mules in the service of the carters are decorated with colored tassels on

their head harness, and apparently know they are admired, even as the gentlemen in London know they are admirable when they walk out with roses in their buttonholes.

The cathedral of Havana is in a closely built quarter of the city, with a small granite-paved square in front and narrow side streets. The front is of venerable aspect and imposing architecture—a heavy stone tower on either hand—the inside is ornate and brilliant. It is here the remains of Columbus—his bones in an urn—were believed to have been placed, when they were, if the treaty was executed, removed from San Domingo at the time that Island was ceded to France. The probability is that they were deposited in Havana, and that the fraud alleged to have been perpetrated by which they were retained, while other bones were conveyed to meet the obligation, was itself a fraud. The bust of Columbus, in marble, on the wall where the bones are said to be, and probably are, is commonplace and true only to the type of men who were early in discovery and exploration of the West Indies. There has been laid inside the cathedral a ponderous and obstructive foundation for a monument to Columbus, but there will be nothing lamentable to grieve over if it always remains unfinished.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE BRITISH AND PROVINCIAL CONQUEST OF CUBA.

How the Island was Invaded, and Havana Captured, After a Bloody and Deadly Siege, in the Summer of 1762, by the British, Under Lord Albemarle, Helped Just in Time by a Force of 2,300 Men from Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, Under General Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam, and then Returned to the Spaniards—Frightful Losses of the Invaders—Havana Looted, and a Prize Money Scandal. The Greed of The British Officers—Did the Provincial Troops Establish a Preëmption Right to the Island?—Colonial and English Sympathy—Washington's Brother in the British Service in the West Indies—A Connecticut Chaplain's Journal of the Plague at Havana—Sad Fate of General Lyman.

WHEN we consider the British capacity to possess good land, and habit of holding fast all they get, and recall how highly the West Indies were esteemed by Europeans in the last century, and that Cuba was worth all the rest of the Archipelago in natural productions and exhaustless fertility, in commanding situation, military and commercial, and in commodious harbors, it is the strangest of Cuban stories that this priceless Pearl of the Antilles should have been the spoil of one of the greatest English expeditions that ever crossed the Atlantic, and handed back to Spain, as if with His Britannic Majesty's festive compliments, as an incident of a transaction not extraordinary.

This happened fourteen years before our Declaration of Independence, and perhaps the British idea was their American colonies possessed so much land there was no

occasion for more. If it had been within English statesmanship to contemplate the grandeur of the Republic of the United States, their sense of propriety as the holders of the soil would surely have impressed them that Cuba should be identified in politics as in commerce with the bulk and potency of the continent.

After a struggle that was dangerous, and cost thousands of lives, Havana, with about one-fourth of Cuba, was surrendered to Lord Albemarle, and if it had been the will of the British government, the whole Island would have belonged to the crown. There was a diplomatic quirk, and Cuba was Spanish again, and when our original colonies became states and United States, we acquired Florida and Louisiana, and were careless about the land between the Mississippi and the Pacific, until we found the Mexicans in our way, and were at the expense of war to regain Texas and California.

Froude, the British historian, delivers the judgment that it was well the British gave up Cuba, after her fair conquest, to Spain, because the Spaniards gave their own blood to the colonies, and built in Cuba, not light structures, but with ponderosity, as in the old peninsula, the most effective method of declaring themselves at home and resolute upon permanency. In many ways British sovereignty in the Island would have changed our fortunes. Almost positively, even after the American colonies had separated from the mother-country, and Rodney defeated the French finally in the West Indies, it would have been within the power and policy of Great Britain, had she continued to hold Cuba as a possession, to have captured New

Orleans, and fenced us in on the west with the Mississippi as was done on the north with the St. Lawrence.

The English must have had a period of modesty, if not timidity, for not only was Rodney not acting under urgency from home when he won his tremendous victory over the French—his activity was disapproved, and orders to be quiet were on the way when he took the responsibility for an aggression that gave his country almost unparalleled prestige, compensating her largely for the loss of the heart of North America, and winning for himself a place among the loftiest reputations in the history of naval heroes.

The same nerveless faltering that surrendered Cuba was that which sought to restrain Rodney. If there had been the courage in the conduct of imperial affairs in 1762 that appeared forty years later, England might have been reinforced in the Napoleonic wars with American troops, as she was in the great French and Indian wars in the middle of the eighteenth century, and in the enterprise, the fruit of which was the futile conquest of Cuba, from which the British general and admiral sailed away laden with booty of gold and silver, and with a fleet of Spanish ships caught in the harbor of Havana. This episode reads like a romance of piracy, for when the spoil was divided, and the high officers got their share, and the dead were buried, the great fleet departed and the Spaniards held, after all, the Pearl of the Antilles.

Lord Albermarle first appeared off the coast of Cuba with an enormous armament—nineteen ships of the line and six frigates and nearly two hundred transport and slaveships—and landed June 17th, 1762. The capture of Havana was the object of the expedition,

but the resistance of the Spanish was resolute and the climate deadly to the troops that had been serving in northern latitudes.

The fact has not been as prominent in our histories as it should have been that, on the 28th of July, in the midst of the sickly season, when five thousand British troops and three thousand sailors were sick and despondent, scratching the burning stones to throw up the trenches from which they were besieging the Moro Castle, suffering from the frightful heat and perishing with thirst, for water was scarce, and there was daily a fearful list of deaths—when there was a dread apprehension that the season of hurricanes was coming, there arrived from New York a welcome reinforcement of twenty-three hundred men under General Lyman of Connecticut, one thousand men from that state, eight hundred from New York, and five hundred from New Jersey. General Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam had been in the Indian and French wars together, and raised the regiment of one thousand men in their state that took so decided a part in the Cuban conquest. Lyman was in command of the brigade, and Lieutenant-Colonel Putnam was acting colonel of the Connecticut regiment.

As they approached the coast of Cuba there was a storm, and the ship, carrying Putnam's fortunes and five hundred men, was driven on rocks about thirty miles from Havana and totally lost, but owing to Yankee skill every man was saved on rafts constructed of the spars and other timbers of the vessel lashed together by harpoon lines, of which there was a good stock aboard. It was one of the most remarkable escapes in the records of shipwreck, and not only were the

Connecticut men saved from the rage of the sea, but they were not, when cast away on a hostile shore, molested by the Spaniards. The whole force of the provincial troops joined Lord Albemarle's army in good form, reporting in fine health and zealous for service.

This arrival put heart in the British and discouraged the Spaniards. The work of the siege was carried on with renewed vigor, and on the 13th of August the city surrendered, and the news was most welcome to the exhausted English, while the American troops had been stricken by sickness and were dying at a dreadful rate, a single month's exposure having resulted in a deplorable condition of the men, many of whom were already gone, killed in the trenches or passing away in the insufficient hospitals. Of the fate of the gallant provincials, we read in Trumbull's "History of Connecticut," that "New England, by her zeal in this enterprise, sustained a very considerable loss of men. Scarcely any of the private soldiers, and but few of the officers, ever returned. Such as were not killed in the service were generally swept away by the great mortality which prevailed in the fleet and army."

Trumbull says of the immense enterprise carried out with such hardship, so costly and triumphant and so easily squandered with facile imbecility :

Lord Albemarle was appointed to command the operations by land. His lordship had been trained to war from his youth, under the command of the Duke of Cumberland. The fleet destined for the service was under the command of Admiral Pocock, who had before commanded with such success in the East Indies. The object of the expedition was the Havana. In this centred the whole trade and navigation of the Spanish West Indies. The fleet sailed from Portsmouth on the

5th of March. This was to be reinforced by a squadron from Martinique, under the command of Sir James Douglass. On the twenty-seventh of May two fleets formed a junction at Cape Nichola, the northwest point of Hispaniola. The fleet consisted of thirty-seven ships of war, with nearly an hundred and fifty transports. The land force on board was about ten thousand men. Four thousand regular troops from New York were ordered to join them at the Havana. A considerable number of provincials enlisted under their own officers and served in this arduous enterprise. The whole land force, when collected, would amount to about fifteen or sixteen thousand men.

The admiral was not insensible how much the success of the expedition depended on despatch, that it might be carried into execution before the coming on of the hurricane months. Therefore, instead of keeping the common track of the galleons to the north of Cuba which was much the safest, though far the most tedious passage, he determined to pursue his course from east to west, through the Straits of Bahama. This is a narrow passage, about seven hundred miles in length. It is bounded on the right and left with so many shoals and sands that the navigation is dangerous for single ships. Yet such were the cautions and admirable dispositions of the admiral that he carried this fleet of nearly two hundred sail safely through this perilous passage. On the 5th of June, Havana, the object of this long voyage, and of so many anxious hopes and fears, presented itself to the view of the fleet and army. On the seventeenth the troops were landed, and for more than two months every exertion of courage, every art of war, with the most invincible patience and perseverance, under almost insuperable difficulties, were unitedly employed by officers and soldiers, by the fleet and army, for the reduction of this important island. The fortresses were strong by nature and art. The enemy made a gallant and noble defense. The climate was burning, and the want of water great and almost insufferably distressing. Never were British valor and resolution put to a severer trial. Some of the soldiers dropped down dead, under the pressure of heat, thirst and fatigue. Before the middle of July the army, in this unwholesome and burning region, and under the rigor of such extraordinary services, was reduced to half its original numbers. *Five thousand soldiers and three thousand seamen were ill at one time.* The hearts of the most sanguine sunk within them while they saw this fine army wasting by disease, and they could not but tremble for that noble fleet which had so long been exposed along the open shore and must, in all human probability, suffer inevitable ruin should

the hurricane season come on before the reduction of the place. As the season advanced the prospect grew more and more unfavorable. But when the troops were on the point of total despondency the arrival of troops from North America revived their drooping spirits, gave fresh vigor to their operations, and was of the most signal service.

Such was the zeal of the New Englanders in his majesty's service, that not only many of them enlisted with a particular view to the reduction of the Havana: but such of them as had assisted in the conquest of Martinique, and by reason of sickness had set off in three ships for their native country for their recovery, soon finding their health restored, ordered the ships about, and steering directly for Havana, shared in the dangers and honors of that glorious enterprise.

In Hollister's "History of Connecticut" we read of the conduct of Putnam in the shipwreck scene, and the fate of the heroes :

A terrible storm now arose, and the transport that bore Lieutenant-Colonel Putnam, with five hundred men, making one-half of the Connecticut regiment, was driven on a rift of craggy rocks and wrecked. Thus separated from the rest of the fleet, so that he could hope for no aid from any external source, the surf rolling mountain high, and dashing against the sides of the ship with such force that she threatened to part her timbers at every stroke of the sea, this brave officer, looking calmly in the face of death, maintained, above the noise of the waves, a discipline that enabled him to issue all his orders without interruption, and secured an obedience to them as perfect as if the bold-hearted men whom he commanded had stood upon the ridges of their own cornfields.

In this appalling situation every man who could wield a saw or a hammer was employed in making rafts from spars, planks, and the scanty and scattered materials that came to hand. In this way a part of the men were landed at the great risk of being drifted far out into the sea. After a few of the men had been safely disembarked, ropes were lashed to the rafts, and those who had thus gained the shore, aided in pulling their companions to the beach. Such was the address and caution exercised by Putnam in this most critical of all conditions, that not a man was lost. Colonel Putnam now pitched his camp and remained several days within twenty-four miles of the enemy at Carthagena. At last the storm abated, and the convoy soon after took them aboard and carried them to Havana.

The climate proved fatal to a large proportion of our soldiers who went upon this expedition. Of the thousand brave men who sailed for Havana, and who aided in reducing it, with all its shipping and military stores, to the dominion of the British crown, a mere handful ever returned to lay their bones in their native soil. A few officers, and here and there a straggling soldier, wasted to a skeleton, were the sole survivors of that fatal campaign, in which victory and death went hand in hand.

This historian Hollister worthily celebrates the record of the colony of Connecticut in the memorable French and Spanish wars, which lasted eight years, when closed by the peace of 1773, saying that during those years: "The sons of the colony had found their graves in every part of the continent, and had been laid to rest beneath the waters of the West Indian seas. No colony, in proportion to her population, had furnished an equal number of men. Again and again she had sent into the field a duplicate supply of troops beyond those demanded of her, to make up for the deficiency that she had but too good reason to think would exist in some of those provinces less embued with the spirit of liberty and less devoted to the cause of humanity. She had also paid out of her own treasury, after deducting the pittance that she had received from parliament, more than four hundred thousand pounds—far surpassing, according to her wealth, the amount paid by any other of the colonies; and the exploits of her gallant officers—her Lymans, her Whitings, her Parsons, her Dyers, her Spencers, her Hinmans, her Coits, her Fitches, her Durkees, her Woosters, her Putnams, and her Wolcotts—were as glorious as their fame will be immortal."

C. C. Hazewell says, in his paper on the "Conquest of Cuba," contributed to an early number of the *Atlantic*

Magazine: "Of the many conquests which were made by the English in the Seven Years' War, no one was more remarkable than that which placed Havana and its neighborhood in their hands, virtually giving them possession of the Island of Cuba; and the manner in which they disposed of their magnificent prize, when George III. forced peace upon his unwilling subjects, was among the causes of their failure to conquer the Thirteen States in the War for Independence." It is related that among the laborers of the English "were five hundred black slaves, purchased, for the use of the expedition, at Antigua and Martinique." This was, of course, a long time before the English developed their talent in abolishing slavery. The English fleet attempted to support the siege of the Moro, but "were roughly received by the Spaniards, and lost one hundred and eighty-two men, besides being greatly damaged in hull, masts, and rigging, so that they were forced to abandon the conflict without having made any impression on the fortress, though they had effected an important diversion in favor of the land batteries." The Spaniards made one desperate sally, and if they had succeeded, the siege would have been abandoned; but they were beaten back with heavy loss, and "in this action a battalion of North Americans bore a prominent part, aiding to drive the first Spanish column to the water, where one hundred and fifty men were drowned."

The commander of the Moro, when the castle was stormed—an operation which cost the English but two officers and thirty men—refused to retreat, and was mortally wounded. The Spaniards lost on the spot 530 men besides the drowned, and the English turned their

batteries upon the city and pounded it with forty-five guns. When it was surrendered, besides "Havana and its immediate territory, the terms of the surrender placed in the hands of the English as much of the Island of Cuba as extended one hundred and eighty miles to the west, which belonged to the government of the place. This was a great conquest, and it was in the power of the conquerors to become masters of the whole Island."

The news of the capture of Havana reached Philadelphia in fourteen days, and was published in the *Boston Gazette*, September 13th, with the concluding statement that the spoil amounted to "fourteen million milled dollars."

The victory was celebrated all over New England, and throughout the colonies great pride was taken in belonging to the conquering nation. Hazewell says of the Canadian conquest: "It is certain that those victories had greatly exalted the American heart; and now that they were followed by the conquest of Cuba, made at the expense of a great nation with which England was at peace when Quebec and Montreal had passed into her possession, it is not strange that our ancestors should have become more impressed than ever with the honor of belonging to the British empire. They were not only loyal, but they were loyal to a point that resembled fanaticism."

The *Boston Gazette* states that one of the captured Spanish ships had five million dollars on board, that almost forty million dollars in specie had already been counted, and that the share of Lord Albemarle would give him an income of twelve thousand pounds per annum, and Admiral Pocock was to have an equal



ALPHONSE XIII, KING OF SPAIN

amount ; and this was only an exaggeration. Gov. Bernard of Massachusetts, at the request of the assembly, issued a proclamation for a public thanksgiving on the 7th of October. After enumerating various causes for thankfulness that existed, all of which related to victories won in different parts of the world, his excellency proceeded to say : " But above all, with hearts full of gratitude and amazement, we must contemplate the glorious and important conquest of the Havana, which, considering the strength of the place, the resolution of the defendants and the unhealthiness of the climate, seems to have the visible hand of God in it, and to be designed by His Providence to punish the pride and injustice of that prince who has so unnecessarily made himself a party in this war."

The great British officers took the spoil, giving the soldiers and inferior officers but little, and in the division, these figures showing the relations of rank to gold as well as glory, but not in the sense that Burns wrote : " The rank is but the guinea's stamp ; the man's the gold," etc.

Sir George Pocock was placed on the same footing as Lord Albemarle, and Commodore Keppel with Lieutenant-General Elliot ; the shares of the two former having amounted to £122,697 10s. 6d. each, and of those of each of the two seconds in command £24,539 10s. 1d. The spoil was in fact equally divided between the two services, having amounted altogether to £736,185 3s., or £368,092 11s. 6d. each. But although the services and chiefs were placed on an equality, the same rule could not be observed with the officers and privates. The share of a major-general was £6,816 10s. 6½d., that of a brigadier-general, £1,947, 11s. 7d.; that of an officer of the staff, £564 14s. 6d.; that of a captain, £184 4s. 7¼d.; that of a subaltern £116 3s. ¼d.; that of a sergeant £8 18s. 8d.; that of a corporal £6 16s. 6d., and that of a private soldier, £4 1s. 8½d. The share of a captain in the navy was

£1,600 10s. 10d.; of a lieutenant £234 13s. 3¾d.; of the other commissioned officers, £118 5s. 11¼d.; of warrant officers, £17 5s. 3d., and of ordinary seamen, £3 14s. 9¾d.

Hazewell says of the bad bargain England made in the treaty by which she gave up Cuba :

She had obtained Florida, which was of no worth to her, and she had given up the Havana, which might have been made one of her most useful acquisitions. That place became the chief American port of the great alliance that was formed against England after she had become committed to war with the new United States. Great fleets and armies were there assembled, which did the English much mischief. Florida was reconquered by an expedition from the Havana, and another expedition was successful in an attack on Nassau; and Jamaica was threatened. Had England not given up the place to the Spaniards, not only would these things have been impossible, but she might have employed it with effect in her own military operations, and have maintained her ascendancy in the West-Indian seas. Or, if she had preferred that course, she might have made it the price of Spain's neutrality during the American war, returning it to her on condition that she should not assist the United States; and as the Family Compact then existed in all its force, Spain's influence might have been found sufficiently powerful to prevent France from giving that assistance to our fathers which undoubtedly secured their independence. All subsequent history has been deeply colored by the surrender of the Havana in 1763. But for that, Washington and his associates might have failed. But for that, the French Revolution might have been postponed, as that revolution was precipitated through the existence of financial difficulties which were largely owing to the part France took in the war that ended in the establishment of our nationality. But for that, England might have secured and consolidated her American dominion, and the House of Hanover at this moment been ruling over the present United States.

The most thorough account of the conquest of Cuba by the English and Americans is that of Thomas Mante, published in London in 1772—a chapter of “The History of the Late War in America.” The historian,

Mante appreciated the dignity of his subject, and calls Havana the key of the riches of Mexico. The army was to be composed of 15,000 men, only 4,000 to go from England, 8,000 were already in the Indies, and the rest were to be supplied from North America. On arriving at Cuba the British fleet mustered :

SHIPS OF THE LINE.	GUNS.	CAPTAINS.	FRIGATES.	CAPTAINS.
Namur.....	90....	Harrison.	Sutherland.....	Everett.
Valiant.....	74....	Duncan.	Thunder.....	
Culloden.....	74....	Barker.	Lizard.....	Bankes.
Pembroke.....	60....	Wheelock.	Mercury.....	Goodall
Orford.....	66....	Arbuthnot.	Glasgow.....	Douglas.
Temeraire.....	74....	Barton.	Grenado.....	
Rippon.....	60....	Jekel.	Trent.....	Lindlay.
Marlborough.....	68....	Burnett.	Cerebus.....	Webber.
Belleisle.....	64....	Knight.	Alarm.....	Almes.
Dragon.....	74....	Hervey.	Dover.....	Ogle.
Centuar.....	74....	Lampriere.	Richmond.....	Elphinstone.
Edgar.....	60....	Drake.	Ferrett.....	
Alcide.....	64....	Hankerson.	Bonetta.....	
Devonshire.....	66....	Marshall.	Basilisk.....	
Defiance.....	60....	M'Kenzie.	Echo.....	Lendrick.
Dublin.....	74....	Gascoigne.	Lurcher.....	
Cambridge.....	80....	Goosetree.	Enterprise.....	Holton.
Hampton-Court.....	64....	Innis.	Porcupine.....	
Stirling-Castle.....	64....	Campbell.	Cygnets.....	Napier.
Temple.....	70....	Legge.	Peggy.....	
Nottingham.....	60....	Collingwood.		
Intrepid.....	60....	Hale.		

The following regiments composed the army :

FROM ENGLAND.

9th, Whitmore's.....	977
34th, Lord Frederic Cavendish.....	976
56th, Major-General Keppel.....	933
72d, Duke of Richmond.....	986
Volunteers.....	217
Royal Artillery.....	270
Brigade of Engineers.....	6

FROM NORTH AMERICA.

15th, Amherst's.....	243
17th, Monckton's.....	535
27th, Blakeney's.....	536
28th, Townsend's.....	378
35th, Otway's.....	471
40th, Armiger's.....	380
42nd, Second Battalion Royal Highlanders.....	484
43d, Talbot's.....	380
48th, Webb's.....	525
60th, Third Battalion Royal Americans.....	587
Royal Artillery.....	107
Brigade Engineers.....	9
	<hr/> 5,382
From England and North America.....	9,747

FROM SOUTH CAROLINA.

1st Regiment (four companies)....	320
77th, Montgomery's.....	605
95th, Burton's.....	585
	<hr/> 1,510

FROM DOMINICA.

22nd,	602
94th, Vaughan's.....	387
	<hr/> 989

FROM GUADALOUPE.

4th,	225
65th, Malpass.....	104
100th, Campbell's.....	356
	<hr/> 685

FROM ANTIGUA.

38th, Watson's.....	289
	<hr/> 289

FROM BELLEISLE.

69th, Colville's.....	556
76th, Two Battalions, Rufane.....	1048
90th, Morgan's.....	465
98th, Grey's.....	370
	<hr/> 2,439
Total.....	15,659

Out of the above troops, Lord Albemarle, besides leaving some sick at Martinique, garrisoned it with

The 69th.....	556
76th.....	1,048
And St. Lucia, Dominica, Grenada, and the Grenadillas with the	
38th.....	289
94th.....	387
98th.....	370
100th.....	356
	<hr/> 4,308
So that there remained for the Havana expedition but.....	11,351

The whole fleet consisted of :

Ships of the line.....	23
Frigates, bomb-ketches, fire-ships, and their tenders.....	24
Transport ships, with troops on board.....	93
Artillery ships.....	16
Hospital ships.....	8
Provision ships.....	24
Ships with fascines.....	4
Ships with negroes.....	2
Ships with horses.....	3
Ships with the baggage of general officers.....	6
Total.....	<hr/> 203

The governor of Jamaica had been ordered to raise 2,000 "stout negroes" for laborers, and 500 "negroes accustomed to arms," but Lord Albemarle feared delay, and "prudently gave orders, at all events, for the purchasing of 800 or 1,000 negroes at Martinique, St. Christopher's, and Antigua."

The Spaniards got together nearly 30,000 men, and their fleet continued at anchor in the harbor.

The siege of the Moro was one of the severest struggles in modern warfare—the Spaniards fought in first-class style, and gave the British gun for gun. When the work was hardest and the fight hottest, there arrived a reinforcement, white and black, gratefully received from Jamaica ; but we quote the English historian :

A much more useful fleet was expected from North America with a reinforcement of men and stores ; and accordingly a thousand impatient and languishing looks were cast out for it ; but all in vain ; not one ship of it yet appeared. Notwithstanding, such was the spirit of the men and the ardor of the officers, that twenty guns were mounted by the 16th. But in order to account for the rapid erection of these works, we must inform the reader that all the artillery, ammunition, and stores, being ready on shore, were now carried by a reinforcement of fifteen hundred negroes, which had arrived from Jamaica, whose legislature behaved on this occasion in a manner that does them infinite honor. Though the ordinary price of labor there was fifteen pence sterling a day, these negroes were furnished for the use of government, at the moderate rate of five pence sterling.

The Spaniards made a brave sally for the relief of the Moro and failed, and the English had new hopes, and these hopes "became more lively by the arrival, on the 27th of July, of part of the long expected reinforcement from North America, under Brigadier Burton, which had sailed from New York on the 11th of June." The fall of Havana was on the 13th of August, and the Spanish fleet surrendered by the capitulation comprised the following ships of war :

El Tigre,.....	of 70 guns commanded by the Marquis del
	Real Transporte, Admiral and Commander-in-chief.
L'America,.....	60
" Infanta.....	70
El Soverano.....	70
La Reyna.....	70
El Aquilon.....	70
El Conquistador.....	60
El Santo Antonio.....	60
El Santo Geniare.....	60
La Thetis.....	18
La Vanganza.....	22
El Marte.....	18
El Neptuno.....	70
El Asia.....	60
La Europa.....	60
One of.....	80
One of.....	60

} Both newly launched and fitted out.

} Taken by the Alarm.

} Taken at Mariel by the Defiance.

} Sunk in the entrance of the harbor.

} On the stocks.

And besides, one royal company's ship was taken, one sunk, and a third burnt. Mante remarks :

In the acquisition of the Havana were combined all the advantages that could be procured in war. It was a military victory of the first magnitude; it was equal to the greatest naval victory by its effects on the marine of the Spaniards, who lost on that occasion a whole fleet. The vast quantity of tobacco and sugar collected at the Havana on the Spanish monarch's account, sold on the spot, exclusive of the ships and merchandise sent to, and sold in England, for seven hundred thousand pounds, which was divided amongst the conquerors.

Though a great part of the provisions brought from England had been spoiled by the heat of the climate, the most distressing circumstances of the campaign was the scarcity of water. Of the vast catalogue of human ills, thirst is the most intolerable. On this occasion it soon caused the tongue to swell, extend itself without the lips, and become black as in a state of mortification; then the whole frame became a prey to the most excruciating agonies, till death at length intervened and gave the unhappy sufferer relief. In this way hundreds resigned themselves to eternity. A greater number fell victims to a putrid fever. From the appearance of perfect health, three or four short hours robbed them of existence. Many there were who endured a loathsome disease for days, nay weeks together, living in a state of putrefaction, their bodies full of vermin, and almost eaten away before the spark of life was extinguished. The carrion crows of the country kept constantly hovering over the graves which rather hid than buried the dead, and frequently scratched away the scanty earth, leaving in every mangled corpse a spectacle of unspeakable loathsomeness and terror to those who, by being engaged in the same enterprise, were exposed to the same fate. Hundreds of carcases were seen floating on the ocean.

The Earl of Albemarle being expressly ordered when the Havana service should be over to return the same number of troops to North America that he might receive from thence, he embarked the fifth brigade for that continent; but most of them died in the passage or in the hospitals immediately on their arrival; and the artillery sent with them was entirely lost at sea. The troops which remained were not much more fortunate, being by this time so reduced by sickness that even seven hundred could not be mustered in a condition to do duty.

It was a great victory—an awful sum of wretchedness. Thousands of young men perished, and the Island was tossed over to Spain as though it had not on it the costly stain of the English and American blood—shed there, it seemed, for prize money only.

The lowest estimate of the plunder of Havana is \$14,000,000, but the poor men got a lean share and the great chiefs were enriched. Colonel Cleveland, who commanded the artillery, selected the church bells for an item of plunder, and the bishop protested to Albemarle, who replied that, “when a city was besieged and taken, the commander of the artillery receives a gratification, and that Colonel Cleveland had made the demand with his lordship’s concurrence.”

The bishop offered to redeem the bells one thousand dollars, and the colonel named thirty thousand as his price—but Albemarle thought ten thousand would do—and the bells were ordered taken down. Then the bishop paid the “gratification,” and the bells still are ringing. Albemarle concluded he wanted more money and wrote this polite note to the venerable bishop :

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SIR:—I am sorry to be under the necessity of writing to your lordship what ought to have been thought of some days ago, namely, a donation from the church to the commander-in-chief of the victorious army. The least that your lordship can offer will be one hundred thousand dollars. I wish to live in peace with your lordship and with the church, as I have shown in all that has hitherto occurred, and I hope that your lordship will not give me reason to alter my intentions. I kiss your lordship’s hand. Your humble servant,

ALBEMARLE.

As the bishop could not pay, and threatened appeal to the courts of England, Albemarle issued a proclamation declaring “that the conduct of the bishop was se-

ditionous ; that he had forgotten that he was now a subject of Great Britain ; and that it was absolutely necessary he should be expelled from the Island, and sent to Florida in one of the British ships of war, in order that tranquillity might be maintained, and that good correspondence and harmony might continue between the new and the old subjects of the king, which the conduct of the bishop had visibly interrupted." Many remember Albemarle in Havana well, and hate him yet. He not only had a monstrous appetite for money—he so misused a church—made a stable of it, the Spaniards say, that it was so defiled it has never been reconsecrated. It is a solemn stone affair—with a grim steeple that was thought a few years ago to be leaning and dangerous, but it bore itself so stiffly it could not be pulled down, and the conclusion was it must be perpendicular ; and so it stands and is regarded as a monument of the English occupation that should be a reproach to any people.

There is no episode of our colonial history more impressive as showing the martial and adventurous character of the people, and their union with the English in national spirit and sympathy, than the important part they took, with hearty good will and cheer, in their most timely and powerful reinforcement of the Havana expedition, that culminated in a glorious feat of arms, but terminated in a prize-money scandal, and an outbreak of frightfully fatal disease, and the ridiculous, uncalled-for resubmission of the inestimable Island to Spain with a long train, not yet ended, of lamentable consequences. Unfortunately the records are so imperfect that the story can only be presented in fragments.

We have much pleasure in recognizing the success of

the New York Branch of the Society of Colonial Wars in collecting and making available the scanty but precious material. There are abundant documents comparatively of the revolutionary times, but the presentation of such papers as exist relating to military matters for the colonial period, while intelligently attempted, was rather due to fortunate accidents than to systematic effort.

The report of the Committee on Historical Documents of the Society of Colonial Wars on the part the colonies took in the expeditions against the Spanish, 1740-1742, published in the Society's Year Book of 1894, and addressed to the general court of the Society of Colonial Wars in the state of New York, is valuable for showing the steadiness with which the colonies were relied upon to aid the English in establishing themselves in the West Indies. The report on historical documents opens with the statement that there was an effort made to prepare a muster-roll of the colonial troops, but "after a good deal of investigation into the public records of the several states of Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, and after communicating with a number of officials and gentlemen of learning in these states, your committee is unable to prepare a complete muster-roll."

A requisition was made by George II., in the thirteenth year of his reign, upon all the colonies north of Carolina, to send four battalions to assist the expedition against Cartagena under Admiral Vernon.

At a general assembly held at Williamsburg, August 1, 1740, an act was passed directing the treasurer of the colony to pay Lieutenant-Governor William Gooch,

Esq., five thousand pounds, to be applied towards providing victuals, transports, and other necessities for the soldiers raised in the colony for service in the Spanish war (5 Hening's "Statutes at Large," page 121).

"The act recites that his most sacred Majesty (George II.), for vindicating the honor of his crown, for securing the trade and commerce of his subjects, and for revenging the cruelties, depredations and insults committed by the subjects of Spain upon those of Great Britain, thought it necessary to enter into a war with Spain."

The result was his majesty wanted help and "recommended and required of his good subjects" to provide certain expenses. The committee report :

There is little doubt that at least three companies were formally enrolled from Virginia, for it appears in the Executive Journal under date of August 6, 1740, that the following were commissioned :

Captains :

LAWRENCE WASHINGTON, CHARLES WALKER, RICHARD BUSHROD.

Lieutenants :

FRANCIS MOSS, — BELLONY, LEWIS BROWNE.

Ensigns :

WILLIAM FITZHUGH, HUGH ROSS, — YOUNG, — PILOT

Under date of May 31, 1740, there is an entry in the Executive Journal of an estimate of "three hundred and fifty pounds of shipping required to transport men that have or shall be raised in this colony for his majesty's service."

It is well known that Lawrence Washington actually served in this expedition. The "Magazine of Ameri-

can History," Vol. II., page 436, N. Y., 1878, has a letter from him, written from Jamaica, 1741.

Lawrence Washington was a brother of George Washington, and Mount Vernon, that was inherited by George, was named by Lawrence after his old friend and companion in arms, Admiral Vernon, who had charge of the expedition.

The destruction by fire of the capitol building at Richmond destroyed the rolls, but there are hopes that copies may be found in the foreign office, London.

The only New York muster-roll is this of a company raised in New Rochelle :

Captain :

ANTHONY LISPENARD.

Lieutenant :

WILL LE CONTE.

Ensign :

JOSEPH PELL.

Privates :

JOSEPH DONALDSON,	JAMES CAMBEY,
THOMAS BOLT,	NICHOLAS VALLET,
ROBERT CLEMENT,	DARIUS LUNT,
JOHN CONSTANT, JR.,	JOHN JAMES PILLIOND,
WILLIAM BRIDGES.	

The prominence of Connecticut in the Havana expedition, 1762, has been apparent, and by the courtesy of the Historical Committee we have the advantage of using the advance sheets of the Society of the Colonial Wars' 1895 Year Book, a valuable publication, The Journal of a chaplain with the expedition has the following title page :

"Extracts from the Journal of the Reverend John Graham, Chaplain of the First Connecticut Regiment, Colonel Lyman, from September 25th to October 19th, 1762, at the Siege of Havana. Printed by Order of the Fourth General Court of the Society of Colonial Wars in the State of New York, Office of the Society, 37 Liberty Street, New York, 1896."

Committee on Historical Documents.

EDWARD F. DELANCEY,

GOUVERNEUR M. SMITH, M. D.,

WILLIAM G. VER PLANCK,

ABRAHAM B. VALENTINE,

CHARLES ISHAM, *Secretary.*

The Journal is introduced with this note :

This Journal gives, with the fervid and formal religious language of a Connecticut Congregational clergyman of the last century, vivid statements of the sufferings of the British army, regulars and provincials, at the siege of Havana in 1762. It also contains valuable statements of the numbers of the British regiments, and the names of the provincial troops, and the names and strength of the men-of-war engaged in the reduction of that strong Spanish city; facts that are difficult to obtain, except in large public libraries.

The Rev. John Graham, who was born in Exeter, New Hampshire, in 1722, and who graduated from Yale College in 1740, was of the same name and profession as his father. The elder Rev. John Graham, M.A., received his degree from the University of Glasgow. He emigrated to Boston in 1718, and married, first, Abigail, a daughter of Dr. Chauncey. At the time of the birth of John, junior, he was settled at Exeter, but removed later to Stafford, Conn., and was subsequently ordained minister over the Church in Woodbury, Conn., where he remained forty-two years—until his death.

The son was, in 1746, minister of the West Parish of Suffield, then in Massachusetts, but since 1752 in Connecticut, and practiced medicine, as well as administering the affairs of his congregation.

In 1761 he accompanied the expedition against Havana, in the capacity of chaplain to the provincial forces, under General Phineas Lyman

of Connecticut, an intimate friend of the Graham family. The Connecticut Brigade of twenty-three hundred men joined the regular troops, and other provincials at Staten Island, whence the expedition sailed on the 18th of November, 1761. The combined forces, having captured Martinique on February 14th, and Havana on August 13th, 1762, succumbed to an epidemic of fever, by far the deadliest foe they had encountered. The Journal of Graham, although fragmentary, gives a vivid picture of the sufferings of these victors, and of their anxiety to relinquish their conquest.

The author was not always careful to write himself junior, hence there might be difficulty in identifying him as the chaplain, since his father had already served with Lyman in the operations against Crown Point. Allusions, however, in the Journal to his children, Love and Narcissus, appear to settle this question beyond a doubt. The Rev. John Graham, Jr., like his father, was twice married, the girl and boy he mentions being children by his first wife, Mary Sheldon.

At the outbreak of the Revolution he was an ardent Whig, and so continued to the end. He died in 1790.

Notices of the Grahams may be found in Spagués' "Annals of the Pulpit," and in Dexter's "Yale Biographies;" also in Cothren's "History of Ancient Woodbury."

Many of the manuscripts and letters of the family were in the possession of the late John Lorrimer Graham, of Flushing, Long Island.

The committee are indebted for this Havana Journal to the courtesy of the Rev. B. F. De Costa, D.D., of this city.

New York, Dec. 16, 1895.

The Rev. John Graham's Journal was in two parts, and only the second has been found, but hope of recovering the first has not been abandoned. That which we have and reproduce in full—for it is a broken block of honest history and beyond estimation in value—begins after the capture of Havana, and says nothing directly of the siege, but gives a quaint and vivid picture of the plague which confirms the frightful narrative we have quoted from the historian, Mante.



A NARROW STREET AND CATHEDRAL, HAVANA

JOURNAL OF THE REV. JOHN GRAHAM,

SHOWING HOW THE PROVINCIAL SOLDIERS PERISHED BEFORE HAVANA OF
A FEVER THAT WAS LIKE THE PLAGUE.

SATURDAY, Sept. 25, 1762.—A pleasant morning, nothing extraordinary happened the last Night—but Sable night in gloomy Majesty sat upon the Camp, a Season, when men used to labour and fatigue in ye day retire from Labour to recline their weary Limbs, and refresh themselves with rest. . . . But in Camp how wide the difference, the Season true, invites to Rest but alas the heavy murmurs that humme among the Tents, and bursting groans from throbbing hearts Seized with panick, horror and Surprise because febrile flame kindles upon their vitals, or Tyrant pain, Tyger like preys upon their Bones or as a harpy Devours their entrails, forbids repose—nor Sooner did I deposit my weary Limbs in Bed and embrace the delectable pillow, but groan echoes to groan, and Sigh rises upon Sigh not unlike the waves and billows of a Raging Sea. . . . Thus with our Melancholly Camp a fatal disease enters tent after Tent, and with irresistable force strikes hands with soldier after Soldier, and with hostile violence Seizes the brave, the bold, the hearty and the Strong, no force of arms, no Strength of Limbs, no Solemn vows, no piteous moans, no heartrending Groans, no vertue in means, no Skill of Physicians can free from the Tyrant hand, but death cruel death that stands Just behind, draws the Curtain, Shews himself to the unhappy prisoner, and with peircing Sound Cried thou art, and at once throws his fatal dart, and fast binds them in Iron Chains—or Some disease in a Milder way Salutes them, and more gently treats them, but by Sure and certain Steps flatters them along by Slow degrees till they are introduced into the hands of unrelenting death. . . . Others roll from Side to Side, and turn into every posture to find ease from pain that wrack their Tortured limbs—others that are yet untouch'd with diseases Called from their rest to help -- the distressed; hearken and likly you'l hear them as they pass along, return oaths for groans and Curses for Sighs *horrible to hear!* Thus death in Camp reigns and has Tryumphed over Scores already, and diseases has hundreds fast bound as prisoners—and how few alas how few are prisoners of Hope.

But are Soldiers the only persons attacked or exposed? *Verilly* no, where are the Capts. the Lt. and Ensign that lately appeared and adorned our Camp, now Succeded by others in the Same Command; are they

not become victims to Death, and Now held prisoners in the Grave on this Barbarous land, their deposited with many of their bold Soldiers till the last trumpet shall wake the Sleeping dead. . . . But heark mithink I hear a different voice, uttering heavy Groans where is it? Surely its in the next Tent, O the officers of the field, Certainly no deference paid to Rank—The 2d in Command in the Regiment is Seized with Cold Chills that pass through every part, throws all nature into violent agitation and Shakes the whole frame; a febrile flame Succeeds, this alternate, till his vigorous and active limbs becomes feeble, and his ruddy Countenance, put on a pale and Languide hue—yet he lives. . . . Thus night after night are we accosted with the cries and Groan of the Sick and dying.

Lamentations, Mourning and Woe in all most every Tent; and what hearts so hard? Who so past all Sensation, thats invested with any Degree of humanity, as not to feel a Sympathetic Smart. . . .

SABBATH DAY, Sept. 26, 1762.—This the day by divine appointment Sanctified and set apart to divine Use and Service; that we in the Dialogue are Commanded to Remember and keep holy. . . .

No occurrences uncommon in Camp this Day—no publick Services.

MONDAY, Sept. 27, 1762.—The affairs in Camp are as usual—a Rumor prevails, that the Troops are to Embark in a few days.

An account of the Troops that Served in the Siege of the Havanah:

Regular Troops.	4 Independt Companies.
1st, 4th, 8th, 9th, 15th, 17,	2. Companies Gorham Rangers.
22, 27, 28, 34, 35, 40. 5th, 42.	1st Connecticutt Regiment.
2d, 42, 43, 46, 48, 49, 56,	6. Companies New York.
58, 60, 65, 72, 73, 77, 90,	2. Do. New Jersey.
95.	3. Do. Rho Island.

5300 Negroes from Jamaica, Barbados and the Windward Islands.

Navy—17 Ships of the Line, 23 Frigates.

TUESDAY, Sept. 28, 1762.—The last night as well as the preceding day, Sultry Hott, had but little rest—my Ears constantly acosted with the groans and outcrys of the Sick and distressed: that the Camp is no other than a constant Scene of Woe, and misery opened, where the actors are a Collect Society of the most unhappy and unfortunate, forlornly wretched—Cast upon some Barbarous Land, among a Savage kind that know no pity, but there tender Mercies are Cruelty—where they are Smitten by the Sun by day, and the Sickly moon by night that in ye day the drought consume them, and Hurtfull damps by night—nor releafe

can be afforded, there pitying friends that stand around with pained hearts, can only tell them necessary Comforts and means are not to be had—what a word is this to be Sounded in Ears of those ready to die.

But turn my thots, and who are these—behold a Number, Straggling along the road—awfull, how they look? what appearance do they make? not unlike walking ghost, Just come from the Shades—but viewing more narrowly find them to be men. Crawled out of their Tent, wasted with Sickness : their flesh all consumed, there bones looking thro the Skin, a Mangie and pale Countenance, Eyes almost Sunk into there heads, with a dead and downcast look—hands weak, knees feeble, Joints Trembling—leaning upon Staves like men bowed and over loaded with old age, and as they Slowly move along Stagger and Reel, like drunken men—pityfull objects. Passing by these, there lyes one fal en down thro weakness by the wayside, there another, and another, yea Sundry more, in the Same Condition, unable to help themselves—there two or three fainted away—others crawling, according to their strength, not unlike the Snail in motion, with a little water to reveive them, as the best Cordial that can be produced. There sets a Number that walked a few rods and there strength is exhausted and are seated on the ground to recruit, that they may return to there Tents. Younder goes four of the stouter Sort lugging their Capt. that stept a little from his tent, fainted away, Back to his Tent again. There goes one, Supported by one under each Arm—goes did I say? rather he is in this manner Carried, for scare has he power to Set one foot before the other, nor can his feeble trembling knees one half support his frame, tho but a Shadow. There another and another in like manner convey along from one tent to another. Just behind is brot along another in his Blanket strung upon two poles—Carried by four. Just by, Six Soldiers take up there Captain upon their Shoulders as he lies pale and helpless in his bed, his bedstead serves as a Byer, and his Curtains waving in the wind as a pawl, in this manner conveyed from his Tent in Camp to a Neighbouring Room, if possible to prevent the extinction of the remaining Sparks of Life. There is one, two, three Graves open'd, here they come with as many Corps, there blankets both there winding sheet and Coffins ; scarce have they finished the interment of these, but a messenger comes in hast to tell them, they must open a grave or two more, for Such a one is dead, and another is dying.

Some there rage and fury seems to be turn'd against God himself—and will knaw their tongues for Anguish and pain, and blaspheme the God of heaven, because of their pain and distress, and repent not of their

deeds—yea Curse their King and God looking upward—at a little distance another lies, not a murmur heard from his Mouth, but seems to be thankfull for everything he Receives, and thinks every favor to be more than he deserves ; another a little revived feels Some appetite or food, and he complains he shall be Starved to Death—another without Compliment lays hold of anything that comes in his way, and with his Teeth soon puts a period to life, another groans under a Load of Sickness, and is ready to Curse the day that he engaged in the Service, Calling himself fool, madman, and worse than distracted, for coming to this place ; but still ran along the Tents, here a Number recruited Somewhat—and there Cry is home, home, when shall we go aboard ; when shall we go home : O if I was once at home I should Soon be well : O Crys one we haven't received our price money : no Says, another and never shall ; another makes answere that he dont care nothing about the price money if I cou'd but once get away from this Cursed place for we shall all die if we don' go Soon—and if I cou'd but once get from henc they shall never catch me here again : But whats here ? its one of the Tenders drunk, anoy'n Swearing at him—thus in different posture under different Circumstances and of different temper and disposition they are—and what a Malancholly, Gloomy and afflictive Scene is this ? How horrible to behold ?—but retire my thots, and give o'er thy Rove.

About 5 o'clock waited on Gen'l Lyman at his Room in the Sheperd Battery with *Capt. Enos* inform'd that a Subaltern's part of the price money now to be divided, was £126 Sterling. A pleasant moon Shine Evening, about 12 at night a Smart Shower of rain.

WEDNESDAY, Sept. 29, 1762.—Had but little rest, Sleep seem'd entirely to depart from my Eyes, and Slumber from my Eye Leds. Filt not so Current as usual when I arose—afterwards more Comfortable, but felt the want of rest.

THURSDAY, Sept. 30, 1762.—The Commanding officers of every Core, dined with his Lordship, who informed that we should Sail in a few days and also that in one Spanish Ship Sunk in the harbour, had in her 260,000 dollors—nothing but the distresses of Sick and dying to be heard in Camp. This Evening about 10 o'Clock Dr. Hubbard died.

The Learned Phiscian, endowed with Skill armed with medicine, came to be an Instrument to rescue others from the Jaws of death—but baffled in his Skill, himself attackt, falls a prey to voratious death Nor means, nor Skill, nor Recipies nor forms Could the fine Surgeon Save—but yields to death, and's hide within the grave.

FRIDAY, Oct. 1, 1762.—This day my daughter Love is nine years of

age—times still gloomy and melancholly in Camp dying 7, 8 and 9 in the Compass of 24 hours Lord let not thine anger consume us.

SATURDAY, Oct. 2, 1762.—All the forepart of the day, very hott, and Sultry about 3 o'Clock P.M., the heavens Covered with Blackness, indicated heavy Thunder and rain, the Clouds seem'd to break and scatter and but a Sprinkle of rain—then Collected again, and by some distant heavy Thunder were broken and scattered again—again Collected, and a Soaking heavy rain enSued. last till about Sundown, when it ceased raining, but the Clouds not cleared of about $\frac{1}{2}$ before 7 o'Clock the rain came on again—a heavy rain till past Eight when it cleared of, and the Queen of Night in Silver brightness Shone: the heavens calm, and Air Serene and Clear.

two heavy Showers in the Night—4 Vessels arrived in the harbour from the american Coasts.

The whole number died out Gen'l. Lymans Regiment Since we Left New York, which then Cosisted of 914—to this day, is 184.

Viz—	2 Captains.
	1. Lieutenant.
	1 Ensign.
	1 Surgeon's Mate.
	5 Sergeant's.
	1 Drummer.
	173 Privates.

Total,	<hr/> 184
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SABBATH DAY, Oct. 3, 1762.—Tho this day is by divine appointment is Set apart as holy, and consecrated to holy uses yet in Camp, among the Troops, is set aside as common, and not so much as the least visible Shew or appearance of anything yet is religious carried on; but God and religion Christ and Salvation are disregarded, contemn'd and despiced, and we live as tho there was no God, no future Judgment, but as if we had given and preserved, life to ourselves, and consequently were never to be accountable to any others how we lived, or Spent our days.

I asked Col. Putnam in ye Morning what there was to hinder publick Service—he answered, he knew nothing in the world to hinder it—I askt him if it was not duty if there was nothing to hinder—Yes, answered he, by all means, and I wonder in my Soul why we don't have Service; and add'd we could have prayers night and morning Just as well as not—but

then says he, ther'l be but few to attend, theres so many Sick, and so many to attend the sick that there cou'd be a Great many, I replied—we had this to encourage us, where two or three are met together in my Name, Says God, there am I in the midst of them to bless them ; so that it was not numbers that entitled to the blessing—thats true Says he, I will go down to the General and Speak to him about it, bides good by—have heard no more of it Sinse.

Spent the day in retirement, affairs in Camp as usual.

MONDAY, Oct. 4, 1762.—A pleasant morning—a pleasant Breeze all the forepart of the Day—went down to the waterside to See Mr. Bancroft, but he was gone, and returned fatagued—in the afterpart of the day visited part of the hospital Tents.

TUESDAY, Oct. 5, 1762.—Had comfortable rest last night, and much refreshed this morning—Some unpleasant Salutations—visited the officers Sick in Camp, and the Soldiers in Some part of the Hospital Tents; and what sad Specticles are they, many of them ; a Bony Frame covered with a little Skin, mere skellitans.

WEDNESDAY, Oct. 6, 1762.—Nothing more than Common Unless, that the men dont fall Sick anything so fast—nor do the Sick die so fast—and more comfortable prospect of the Recovery of many that have been brought low—visited Gen'l. Lyman, and all the officers sick in Camp—the rest of the day Spent in Reading.

THURSDAY, Oct. 7, 1762.—This Morning Col. Putnam and Lt. Park went of into ye Country to buy fresh provisions, Such as poultry, etc.—in the afterpart of ye day visited part of the hospital Tents.

FRIDAY, Oct. 8, 1762.—A pleasant Morning—the day thro a Comfortable Breeze—the forepart of the day visited all the officers sick in Camp two Ships of war came into the Harbour and one Cat Ship.

Nothing extraordinary in Camp happened this day.

SATURDAY, Oct. 9, 1762.—Much labour of mind to waste away the time with most, impatient for the arrival of that day and hour when they shall embark for Home, and Crossing the foaming Seas, shall reach their native Shores, and with wraptured hearts o'er come with Joy, Salute, embrace, and fall into the Arms, of their long wished for, wishing, lovely, loving friends.

The No. of dead out of Gen'l. Lymans Regiment, 207. Nothing remarkable in Camp.

SABBATH DAY, Oct. 10, 1762.—This Day has been observed as Usual in Camp, a total neglect of all religious Services, as to any visible appearances in General.

Orders from Head Quarters. That the provincials hold themselves in readiness to embark about the 20th of this instant.

Long looked for, long expected, much desired to know the fixed time.

MONDAY, Oct. 11, 1762.—This morning 3 Ships of the Line fell down out of the Harbor, under the Command of Commodore Kipple, who Saluted Admiral Pocock with 17 Cannon, the Admiral return'd 15—one of the 3, a 70 Gun Ship, unhappily went foul of one of ye Sunk Ships in the mouth of the Harbour, and Stuck fast till 3 o'Clock P.M. when She cleared the Ship—Tis said that the Ships are design for Jamacai.

A.M., Visited all the sick officers in the Regiment that are in Camp, then visited Gen'l. Lyman. P.M. visited a considerable part of the hospital Tents—at my return found Col. Putnam and Lt. Parks returned from the Country, Lt. Parks Sick—at Evening had the Joyfull news of the prosperous Season in New England and the Smiles of divine providence upon the labours of the field : that they have plentiful Crops, the News bro't in by a vessel last from New London—that arrived this afternoon in the harbour.

TUESDAY, Oct. 12, 1762.—A heavy rain towards morning—a pleasant morning and fine Air.

A. M. visited officers in Camp. Sick—all seem to be upon the recruit. This morning 3 Ships of the Line more fell down out of the Harbour, to Join Commodore Kepple, who are to Cruize along to the Northward if possible to come across a french fleet that is reported to be out—and then go to Jamaica. Two frigates Joind them that lay at the mouth of the Harbour. Towards night, the heavens were cover'd with blackness, and a heavy rain came on, Severe lightning and heavy Thunder, held till 8 o'Clock the heaviest rain we have ever known upon the Land.

WEDNESDAY, Oct. 13, 1762.—This Morning another Ship of the line went out to Join the above mentioned Ships upon their Cruize—a little before 4 o'Clock P.M. the rain came on again—continued till late in the Night.

THURSDAY, Oct. 14, 1762.—About 2 o'Clock this morning Ephraim Parks, one of our Family died, a rainy night this morning fair and pleasant—in the afternoon very strong wind—at night heavy rain.

FRIDAY, Oct. 15, 1762.—A very heavy Rain all the latter part of the night and in the morning, little after sun rise Clear'd of—a pleasant fore noon—this day my youngst Son Narcissus is a year old. A.M. visited the sick officers in Camp. P.M. Orders from head quarters. 6 Trans-

ports appointed for the Connecticut Troops to Carry them to N. York, who are order'd to imbark Next Tuesday—good news to the Troops.

SATURDAY, Oct. 16, 1762.—A pleasant and comfortable Morning for this Country that has proved so fatal to so many of our Troops. Visited the offices sick in Camp—this day a distrabution of the troops among the transports and, am order'd aboard the Royal Duke, a large Transport Ship of about 500 tuns.

SABBATH DAY, Oct 17, 1762.—All in a hurry making preparations for the Embercation and laying Stores for the Voige to New York—tho' the day is the Lord's by a special appropriation, yet nothing of religious service observed, or anything besides the present important affair of providing each one for himself without an relation to another, and as tho' there was no being to be dependant upon but each upon himself.

Visited the sick officers in Camp—by Yesterday return, died the last

Week..... 19

Dead before..... 207

In Gen'l. Lyman Regd. Total..... 226

MONDAY, Oct. 18, 1762.—The Camp all in a Tumult, in a hurry embarking the Sick and laying stores for voyage one running one way another hastning another in a hurry doing but little—about 4 o'Clock P.M. embarked on board the Royal Duke, a fine large ship and noble Conveniences for Officers and Soldiers—the main body of the Connecticut Troops embarque'd this Day on board the transports appointed for them.

TUESDAY, Oct. 19.—This day Gen'l. Lyman Recd of the Pay Master Gen'l. the prize money for Connecticut Troops—and pay'd to the several Cpts. of our Regm't a propotion for themselves and Soldiers. Still lye in harbour.

WEDNDSAY, Oct. 20, 1762.—Weigh'd anchor and fell down to the mouth of the harbour. A.M. went on board the Resolution and Rec'd the adjutant. 100 Dollars and 150 in Bitts.

THURSDAY, Oct. 21, 1762.—Just at night going out of the harbour narrowly escaped running on the Rocks—the Ship struck once, but a wind Sprung up and carried us Clear—stood of to sea all night.

FRYDAY, Oct. 22, 1762.—Return'd Back to find the fleet. Join'd the fleet toward night, when the Cpts. of Transports Rec'd there orders from the Commadore. Was very ill all day.

SATURDAY, Oct. 23, 1762.—More comfortable this Morning, continued on Course towards the metazes.

SABBATH DAY, Oct. 24.—Had a very ill day unable to move, thick broke out all over—a pleasant day.

MONDAY, Oct. 25, 1762.—the last night towards the latter part strong gust of wind—Continued all day—more comfortable to day but not able to sett up much.

Taken out of the money Recd of Dollars 3. Bitts 5.

JOHN GRAHAM.

10 March, 1763.

The leader of the provincial troops in the Havana expedition was General Phineas Lyman, of whom we have this brief and mournful account in Appleton's Encyclopædia :

LYMAN, PHINEAS, soldier, born in Durham, Conn., in 1716 ; died near Natchez, Miss., 10 Sept., 1774. He was bred to the trade of a weaver, but subsequently prepared for college, and was graduated from Yale in 1738.

In 1761 he was ordered to Canada, and in 1762 he was sent with 2,300 men to assist in the capture of Havana, and subsequently placed in command of the entire provincial force during that unlucky expedition. At its close he was deputed by the surviving officers and soldiers to proceed to England and receive the part of the prize money that remained due. A company of "Military Adventurers" had also been formed by his exertions, chiefly composed of those who had served in the late wars, whose object it was to obtain from the British government a tract of land on the Mississippi and Yazoo rivers. Soon after his arrival in England, in 1763, a change of ministry took place, and so many obstacles appeared in the way of accomplishing his design that he remained abroad until 1772, unwilling to return home and admit failure. He was at last taken back by his son, the wreck of his former self, but not until he had obtained permission from the crown to settle on a tract of land twenty miles square, east of the Mississippi and south of the Yazoo. The "Military Adventurers" having been reorganized, Gen. Lyman began in December, 1773, with a few companions, to make a preliminary survey. The party settled near Natches, but Lyman soon died.

As two of the British lords divided more than a million dollars, it was not unnatural on the part of the provincial officers to think there was something coming to them; but the wild land in the Yazoo country was in those times a sorry substitute for the Spanish silver and gold that was carried to England.

CHAPTER XV.

EARLY INCIDENTS OF THE PRESENT WAR.

The Ibarra Band the First Organized—Coloma and His Fiancé, Being Captured, are Married in Moro Castle—Efforts Made for Peace, but the Disturbance Spread Rapidly—General Campos, President Marti, Gomez, and Maceo Land in Cuba—Marti's Death—The Cause of Guerilla Warfare.

ON the 24th of February, 1895, the citizens of Havana were greatly surprised to learn that public order had been disturbed in two different sections of the country. Captain-General Calleja had received an official communication from the civil governor of the province of Matanzas, stating that an insurgent band had made its appearance in Ibarra, while the civil governor of Santiago de Cuba had telegraphed him to the effect that mobs were causing trouble both in Baires and in Jiguaní. Further information gathered was not reassuring to Calleja, and by his proclamation of the 28th of February, "martial law" was put in force in the two provinces named. According to Art. 3 of said proclamation, no penalty whatever should be imposed on any rebels who would surrender in eight days.

That Ibarra band, the first one in the present war, numbered about thirty men, one of them being Juan Gualberto Gomez, colored, the well-known editor of the popular Havana daily, *La Lucha*. The chief of the party, however, was Antonio Lopez Coloma, a young man who was in charge of the Ignacia plantation

and had organized the band. On his leaving for the neighboring fields, another young man, Armando Gonzalez, tried to detain him by force; but Coloma killed him on the spot. Four days afterwards the party were encamped in the woods near the Ignacia sugar mill; when a few cavalrymen and a small guerilla band made a sudden attack upon the rebels; some of them succeeded in escaping, Gomez among them; but others were made prisoners.

A romantic incident is deserving of mention here. Lopez Coloma and Señorita Amparo Orbe had been engaged for some time, and when he determined to take to the field, she ran away from home to follow him and share his fate. So it happened that she was a prisoner with her lover in the San Severino Castle of Matanzas; but was released a few days later, while Coloma had to remain in the fortress. He was subsequently taken to the Moro Castle of Havana, and the young woman having moved to the capital, their marriage took place in that prison.

Editor Gomez had escaped unhurt; but after having ascertained what had happened to Lopez Coloma and most of his companions, decided to surrender to the authorities, which he did, as did likewise the rest of the members of the Ibarra band, who were scattered about the country. He was brought before General Calleja, in Havana, who pardoned him at once, in accordance with said Article 3 of his proclamation; but while Gomez was still in the governor's palace, the chief-of-police arrived there with an order from the court to arrest him on a charge that he was implicated with two Spaniards, Agapito Anitua and Eladio Larranaga, in the introduction of a lot of firearms and car-

tridges, of military pattern. The Cuban and the two Spaniards were tried and found guilty. Gomez and Anitua were given twenty year sentences, and Larranaga twelve of hard labor in Ceuta, the Spanish fortress on the African coast, opposite Gibraltar.

Soon after the dispersion of the Coloma band, it became evident that the spirit of rebellion had already spread through several districts, where secret preparations had been made, as the result of long and careful plotting at home and abroad. Dr. Martin Marrero gathered about fifty men under the Cuban flag at Jaguey Grande, and Joaquin Pedroso, a young gentleman of Havana, organized another small party at Aguada de Pasojeros; but these two bands were only a few days in the field. Troops were sent against them and a general dispersion followed. Most of the men surrendered, but Dr. Marrero was allowed to leave for Spain, together with two friends of Pedroso. Before surrendering, some of Marrero's men took refuge in the "Cienaga de Zapata," where they met an unexpected and terrible foe. They had to fight regular battles to protect themselves against swarms of furious alligators, the most aggressive inhabitants of that vast marsh-land. There was trouble of a different kind in Pedroso's party; this gentleman commanded his own band only until it received a reinforcement consisting of a number of highwaymen, under Matagas, who at once instituted himself as supreme chief, notwithstanding all proper protestations. Matagas, like Manuel Garcia, Pregino Alfonso, and some others not so well known, had been plundering the country for many years previous to the outbreak of the present revolution. Manuel Garcia, generally called "El Rey de los Campos de Cuba"

(the king of the Cuban fields), was killed in an encounter with the troops at the same time the above events were taking place.

In the meantime, Julio Sanguilly, Jose Maria Aguirre and Ramon Perez Trujillo had been arrested. Sanguilly, a major-general, and Aguirre, a colonel of the Cubans in the last war, claimed American citizenship; Perez belonged to the Central Junta of the Autonomist party in Havana. Nothing could be proven against Aguirre or Perez, and they were released after due investigation before a civil court; but Sanguilly was convicted, and sentenced to prison for life.

The dispersion of the bands at Jaguey and Aguada led to the belief that peace would prevail in the provinces of Matanzas and Las Villas. Not so in that of Santiago de Cuba, where a tremendous plot was discovered. The conspirators had planned to set fire to the whole of Santiago and start a general massacre, the first intended victim being Governor Enrique Capriles, who, receiving warning, lost no time in preventing any possible disturbance in his capital. Numerous bands began, also, to appear in other districts under "Guillermo, Quintin, Bandera, Periquito, Perez, Garzon Goulet, Herrezuelo, Enrique Brooks, the brothers Sartorius, the journalist, Jose Miro, Guerra, Feria, Marrero, Bojas; Lora, the brothers Rabi, the Estradas, Reitor and Tamayo." Many of these chiefs had served the Cuban cause during the last war, especially Bartolome Masso, a very influential man in the Manzanillo district.

The mobs at Baires and Jiguani were unimportant, except as a premonition of future events; but now, the general uprising in the Santiago province and the presence of Masso in the field, and the information obtained



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THE CUBAN JUNTA.

in regard to the work of revolutionists abroad, made the governor, the political parties, and the population of the Island at large understand that the situation was really a very serious one. The Cuban Autonomists or home-rulers had already begun to use their influence to prevent the spread of the revolution, and General Calleja authorized Leyva, one of the leading members of their Central Junta, to confer with Masso to try to persuade him to give up his plans, with the assurance that no penalty was to be inflicted on those insurgents who would lay down their arms and return to their homes in peace, and that all facilities were to be given those preferring to leave the country.

Leyva left for Manzanillo, and soon after his arrival there he completed all arrangements to meet Masso, who was at "La Odiosa." He thought it a good plan to be accompanied by some influential men belonging to the various political groups in Cuba, and the following gentlemen consented to help him in his mission: Manuel Romagosa and Jose Ramirez, Autonomists (Cubans); Virgilio Lopez Chavez, a distinguished officer in the Spanish navy (Cuban); Manuel Muniz Fernandez, Conservative, a banker (Spaniard), and Marcelino Vazquez Liora, a merchant (Spaniard). This committee did their best to impress Masso with the disastrous consequences of another civil war, and some remarks touched him deeply; but the only practical result of the conference was Masso's proposition that the military authorities allow ten days for him to consult other Cuban chiefs and give a definite answer. The commissioners returned to Manzanillo, and Leyva proceeded to Santiago to see General Lachambre, the military commander of that province. Lachambre flatly

refused to allow further delay for the submission of the rebels, and ordered his troops to attack them immediately.

Other efforts were made in favor of peace. On the day following Leyva's departure from "La Odiosa," Masso received there his old friend, Juan Baptista Spottorno, a man of such prominence in the revolutionary party that he was president of the Cuban organization for some time during the last war, and a committee of five ex-rebel chiefs left Manzanillo for Havana, to ask the captain-general to stop hostilities. It was all useless. Masso would not surrender without delay, and Calleja would not countermand Lachambre's orders. Further endeavors on the part of Leyva, embodied in a remarkable letter of protest to Masso, and later on, the action of the Central Junta of the Cuban Home Rule party in publishing an important "Appeal to the People of Cuba," could not prevent the dreaded conflagration.

By this time, the situation in the eastern province was a rather peculiar one from a military standpoint. The rebel force mustered about 1,600 men, divided in twelve bands—the largest not 250 strong—scattered in several districts of that thinly populated section of Cuba. The government troops were also few in number and serving mainly in the seaport garrisons, for the whole army was less than 14,000. General Lachambre was at once reinforced by a column under Colonel Santocildes. Nearly all the rebel bands were composed of cavalymen, as horses were plentiful in the country, and the Cubans are excellent riders; but they were very badly armed, having only their machetes, and a few old guns. For this reason their operations consisted chiefly in trying to overcome small

garrisons of regulars or volunteers, to obtain their arms or ammunition. The first occurrence of this kind was dramatically interesting.

Veguitas, a small town on the road between Manzanillo and Bayamo, was ungarrisoned, and the arms belonging to the company of local volunteers had been gathered in a certain house. Esteban Tamayo knew this, entered the town with his fifty followers, went directly to the residence of Cayetano de la Maza, the captain of said volunteers, and ordered him to deliver the arms of the company. Maza made no resistance, and Tamayo's men were soon provided with guns and cartridges, only to discover at once that they had been rendered useless. The disappointment filled the whole band with rage; the captain was prefactorily court-martialed and sentenced to be shot then and there, and the customary number of men proceeded to execute the terrible sentence. At that critical moment a young woman sprang between the victim and the muzzles of the rifles, and facing them, cried to the rebels: "He will not die before you have killed a Cuban woman." She was Señorita Maria de la Maza, the captain's niece, whose marvelous act of devotion and bravery paralyzed the executioners and caused intense astonishment to the whole party. The sentence was reconsidered, resulting in a grant of pardon, and the band left Veguitas.

Several small columns of regulars and local guerillas went out to the country in pursuit of the rebel parties, the latter taking to the inaccessible woods when they could not fight to advantage, and falling upon badly protected villages to get guns and cartridges, in which they were sometimes successful, after more or less skirmishing and loss of men on both sides. In this

way the military operations of the present revolution were started, and the hide-and-seek methods have prevailed ever since. It is a fact that no better plan of campaigning could be adopted in Cuba to make an armed conflict last indefinitely, for the topographical and climatic conditions of the country demand guerilla warfare. The mountains are covered with the thickest woods imaginable, while the dry plains are a mass of manigua (very high bushes and grasses), and the rest of the territory is quite marshy. Only the cultivated lands, after harvesting, could afford a place for regular battles. Whether the contending armies be large or small, nothing but guerilla warfare is possible in Cuba, and large battles being out of the question, any of the parties can, at will, make the conflict one of long duration. This will explain why 50,000 or more men of the revolutionary army, and over 130,000 Spanish regulars, actually on the field, have engaged in military operations for one year, and no decisive encounter has been reported yet. Hardly a day has passed without the occurrence of some fighting, but nearly every encounter was merely a skirmish with more or less combatants in it, giving occasion to many examples of individual bravery, but affording very few opportunities to register brilliant victories on either side. Some of them will be mentioned here as characteristic specimens of Cuban warfare, in which all dangers and discomforts are multiplied, while martial glory is generally at a discount.

But other events must be reviewed in succession. The Cuban Junta in New York had not been idle, and it soon began to organize expeditions of men, arms, and accoutrements which were gladly received by their friends in Cuba.

Antonio Maceo and his brother Jose, with Flor Crombet, Cebreco, and other comrades, a score in all, had left Costa Rica and succeeded, not without some difficulty, in landing near Baracoa, on the 31st of March. On their way to the interior, Flor Crombet was killed, and some were made prisoners by detachments of regulars, but the Maceos and Cebreco finally joined the band of Periquito Perez, about Guantanamo, and then Antonio Maceo took command of the revolutionary army in the Oriental province.

Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez also set foot on Cuban land at Cabonico (Baracoa district) on the 14th of April, and after hiding in a cave for two days, they marched inland, and met the party under Felix Buen, who received them with military honors, and recognized Gomez as general-in-chief of the Cuban army. The influx of help and the presence of the principal leaders caused the revolt to spread more and more every day, and the men in arms soon numbered over 6,000.

Spain had reinforced her colonial army with a number of battalions when the Sagasta Cabinet resigned, and the Conservative party took charge of the government. Premier Canovas then had Martinez Campos appointed governor-general of Cuba, who left at once for his destination with another reinforcement of 25,000 men. He landed at Guantanamo on the 16th of April, and also visited Santiago and other ports, as he wished to give preliminary orders, before reaching Havana. His elaborate instructions referred to every department of military service, especially to the proper diet and medical attendance of his soldiers, to the treatment of prisoners of war, and to the protection of non-combatants.

The revolt was centred in the Santiago Province. The daily increases of both armies added importance to the struggle, without altering, however, its characteristics. Detachments of small columns of Spanish foot-men and groups of mounted rebels were moving continually about the country, and hunting for one another. There were marches and countermarches, ambushes and surprises, with occasional hard fighting at close quarters. The following is an example :

THE DEATH OF THE CUBAN LEADER, MARTI.

Marti landed with Maximo Gomez on the southern part of the Baracoa district, and from the moment he arrived his purpose was to extend the war to Puerto Principe, availing himself of the military experience of his companion, the Dominican chief, who, in the last campaign, had made El Camaguey the scene of his operations. They both were near Ventas de Casanova, and, as it has been ascertained, after organizing an expedition that was to march to Puerto Principe under Gomez's command, Marti intending to go to the seacoast in order to return abroad and continue his work there in favor of the secessionist revolution. It was then that a column, commanded by Colonel Jimenez de Sandoval, left Palma Soriano for Remanaguas and afterwards proceeded from the latter place to Ventas de Casanova. The column then marched towards the Contramaestre river, and on the road arrested a man, Chacon by name, on whom were found letters from the rebels and some money with which he was going to make purchases by order of the insurgent chiefs. Chacon gave some information rela-

tive to the enemy's location, and accordingly Colonel Jimanez de Sandoval, on the 19th of May, gave the order to march, and arrived at La Brija. The Hernan Cortes squadron, under Captain Oswaldo Capa, was in vanguard, and attacked a band commanded by Bellito, which had come to meet the column.

When Colonel Sandoval heard of it he advanced up to the plain of Dos Rios, and ordered his infantry to open fire. A spirited combat ensued with fatal results to the insurgents, as while the Spanish guide, Antonio Oliva, ran to help a soldier who was surrounded by a large group of the enemy, the guide fired his rifle at a horseman who fell to the ground, and was found to be Jose Marti. Captain Enrique Satue was the first to recognize him. A fight took place on the spot, the rebels trying hard to carry the corpse away. There was also another very important incident. Maximo Gomez was wounded, which for some days led to the belief that he was dead. According to one narrative, Gomez was on the scene of the above events from the beginning of the combat, and while hurrying to recover personally the corpse of Marti, he was wounded, although not seriously. Others say that the famous chief had already taken leave of Marti to go to Camaguey, when, passing at some distance from Dos Rios, he heard the report of musketry; he imagined what was happening, and ran to rescue the civil chief of the revolution; but when he arrived Marti had been killed. Gomez being wounded, Borrero placed him on his own horse, and in this manner took him away in safety. The Spaniards, after their victory, moved to Remanaguanaguas, where the corpse of Marti was embalmed. From the latter town it was taken to Santiago de

Cuba, and while on the way there the troops had to repel an attack from the rebels, who intended to carry off the coffin. On arrival at the Oriental capitol the remains of Marti were exhibited in the cemetery, and, in spite of the effects of rapid decomposition, which had set in, many people recognized the features of the secessionist agitator, as stated in an official attestation. Colonel Sandoval presided over the funeral ceremonies, and General Salcedo caused the dead man to be given a decent resting-place. Here are Sandoval's words on the occasion :

Gentlemen:—In presence of the corpse of him who in life was Jose Marti, and in the absence of any relative or friend who might speak over his remains such words as are customary, I request you not to consider these remains to be those of an enemy any more, but simply those of a man, carried by political discords to face Spanish soldiers. From the moment the spirits have freed themselves of matter they are sheltered and magnanimously pardoned by the Almighty, and the abandoned matter is left in our care, for us to dispel all rancorous feelings, and give the corpse such Christian burial as is due to the dead.

The province of Puerto Principe was still in peace. Only one insurgent band had been raised, and this was soon defeated under the leadership of Pachin Varona. On the 12th of April, he went to San Miguel de Nuevitas, a village whose only garrison consisted of a few men of the civil guard, commanded by Sergeant Martinez. Varona's force attacked them in their quarters, and the besieged made a good defense, until other troops came to their rescue, and dispersed the band, after several of its members had been killed. During the defense there was an unusual incident. The Cubans attacked the private house of Sergeant Martinez, whose son, a boy eleven years old, took a rifle and killed the first man



SALVADOR CISNEROS,
President of the Cuban Republic.



JOSÉ MARTÍ,
Father of the Present Revolution.

who tried to force an entrance. The father hurried to the house, and arrived just in time to shoot at a negro who was entering, machete in hand ; but he missed his mark, and the negro brandished his weapon to kill his opponent, when Martinez's wife disabled the intruder by means of a terrible blow with another machete.

Maximo Gomez had made up his mind to invade the territory of Puerto Principe, generally known as "El Camaguey," and, notwithstanding the efforts of the Spanish generals to prevent it, he crossed the boundary line early in June. On the 5th of that month, the old Marquis de Santa Lucia, an ex-Cuban president, left the city of Puerto Principe and took the field, in company with a number of friends, while Maceo, leading a few thousands of his Orientals, also entered that province, to aid in its general uprising. Many citizens joined the invading army, or the new bands that were appearing every day. Regiments of regulars hurried to Camaguey, and operations were actively conducted, as in Santiago province, notwithstanding the effect of the rainy season, which had already set in.

Gomez proceeded immediately to put his general plan into execution. He ordered all Cuban bands, First, to attack small Spanish posts and get their arms, if possible, freeing every man who would deliver them ; Second, to cut all railway and telegraph lines ; Third, to keep on the defensive, and retreat in groups, unless his men could fight the enemy at great advantage ; Fourth, to destroy Spanish forts or other buildings from which the foe had made any resistance ; Fifth, to destroy all sugar-cane crops or mills, whose owners would refuse to contribute to the Cuban war fund ; Sixth, to

forbid the farmers to send any food to the cities without paying certain taxes.

On his part, Martinez Campos ordered : First, several regiments, divided into detachments, to protect the sugar estates ; Second, other detachments placed along the railroads, and on every train in motion ; Third, an attack always, unless the enemy's force be above three times the number of the troops ; Fourth, that all rebels who surrender, except those having the rank of officers, be allowed to go free and unmolested ; Fifth, convoys of victuals sent to the towns that needed them.

Operations were continued week after week, more important now in Camaguey than in Santiago, for the evident wish of the insurgents was to move and spread the insurrection toward the western part of the Island. Among the innumerable encounters which took place during these several months, there is one, July 12th, near Bayamo, of such celebrity that it is treated separately, as a remarkable episode of arms, though indecisive, like all the combats in Cuba.

About the 24th of August, the insurgent general, Carlos Roloff, and a party of old Cuban officers, landed near Tunas de Zaza. They had left Key West, Florida. The revolt had spread to the Santa Clara province, also called Las Villas, whose inhabitants were witnesses to scenes similar to those with which every one has become familiar in Santiago and Puerto Principe, but the attack of trains and destruction of property became more frequent and telling, and the provinces of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio began at last to be involved in and suffer from the disastrous struggle.

Many fights, but no military event of particular importance, took place during the months of September and

October. Maximo Gomez was making preparations for the invasion of the western provinces.

The revolutionary government had been elected by an assembly, composed of representatives sent by all the bands that were in arms. That body deliberated for three days, and elected the Marquis de Santa Lucia for president, and Bartolome Masso for vice-president. Maximo Gomez was confirmed in his office of general-in-chief of the liberating army, and Antonio Maceo as general-in-chief of the invading army.

CHAPTER XVI.

BATTLE OF BAYAMO AND RESULTS.

Campos' First Sharp Check—Spaniards Much Shaken—Severe and Interesting Battle—General Santocildes Sacrifices his Life to Save that of Campos—Maceo does not Permit his Sharpshooters to Pick off Campos—Maceo's Humanity to the Wounded.

FAR the most severe battle of the first campaign of the present war was that in which Martinez Campos and the rebel chiefs were pitted against each other, in July last, near Bayamo—a conflict in which was announced to the hard-pressed captain-general of Spain, and all observers able to understand the facts, that there was a crisis in Cuba. The mettle and the method, the power and conduct of the insurgents, were made known on that bloody field, to the world. It was the first sharp check that Campos received and the time when he was admonished that his part as conquering hero was well nigh played through.

He was in the field with several columns to attack the Cubans near Bayamo and left Manzanillo with 1,500 men. General Lachambre, with about the same number, left Bayamo, and General Valdes was moving from the North with 2,000 men. The Spanish pursued the usual course of operating in detachments—a policy dictated by bad roads, and the cloudy state of the Cuban forces—who are like a mist in the woods and quick to develop a storm.

The Cubans got together nearly 3,000 men in a posi-

tion to prevent the union of the gathering Spaniards and to strike them separately—a scheme that Spanish strategy invited. Campos had the *Isabella*, the Catholic Battalion, three companies of the Sixth Peninsular Battalion, one company of engineers and two companies of mounted guerillas. The insurgents were drawn up on a stock farm and strongly posted. There was some uncertainty as to the guide of the captain-general, an old negro, and his column changed its course—it is not certain through advices or accident—avoiding the ambuscade arranged for the general's column, the purpose being to crush him with a machete charge. The insurgents did not get the Spaniards as they wanted them, and then mistook the formation of the column, which was advancing with twenty-five explorers leading, then General Santocildes with 500 men, then Campos, and then a strong rear guard.

The insurgents mistook the immediate command of Santocildes, who closely followed the pioneers, for that of Campos, the centre of the column which they meant to assail first, and then to strike the rear guard. The fight was partially on wooded hills and a long and bloody affair. The firing was sharp on both sides, and in the midst of a Spanish charge General Santocildes was killed, and the heel of Campos' boot was torn by a bullet. The keen eyes of Maceo, who was in command of the rebel cavalry, perceived from the commotion that some important Spanish officer had fallen, and was encouraged to make enthusiastic efforts to win decisively. Campos at last formed with his whole force a hollow square, and the horses and mules killed and the wagons were used as breastworks. In this formation the struggle went on several hours with

varying fortunes, Campos personally directing the defense and constantly exposed to the deadly aim of swarms of sharpshooters.

The insurgents tried early on this field their favorite stroke at the baggage train, with the hope of getting ammunition. They are fond of attacking the vanguard of the Spanish force in a spirited way, making a real assault, but not in full force, while the main body moves on the flank, eluding observation if possible, and when there is the greatest possible diversion, making a grand rush upon the rear guard, counting it the greatest success to capture ammunition. Maceo tried this at Bayamo, and recently repeated the operation at Pinar del Rio, avoiding the main body of his enemy and going for the cartridges. At Bayamo the rear guard fought its way to the main body, and completed the Spanish square. The generalship of Campos on this critical occasion has been highly commended. The position which he assumed and his personal presence prevented a rout, and the Spaniards, finding themselves able to hold their ground, grew composed, and were, late in the afternoon, put in motion toward Bayamo. The insurgents made gallant efforts to break the Spanish formation, and poured a heavy fire into them on their right flank as they left the field, keeping it up until some large buildings sheltered the beaten column of the captain-general, and late in the evening the combat ceased.

The Spaniards were this day severely shaken and their losses heavy. The rebels claimed to have found thirteen Spanish officers killed. The Cubans had two colonels, Goulet and Machado, killed, and Colonel Gónzaga wounded. The Spanish loss is not known, for

their official reports are rarely complete, and usually highly colored. Several of the staff of General Santocildes were killed and wounded; and the Cubans, admitting fifty killed and wounded, claim that 300 Spaniards fell dead or disabled.

We have followed the Cuban account of this action closely. The Spanish story does not give Campos as much credit as he gets from the Cubans, but distinguishes General Santocildes as the real hero of the day. The Spaniards say :

On the 12th of July, Martinez Campos left Manzanillo for Bayamo with an escort of 400, and, while on the road, other troops joined Campos, forming a column 1,550 strong, at Veguitas. Campos proceeded with his escort toward Barrancas, at 4 o'clock the following morning, and instructed General Santocildes to leave for Bueycito with 1,150 men. Santocildes did so, and going faster than Campos, and following the same road, he almost overtook him, when Campos sent back one of his aides to remind Santocildes that he should march toward Bueycito. This happened for a second time, and then Santocildes advanced to meet the general, and said he had not yet found a certain road he preferred to take. This was a good excuse; Campos evidently wanted to go alone, while Santocildes would neither allow that, or openly disobey his instructions; he knew there was danger. They had been riding together for a short time, when Maceo's vanguard opened fire.

Maceo had called and gathered together several bands, numbering nearly 6,000 men, to fall upon Bayamo, and having learned that Campos was going there without an army, he determined to take him by surprise. The Spaniards, in fact, were soon attacked from every direction, and Santocildes, at the head of his column, broke the enemy's lines several times, and advanced, only to be encircled again. Both the regulars and the rebels fought fiercely, and in the midst Santocildes was killed.

Campos then took command of the column, and continued his advance, sometime on the defensive and sometime attacking, until he arrived at Bayamo, as intended, about 10 P.M. The column lost 123 men, killed or wounded, and the insurgents over 200. This encounter took place near Peralejo. It may be said that Santocildes sacrificed his own life to save that of his friend and superior.

There are many reports about the personal fortunes of Campos on this field ; one, an insurgent authority, is this : " Campos only saved himself by a ruse. Taking advantage of the Cubans' well-known respect for the wounded, he had himself placed in a covered stretcher, which they allowed to pass without looking inside the cover. When outside of the Cuban lines he was obliged to walk on foot to Bayamo, through six miles of by-paths, under cover of the darkness, only accompanied by his colored guide."

It must be admitted there is a touch of the extremely improbable about this, but nothing of that nature should daunt those who really care to believe, and the romance is not a bad one.

There is another story that has had large circulation in Cuba, that Maceo, perceiving Campos in the midst of the fight, and recognizing him, pointed him out to his men and told them not to kill him, as he was a soldier who made war honorably ! Still another probable fiction, but a pretty one, is that a son of Campos, a lieutenant, was made prisoner and released with a friendly message to his father, who was of course expected to follow so admirable an example.

The following letter from Maceo is consistent with the Cuban policy from the first in the treatment of wounded :

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, THE GENERAL MARTINEZ CAMPOS.

Dear Sir : Anxious to give careful and efficient attendance to the wounded Spanish soldiers that your troops left behind on the battle-field, I have ordered that they be lodged in the houses of the Cuban families that live nearest to the battle grounds, until you send for them.

With my assurance that the forces you may send to escort them back will not meet any hostile demonstrations from my soldiers, I have the honor to be, sir,

Yours respectfully, ANTONIO MACEO.

Of course, as the insurgents cannot maintain hospitals, they have reason to set a good precedent in the treatment of the wounded ; but that should not detract from the credit due them for their undoubted humanity. Campos, in his reports to the home government, did not deny the gravity of the situation at Bayamo, and, indeed, got very candid about his difficulties sometime before they culminated in his retirement, which was a confession of failure.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE MASSACRE AT GAUTAO.

A Seaside Breakfast and the Cuban Flag—The Road into the Cuban Republic—How the Rebels Foraged—The Gulf and the Sharks—The First News of the Massacre—The Tale of a Volunteer who Participated—Eighteen Pacificos Killed to Two Soldiers—Marcy Reports—Adventures of Correspondents—Talk with General Weyler on the Subject—The Dismal Scene at the Palace.

THERE were continually in Havana last winter differences of opinion as to the reliability of rumors of bloody outrages in various parts of the country. Each day brought some new tale of terror, and there was a steady current of accounts of "battles." The Spaniards, having the inner line and greater facilities for publication, as a rule got out their statements first, though at times the wires gave forth curious secrets that, after a time, seemed to refer in some degree to events that through official condescension were mentioned. The magnetic affiliations of telegraphy must have puzzled the operators ignorant of ciphers and innocent of schemes. As a matter of course, the official bulletins were discredited as to "combats."

The regular affair, in which from five to seventeen insurgents were killed, and many wounded, and the ground strewn with lost hats and guns and dead horses, all showing victory for the government, while the Spaniards lost a horse or two, and had two men wounded, and closed the struggle with a bayonet charge, became a common grievance.

Occasionally there would be signs, and much matter printed, of a fight, in which some persons were hurt, and there were participants and localities named, so that when the news came by grapevine, we could formally identify the "engagements," but there was hardly ever found a show of resemblance between the respective histories of the conflicting sides. There was much wretchedness uncovered here and there, frequent hard cases of impoverished millionaires, estates visited by hostile bands, cane fields fired, houses and villages burned, machinery broken, and assassinations on the road.

One of the things repeated so often that it became difficult to consent to the opinion that it had any foundation, was, that there came into a small village a troop of rebels, who helped themselves to whatever they required, or that took their fancy, especially groceries and preserved meats and articles of clothing. When the place had been ransacked the intruders would depart, and then came the Spaniards, enraged that their enemies had found supplies, and they would say: "Oh, you have had scoundrels here, have you, and you fed them; you gave them all you had, eh?" The answer was, "They took what they would; I could not help it. They carried away my property. I was robbed, that was all." Then came, "You had them come, and you did not fight. You helped them, and you are rebels, too, and cowards also; there, then;" and "bang! bang!" went the guns, and the people were killed because they had been robbed.

There were four men at a plantation. The rebels came along, and took the horses and corn and cattle. Then came the Spaniards, and said, "Aha! you gave

up everything to the scoundrels, so then you will not fight them," and it was "bang! bang!" again, and the four men were dead. There was an innocent American citizen, fitted with a romantic Spanish name, a gentleman, rather dark and excitable, speaking no English at all, and never known to be out of the Island, but fully equipped with naturalization papers of citizenship in Florida; and the Spaniards, finding that he had been visited by rebels, called and beat him and robbed his house and stables—and there was a case for the American consul—and there were darker stories of murders, and worse than murders, and the sincere seeker for truth was perplexed in the extreme.

One thing only was certain. There was a flood of misfortune rolling over the golden Island, the torrent was sweeping away plantations, towns, families—where there had been wealth there was poverty—and the dark desolating waters reflecting fires were tinged with blood and rising higher and spreading wider were merciless as the deluge. The soldiers marched in the street, and the roll of drums told of their progress. The red and yellow flags decked the balconies and streamed from the towers, and the children danced at night to the mellow strains of a band from Andalusia, the dark eyes of beauty gazing out with anxiety, flashed at the windows guarded by bars of steel.

The coming of the new captain-general was a horror. "There is no one man or woman safe in this Island with this man here—Oh! Why do not the dead of the long war rise from their graves to fight?" was the cry of a woman despairing for herself, her family, and her country.

The clouds came up from the Caribbean Sea, majestic

in their gloom and poured rivers over the city, and the sun and the wind came and the mud was dust again. Troops arrived from Spain and saw rockets flaring and heard the guns of Moro, and flowers were thrown, and birds, adorned with ribbons, were flung by fair hands from windows into the ranks. Marching up from the wharf from which Cortez sailed for Mexico and conquered Montezuma, and De Soto embarked for Florida and discovered the Mississippi—the little temple and big tree on the spot where the first mass was said in the Americas on one hand, and the palace of the captain-generals on the other—were the dusky boys of Spain, the bayonets twinkling over them. The cries of the newsboys are heard in the streets with “Extras,” and the Cubans in their own way interpret the Spanish sheets, and who shall know what is so, and who shall tell that the truth is here when he sees or hears that which is the fact or fancy of the hour?

It was a sunny Sunday morning and I was invited to go to breakfast twelve miles away—down the road to Marianao—not then so well known as now, and from that charming suburb by a prong of roads that slanted westward to the Gulf of Mexico. I had visited Marianao before, another lovely day, and walked beyond where there was a bright deep stream that they call a river, and stood upon the gigantic mass of stone arches, a bridge that would have passed in Europe as one of the mighty works of the Romans. This was the frontier; cattle were grazing in the valley, boys were fishing with little scoop nets on poles; there were cocoanut palms and orange trees hanging over fences of wild pine trimmed with the machete; there were little forts in conspicuous places, and the porch of a large house

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at the corner looking toward the bridge was walled with sand bags, and volunteers walking about with glittering rifles, and on a spire was a look-out with a glass, with ceaseless vigilance watching all the approaches. But I need not have been surprised, for I had seen the Treasury Building at Washington barricaded and guarded by many loaded rifles. At Mari-anao there were trees in bloom, and hanging over the side of a noble residence was a wondrous sheet of flowers, rich in color—looking like a matchless drop-curtain in a gorgeous theatre, too radiant for the entertainment of mortals.

It was over the huge bridge, spanning the small stream, that the volunteers and firemen and a company of Spanish regulars marched a few days later—on the night before I set out for that neighborhood to breakfast by the sea—to the village of Punta Brava and the further village of Gautao, where a tragedy, of which the world has heard, took place. The sun was hot that Sunday morning on the white shore and coral rocks and the snowy surf and the shining waters, each wave crested with jewels of incomparable splendor that vanished in the exquisite sand.

Before we sat down to breakfast, a gentleman who lived in the vicinity said, "We had our friends, the enemy, with us here last night. They came in and were all around us, and helped themselves to hams and chickens. They were quiet fellows and behaved fairly well, were rather hungry though, and those about very early this morning wanted coffee above all things. One was suspected of milking a cow!"

"You refer to the insurgents, of course?"

"Yes, they go about freely, and there is not anybody

to molest them ; no troops, no firemen, no police. This is a free country."

"How far is it to where there is a position that they hold." This question was mine. "Come with me to the top of the house, and I will show you their flag ;" and we ascended to the roof, the citizen carrying a big spy-glass, with which I was directed to scan a hill a couple of miles southwest, and there was a flag sure enough, but from the way the wind was blowing the folds I could not make it out further than to be sure it was not the flag of Spain.

"What do you call the boundary between the ground held by the opposing forces?"

"You see the bridge there," pointing to one a quarter of a mile distant across the same stream that flows under the walls of Marianao and through the colossal arch said to be a monument to slave labor, "that bridge may be called neutral territory."


"How far beyond is it supposed one would have to walk to meet the gentlemen who want to be recognized as belligerents?"

"That depends. The sand is deep on the road and there is not much shade, but walk that way and you can probably find yourself under the jurisdiction of a Cuban government half a mile from this. I can warrant your meeting a picket half a mile over the bridge. There are but a few, say ten, with good horses and guns, and where you see the flag there are about fifty, and half an hour's walk beyond, fifty more, and so on all the roads. If there is a main body it is four or five miles away. They do not do much shooting, for they have very little ammunition, and are ordered to spend no cartridges unless the shooting is good."

"This would be rather a clever side road into the region of the rebellion, would it not? What is to hinder the Havana men who want to join the army from doing it right here?" "Nothing." "Why do they not come this way, then?" "Cannot say. Maybe they do." "Why do not the Spaniards, who take so much pains in many places, guard this line?" The answer was to the effect that the Spaniard, unless stirred up, was rather stupidly a disbeliever in danger.

The long white slope up which the surf flashed, one curling line of snow succeeding another with regular pulsations, and the delicate greens and blues of the deep glowing in the sunlight, suggested a bath and a question about sharks, and it appeared that the biters were unpopular visitors to that part of the coast. But owing to the precautions that are Cuban and effective, there had not for several years been fatal accidents.

There was a charming breakfast, that was concluded about 1 o'clock, and then came a sudden sensation, a painful surprise. There had been a massacre just over the hills to the left, beyond Marianao; an incursion of the rebels as far as Punta Brava, and near that village was the small place Gautao. One of the young men employed at the house where we breakfasted had been engaged in the affair as a member of a volunteer company, and returned to his duties, was telling of the bloody business. His story was that news came to Marianao of the presence of the enemy at Punta Brava, and the volunteers and firemen were rushed to the scene of the presence of the insurgents, who, not expecting so much heartiness of movement, were surprised, but finding themselves outnumbered, took refuge in the houses, where they were pursued, and the general re-



1. CUBANS IN AMBUSH.

2. SPANISH VOLUNTEER.

3. A TYPICAL FORT.

sult was twenty dead men. The officer I saw was one who had collected the bodies, and of the twenty only two were certainly of the insurgent forces—the rest were Pacificos, or townsmen, non-combatants.

There was general interest and intense feeling in Havana about the slaughter at first associated with Marianao then with Punta Brava, and finally with Gautao, the actual location of the killing. The Cubans were exceedingly agitated, and their bitterness was fierce in proportion as it was suppressed. The Spaniards regarded the incident as a victory. They had the mitigation, certainly, that the insurgents had been trotting in and out of the villages, and some of them had been caught there and found shelter in the frail houses—the dwellings of poor people. There could be no reasonable doubt, however, of the character of the tragedy.

The force of troops that advanced from Marianao, under the commandant at that post, was too strong to be in peril from any band of insurgents within half a day's ride, and it was not necessary to secure the actual fighting men present that assaults upon all suspected houses should be made. As soon as the attack in support of the search was opened, the ferocity of blood-hounds was exhibited by the troops. They were in an ungovernable frenzy, and regarded the villagers as sympathetic with the rebels, as they no doubt were, for they all are, and the miserables were vindictively killed in their homes, some sick and helpless in bed. There was no restraining discipline and no quality of mercy. When the end came the dead were gathered, and there were twenty bloody corpses, only two men claimed by the soldiers who had slain them

to have died with arms in their hands. There were rumors that had circulation, that happily were not verified, that several women had been killed, and that others had been stripped of their clothing on the pretense that they might be rebel soldiers in disguise! On the subject of this butchery I happened to have information from original sources, and the time has not come to give all the testimony, and how it was obtained, for there are still chances for other hearts to bleed.

Two American newspaper men, who have not had the full credit their courage and enterprise merit, passed through the lines and visited the streets and houses where the bloodshed took place, and found the worst rumors—save those regarding the women—to be true; and they ascertained the names of nine of the victims. The same names, and two additional, were furnished me on a mysterious scrap of paper from the bloody village, and there were other particulars of confirmation altogether conclusive. There was no fact that appeared suggesting an excuse for the slaughter, except that there were insurgents in the village. The Marquis de Cervera, the commandant of Marianao, made a report of his victory, and the fact that one Spaniard had been mortally and one slightly wounded, was held sufficient to prove that there had been a “combat;” and the marquis was duly congratulated upon his gallant achievement. In a personal interview with Captain-General Weyler, I asked him whether he proposed to investigate the Gautao incident for his own satisfaction, and his reply was, with an air of surprise, that the affair had been officially reported, and he was aware there had been a “combat.” Afterward, there came from Marianao the moth-

ers, wives and sisters of "the Pacificos" who had been murdered. They filled a railroad car, and crowded the anteroom in the palace—as dreary and wretched a spectacle as has ever been witnessed in the course of this horrible war. The women bore in their deep-lined faces the stamp of their agony. They were plainly the people of poverty, but had the respectability of neatness, and the gloomy expression of hopeless sorrow fixed upon them all was something dreadful.

The reason of speaking so fully of this is, that the place was well known in Havâna—a suburb near the sea, and beautifully situated, familiar to the whole city—and the people for miles around Punta Brava and Gautao were so terrified by the conduct of the troops that they fled to Marianao and to Havana, where they were sheltered, so far as possible, by friends, and told their straightforward stories, some of which were taken down, word for word, and furnished me, and I did not publish them, and do not now, because some bereaved woman might have to suffer for her word spoken in the excitement of terror, and perhaps of inability to realize the proportion of circumstances. If one should even say what the humble, honest occupation was of one who mourned her dead, she would be designated, and there might be some scamp hateful enough to repeat and distort the communication that she unwittingly gave American correspondents, and additional suffering for her because she had spoken freely to those who reported her, for the sake of the truth. The evidence is abundant. The panic that seized the peasantry of the district stained with innocent blood, was not propagated by the newspapers—for the fugitives acted not on what they had read, but upon their own knowledge. They were like

deer escaping from wolves. There have been hundreds of reports of dreadful deeds—murders by regular troops, by insurgents, by bandits—the innocent “*Pacificos*” perishing because, perhaps, those engaged in war resisted successfully, and the shedding of blood seemed in itself to supply a military want.

Cuba is full of tales resembling that of *Gautao*, but far the greater number are beyond the range of investigation, and this bloody picture is painted to a finish, because it is typical, and touches up with the light of reality the darkness of the horror-haunted Island.

CHAPTER XVIII.

HORRORS OF MORO CASTLE.

A Newspaper Correspondent Arbitrarily Arrested—A Night and Two Days in an Ugly Dungeon—Neglect of Prisoners—A Case of Mistaken Identity—Released, but Apology not Made—The Claim of Clemency, not Justice, Insisted Upon—The Exclusive Society of Gray Rats Not Agreeable.

CHARLES MICHELSON, a well-known journalist of California, was one of the enterprising and lively young men in Havana, engaged in newspaper correspondence, and rather fretful that we had to defer so much to the caprices of the military censorship. He suddenly had the experience of a military arrest, and found himself a prisoner in Moro Castle, without liberty to communicate with friends.

The Monday morning after the massacre near Punta Brava, which is fourteen miles southwest of Havana, Michelson with his interpreter, Lorenzo Betoncourt, started out to investigate. At Marianao, the end of the run by cars, Michelson took the reasonable precaution to ask the commandant, who happened to be a personal acquaintance, for authorization to go to the scene of the "combat." He was unexpectedly refused, and therefore did not go forward, but gathered the essential facts from fugitives.

That night we parted at midnight, going to our respective rooms in the same hotel, and it was a surprise in the morning to find he had been captured by

the military police. The next news was of the arrest of Betoncourt and the transfer of the prisoners in separate boats to Moro Castle, where they were placed in separate cells. They were thus hustled into solitary confinement, rated as prisoners "*in comuno cado*." It was difficult to learn upon what charge the arrest had been made, but late in the afternoon the wild romance was officially given out that Michelson's crimes were communicating with the enemy and assaulting the guards. We have explained what the first part of the charge amounted to; the second, that of doing violence to sacred officers, was pure fiction.

The American correspondents found it difficult at first to see in the arrest of Michelson the seriousness of the incident, for it is the privilege of freedom to smile at despotism, and the proceedings they generally knew were on a charge based on a case of mistaken identity; but the Cuban friends of Betoncourt, who is a citizen of the United States, were deeply alarmed and distressed, and the lines of old sorrows were on their faces. That one dear to them is in Moro Castle is of awful significance to Cubans.

It is almost impossible to see a distinguished official in Havana before his 11 o'clock breakfast, and this day the governor-general drove out to call, and it was 5 o'clock before Consul-General Williams got an audience. General Weyler's smile of welcome was cut sharply as the grave tones of the American consul fell on his ear. Mr. Williams put the matter forcibly, sure that it was a simple and clear case. The captain-general's reply was that he would be very glad if the matter turned out as represented, and he would order the case investigated immediately.

It is an interesting illustration of the use of language that when the report was made to Michelson, in his cell, that his case should not be delayed, it was put that there was to be a "summary proceeding," and the idea of that sort of "proceeding" in Moro Castle is closely associated in the American mind with shooting on the spot. In a second call by the consul-general on the captain-general, he said there would be no time lost in reaching a decision, and after a few hours watching and waiting, in walked the "captive set free" and, with other correspondents, we had a celebration.

It was my intention to leave for New York on Thursday, and as Michelson was to wait in Havana, I wished to give him a "send off" at the palace, and turn over as much good will as might be transferred. Also it was proper he should see the captain-general and thank him for his "summary proceedings." Our first call was upon the accomplished marquis, the secretary of the government. The marquis was sorry I was going, and generous in compliments. Did the marquis think the captain-general could be seen then? As I wanted to pay respects and take leave—why, the captain-general might be seen, and the marquis saw him for us and in a minute returned, saying his excellency would see us at once. There was noticed something odd on the face of the marquis as he came back to take us to the general—something of amusement—almost apprehensiveness—and as we reached the floor of the picture gallery and paused standing, in a flash the general came through a little door, making, what the actors call, a very effective entry! There was no acting about this—it meant business—a real life scene. The interpreter said, as the general shook hands briefly with me,

and looked around with a spark in his eye, that I had called to pay my respects and take leave. That the general had something on his mind was plain in his fixed jaw and fiery eye, but he bowed in recognition of the call (my P. P. C. as it were) and Michelson's thanks were to be the very next thing, for evidently there was to be no time lost, and there was a chill in the air. The general knew Michelson was in the group, singled him out and "spoke right out in meeting," saying he had ordered his release and that of his interpreter, though he knew their guilt! The testimony was positive and conclusive, and the release was granted solely on the grounds of personal regard for his friends and friendship and favor for the American people; and all should understand this was a signal instance not of justice but of clemency.

This speech hardly needed interpretation. It was peremptory, harsh, menacing, absolute—such a speech as Junius Brutus Booth, the elder, might, in the height of his power, have delivered. I shook my head as the language was rendered, attempting to convey a strong negative and saying, "Your excellency believes false testimony. It is an illusion." How fully this was interpreted I do not know, for the interpreter was interrupted sharply by the impetuous general, and Michelson was assured that the falsity of his representation was known, aye! proven, and yet he was allowed to go free! It must be understood that he was guilty and discharged through favor and mercy! Michelson spoke to the purpose, saying, he would like to meet the men who accused him. The captain-general seemed surprised, and Michelson was assured that he would have a chance to confront those who testified.

In a moment the captain-general's departure at the side scene was as effective as his entry. The explanatory truth is, two young men who did not suppose there would be any objection to going on from Marianao to the scene of the tragedy, and did not imagine that the territory traversed daily by a licensed coach, which they took in good faith to go and come—and did go and come in it—was believed by the commandant to be the men who applied for a permit and were refused. It was his testimony the captain-general held with heat to be indisputable; and his anger burned fiercely to think Michelson dared defy the military order—which he had not done—and neither did the two correspondents, who did not know the marquis and asked him no questions.


Michelson's account of his arrest is that there was a thumping on his door at 1:30 A. M., and eight persons, in uniform, entered, and there were soldier police on the sidewalk and in the hall. His room was searched, and his photographic apparatus was a great curiosity, and seemed to be regarded as an implacable enemy; and their lack of knowledge was in evidence by the fact the officers held the undeveloped film to the light in an endeavor to see what pictures Michelson had taken. This, of course, destroyed the negatives. Michelson was seated at his own table to make a statement of what he had been doing on Feb. 24th, and his statements, perfectly true, were heard with jocular incredulity.

The search over, he was taken to the police office, where he caused one man to laugh when the guard was relieved, by suggesting that he also wanted relief. Another of the guards refused to laugh, "scratched his chin with a bayonet, but accepted a cigarette."

Just at dawn an officer came, and the words, "*A el Moro*," were heard. This order to take him to the castle sounded serious. With soldiers behind, before, and on each side of him, he was marched through the streets to the water, as if he had been a dangerous chief. He was taken to the other shore, and marched up to the ugly entrance of the hoary, grimy castle, and stood in the gloomy, arched doorway until they were ready to take him to the cell, an arch of huge masonry, a ceiling of beams, damp with moisture that had risen from prisoners for many years, the whitewashed walls scrawled upon and smeared. A window high up in the arch, barred so that a squirrel could not slip through the irons, or an elephant break the bars, and that was all. No cot: not even a blanket or a chair.

But he had company enough of a certain sort, for his entrance scattered a crowd of cockroaches, and as they ran into the rotten cracks, he heard the shuffling and the squealing of rats. Too tired to think, too wretched to dream, he threw his overcoat down on the cleanest spot he could find, and fell asleep for an hour or two. When he woke he was hungry and very thirsty, but no amount of kicking on the cell door, and by no noise could he attract the attention of the soldiers, so he tramped around the cell until he was weary and worried, and, as he says: "I realized that if I began to be nervous in that place so soon that the horrors could not be far off. I finally went over and corrected the askewness of the eyes of the face of a man which some poor devil had drawn, but that was when I had reached the point when any employment, no matter how trivial, was a luxury. It was cross-eyed and annoyed me."

The window, ten feet above the ground, interested



CELL IN THE MORO CASTLE.

him, and the marks were there of the feet of the many prisoners who had clambered up there, and by crouching at the bars, got the total of their daily pleasure in the sight of the world without.

He, too, climbed up. The view was fine, but a guard ran up from outside, and poked at him with his bayonet. As an amusement, during all that day, he watched the chances to clamber up again, and get down before the man with the bayonet could reach him. He tried the blandishments of small silver, cigars and cigarettes, but was not permitted to look out of the window, and he tried to buy a lead pencil, but was told that prisoners "*in comuno cado*" were not permitted to write, and he asked for a book, or something to read, but was told that prisoners were not permitted to read.

He counted the number of boards in the floor, there were twenty-six; and the number of beams in the ceiling, there were fourteen; and the number of bars in the window. The changing of the guard was a sensational incident, and about noon (he had had nothing to eat or drink since the evening before) they brought him a tin basin full of soldiers' soup and beans, and a coal-oil can full of water. The soup was strong and scummy, and the can had been so recently emptied of its original contents that there was a film of oil over the top of it. He said: "Before dark I was glad of the excitement of sitting very still, and waiting breathlessly to see if an old rat, whose head I had caught sight of peeking through a crack, would come out. I spent the hours before I could go to sleep, in a vain endeavor to head that rat off from the hole, and when at last I closed my eyes there on the floor, with my overcoat for bed and covering, it was after the longest day I had ever spent.

"Of course, I could not sleep the night through. The half-hourly cry of 'sentinel alerta,' was interesting at first, but I got to hate the cry before morning, and morning was a long time coming

"In one sound sleep I was startled into wakefulness by what I thought was a hand upon my face. It was not a hand, it was my old friend, the big gray rat, curious about my hair."

The silver scattered had some effect, for at daylight a cup of coffee came—a rare favor. This second day it was the same thing over again. He inspected the cell, counted the boards, wished that the guards would change oftener, took long walks around his cell—in one stretch 140 rounds—and tied wonderful knots with a piece of twine that came around his breakfast ; and scratching his name and the date with a rusty nail was another pleasurable employment.

The two days were eternity, and yet he was well treated, compared with his interpreter, who passed his first night in a fouler cell than Michelson's, and had been bound. If there was humor in this transaction, Michelson did not at once appreciate it. If it was a joke, it was grim.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE SECOND YEAR OF THE SECOND WAR.

The Condition of the Country Approaching the Second Rainy Season of the Struggle—Why the War-Cry went forth in February—The Sagacity of Gomez in Choosing Time and Place—Preparing for his Remarkable Campaign—The Policy of Destruction—Why it was Adopted—The Way the Spaniards are Retaliating—Cuba Laid Waste by Both Combatants—War, Pestilence and Famine—The Terrible Privations and Distress of the People.

THERE have been many wars in and about and around Cuba, but only two that may be called Cuban—that of the ten years, from 1868 to 1878, and the present. The English, French, and Spanish, when at the height of their maritime power, compared with others, and themselves the foremost of nations in enlightenment, enterprise and progressive development, warred in and for Cuba, and for the seas surrounding her and the islands of those seas, and there came also pirates and filibusters, and used the shelter of her shores to assail them and the commerce that sailed from them or found its channels beside them.

There were armaments and assaults, aggressive expeditions and vengeful massacres ; riotings in the cities and insurrections of slaves. The struggle of the Cuban people for themselves, their fights for liberty, were the two wars whose causes, course and consequences we are tracing ; and we are in the second year of the second war.

The last week of February of 1895 did not happen

accidentally to be chosen for the declaration of the contest that is progressing. Time and place were carefully taken into account. Those engaged in the preliminaries for Cuban revolt were wise in the affairs and the policy of Spain, and could very well understand the weaknesses she would develop in action, and the lines on which her resources could be most certainly and swiftly crippled.

One man especially was able to form an accurate judgment from personal experience, and was profoundly able to plan the campaign that was coming. We refer not to the ardent patriot so soon to fall, Jose Marti, but to the old military chieftain, Maximo Gomez. He had so far been informed of the state of the Island that he was certain Spain would underrate the insurrection. She would look upon it as at the worst for her, assuming the proportions during the first year that had been attained in the last year of the first war.

Gomez knew that the renewed conflagration was to be the most widespread that ever broke out, and that the Spanish government would be certain to be sluggish at the start to meet the real danger, partially that it was the habit of Spaniards, but principally because they would naturally undervalue the forces that were to be put in motion against them. If he had not had confidence in the resources to be placed at his command, Gomez would have selected the most difficult and dangerous season of the year to send forth the war-cry for field operations ; but he nicely measured the time and materials and the ways as well as the means of his partizans and enemies, and the opening of the spring, as it would be called in temperate countries, was fixed as the time for the war procla-

mation. He wanted some months for getting the insurgents out and organized, and he did not want them drenched and scorched in the rainy season to begin with. He gave himself the good campaigning time of March, April and May for field preparations, knowing that when the Spaniards would appreciate the magnitude of the work cut out for them and pour in their battalions, their movement would be checked by the rains and fear of the fever, and he have the opportunities of three quarters of a year for development. It turned out just so.

Martinez Campos first tried his old persuasive methods and then ascertained that there were a million Cubans to combat with; and when his urgent calls for more troops were responded to and they had been gathered, and made the long voyage and landed, the rains came and with them the full power of the tropical sun and the fever, and by the time he had found how unavailable were his peace measures and his mud marches, and consented to wait until the campaigning conditions had come to pass, Gomez had made ready for his raid from Santiago to Pinar del Rio, which was more than a surprise—it was astounding, and with the invasion of the central and western regions of the Island, rich in the sugar and tobacco plantations—the sources of Cuban wealth and Spanish revenue—was developed the grand tactics of desolation.

In his long march, which was as great a distance as from Philadelphia to Detroit, not only the scope of the rebellion was extended, but its strength increased at every step. Campos was out-generaled before he took command. The revolutionists had formed a resolution of desperation. It was to put an end to the prosperity

of the contested country for all purposes of those who had selfishly and oppressively misgoverned it. The Spanish had made themselves foreigners, except as holders of offices and special privileges and as consumers of the substance of the people. Spain had made Cuba her slave, and had to pay the penalty in the horrors of servile insurrection.

Gomez knew well the old story in warfare of the Spanish Trocha—a line across the island—and, knowing its invulnerability was an illusion, he gave himself no concern about it, and when the time came marched through and began the westward movement that was his master-stroke of warfare. He stopped cane grinding just as the sugar planters were about to begin it, and when his orders were disregarded he burned cane fields as warnings, and explained his purpose. It was to cut off the supply of sugar for exportation so that there would be nothing with which to pay for the importations on which the Spanish duties were collected. Cane fields enough were burned to alarm the planters generally, and when any of them were defiant, they found the protection of the government was a total failure.

As Gomez marched, the smoke of burning cane darkened the air and signaled far and wide that the tide of war rolled steadily west. Campos turned his columns from place to place and called for more and more men, but fire in the cane did not spread so fast or far as the flames of the conflagration of the rebellion, and as industry ceased, the men of labor took up arms, their machetes if nothing else, and horses and saddles and joined the army of destruction and liberation.

The Spaniards hoped to check the advance of the destroyers in Santa Clara and failed, and then in Ma-

tanzas and failed again; and there was a wild, vain rush to protect the province of Havana. Still the fire reddening and the smoke obscuring the indigo sky of Cuba, the pillars of flame and the pillars of cloud, told the march of the liberators moved ever westward and invaded the province never before disturbed beyond Havana, where the tobacco stalks yield leaves of gold; and on the tobacco, as on the sugar lands, the insurgent armies were recruited, and productive Cuba ceased; and the dreadful character of the war was developed.

Campos strove to gain for the cause of which he was the leader, the good will of civilization, and was met by the command that he should use the same weapons the rebels did, and make the warfare one of savagry, but the proportions of the insurrection were so vast that the inadequacy of the recommendation was obvious except to those whose vision was perverted by passion. The Spanish, not obtaining decisive victories, demanded severities, and as shouts of triumph were not warranted there were cries for vengeance, and Campos, beaten and discredited, retired.

Then came Weyler as a terror, and was intimidated by his own reputation; and, unable to resist importunity for assurances, made promises that were irredeemable, and he found his occupations at Havana so exacting and so many scenes of military action calling for supervision, that he did not follow the example of his illustrious predecessor and rush fitfully to the field, but he evolved the scheme of surrounding the enemy, which proved a failure as palpable as the other conception of lines and fortifications that the insurgents could not pass from the Atlantic to the Caribbean Sea.

As to these lines there is the most serious attempt of the Spaniards that has been made, to confine the daring Maceo in the western province, where he has been for weeks alternately dodging the Spaniards and charging them, fighting for ammunition, and foraging in a country that has become so war wasted that living on it is very precarious. The Spaniards seem to have given up attempts to defend property, and to have adopted in a modified degree the tactics of the Cubans. The Cuban theory has been for a year that in order to liberate the Island it must be laid in ashes and, in an agricultural and commercial sense, completely ruined. They have believed the Spaniards would themselves become so impoverished by the extinction of the resources in the Island and the enormous expenses of their exertions in keeping a force of nearly two hundred thousand men engaged by land and sea, that their aggressiveness at least would be extinguished by exhaustion.

The most intelligent Spaniards must be aware that the Island is lost to them in the sense that it can no longer be profitable to them ; and there is in the reports from the scattered scenes of the customary circumstances, that the Spaniards are becoming fiercely disposed to destroy the villages and plantations the rebels have spared, and to slaughter remorselessly the people who have sought to evade participation in the war. The design behind this is that the country shall be reduced to such a state of indigence that the rebels cannot find food, and must disband or become so divided as to be unable to cope with Spanish battalions. Certainly the game of desolating a land is one that two can play at, and both parties in Cuba seem to be playing it.

All the world now knows the rebel war operations are an answer to the Spanish political economy that confines the industries of the Cubans to the two great specialties of sugar and tobacco, forcing Cuba to take Spanish manufactures and refusing fair reciprocity for Cuban products. No more intolerable tyranny than is involved in this policy can be conceived. The Cubans have destroyed the sugar and tobacco crops, and strike Spain through her revenues and manufactures. In order to do this the insurgents have to keep moving, and operate without bases, depots or hospitals or objective points. This is, indeed, the only system of war permitted in Cuba, surrounded as she is by the sea, in possession of Spain, and trampled by an army that amounts to one man in eight of the whole native population of the Island, white, black and mixed.

Weyler ordered the country stores emptied, and that the people should concentrate themselves in the towns; but, forced to do this, they must be assisted to food or starve, and they are starving. The great body of the country is therefore given up to the insurgents, among whom as a vital matter there is rigorous discipline. The Spaniards, who claim to understand and abide by the honor of arms, become insane in combat, and revengeful as they are successful; and a wide margin is left for the totally depraved bandits, who stop at no crime and kill alike and are impartially killed by Spaniards and Cubans.

The effect of the marching to and fro of Gomez and Maceo, and the manœuvres of the regular troops, and the reign of terror of the robbers, is to fearfully disorganize society. It is said in some countries in Europe that the men and horses go to the war, or at least to the army,

and the women and cows do the work. In Cuba there does not appear to be even the diversion of women and cows industrious in providing food, and the Spanish are aiding in the work of ruin they could not quell or limit, believing that, at the same time, Spain is deprived of money, or any form of the fatness that has hitherto characterized Cuba, the Cubans will find themselves unable to get anything to eat, and must disband so far as to make no showing of an army, and they are acting on the principle that each Cuban killed stops a possible rebel recruit.

There has been no precedent of such warfare as this in any civilized land, and there is a question whether, in the interests of humanity, there must not be interposition to restrain the continuance of the horrible combat, which never was conducted with the usages of organized people, but is an endless system of skirmishes in ambuscades and, according to the combatants themselves, has largely lost the forms of civilization and become a competition of incendiaries and assassins. It is not they alone who take the sword that perish by the sword, and make good the old word, but they who take the torch perish by the torch also, and the ghastly spectre of the yellow fever will soon waste at noonday and walk in darkness. There is already famine, and the fever—and we have the three horrors, war, pestilence, and famine!

There is reason for estimating carefully the probabilities, when reading the daily supply of "Outrages upon American Citizens" that are furnished to the country. The demand for this sort of thing is as continuous as the supply is copious, but the Spaniards, while excited and resentful towards Americans on account of their peculiar interest in Cuba, have sense enough not to be

picking quarrels with the United States. There are, however, so many of our citizens engaged in the rebellion, that it is only with much caution that encounters with them by the Spanish authorities can be avoided, and the Spaniards, it is to be presumed, are not unwilling to annoy our official representatives by dealing with citizens who use the name of America as a cloak, to cause embarrassing cases.

It would relieve the American public of a good deal of anxiety and indignation to remember that the news by way of Key West and Tampa is manipulated in the insurgent interest just as fashionably as that of Havana is in the Spanish interest. One could give both sides of a thousand stories of "battles" in the bushes without imparting any real information. As reported, with a manifest mixture of expressions and exaggerations, there is not a sensation in 500 fights, and history must deal with general results.

As the month of April closes, we hear little of Gomez compared with that which circulates about Maceo, and whether Maceo is in a desperate situation in the west end is uncertain. There is reason to believe, however, that he is hard-pressed, for other insurgent generals are not doing anything decisive for his relief, and the captain-general is using all means of transportation to concentrate, first, to prevent Maceo's retreat eastward, and second, to crush him. If the insurgents have the authority and resources and means of communication upon which they claim recognition for belligerency, and if they find the sea so open, they will make movements to occupy the Spanish army to a considerable extent remote from Maceo, and land for him canned meat and hard bread and cartridges.

It is not by big battles that the war will be decided. The pivotal questions are the public credit of Spain and the food supplies of Cuba. Regarding famine, we do not believe there is fiction on the wires. The application of the intelligence about the dread calamity is not, as it is comprehended, so partizan as to demand perversity of patriotism. Here is a Havana despatch of April 20th, saying, "Reports come from all parts of the Island of much distress, resulting from the concentration of the population in the cities and the desertion of the fields." A letter from Cartagena states that the people are in a terrible condition. There is no work for men, and little food. In Trinidad fish sells for thirty cents a pound, and meat has increased two and a half cents a pound. In Sancti Spiritus charcoal, formerly forty cents, is now \$1.40. All food has advanced equally in price. In Sitio Grande many families are living in tents erected in the middle of the streets."

Another despatch from the same place, of the same date, reads: "The situation in Cuba is heartrending; the poverty is appalling; famine stalks through this naked, desolate land. The bread question will presently become as important as the political question. Preparations for relieving the sufferings of the non-combatants must soon be made. Women and children from the interior continue to flee to the United States on every steamer. The benevolence of Americans will soon be tested, or thousands will starve, for everything is being put to the torch."

Thousands of people are in the woods to evade Weyler's order to concentrate in the towns. Both sides are dealing violently with the country people. A letter from Sancti Spiritus says: "It is dreadful to think of the

effects of the concentration. It means the death of many families. We have no houses or food for them. The people try to evade the general's order. The Spanish troops have strict orders to burn every house, whether occupied or not. In the districts of Macaya-beos and Yayabo, all the houses have already been burned by the Spanish columns, and the inhabitants have been forced to come into the towns, or meet starvation."

The accounts of the estates burned by the insurgents, with immense quantities of cane, the houses, the plantation property of every kind, are appalling, and, with the Spaniards engaged in like work, the speedy reduction of the Island to a desert, visited with every calamity that scourges mankind, is certain.

Thus far, every shape of general misfortune and distress aids to swell the ranks of insurgents. The Weyler order for concentration in villages is declared to have thrown thousands of desperate men into the ranks of Gomez in the east end. Driven from their homes, they prefer to go to the army rather than to the garrisoned towns, and the women have been following them, being homeless, and feeling safer in the camps, than in their houses without the protection of husbands, brothers, and sons, all gone into the army. This women movement, however, cannot be general, for they cannot take the children to the army, and so they live in privation and terror, and have places where they hide from the raging savages that have become the beasts of prey.

CHAPTER XX.

THE PICTURESQUE IN THE WAR.

The Camps of the Rebels and the Palace of the Governor-General—How the Wounded Cubans are Cared for—The Inside of the Rebellion in the Woods, and the Secret Doors of the Palace—The Cuban Women in the War, and an American Woman Interviews the Redoubtable Weyler, and He Shows Photographs of His Family, and Gives Her Flowers.

GROVER FLINT'S pen-sketch of a camp of Cubans is a fine picture, full of touches that tell of truthfulness. He was writing from a real insurgent retreat, and as he wrote, the swarthy guards, with the silver star on their hats and rifles in their hands, were duly vigilant. He says :

"CAMP SABANAS, near Sagua, April 1.—This is a real insurgent camp. About me, as I write, are standing its swarthy guards, with the silver star on their hat rims and rifles in their hands. It is a permanent camp, with a little hospital. Dr. Francisco Domingues, of Havana, is stationed here as a special agent of General Maximo Gomez, not only to attend to the wounded, but to forward despatches to the chiefs of insurgent divisions throughout the Matanzas province.

"The camp lies in a forest among the foothills that rise from either side of the valley, reaching from the coast to the interior of the Island. High mountains and swamps, green with rushes and cane, protect it on all sides but one. On this side a narrow trail zigzags for a league in the woods, barely missing morasses and pit-



VALLEY OF THE YUMURI, NEAR MATANZAS

falls. Twenty well armed men could hold that trail against a regiment.

"The camp itself is tropical and picturesque. It is a plateau, thickly overgrown with stunted trees and towering palms, reached by little paths cut with the machete.

"The insurgents live in small huts or wickyups, 'jack-als' they call them here, built of boughs and saplings, and thatched with palm leaves. Rebels against Spain must sleep in hammocks, for the ground sweats in the Cuban jungle, and white men cannot sleep on it and live.

"At night strange birds sing. Queer animals, like overgrown rats, look at you from the trees, and great land crabs scurry into their holes at your approach. Horses are tethered about everywhere, and stand unsheltered, rain or shine. They are fed on rushes, or colla, for no other grain is to be had, and a sorebacked, sorry lot they are, though tough and tireless as our own bronchos.

"The camp guard consists of fifty men, exclusive of negro camp servants, armed only with machetes. Major Juan José Andarje, a strong, handsome young Cuban, is in command, with a captain, a sergeant, and four corporals. Guards and patrols watch the trail leading from the valley, and no one is allowed to leave without a pass from the commander. Squads of men ride through the country at night in search of 'plateados'—those bloodthirsty robbers who were the terror of the country early in the war, but who have been almost suppressed by the insurgents. When the plateado is caught, he is brought to camp and hanged to the nearest tree.

"It is odd to find soldiers with camp servants to fetch water, cut wood and perform the acts of personal service; but the men are active and quick to take the saddle on sudden alarm, as I have seen on several occasions since my arrival. The life is like that of Marion's men in our American Revolution for simplicity. No coffee, no bread, heated sugar and water at daybreak, sweet potatoes and stewed beef at noon, and stewed beef and sweet potatoes at night. Beans and rice are luxuries. Sugar cane, sweet and nutritious, does for bread. We eat with our fingers and knives down here, with bits of palm bark for plates. Food is plentiful or scarce, according to the country and to circumstances. That there is no scarcity now is proof that the sympathy of the native population is with the insurrection.

"No man is so poor that he cannot cheerfully give food for the army, This proves also the truth of the saying here that the Spaniard owns only the ground he stands on. The news of every movement of the Spaniards is quickly reported.

"I find these people capable of any sacrifice for the cause. In the interior, inhabitants of the villages will burn their towns on the approach of a Spanish column, so that they may not afford the troops shelter, and points whence expeditions may be sent through the country. I also find that whenever the insurrectos ride with their red, white and blue cockades, the people are glad to see them. The girls stand in the doorway and wave their hands, and the small boys look on them with admiration. On the other hand, the news of the approach of Spanish troops will throw a community into a panic.

"I can now, from the insurgents I have seen and

lived with, contradict the absurd and pitiful misstatements of the Spanish press and Spanish minister at Washington, that the insurgent ranks are composed of bandits, whose only aim is to kill and burn. I find myself among men courteous and well bred, proprietors of plantations for the most part, or sons of such proprietors, and evidently accustomed to a comfortable mode of life. These remain in the field, half-fed, inadequately armed and badly equipped, certain only of ignominious death in case of capture. They receive no pay and are earnest, patriotic and self-sacrificing. They obey the officers implicitly and do their duty without complaint. Moreover, you do not hear of a single authenticated case of robbery or violence of any kind done by them. The vicious, cowardly atrocities penetrated on defenseless men, women and children are the work of Spanish troops.

“The victims of these are rarely important enough to attract special attention, but the massacre continues in every part of the Island. I am told that this state of affairs was unknown at the time of Martinez Campos.

“To-day I talked with Jose Ballete y Sirea, proprietor of a little plantation near Recreo. Two weeks ago his sixteen-year-old son was seen by some Spanish guerillas exchanging words with a passing party of insurgents.

“After the rebels had passed, the guerillas came from their hiding place, arrested the lad and took him before the alcalde of Recreo as a suspect. The alcalde dismissed the case and ordered the guerillas to take the boy home. As soon as they were clear of the town the guerillas cut the boy to pieces with machetes, and left the mutilated body in a field, where it was found six days later by the parents. Then the father put a star

and a ribbon on his hat and joined the rebels in the woods."

Kate Masterson, writing from Havana, after hearing from the Cuban women, with a woman's sympathy, the startling stories of their confidences, gives this romantic history of woman's part in the war :

"From this beautiful summer land one cry goes up which is heard over the din of battle and the clash of arms. It is the wail of the desolate Cuban women. They are mourning for their loved ones, and their tears are falling upon new-made graves throughout the Island.

"Their soft eyes have looked upon ghastly bonfires in which the bodies of their babies have been the fuel that fed the flames. Their cry is more eloquent than all the ruin and desolation of this beautiful land of graves. The cane fields, sending their columns of flame and smoke across the stars like signal fires to the American nation, are not so imperative as all this woman love going up to Heaven in a tortured cry for help.

"Like the Easter lilies of Cuba, bent and stained with patriot blood, and the roses trampled in the earth and drenched with mire, are the hearts of these poor women. They are suffering, bleeding and breaking; yet they still have courage, and trust that God will send aid from America and liberty to Cuba.

"It is for the women and the children that these men are fighting who are so bravely holding the Island in the face of an army, more than three times bigger in numbers than they; half naked as they are, their bodies torn from the underbrush through which they walk, often with only one cartridge apiece to face a well-provided foe, they are fighting with a spirit which once moved the American army of the revolution.

"The women of Cuba are the mothers of this most human revolution. They do not fear death. They would gladly die for Cuba, but their cheeks grow white at the thought of the atrocities and crimes which the Spanish soldiers employ toward the helpless. So strong is this fear, that many of the women have accompanied their husbands to the fields, remembering the crimes of the late war against their sex. Men have hesitated to leave their wives and daughters unprotected at home, and there are over a hundred women under Maceo and many under General Gomez as well.

"Many women are nursing the sick and the wounded. Some are fighting shoulder to shoulder with the men. They do not fear death one-half so much as the horrors which might await them at their homes. Their children are born upon the battlefield. It was thus in the last war also. Is it a wonder, then, that the Cubans are patriots?

"It is one great feature of this revolution that not only the women, but the children, are fighting with the army. There is a list of child martyrs, baby patriots. The Spanish authorities, with their usual cheap acuteness, have endeavored to make capital from the fact that there are women in the field with the Cuban army, and have spread the report that they are 'Amazons,' describing them as rough, masculine creatures, devoid of gentleness and modesty. This is one of the favorite lies which they are so fond of quoting. The Cuban women are the most feminine and simple women in the world. They are almost childish in their love for prettiness and charm. They adore their children and worship their husbands. But their gentleness has turned to bitterness in many of their hearts through the sorrows that have been inflicted upon them.

“Besides the women who are with the army, there are any number of women in Havana to-day who are anxious to join them. They know only too well that should the Cubans attack Havana, the vengeance of the Spaniards would be directed to them. I have visited them in their homes in Havana and outside of the limits placed by war. I have spoken with them and have been thrilled with their courage and patriotism. I know that American women are patriotic, but these Cuban women are fierce in their patriotism, and wish to take arms against the enemy who has despoiled their homes and killed their relatives. They are the ‘insurrectes’ heart and soul, the moving spirit of the revolution. To-day Maximo Gomez carries over his heart a silken Cuban flag which he has sworn that he will never unfurl until it floats over Moro Castle.

“Many of the Cuban women have lost all they possessed through this war. Their plantations have been burned and their fortunes swept away, but I heard none complain. They are willing to give everything for Cuba, and they see their sugar cane go up in smoke, glad that thereby its revenue will be lost to Spain. Some of these women sold their jewels when their money was gone, in order to send medicines and lint to the rebels. In every Cuban home, also, a sum is set aside out of each day’s household money to send to the field.

“There are pathetic and moving incidents without number connected with this war in which women play the first part. Many of them lie in unmarked graves to-day, but their names will live in Cuban history forever. An old lady of eighty, whom I visited at her home a few miles out of Havana, showed me an

American flag which she has kept carefully for years folded away in camphor, She told me in Spanish that she was keeping it to drape over her balcony when the American troops marched through the streets of Havana.

"One of the most dramatic incidents of the war was a marriage ceremony performed at dawn in the mountains of Puerto Principe. Robau, a handsome and well educated young man, whose father owns a large plantation at Puerto Principe, enlisted as a private with General Gomez when the war broke out. He has fought bravely from the beginning until now, and was made lieutenant, then first lieutenant, captain, and then major. He recruited his regiment from his own neighborhood, and it is now composed entirely of his friends, all finely bred young men.

"Robau was in love with a young girl who was a native of a small village near his father's estate. She was in humbler circumstances than he, and the rigid rules of Cuban etiquette kept them apart. But when the young man first marched through the town with his splendid company of men, their horses' bridles were braided with ribbons and they wore wreaths of palm leaves about their hats in her honor. They passed the girl's home, and saluted her as she stood on the balcony with her mother.

"Robau went in and asked that he might marry the girl then and take her with him, as he feared that evil might befall her in his absence. But his sweetheart's parents objected, and finally Robau yielded to their wishes, and marched away broken hearted. Two days later, when he had gone many miles, the girl dashed to his side, mounted on a horse. She had run away from her home in order that she might be with her lover.

“That night Robau sent a guard of two men, with an extra horse and an empty saddle, to the house of a padre near by. The good priest mounted and rode along between the two men, muttering prayers, for he expected, despite the assurances of his escorts, that he was to be killed. They reached the hills where the regiment had halted, and just as dawn broke from the east the young people were married. They are now at Santa Clara, where Robau is in command of 400 men, operating with Seraphine Sanchez and his band of 4,000.

“One of the notable women of this revolution is Rosa Hernandez, the wife of Dr. Hernandez, of San Cristobel. She is now in the field with her husband, under General Maceo, taking active part in the fighting. She is young and beautiful, and had only been married a year when her husband had been called upon to organize a band of men. He came to his young wife, who was soon to be a mother, and told her that he would do just as she willed, for he felt that his life belonged to her. She answered him that she wished he should go to the war. In a week he had raised a band of 500 men—half a regiment—and, as they marched out of the town, they saluted Mrs. Hernandez, passing her house, shouting ‘Viva la Reine Cuba!’

“When her husband had been gone about three weeks, the Spaniards took possession of the town under General Carnellos. One of the lieutenants rode into Hernandez’s home on horseback, and subjected her to threats and insults. As soon as he had left, she got a horse and joined her husband, riding many miles through the Cuban hills until she found him.

“The women of San Juan Martinez have also taken



CUBANS FIGHTING FROM TREE TOPS

a great part in the rebellion. When the Spanish troops, under Cornell, were on their way to the city, the people met and took a vote as to what course they should pursue, the women casting ballots with the men. They decided to burn their city rather than to have the Spanish soldiers destroy it. They took their children in their arms and turned their faces toward Guane, walking all the way, as they had given their horses to the Cuban soldiers. Before they left, the women set their homes on fire, and when the Spaniards reached the place at midnight, they found the city in flames. When the people of Martinez reached Guane they found that the baffled soldiers were still on their track, and they burned Guane, as they had their own city, the women putting the torch to the houses. They afterward burned Montezeula in a similar manner, cutting off the Spaniards effectually. The path of these women and their babies was marked by fire until they reached the protection of the insurgent army.

"On the 7th of January last, the rebel forces, under Perico Delgado, burned the settlement of Cayajabos, Pinar del Rio. A rebel soldier was carrying an oil lamp to bedaub the walls of a house. Miss Regla Quevedo, a graceful young lady, ran toward the revolutionist and grabbed his arm, at the same time exclaiming : 'You must not do that to this house, as it belongs to a Cuban ; come with me and oil this other one, which I myself want to set on fire ; it belongs to a man who hates us.'

"It was a Spaniard's house, an officer of the volunteers.

"Mrs. Louisa Hernandez, the wife of Damian Pere-soto, a political exile in the Isle of Pines, accompanied

her husband in his exile, that she might liberate him. When he was working with eleven others cutting wood, she began to talk with the padrone who had charge of them, so as to get familiar with him, and in one of their talks she seized the guard's gun on pretense of examining it. Suddenly she leaped backward, and, pointing the gun at the guard, threatened him with instant death if he moved. Then taking the guard's machete, her husband and his comrades tied the unfortunate man and fled toward the coast.

"On reaching the coast they compelled the captain of the schooner *Margarita* to set sail for Cienega de Zapata, which they reached in safety. The twelve fugitives made their way to Cuba and joined the revolutionary forces. Mrs. Hernandez is still at Zapata, where she acts as nurse in a hospital.

"In the Cuban regiment under Colonel Antonio Nunez there are two young and pretty women, wives of two rebel chiefs. They travel well armed and ride two very fine horses. January 7, when the forces which they accompany stopped a passenger train at St. Cribal Station, Pinar del Rio province, the two young women were the ones to quiet some of the passengers who were frightened, and as some of the passengers were astonished at seeing them armed, they answered: 'The country needs arms which can carry those arms that she needs for her defense, and does not make any distinction whether they be those of men or women. All of them are the same, with the proviso that their owner should be courageous and have determination.'

"When the insurrectionists, under Edward Garcia and Rafail Cardenas, invaded the settlement of Sabanilla del Comendador, the majority of the women residents

joined them, receiving them with cheers and cries of 'Cuba libre!' The garrison of the town before surrendering defended itself, and during the fight some of the women employed themselves in setting fire to the settlement while others gathered up the wounded and others were getting arms from the rebels, so as to fire themselves.

"With the forces of Calixto Alvarez there are eleven women, colored, wives of eastern chiefs, who have abandoned their small farms in St. Jago de Cuba, to follow their husbands' lot. These women busy themselves in gathering up the wounded that fall during the fights and succoring them. All of them carry machetes and revolvers.

"Christina Lazo, a daughter of Cuba, was imprisoned by reason of her separatist propaganda, and was locked up in the Jarneo prison. On the 19th of February, the forces under Maceo invaded the place and liberated the prisoners. Christina burned the prison, made a speech to the townspeople to prevail on them to join the rebels, and then marched away with the Cuban troops."

To what extent the Cuban ladies unconsciously exaggerate the number of their sisters who are fighting for freedom, is not known, but that they are, in their excitement, inaccurate we may safely assume. No doubt many sincerely wish to fight, but cannot get the chance. The Cuban ladies are not advanced in the modern woman sense, and Mrs. Masterson has faithfully portrayed them. There is no question that some of them are with the armies. They can be of greater actual service in the hospitals; but, unhappily, the wounded cannot receive the care they should have. Mr. Rappleye said, in one of his early letters: "There are four women with Gomez. They are

white women, one of them an American. They are the wives of some of his officers. They are dressed in masculine attire, as a pair of bloomers have never been landed in the island of Cuba. They ride horseback with Gomez's staff, and each carries a Mauser rifle and ammunition. They have taken part in several engagements, and so far they have escaped being wounded."

Here the number of Amazons is understated as to the time covered, and they have had reinforcements. The Spaniards not only admit the presence of the Cuban women with the insurgent forces, but assert it with ungenerous imputations. The Spaniard cannot, as a matter of patriotism, do justice to the discipline of the Cuban soldier—much less to his bravery and his mercies—and they should read, mark, and inwardly digest this testimony, which is given in a letter by the president of the Stanford University, California—

SAN FRANCISCO, April 26.—President Starr Jordan, of Leland Stanford, Jr., University, writes to the *San Francisco Call* as follows:

PALO ALTO, CAL., April 25.—Some time ago I wrote to a friend in Havana, a gentleman of Spanish descent and education, an author well known in Havana, and withal a very trustworthy man, asking him to tell me what the real feeling of the intelligent classes of Havana was in regard to the present insurrection. I inclose herewith a translation of a letter received from him. It seems to show that this rebellion is not a mere bandit outbreak of negroes and jailbirds, but the effort of the whole people to throw off the yoke of a government they find intolerable.

HAVANA, April 17, 1896.

DR. DAVID S. JORDAN, Palo Alto, Cal.

Dear Sir: It is to be regretted that, as you say, those of you who are interested in the fate of this country have not a perfect knowledge of its true present state. Great ruin and much blood must be shed to attain what now seems likely to be attained, but it is never too late for the good. I can give you an idea of what the really intelligent Cubans think of the

present movement. I have heard the opinions of the most distinguished persons of the city, persons who, by education and from a sense of honor, are incapable of falsehood. They have given testimony, one by one, each without knowledge before and after of what the other has said. It seems to me, therefore, that I can reply to your inquiries with authority.

1. The insurrection was begun and is kept up by Cuban people.

2. The Government has made colossal and unheard-of efforts to put it down, bringing against it a force of 150,000 armed men and resorting to all possible measures of prudence and resource, but has not succeeded in diminishing it. It has extended from the extreme east to the extreme west, and is everywhere maintained.

3. The flower of our youth is in the army of the insurrection. In its ranks are many physicians, lawyers, druggists, professors, artists, men of business, engineers, *et al.* By the excellent consular service of the United States this fact may be proved if it is not already known.

4. The insurgents began by destroying their own property, in order to deprive the troops of the government of shelter and sustenance.

5. Destruction is carried on by both sides; by the insurgents on the much greater scale.

6. Let it be understood that the insurgents will continue in their course until they fulfil their purpose, carrying all before them by fire and blood.

7. All eyes are directed toward the north, to the republic, which is the mother of all Americans.

8. The people of the United States must bear strongly in mind now, as never before, that profession is null and void if action does not confirm it. Men like yourself know this best of all.

The man most abhorred of all in the world by the women of Cuba is Captain-General Weyler, and the only American woman who has interviewed him is the same who has written with so much warmth and grace of the Cubans of her sex, and whose romantic sketch of the heroines in the army we have largely reproduced.

Now, Weyler is a very accessible captain-general, a diplomat in conversation, and of various manners from the sharpest business tones and language, and the most peremptory questions to the gracious and the gallant.

Mrs. Masterson describes Weyler as advancing to meet her with a clasp of his firm, finely-shaped, cold hand, and quick, magnetic voice! He wore a black alpaca office coat, and his linen was spotless, and about his waist, over his vest, was a sash of red silk, and the great strength of his face, and massive build of his shoulders were what first impressed themselves upon his caller, who saw that "his eyes are bright and are the color of sherry with ice in it. Otherwise they have a naughty little twinkle."

The interview proceeded as follows, under the usual common consent that it was not an interview, a little finesse of the exalted officials in many lands.

"Your Excellency," I said, through my interpreter, "the American women have a very bad opinion of you. I am very much afraid of you myself, but I have come to ask the honor of an interview with you, in order that I may write something which will reassure the women of America that you are not treating women and children unmercifully."

The general smiled.

"I do not give interviews," he said. "I am willing, however, to answer any question you wish to ask."

So it was with this understanding that we conversed. The general has allowed me to have the conversation published.

"In the United States," I said, "an impression prevails that your edict shutting out newspaper correspondents from the field is only to conceal cruelties perpetrated upon the insurgent prisoners. Will your Excellency tell me the real cause?"

"I have," replied the general, "shut out the Spanish and Cuban papers from the field, as well as the Ameri-

cans. In the last war the correspondents created much jealousy by what they wrote. They praised one and rebuked the other. They wrote what their passions dictated instead of facts. They even created ill feeling between the Spanish officers. They are a nuisance."

"Then I can deny the stories that have been published as to your being cruel?"

The general shrugged his heavy shoulders as he said, carelessly :

"I have no time to pay attention to stories. Some of them are true, and some are not. If you will particularize, I will give direct answers ; but these things are not important."

"Does not your Excellency think that prisoners of war should be treated with consideration and mercy?"

The general's eyes glinted dangerously.

"The Spanish columns attend to their prisoners just as well as any other country in times of war," he replied. "War is war. You cannot make it otherwise, try as you will."

"Will not your Excellency allow me to go to the scene of battle, under an escort of soldiers if necessary, that I may write of the fighting as it really is, and correct the impression that prevails in America, that inhuman treatment is being accorded the insurgent prisoners?"

"Impossible," answered the general, "it would not be safe."

"I am willing to take all the danger, if your Excellency will allow me to go," I exclaimed.

General Weyler laughed. "There would be no danger from the rebels," he said, "but from the Spanish soldiers. They are of a very affectionate disposition, and would all fall in love with you."

"I will keep a great distance from the fighting if you will allow me to go."

The general's lips closed tightly, and he said :

"Impossible ! Impossible !"

"What would happen," I asked, "if I should be discovered crossing the lines without permission ?"

"You would be treated just the same as a man."

"Would I be sent to Castle Moro ?"

"Yes." He nodded his head vigorously.

That settled it. I decided not to go.

"It is reported," I said, "that thirty women are fighting under General Maceo. Is this true ?"

"Yes," replied the General. "We took one woman yesterday. She was dressed in man's clothes, and was wielding a machete. She is now in Moro Castle. These women are fiercer than the men. Many of them are mulattos. This particular woman was white."

"Do you not think that the life of a newspaper correspondent in Havana is at present a most unhappy one ?"

"I think it must be; for they make me unhappy. If they were all like you it would be a pleasure."

"Do you not think the machete a most dangerous implement of war ?"

"No. It is simply something to fight with. A man fights with a stick, a gun or a sword. It is not so cruel as a sword."

"Is it true that thumb-screws are used to extort confessions from prisoners ?"

"Not by the Spaniards. Rebels use all these things similar to those that were used in the Inquisition tortures."

"Do you not think that Maceo and Gomez have shown good generalship ?"



FRUIT STAND, HAVANA

"No. Maceo is a mulatto. He has had no military instruction. Gomez fought under me at Santo Domingo. He was a captain and I was a colonel."

"Was he not a brave soldier?"

"No; he never distinguished himself in any way."

"Does not your Excellency think the Cuban women very pretty?" and the General smiled approvingly yes.

"Yes, beautiful," he said.

"And the American women, what do you think of them?" he was asked.

"If you, señorita, are a fair sample, then I think them adorable," and the General bowed with his hand upon his heart.

"Would you not like to see the palace?" he said.

Then General Weyler led the way into the throne room, which was just off the audience chamber. It is a long, stately, high-ceilinged apartment, curtained in brilliant red velvet. The floors are of white tiled marble, and the walls of red brocade outlined with gold. The throne itself is on a raised dais at the end of the room, right under a portrait of King Alfonso.

There seemed to be no outlet to this apartment, but the general placed his hand upon the wall, near the throne, and almost like magic a panel door opened, which the general held until I had passed through.

"This is my bedroom," he said. It was a beautiful room. The big brass bed was canopied in fine lace and soft, white monogrammed linen showing through. The chairs were of cane, and a couch was drawn near the window, where flowers were blooming. A cut-glass liquor set was on a small table, and books were upon a shelf near the bed.

"Step in here," said the general, and he opened an-

other of those secret doors in the wall, and we were in the enclosed balcony. The general pushed open one of the blinds, and the palace garden was before us, a delightful breeze coming through the wavy palm trees that lined the walk.

The sitting-room opens off the bedroom. It is daintily furnished. A dressing table draped with lace bears silver toilet implements and many photographs. A broad table near the window is furnished with writing materials of silver.

General Weyler drew aside the lace that hung before the window, and pointed to the sea.

"Is it not beautiful?" he said.

"This room is like a lady's boudoir," I exclaimed. "Has not your Excellency a wife and daughters who might enjoy all this with you?"

He went to the dressing case and picked up a large photograph of a beautiful young girl with black hair and large serious eyes. Across the corner was written in Spanish: "To my father," with an affectionate sentiment inscribed beneath.

"She died five months ago," he said. Then he handed me another picture, that of a bright, sweet-faced girl. "She speaks English," he said.

Then came the picture of a boy, resembling the general across the forehead and eyes. "Has he not a good German face?" he asked, proudly. After this he handed me a card upon which the faces of his smaller children were pictured, the heads close together. "These are my babies," said the general.

"Now I must show you my bathroom," he continued, and with pardonable pride he ushered me into a large room, the floor and walls of which were of pale blue

marble There were Turkish towels everywhere in a beautiful profusion, which I had not before observed in Havana, and a cane couch had pillows, also covered with toweling. A velvet screen shut off the marble bath, but the general led me back of this so that he might show me the shower bath. The floor was indented beneath the shower, and the general stood at a safe distance and pulled the brass chain to show me how it worked. It was wonderful.

"There is not such a beautiful bathroom in Havana," he exclaimed enthusiastically.

Out of this room we walked into a spacious billiard room, the long windows filled with flowers. There was a fine table and a set of cues in a case upon the wall.

"Do you play, general?" I asked.

"Yes, but I have no time now," he answered. He ushered me into a stately dining-room, white and cool and finely furnished.

A long table was spread in the centre of the room and there were hundreds of roses upon it. They were in tall vases and in circles upon the white cloth. They filled the air with their fragrance.

"Will you not accept these?" said the general, selecting some particularly fine ones from the largest cluster.

"What color do you prefer?" said he. Then he handed them to me with a bow, as I thanked him.

"I shall be most happy if you will join me at dinner this evening," said he, "or, if not convenient, any other evening; or to breakfast, if you prefer. Breakfast is at 12 each day, and dinner at 8."

I thanked the general for his courtesy, and he continued: "You must not think it odd that I should

invite you. I know that American ladies can dine or breakfast with a gentleman without remark."

I assured the general that I should be very much honored to accept his kind hospitality, and we passed into a long room, half balcony and half windows. Upon the walls were wooden shields with various kinds of sabres fastened to them, the blades beaming in the sunlight. Upon one of them hung a wreath of laurels, tied with ribbons of red and yellow. Upon the ribbons was written in letters of gold :

"To the brave and illustrious Dan Valeriano Weyler, Gobernador-General de la Isla de Cuba."

This historical penciling possesses unique value, because it is by a woman and of a man whose position in the crisis of the conflict between the Spaniards and Cubans gives him the interest of exceptional importance.

CONCERNING THE TROCHA.

There has been general curiosity about the latest and, it is alleged, the most formidable of the trochas in Cuba, and the *Herald's* explanation of the meaning of the word that is so much in the air adds to the public information. The Spanish place a reliance upon the trocha that is not supported by their experience, and the only advantage it seems to be to them is it offers a suggestion that they are aggressive when they are at a standstill, and so magnifies the office of inertia. The *Herald* states the value of the Spanish military line from the standpoints of the combatants, and gives a sketch of its unreliability, saying that that particular military form of defense, known as a trocha, seems destined to play an extremely important part in the present rebellion in Cuba. The great length of the

Island—700 miles from east to west—with an average width of only about sixty-five miles, undoubtedly suggested the idea of establishing military roads or trochas between points on the north and south coasts. The design of the trocha is to prevent the passage of the insurgent forces from one district to another. The strategic value of the line is doubted by many Spanish commanders. Among these is Captain-General Valmaceda, who, after inspecting the work on the famous trocha between Jucara and Moron, remarked that for military purposes, even if it cost nothing to build and maintain, he would not accept it as a gift. Maximo Gomez, in the ten years' war, apparently demonstrated the soundness of Valmaceda's view by crossing the trocha seven times, once carrying with him his wife and children. The succeeding captain-generals of Cuba, however, including Campos and Weyler, have been wedded to the idea of a trocha as of great military utility.

General Campos distributed nearly fifty thousand men along the Jucara and Moron trocha, hoping to keep Gomez from entering the province of Santa Clara. Forts were built along the line at every fifteen hundred yards, and communication was kept up between them. Trees and undergrowth were cleared away for two hundred yards, and every precaution was taken to intercept the insurgents. Nevertheless Gomez, with his compact column of twenty-two hundred men, not only safely crossed the trocha on October 29th last, but soon afterward recrossed it into Camaguery and met Antonio Maceo. Together they conducted their combined forces again across this supposedly dangerous line, and began the campaign of the "Occident." Still General Campos did not abandon the idea of the trocha.

The insurgents swept on across Santa Clara, Matanzas and Havana, and in a vain hope to prevent the revolution spreading into Pinar del Rio, General Campos established another "trocha of iron" between the cities of Havana and Batabano, on the south coast, a distance of only twenty-eight miles. It was something of a departure from the idea of the old trocha. Forts were, as usual, built along the line of railroad, but in addition to this, hundreds of freight cars were covered with boiler iron, with narrow openings for rifles, five feet from the floors, and these moving railroad forts were kept running up and down the line day and night. After a careful inspection of this improved trocha, Gomez and Maceo, with their combined forces, crossed the "iron dead line" on the evening of January 4th, without firing a shot.

After getting safely on the west side, Gomez remarked that in compliment to General Campos, the constructor, or promoter, of the trocha, the insurgents ought to show some appreciation of his efforts. The rebel forces, therefore, rode back some distance and tore up about three miles of the track, as Gomez said, "Just to let the Spaniards know that we have noticed their toy." On January 7th Gomez recrossed this railroad trocha, without accident, into Havana province, where he was joined by Maceo some weeks later. But Maceo seemed to have taken a liking to Pinar del Rio, and, instead of fulfilling the prophecy of Weyler by hiding himself in the swamp of the Big Shoe, he again swung his column to the westward through the province of Havana, again crossing the trocha into Pinar del Rio without deigning to notice its existence.

An observer naturally asks, Where were the fifty

thousand Spanish troops who were stationed along the line for the express purpose of preventing such rebel manœuvres?

The Spanish idiom, "Quien sabe?" seems a very appropriate answer.

Now General Weyler has taken a hand at trocha building. He has constructed a trocha from the town of Mariel, on the north coast of Pinar del Rio, twenty-five miles west of Havana, to Majona, on the south coast, a distance of only twenty-three miles, and on the success of this trocha preventing Maceo's supposed anxiety to reach Gomez, who, with fresh forces, is approaching from the east, General Weyler is said to stake his military reputation.

Mr. Guerra, treasurer of the Cuban revolutionary party, and Agustin Agramonte, the nephew of the rebel president, Cisneros, were seen with reference to the probable effectiveness of this trocha of General Weyler. Mr. Guerra said: "Let no one entertain any anxiety in regard to the safety of Maceo. His instructions from General Gomez were not only to enter Pinar del Rio, but to maintain the revolution in that province. If he crosses the trocha into Havana it will be only to convince General Weyler of the futility of the trocha idea."

Mr. Agramonte thought the trocha an "excellent institution for the Cubans." He continued:

"This same favorite military hobby of the Spanish commanders is very liable to prove for them a trocha of death. Fifty thousand men cannot defend a line twenty-three miles long. It takes five thousand men five feet apart to cover a mile."

CHAPTER XXI.

AN IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT OF TESTIMONY.

The Double-Entry Historical Bookkeeping of the Battles in Cuba—
The Remarkable Characteristics of Discrepancy—The Havana and
Key West Stories Discolored and Distorted Out of Recognition—
—The Responsibility for Nickel Novel Cuban Reports—Dynamite
and the Press—The War in the West End.

THERE cannot be a consecutive history of the horrors of the warfare in Cuba. This time the whole Island is involved, and the coast and the interior, the cities and the country, are included in the calamity. There is a special activity in and about Havana, caused by the necessity of supplying the Spanish army, and the efforts of the Havana merchants, who have something to sell, to get it away from the Island that is vanishing in a vast catastrophe.

One can tell by the sort of news the newspapers contain whether the accounts of the battles come by wire or by grapevine. For example, this is a typical Spanish story :

Guadalajara battalion, while marching to San Miguel, met a party of 600 rebels, commanded by Aguirre and Morejon. A fierce fight ensued, resulting, it is said, in the rebels being so thoroughly beaten that they fled demoralized from the field. The rebel loss was stated to have been sixty, including fourteen killed. The Spanish troops were reported to have lost one officer and three soldiers wounded.

This is the Cuban interpretation :

The affair was similar to others in which "Pacíficos," or peaceful citizens, have been killed by Spanish troops. Fourteen of the dead are said to have been employees on estates, and not insurgents. On the Spanish side none were killed and only three wounded, while the Cuban dead exceeded thirty. Jaruco, the scene of this "combat," is only fifteen miles from Havana, on the Matanzas railroad.

Here is a representative story of a war incident :

Colonel Zubia reports that the troops under his command met a band of rebels on the San Jose estate, near Camajuani. A brisk fight followed, in which the rebels lost four killed. The insurgents retreated, but were followed by the troops, who again attacked them. The rebels made a stout resistance, but could not withstand the fire of the troops, and were compelled to retreat, leaving eleven dead on the field. The troops, according to the report, had only three wounded in both fights.

Another of the same sort :

While Colonel Pinto's command was reconnoitering on the Conchita estate, near Mariel, a rebel band, under Perico Delgado, was encountered. The insurgents occupied strong positions in the Rubi hills, but the troops dislodged them, and pursued them into the mountains. The loss of the insurgents is said to have been heavy. They left twelve dead on the field, and two men, who were wounded, died later. The troops had seven wounded.

Details of the minor matters are marked by the views of those who bear the intelligence, as are the outlines of large operations in this case, of a small one for example :

Colonel Escudero, while reconnoitering in the Zapata swamp, destroyed four rebel camps, and had several engagements with rebel bands, under the Socorros and Sanabria, killing four insurgents.

And this the same :

General Melquizo, at the Zaldiva farm, this province—Havana—has had a skirmish with the insurgent leader Castilla ; the latter left ten men killed, and retired with a number of wounded.

The comment will be no Spaniard hurt in this case, and there is no mistaking the paternity of this :

During recent engagements between the Spanish troops, under General Fort, in the Havana province, and the insurgents, the latter admit having lost 82 killed and 157 wounded.

Reports received here from Lacret's band of insurgents show a very demoralized condition of things. It is said that Lacret is frequently intoxicated, and that of twenty American members of an expedition from the United States, which recently joined him, five have been killed and the rest are disgusted. They say they have been deceived, that this is no war, that there is no fighting, and that they are living in swamps without clothing, compelled to eat bad food, that the agreements entered into with them have not been carried out, and that they are without leaders.

General Aguirre of the Cuban forces wrote recently :

We are close to Havana, and on March 22d my forces raided Guanataco, which is but five miles from the capital. Guanataco is the "Brooklyn of Havana," joined by ferry service, and has a population of 45,000.

No difficulty was encountered by us in the assault, and we secured 60 horses, 150 Remington rifles, 14,000 cartridges, and considerable clothing and medicine.

Only one of our men was wounded, but I have learned that the Spanish lost several soldiers.

The following is the way one of Maceo's "battles" appeared after it reached Havana by a private conveyance, and flashed through the secret channels to Tampa, from which it passed into American history :

A combination of Spanish columns was attempted near Limonar, where Maceo was apparently intending to cross the line into Havana province. This also failed, for the reason that Colonel Tort, with the Almancea battalion, a newly arrived body of green recruits from Spain, who had never seen fighting, attempted to hold the vital point on the lines. Maceo's veterans swept down upon them, and broke through the combination with a fierce fight which fairly wiped out the Almancea battalion.

The Spanish retired in the direction of Limonar, carrying about 100 wounded ; and, besides the nineteen dead they carried away, left seven on the field, whom the rebels buried.

The functions of the telegraph operators in breaking up the Spanish combinations are sometimes candidly set forth as in this curious instance :

Gen. Weyler's staff planned a manœuvre which would bring all the forces into conjunction surrounding Maceo's army at a point one mile from Colisea. The orders were sent by telegraph to Gens. Prat, Linares and Aldecoa, and Col. Hernandez, requiring them to make that place at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. The telegraph operator let the message go correctly to Gen. Prat, but changed the hour to 6 in the other messages ; and when Gen. Prat came upon Maceo he had about 3,500 men and the rebels over 8,000 cavalry. Gen. Prat was forced to retreat with the column badly shattered.

The Spaniards had another day of hard luck when at

Cayojabos, the rebels took possession of the burned town for a camp. Gen. Linares, Col. Francis and Col. Inclan attacked them. Col. Frances arrived first. Gen. Linares and Col. Inclan heard cannonading and rifle fire and hurried on. The fight here lasted four hours, and the Spanish had four captains and seven lieutenants killed, the killed and wounded soldiers numbered nearly 300. The rebels captured 1,000 rifles, and, on account of their strong position in the town, got through the day with about eighty losses, dead and wounded, as nearly as can be learned.

Then we have something of another sort :

Col. Hernandez reports having a fight with the rebel bands of Masso and Acea near San Felipe. The enemy occupied strong positions, but were attacked with great vigor by the troops, and finally fled, leaving seven dead on the field. The troops had five men wounded.

Col. Moncada reports having had several engagements with rebel bands near Cienfuegos, in which the enemy had four men killed and seventy wounded, and the Spanish troops had five wounded.

Just five men wounded every time! We all know the strange coincidences and persistent uniformities developed in statistical tables.

And again the Spaniards were slaughtered in the same part of the country :

The troops of Gen. Linares had begun to arrive to assist Hernandez and Inclan. They brought cavalry and artillery. The Spanish forces were moving along the road which lies between Candelaria and Guanajay. It was raining in torrents. Suddenly the whole division found itself in an ambush ; 4,000 rebels were behind stone fences on both sides of the road, and as soon as the fighting began they closed in front and rear. There was fighting for two hours. The rebels used the ammunition they had captured the day before. They captured two cannons and more ammunition and inflicted such losses upon the Spanish that a special train was sent out from Havana to bring in the dead and wounded. It was even given out at the palace that the troops had suffered two captains killed, four lieutenants wounded, and fifty-seven soldiers wounded. There were about fifty soldiers killed.

Something wrong here. No such news as that was ever given out at the palace, at least not since the time of Campos.

And the Spaniards had their innings, if we can believe their own accounts :

General Gonzalez Munoz reports that he has dispersed the rebels who were besieging Fort Zanja, near Manzanillo. He went to the assistance of the beleaguered garrison with a column of troops on four gunboats and two tugs. The rebels retired as soon as the troops landed, and the gunboats opened fire upon them. The garrison made a glorious defense. They were besieged for five days by 3,600 rebels, commanded by Mayai, Rodrigues, Rabi and other leaders.

The fort, when relieved, was without water, the tank having been destroyed by the rebel fire. The insurgents fired 111 volleys of grape-shot. They had two rapid fire guns that were recently landed at Guayabal. The artillery was served by American gunners.

There is an unusual pretense of authenticity about this paragraph :

The official report of the fight on the Fermina ranch, near Jovellanos, states that the rebels lost eight killed. The troops lost seven wounded. The Spaniards pursued the rebels, and in skirmishes killed eighteen without loss to themselves.

One of the troubles with this history of the war by double-entry bookkeeping is the impracticability of the verification in many cases of the incidents. The two inevitable tales about the same battle are so different in all important particulars, with perhaps the exception of locality and names of officers, that the laborious seeker of truth is driven close upon the theory that instead of one affair there must have been two or more.

Mr. Frank Clark, agent of the United Press, very recently from Havana, and a most vigilant observer, makes a statement that may assist to clear the minds of analytical readers. He says :

Before the arrival of Gen. Weyler, correspondents were permitted to accompany Spanish columns, and in the early stage of the war Spanish generals even permitted correspondents to visit the enemy's camps. Since the enemy has grown from scattered bands to organized and fairly well armed and drilled columns, it is a matter of life and death for a correspondent to penetrate the rebel lines. He would be welcomed by the insurgents, but shot upon his return to Spanish camps. I have had experience with four captain-generals—Calleja, Campos, Marin and Weyler. The last is the only one of them who made the life of a war correspondent burdensome. Suave and courteous in his talk, profuse in his offers to aid correspondents in sifting truth from error, polite in his reception of all Americans, yet he has a way of impressing upon a correspondent without putting it into words, that it would conduce to his personal safety to report nothing but Spanish official news. As these reports fail to mention a single insurgent success from the beginning, and are a record of many Spanish victories which

exist on paper only, the correspondent who accepts them at face value beguiles his readers. If Spain were winning battles, why not permit accredited correspondents to accompany columns of troops and report from personal observation? If battles are fought whenever announced officially, why are safe-conduct passes refused to correspondents when all is over?

The Spanish correspondents of Madrid papers, the Spanish reporters of Havana papers, all subject to the press censor, and the American correspondents are penned up in Havana, and every effort is made to keep the world in darkness as to what is being done in Cuba. Every cable despatch is carefully edited before it can be transmitted. Everything unfavorable to Spain or favorable to the Cuban cause is eliminated. The mails are searched to prevent newspaper correspondence being sent off. But with all these precautions the truth cannot be suppressed, and every Wednesday and Saturday the papers of the United States arrive in Havana, and long accounts of rebel victories and Spanish brutalities, which are true, are read by the English-speaking residents and translated for the benefit of Spaniards.

It is this system of suppressing the facts officially, and doctoring the news for the bulletins until they are ciphers, that inflames the imaginative faculties and produces the daily dime novel of current Cuban literature.

But there is a mystery in the atmosphere which involves a fact—a most notable one—of the disposition of the volunteers, so that the result of two candid and intelligent men trying to tell the truth about them is as follows :

(THIS IS FROM AN INSURGENT GENERAL, OPERATING NEAR HAVANA, AND TELLING OF HIS EXPERIENCES IN A CAPTURED TOWN.)

To demonstrate the feeling of the volunteers in the town I will give an episode of my raid. One of my men demanded of a Spanish grocer, a volunteer, the arms and ammunition in his possession. His answer was : "If you promise to respect my property then you shall be welcome to it. I do not hate, and will not fight, the revolutionists while they do me no harm. I would fight for the integrity of Spain, but this is not

Spain, it is Cuba, and you should have as much right to govern yourselves as we have in Spain. The volunteer service has already cost me many hundred dollars. My comrades have the same story to tell, and if you could convince us that our families and properties would be protected, we would all join the revolution."

(FROM A HAVANA CORRESPONDENT RELATING PERSONAL CON-
VERSATION.)

The source of danger is the volunteers. I was talking with my hotel waiter recently after he had been away for a day. He said he was out doing duty as a volunteer. He is a little sawed-off ignoramus, and I was curious enough to ask him how his companions felt toward Uncle Sam.

"Muerta Senor Sam," he hissed, bringing his fist down with a whack on the table.

"Death to Mr. Sam?" I repeated. "Why so?"

"He is going to help the insurrectors. We'll have to kill them all."

"But I'm an American; would you kill me, too?"

He seemed to be confronted by a situation for a moment only, when he said, sadly and earnestly:

"I am your friend, Senor, but I should have to kill you."

I was talking with an intelligent Spaniard who has a large business house here in town, and he was asking me:

"What in the world is the matter at Washington? Is Mr. Cleveland going to desert Cuba at the crisis? Can it be the action of Congress upon belligerency is to meet with his disapproval? Why haven't we heard that is all fin——"

At that moment another Spaniard came up.

"Senor, allow me to present my friend——. As I was just telling this American gentleman, Spain will find every loyal son shoulder to shoulder, fighting till the last drop of blood is shed to avenge such an insult to our national honor as this uncalled-for interference of America."

Since I have come to have more or less friendly relations with the second senor, I have found that he is a physician of considerable prominence, and when we met accidentally, when we were alone, his first question was:

"Do you think there is any danger of the Congress modifying those resolutions if there is a joint session?"

There was an attempt at the Spanish palace after the explosion that broke the monotony of the movements of eminent officials with a shock that rent solid masonry, to create the belief that it was caused by a gasoline engine which had suddenly collapsed. It is surprising, however, to those who know the desperate temper of the Cubans, that dynamite was not set off in Havana long ago. The use of it has been freely talked of for months, but confined to the destruction of railroads. There is a circumstance going to show that the shock of an explosive in the palace was caused by some one who was unfamiliar with the surroundings or shaken by timidity—at least that he lacked knowledge or nerve, and was not of the nature of the Russian or Spanish bomb throwers. The explosion took place in the corner of the palace most remote from the apartments of the captain-general. If it was meant for him, there was inferiority of purpose or information. There is a Key West story that introduces as a possible factor another force of civilization—poison!

There is a rumor that the Spaniards have turned loose mules loaded with poisoned provisions, and an insurgent general says: "Known Spanish troops poison wells, and, to break up camp, leave poisoned provisions behind in the hopes of their falling into our hands. In the last war this was a common thing."

The better way is to disbelieve much that the combatants declare until there is a demonstration of the infamies that should be incredible.

The captain-general has issued a proclamation ordering severe measures to be taken against the press, and that penalties be imposed upon newspapers publishing articles lessening the prestige of the Spanish national-



AN ENCOUNTER AT CLOSE QUARTERS

ity, the army or the authorities, and empowering the governors of provinces to suspend the publishing of any papers continuing to infringe upon their orders. The captain-general is not, however, strong enough to suspend the law of precedents, and order that his country shall be served by the freedom of the press to publish live news. It will take more than one revolution to arrive at that beatitude.

Meantime there is a letter from Maximo Gomez, saying:

We have a great military advantage over the enemy in the incapacity of the majority of Weyler's generals. The false official reports of supposed victories with which they cynically pretend to deceive themselves, their government and the world, contribute to the speedy triumph of the revolution. No human work which has for a base falseness and infamy, can be either firm or lasting.

Everything that Spain orders and sends to this land, that she has drenched with the blood of her own children, only serves to ruin her power. And no man is so well chosen as General Weyler to represent in these times and in America the Spain of Philip II.

The commanders-in-chief on both sides have notably forcible ways of expressing themselves.

In nothing during the whole course of the war have there been more positive disagreements than concerning the position of Maceo in the west end. This is a typical and test case. It was the boast of the Spaniards that the western province was truly loyal to them. There the feet of rebels had never polluted the soil save by stealth. One would have supposed from Spanish conversation that if the rebels ever got there they would be suppressed instantly by the peninsular patriots. When the tide of invasion sweeping over the Island passed Havana, and poured, like a river of lava, in

Pinar del Rio, the people welcomed the destroyers with open arms, and there was rejoicing in the villages.

After Captain-General Weyler had reorganized the scattered and bewildered columns, and imparted to the troops some of his own confidence, he ordered them to be put in motion, and the insurgents, short of cartridges, and without hospitals to save their wounded from death in languishing captivity, evaded combats until they found, through superiority in local information, advantageous opportunities, and then they behaved with extreme caution, and the larger bodies drifted rather than were driven eastward; and the report was, Gomez was sick and going into rainy weather quarters, while the Maceos would conduct some skirmishing. The Spanish confidence was higher than it had been for months, when it was dashed by rebel recklessness close to Havana. The peculiar sluggishness of the Spanish columns until they have positive orders to do explicit things gives time for rebel raids. The Spaniards are not cowardly in the sense of being afraid of the enemy, but they are fearfully particular about their orders, and there is next to no independent initiative.

The rebels rushed into villages within half an hour of Havana, and had their way for hours, watching all the while for the signs of Spanish activity, and going away at full gallop with such necessities as they could gather as soon as there was choice between a heavy fight or flight. By the time the Spanish are massed to their satisfaction and in motion, the insurgents are out of sight. The return of Antonio Maceo to Pinar Del Rio was to the Spaniards a surprise, but the statement is current in Cuba that he was expected, and the secret well kept; also that there had been carefully stored, in

anticipation of his coming, stores of supplies ; that there was corn ready for his horses and cattle ; sheep and hogs and potatoes in plenty secreted in the mountains. Upon this is based the Cuban theory that Maceo is not undergoing great hardships, and is not disturbed by decisive movements, though his position is well known. It is claimed for him that he has the country with him, and that there are signals arranged for surf boats, by which supplies are landed in some of the many harbors that are a feature of the coast line.

There have been several of the sharp skirmishes that in Cuba are classed as battles, between the troops of Maceo and the Spaniards westward of the trocha, and each side claims victory, the rebels, as usual, riding down the Spaniards, hewing them in pieces and capturing cartridges ; the Spaniards winning the fields by irresistible bayonet charges. The fact of deadly combats is attested by the names of officers on both sides killed and wounded, but the narratives are vague enough to allow large scope for controversy without descending to tantalizing particulars. There is a waiting game played. Maceo feels that he is doing the cause of his country service when he remains in the west ; that time is against the Spaniards, and they far outnumber him, and have him located. It is their turn to move.

The Spanish say Maceo's men are nearly naked, hungry, and despondent, and wanting to surrender, and must soon come to a bad end if they can be prevented from moving eastward ; and the troops work on at their trocha, in high spirits that they only have to fortify a line and stay there. This is regarded as equivalent to aggression, but it shows the captain-general is imitating the failures of predecessors.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE RECORD OF DESOLATION AND DESPAIR.

The Torch is Mightier than the Sword—Lists of the Plantations and Towns Burned—Dramatic Scenes and Thrilling Incidents in the Doomed Island—The Work of Destruction the Only Occupation—Utter Collapse of Business—Famine Close at Hand—Inhumanity and the Cuban Cry for Cartridges—A New York Deserter—A Business Man has One Hope of Escaping Ruin—The Truth of the Civil Government of Cuba—The Cry for Cartridges.

“CUBA to-day only presents pools of blood dried by conflagrations,” are the terrible words of Maximo Gomez in a letter to the Cuban delegate at Washington, and he goes on, “Our enemies are burning the houses, to deprive us, according to them, of our quarters for spring.” The old chieftain adds, that “we will never use reprisals, for we understand that the revolution will not need to triumph by being cruel and sanguinary.” The insurgents are, however, freely using the torch, that has become mightier than the sword—than even the machete.

The Spanish authorities have furnished a list of plantations destroyed by insurgents during this war in the four western provinces—precisely those not affected seriously by war until in course of the struggle that is progressing :

Name.	Province.	Proprietor.	Annual production Bags.	Value of stock and machinery.
Mercedita.....	Pinar del Rio...	Ernesto Longa.....	20,000	\$250,000
Tomasta.....	Pinar del Rio...	A. Ledesma	12,000	150,000
Asentista.....	Pinar del Rio...	Guillermo de Sealdo. .	5,000	55,000
Begona.....	Pinar del Rio...	Conde Reunlon.....	15,000	100,000
San Juan Bautista...	Pinar del Rio...	Gutierrez Aldave.	12,000	100,000
San Gabriel.....	Pinar del Rio...	Conde Lombilo.....	12,000	100,000
Santiago.....	Pinar del Rio...	J. A. Bascal.....	10,000	85,000
San Augustin.....	Pinar del Rio...	F. Delvalle.....	5,000	50,000
San Claudio.....	Pinar del Rio...	Eduardo Delgado.	15,000	120,000
Gerado.....	Pinar del Rio...	Vincante Cagigal.....	15,000	140,000
Santa Teresa.....	Pinar del Rio...	Vicente Cagigal.....	4,000	35,000
Guacamaya.....	Pinar del Rio...	Y. Fernandez.....	10,000	210,000
Santa Joquin.....	Pinar del Rio...	Joaquin de Mier.....	20,000	200,000
Salvador.....	Havana	Conde Berreto.....	30,000	300,000
San Augustin.....	Havana	Francisco Casuso.....	15,000	200,000
Teresa.....	Havana	Domingo Arango.....	45,000	400,000
San Jose.....	Havana	Carolina Lacoste.....	80,000	700,000
Emilia.....	Havana	Manue Escobedo.....	10,000	100,000
Manuelito.....	Havana	Conde Duana.....	40,000	300,000
Luisa.....	Havana	Jose M. Herrera.....	15,000	180,000
Santisima Trinidad...	Havana	Jose Arrogo.....	12,000	140,000
San Leon.....	Havana	Sierra Y Toscano.....	12,000	140,000
San Antonio.....	Havana	Mamerto Pulido.....	15,000	300,000
La Victoria.....	Havana	Viuda de Lejalde.....	10,000	200,000
Tivo Tivo.....	Havana	Herderoz de Macia....	8,000	120,000
Purísima Concepción.	Havana	Carlos Mazorra.....	6,000	90,000
Aitrevido.....	Matanzas.....	Foyo Y. Diaz.....	25,000	250,000
Saratoga.....	Matanzas.....	Drake & Co.....	10,000	150,000
Laberinto.....	Matanzas.....	Sarañ Mederos.....	30,000	350,000
Carlota.....	Matanzas.....	J. Guerendian.....	20,000	150,000
Esperanza.....	Matanzas.....	Herederos de Pelayo..	15,000	200,000
Arco Iris.....	Matanzas.....	L. de Ulzurrun.....	14,000	100,000
Diana.....	Matanzas.....	Herederos de Baro.....	40,000	400,000
Santa Leocadia.....	Santa Clara....	Raurell Hermans.....	10,000	180,000
San Jose.....	Santa Clara....	Cacido y Cia.....	8,000	120,000
San Antonio.....	Santa Clara....	Cacido y Cia.....	5,000	55,000
Carmen.....	Havana	Mearinan Crespo.....	100,000	1,000,000
Santa Ana.....	Havana	15,000	200,000
Dos Hermanos.....	Havana	Felix Sardinias.....	16,000	300,000
Semillero.....	Havana	Herederos de Arango..	40,000	500,000
Totals.....			807,000	\$8,915,000

To this must be added at least a hundred cane fields,

and the following sugar estates, which had buildings and machinery, but sent their cane to be ground elsewhere:

Name.	Province.	Proprietor.
Santa Ysabel.....	Pinar del Rio.....	A. Otamendi.
Dos Hermanos.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Conde de la Reunlon.
Nueva Embresa.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Gutierrez Aldave.
Rojas.....	Pinar del Rio.....	J. Barberia.
Varela.....	Pinar del Rio.....	E. Uzabiaga.
Recompensa.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Marques Veitia.
Manuelito.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Eduardo Delgado.
Redencion.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Emilo Kessel.
Loboria.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Gutierrez Aldave.
Corojal.....	Pinar del Rio.....	Abelarde Ledesma.
Plazaola.....	Havana.....	Ygnacio Herrera.
Esperanza.....	Havana.....	Conde Romero.
Aljovin.....	Havana.....	Candido Matos.
Concordia.....	Havana.....	J. Romay.
Encarnacion.....	Havana.....	Julio Hidalgo.
San Ysidro.....	Havana.....	M. Borrell.
Amistade.....	Matanzas.....	Heredos de Macia.
Capitolio.....	Matanzas.....	Heredos de Macia.
San Luls.....	Matanzas.....	Ygnacio Herrera.
Peria.....	Matanzas.....	Pedro Matiarlo.
Diamante.....	Matanzas.....	L. Angulo.
San Blas.....	Matanzas.....	J. M. Ponce.
Penon.....	Matanzas.....	Viuda de Quesne.
Intropdio.....	Matanzas.....	L. Solerre.
Sanjoaquin.....	Matanzas.....	Gonzalo Pedroso.
Elrico.....	Havana.....	Pedro F. Decastro.

This list of forty-two towns burned is charged to the Spaniards:

Los Arroyos,
Juan y Martinez,
Vinales,
Sandiego de los Banos,
Torriente,
Auroro,
Flora,
El Cristo,

Ranchula,
Salamanca,
Boniato,
Bejucalo,
Catelina,
Jaruco,
Los Abicus,
San Juan de los Yeras,

Paso Real,
 Los Palacios,
 Santa Cruz,
 Bahia Honda,
 Roque,
 Maia,
 Los Abenus,
 Dos Bacos,
 Cabanas,
 Cayapabos,
 San Diego de Nunez,
 Quiabra Hacha,
 Sagua de los Ramos,

Puerta Piton,
 Ramon de los Yaguas,
 Bainaio,
 San Nicholas,
 Sieba,
 Benavides,
 Cardenas,
 Ibarra,
 Navajos,
 Carrafalo,
 Cartagena,
 Moron,
 Melena del Sur.

In justifying the war of the torch and explaining his invasion of the west end, Antonio Maceo says, in a letter dated at El Rubi, at Pinar del Rio :

“I have been compelled by circumstances to resort to extreme measures. General Weyler, in his wild desire of gaining glory and of obstructing the recognition of our belligerency, went in his proclamation so far as to promise the planters that they would be able to grind their sugar cane, while to the government he gave the assurance that the elections could be peaceably held, and to the country at large he declared that the Pinar del Rio and some other province would be soon pacified. Some of the planters, showing themselves willing to believe that the general would keep his promise, began to get ready for grinding the cane. Under the circumstances I made up my mind to invade Pinar del Rio again, in order to show that we are fully able to compel obedience to the orders of our government.

“I am perfectly satisfied with the success which has attended all my operations during this second invasion, which shall last so long as there is anything to destroy

from which Spain may derive any revenue. As you will see, the discredit which the proclamations of Weyler were intended to throw on our revolution has, through what we have accomplished, fallen on Spain, whose incapacity to control our movements has been again plainly shown.

A correspondent with the rebels writes :

I asked Dr. Dominguez why the insurgent columns burned the towns when the inhabitants were really in sympathy with the Cuban cause.

"The burning of the towns," he answered, "is often a necessity. The Spanish troops are unwilling to sleep in the open air. We therefore burn a town to harass them, but the principal purpose is to prevent its becoming a headquarters from which they may skirmish the surrounding country."

The Spaniards have begun a general slaughter of horses wherever they find them, no matter to whom they belong. This is to prevent them from falling into the hands of the insurgents, and is probably in accordance with orders from the military governor at Matanzas or from General Weyler. Outside of the cities the soldiers kill every living thing. In addition to the common outrages on non-combatants, they kill horses, donkeys, cattle and mules for amusement or for practice. In many parts of the country people have abandoned their plantations and have taken their families into the cities to save their lives.

The mayor of Wajay, near Marianao, April 18, accompanied by a policeman, was held up on the Arango estate by a rebel band, under Juan Delgado. The horses they rode and four others, taken from citizens for the government service, were seized. All receipts from taxes and town money already collected were taken from the mayor, who was then released. The Arango estate was burned.

A party of insurgents caught the mail carrier between Bainoa and Caraballo, took his letters from him, and then made him assist in the work of demolishing fortifications erected on the Loteria estate. The Carahatas correspondent of the New York *Herald* writes :

"The town is left in absolute darkness, except for the fires started by the rebels on neighboring estates. There is no kerosene in the town. Poverty is general, and there is no money even to send a schooner to Havana for food and merchandise. The rebels burned yesterday a



SPANISH OUTPOST NEAR REMEDIOS.

bridge on the road from Carahatas to Ramona station, and four houses on the Sabanilla estate. The torch is applied everywhere."

A despatch from Havana, dated in March, gives these particulars of the way the work of destruction was going on then :

The insurgent leaders, Vincente Nunez and Eduardo Garcia, with a force estimated to number about 1,500 men, are encamped at the plantation of Magdalena, district of Santa Ana, Province of Matanzas. They have burned fourteen houses belonging to the colony of Estrella, near Palmillas, province of Matanzas, and have destroyed a number of cane fields in Central Felicia and Alfonso Doce.

The insurgent leader, Angel Castillo, has burned near Puerto Principe a fine farm and a number of houses at Quinta Maria, San Miguel la Carbonera, La Josefina, Santa Rosa, and other places which had good houses.

The insurgents have burned thirty houses in the village of Jamanitas and the farm of La Herminia near Marianao. They have also burned 635 tons of sugar cane near Palmillas in Matanzas.

Quite recently we learn that the rebels have burned all the tobacco plantations belonging to Pedro Murias, near Dimas, in the Pinar del Rio province, together with other property. Over 300 houses and 40,000 bales of tobacco were destroyed. The loss is estimated at over \$1,000,000, that of Murias alone being \$700,000. The misery resulting from the firing of the plantations is terrible ; 3,000 persons are rendered homeless. They are being protected by the government as best they can be, and fed with military rations.

Among the documents found on the body of Jose Alfonso, the rebel leader, who was killed near Cardenas, was a circular ordering him to respect the property of Americans. These are the leading items in a recent news summary :

"The rebel leader, Juan Suarez Gonzales, who was killed in an engagement at Jesus Maria, had on his body a communication from Lacret, ordering him to hang the owners of sugar estates who were proceeding with grinding operations, and all marauders, as soon as their identity is established.

"Fear is expressed in Matanzas that an epidemic will result if the slaughter of horses is continued around the city. The newspapers in Cienfuegos clamor for precautions to avoid the spread of the smallpox. The city is now filthy.

"At Jaguey la Grande, in the Remedios district of the province of Santa Clara, the insurgents have burned the machinery houses of the Rosario plantation and the railroad station at Guanabano. The machinery houses of the plantation of San Narcisco, near Guira Melina, this province have been burned, and the cane plantations of Loteria, Carmen, and their colonies destroyed, with 22,000 tons of cane."

A late letter from Havana states the deplorable condition of the people of the country districts in these terms :

A very large proportion of the working class is absolutely destitute of ready money. The men, knowing there was no work for them in the towns, hesitated about going with their families, while they feared to remain in their poor homes, where, at least, they could be sure of food. The time for obeying the decree ended yesterday.

There can be no doubt that the majority of houses on the main roads will be deserted. There are many instances of men who have sent their wives, etc., to the towns to look out for themselves as best they can, while they remain in defiance of the government and run the chance of escaping the Spanish soldiers. Very many other peasants have joined the insurgents, with their wives and children, and stories of the exploits of the half frenzied women in the ranks are already beginning to circulate on the Island.

A reliable person from the Sancti Spiritus district informs me that fully eight thousand recruits have been obtained for the insurgents in this province. In order to obtain food for the cities, the Spaniards have decreed that the cultivators from the country must lay out market gardens in the immediate vicinity of the towns and within three miles of city lines.

Serafin Sanchez, the insurgent commander in Santa Clara province, has issued a counter proclamation instructing the men not to raise vegetables about the cities, promising them protection.

It will be observed here that the Spaniards and Cubans alike are frightened by the imminent danger of famine, and it is certain to come along with pestilence, if war is the sole occupation of the people.

It is a horrible condition of things just at the beginning of the rainy and sickly season. Such is the terror the torch has spread, and the desertion of all productive occupations, that there is no hope in the future, so far as human eyes can penetrate the gloom. Both sides are burning houses, the Spanish are killing horses to deprive the rebels of transportation, and the rebels are killing the domestic animals to get meat, and are ravaging the fields for potatoes and stripping the trees of fruit. There is no safety for any one on the road, and no assurance, if any care to attempt raising corn or garden produce, that he or she who sows or hoes shall reap. The rebels burn the cane and tobacco, and there will be no crops this year at all, and the meaning of this is no money to buy anything with. The fields are to yield weeds, the domestic animals of all kinds are in course of massacre. The Spaniards have ordered the people to the towns, and soon will have multitudes they cannot feed ; indeed, there are now many haggard with want. The destruction of houses by Spaniards is to force the rebels, by annihilating shelter, to sleep on the ground, which cannot be endured in the rainy season.

The Spanish and Cuban armies are simply engaged in thorough work destroying all the improvement of many generations on the Island and all resources for the production of food. Already there is most dreadful destitution, and the result threatens to be the extermination of the people following their total impoverishment. ,

An April 23rd letter gives a summary of the prostration of Cuba, the collapse of her finances and industries, showing the progress of the policy of desolation. We quote from the *New York Sun* this most shocking compilation of the evidences of material disaster:

The receipts at the custom house, which have usually amounted to from \$40,000 to \$50,000 daily at this time of the year, have fallen to an average of \$20,000. Some days even \$16,000 is not reached. The fact is due to the general poverty of the country produced by the war and the reduction of imports.

The sugar product is only 8 per cent. of its average amount in times of peace. About 1,000,000 tons of sugar have been produced in the Island annually, but only 80,000 tons were produced this year. These 80,000 tones have come from sugar estates which were permitted to grind by the insurgents, contrary to their rule and in accordance with private arrangements with the insurgent government. The sugar planters are loosing all hopes of a good crop next season. It is said that Gen. Gomez will issue a proclamation prohibiting grinding next year. Some say that the proclamation will come from the Cuban delegation in the United States, as Senor Estrada Palma, the Cuban delegate there, has received orders from President Salvador Cisneros to issue it.

It is reported also that Senor Emerterio Zorrilla, a rich Spanish sugar planter now in New York, has written to his friends in Havana that there is no possibility of a mometary arrangement with the Cuban delegate at New York to secure permission to grind. "The island," says Senor Zorrilla, "is condemned to destruction. I think that sensible Spaniards ought to look for some terms of peace that will satisfy the Cubans and prevent the total ruin of the Greater Antilles."

In the last balance sheet of the Bank of Commerce only \$231,000 ap

pear as deposits. In times of peace the bank never had in deposit less than \$1,000,000. The situation of the Spanish Bank of the Island of Cuba is also desperate. The governor of the bank, who is appointed by the government, desires to increase the capital from \$8,000,000 to \$10,000,000. The share-holders oppose this measure. They say that even the capital of \$8,000,000 is only in name, as the stock is quoted at only 50 per cent. of its face value.

Private bankers, such as I. M. Borjes & Co., Uppman, Hidalgo & Co., and Gelats, have sent to New York and Europe nearly all the money they deposited. They are fearful of the situation and of their responsibility in case the governor-general, as a war measure, orders a heavy contribution from the banks. During the ten years' war the Spanish Bank was ordered to advance to the government a large sum.

Former rich commercial firms have now only a few names on their salary lists. Nearly all the clerks may sleep and take their meals in the house, but receive no money.

The increase of the inhumanities is plain, and the decline into barbarism indicated by events that under other conditions would not be credible, and we compile specimens:

On the sugar estate Santiago, in the province of Pinar del Rio, Lieut. Lazcano, who was commanding the vanguard of Gen. Arolas, met an old Cuban laborer who was watering his cattle. He asked him what he was doing. "You see," answered the man. Instantly he was shot dead by Lazcano. Then Lazcano went to Arolas and told him: "I have killed an insurgent." "All right," was the reply. "Do it again."

In Cervantes the same Spanish column assassinated one night twenty-two peaceful laborers. On the sugar estate Vizcaya, another man was shot by the guerilla of Lieut. Campillo. In the province of Matanzas no countryman escapes if he is a Cuban. In San Jose de Los Ramos the crimes committed by the Spanish troops are numerous. On the farm San Cristobal, Bernabe

Ramos, a laborer, father of four children, was killed simply because he was a Cuban. His friend, Felix Ramos, having also a large family, and Jose Fabio, an employee, were shot also. On the neighboring estate Santa Rita Jorgo Vento, another pacifico, was hanged. On the sugar plantation Progreso Pedro Ortiz, Ceferino Fernandez, Pedro Hoyos, and the latter's three sons, 20, 17, and 15 years of age, were shot. And these ghastly murders are called "making war."

One of the complaints of American citizens of property destroyed—and it is true there are many millions of American investments in the Island—is filed by the brothers Farrar, owners of the coffee plantation Estrella in the Havana province, and is supported by this statement:

On Saturday, March 21, the dwelling house of the coffee plantation Estrella was the object of wanton attack by the column of Gen. Bernat, operating in that region. The said building received cannon shots of grape and canister, breaking the door, one window, several piazza columns, and greatly endangering the lives of the families of my brothers Don Tasio and Don Luis Farrar, both American citizens, the wife of the former being *enciente*. There were two small children in the house. From my information, it appears, that the troops mentioned had sustained fire with a rebel band in Paz plantation, a quarter-league from Estrella.

The rebels having fled to Pedroso and Buena Esperanza plantations, the government troops advanced toward Estrella, in quite an opposite direction from that taken by the rebels. On arriving at the borders of Estrella plantation, the Spanish columns began firing cannon at the dwelling house, and it was immediately invaded by soldiers, who ransacked it, carrying off from wardrobes all jewelry and men's clothing which they contained, as well as a sum of about \$60 in money. They also took away everything found in workmen's dwellings, arresting at the same time twelve of the occupants whom they conducted to Alquizar as insurgents. It should be observed that the cannon were fired solely at the dwelling house of the owners, although there were twenty other buildings on the plantation, and the place was entirely clear of insurgents.

In consideration of all the above, and particularly on account of the danger to which his relatives were exposed, and also for the unjustifiable looting on the part of the regular troops in the service of a constituted government, the undersigned does most solemnly protest, and asks an immediate indemnity for the damages suffered, which he values at \$5,000, as all work has been stopped on the plantation and everything abandoned

In the midst of this merciless war, there is on the part of the combatants no thought of peace. "The surest way of bringing hostilities to a close," says General Maceo, "is to place in Cuba 20,000 rifles and 4,000,000 cartridges. It would be a great service to Cuba," he says, "if the United States would not interfere with the shipment of arms and ammunition" as he understands such shipments would be legal.

It is said that the *Bermuda* on her second excursion "carried 1,000 rifles, 500,000 cartridges, two Gatling guns, many machetes, and 1,000 pounds of dynamite, besides uniforms, rubber coats and medicines.

"The arms, ammunition and supplies were landed in six big surf boats that were taken aboard the steamship at Jacksonville."

It is not yet bread, but only cartridges, that the Cubans cry for, and the Spanish policy of vengeance shows no sign of abatement. We say policy of vengeance, because the cost of this war added to the last would absorb all the money that could ever be exacted from the productive industries of the Island, if we may imagine, which we do not, their revival under the flag of Spain. The only use Spain can have for Cuba hereafter, and this is the outcome of all complications, is as a place for the favorites of the Spanish government to pillage. Even that comes to an end in the poverty of

the people. In Havana, that was a man of affairs in Cuba who said: "I am ruined if the Spaniards succeed in their strife for contest. I am ruined if the revolutionists succeed and the independence of Cuba does not mean annexation to the United States, for in either case we shall be under the rule of the sword until we are in the Union. My hope then," said this citizen of Cuba, "is in the union of my country as a state with the states of the American Union. It is a far-off, faint hope, but all I have. Without it my estate is annihilated, and my wife and children will come to want, for I shal' be broken and done. I am not a political theorist. All I ask is a government that keeps order without tyranny and suppresses corruption so that a man who is honest has fair play. Men of my class were nearly used up when the war began, and we are punished as the case stands." This was the despairing utterance of a man who had been a millionaire, and now mourned his broad fields desolate, his palace beyond his avenue of royal palms in ruins, his wife and children sheltered by marble and surrounded by splendid appointments, but stinted for the necessities of life. There is constant controversy as to the civil government of Cuba, and it is just as well the friends of the freedom of the Island should say frankly that it is but a shadow.

Mr. Hitt, in the House of Representatives, speaking for the recognition within conservative limitations of the rights of belligerency, said: "The Spanish troops are practically penned up in the cities. They have only detachments outside of towns. The country is Cuban and the Cuban army holds it. The Cuban capital, Cubitas, is more secure than Havana is to-day. It

is not a war of similar dimensions to the ten years' war of 1868 and 1878. That never extended far beyond the eastern province of Santiago, and even that it was impossible for the power of Spain to subdue. They held that monarchy at bay for ten years, although they had not an armed force one-fourth as great as that now under the commands of Generals Gomez and Maceo."

We cannot give full consent to this for Havana is not and has not been for a moment in the slightest danger from the insurgents, and Cubitas is only safe in that sense that it is unsearchable. It is true, though, that the country is Cuban and the Cuban army holds it, except that part which is under the feet of armed Spaniards. It is true, too, that this war is a greater struggle than the one that lasted so long. If this goes on, it must end in total ruin to everybody involved. Spaniards and Cubans are falling together into an abyss. The answer that should be made to the assertion that the Cubans have no civil government, is that they have as much authority of a civic character as the Spaniards, for there is nothing but martial law in the Island. The fight of Spain is to continue martial law, and the Cubans are in arms to overthrow the Spanish law, which is administered by soldiers by force of arms. Some of the Cuban people thought to govern themselves, and they will seek first to be emancipated from military despotism, and the way to do it is to organize as a state and apply for admission to the United States. The importance of belligerency recognition is exaggerated. It is a question of cartridges and rifles, and it is not the part of revolutionists to regard proclamations and decrees as essential.

The Cubans have been exerting themselves to the utmost to provide by their loan, recently negotiated, means to capture a port and hold it. To this end they have been arming vessels, buying artillery, and firing upon Spanish gun-boats with some effect. If they could hold a port, especially in the west end, it would be a powerful argument for recognition by all nations.

Some of the cartridges Maceo needs so bitterly appear to have been captured, but there is news from Jacksonville of the *Bermuda*.

The manifest shows that an immense cargo of Gatling and Hotchkiss guns, rifles, machetes, revolvers, powder, cartridges, torpedoes, etc., is carried. John Kennedy, an employee of J. A. Huau, a Cuban, professed to be the shipper, and the munitions are consigned to the Central American Fruit Company, Puerto Cortez, Honduras.

When the *Bermuda* came into Jacksonville she had about 200 men on board. The others were picked up here and at the bar. One hundred came from Fernandina. This contingent was taken by rail to a point on the St. Johns River below Jacksonville. There they boarded the tug *Kate Spencer*, which took them outside and transferred them to the *Bermuda*. Fully one-half the men are natives of the United States. The pilot who took her out says she looked like a war ship. Cannon had been mounted fore and aft, and machine guns had been placed amidships.

The *Bermuda* was evidently not prepared to put in a plea that she was a ship on a peaceable errand.

One old American soldier has had enough of the Cuban war, and has been heard from at Poughkeepsie



LANDING THE CARGO OF AMMUNITION, ETC., BY THE STEAMER
BERMUDA IN CUBA.

on his way to Buffalo. His name is William Ewing, and he is fifty-five years of age, a native of Buffalo, and his story reminds one of the romances of the crusaders.

He served in the Seventeenth United States infantry all through the civil war, and is a member of the G. A. R. Since the war he has lived in Buffalo until three years ago, when, with his wife and daughter, he went to Cuba, and invested \$7,000, all the money he had, in a sugar plantation. His brother-in-law, William Hamilton, helped him work the plantation.

Owing to the troubles on the Island, Ewing sent his wife and daughter to New York last October, and from there they went to Buffalo. He has not heard from them since. Ewing and his brother-in-law joined the insurgent army, and Ewing has been in twenty-one engagements, under Generals Gomez, Maceo, and Garcia.

"In one of those engagements my brother-in-law was killed," said Ewing. "Being almost crazed by my reverses, and not having heard from my family, I determined to come to the United States and look them up. On the night of March 28th I made my escape from the Island, and was rowed out in a small boat three miles, when I boarded a blockade runner, landed at Atlantic City, and walked to New York.

"After arriving in New York I was afraid to make myself known, and, therefore, received no assistance from the Cuban Junta. From New York I walked to Yonkers, where Grand Army comrades gave me food and paid my fare to Poughkeepsie."

Mr. Ewing, under all these circumstances, seems to have done well to have escaped from his plantation, for neither peace nor war had thrived with him in the tropics.

He is a type of an American-Cuban soldier. One hesitates to use the word Cuban as distinct from American, for Cuba is the great American island, and should be included when we speak, as Daniel Webster did, of the nation as distinct from the states, and the sum of all: "One constitution, one country, one destiny." Here is a man who fought through our war in the

regular army, and when peace came resumed the labors of peace, and earned a little but adequate fortune, and concluded to go beyond the lines of the land of his birth and blood, tempted by the soil and sky of Cuba, and there invested the provision that, with industry and thrift, he had made for his old age. The war cry was heard, and he fought for liberty again, but his friends fell by his side, and he thought there was no hope left in that bloody land, and became a fugitive to find his own country, and the charity of his old comrades of the Grand Army of the Republic, helped him on the way home.

The fixed resolution of Spain to ruin herself to the bitter end to hold Cuba for her favorites, and her forced market is not in the least relaxed, but grows still sharper and more severe and deadly as the misfortunes her policy has fastened upon herself are harder to bear. The vital forces that, wisely administered, would have made her a great nation once more are dissipated in the futile struggle to enslave forever her own children.

In the strife that has marked the course of the failure of fallen nations, there has been nothing more dramatic or deplorable ; and, as in these evil times the beautiful Island is blasted, it would seem that the Cubans of to-day, like the natives of 400 years ago, must live in huts, sheltered by the trees, on the fruits of the forest and the natural growth of food in the generous ground, whose prodigies of production offer the last possibility of livelihood, until they pass away under the savage cruelties of misrule, like those pathetic people here enslaved and destroyed by the discoverers of the Indies.

AN ILLUSTRATIVE MASSACRE.

Pedro Casanova, who has recently related his unhappy

experience with Spanish troops, is vouched for as an American citizen and a man well known and educated and respected. The *Herald* representative in Havana has interviewed him—and it is absolutely reliable—of this I can vouch from direct personal information, and this gruesome story is an example of the blood-thirsty madness that spreads and blights like some contagious disease. Casanova owned at San Miguel de Jaruca, in addition to his residence, buildings and machinery, all belonging to the estate, a large, unfinished structure on a hill, built by Casanova's father and intended for a public school or church. Opposite the railway station was a drug store, which is now closed. Casanova lived at a distance of four city blocks from the station, and the rebels had passed many times without molesting him. This seemed to constitute the grievances of the Spanish troops.

The regiment stationed near-by had won the title of undertakers, on account of their methods, as wherever they passed they left death. This regiment is in command of Major Fondeviela, whose officers say he instructed them that whenever shots were fired from a house their soldiers should kill all the occupants, including men, women and children. They obeyed the order to the letter.

Casanova's family consists of his wife, three children,—the oldest a girl of five, the youngest a babe in arms—and a nephew, Julio Vidal, a young man and a native-born American. Casanova's story is as follows :

“I have suffered great outrages at the hands of the Spanish soldiers. The soldiers recently passed on the road, and my wife called my attention to the fact that they had broken into a vacant house where valuable

property was stored, and were pulling things in pieces. Just then I saw two officers coming toward the house. I was very glad, and went out to meet them, and invited them to enter the house and refresh themselves. They accepted, and said they liked coffee. While they were drinking, one or two soldiers came and spoke to the captain, who asked me, 'Who are the men in the sugar house?'

" 'My employees,' I replied, 'including one engineer. The others are engaged in repairs.' The captain said :

" 'I hear rebels are hidden there. I must take the men before the major for examination ; the major himself will be here to-morrow.'

" After he left, I found the door of the house on the hill broken open. A quantity of bottled beer had been taken, also my saddles and bridles, and many other things. Gloves and other articles of woman's apparel were tossed in the yard. I went to the station. The drug store looked as if it had been visited by a mad bull. All the shelves and drawers were thrown out and smashed. An empty store opposite was in the same condition. The counter was thrown down and the door posts hacked by machetes. The large coffee mill was broken, and all was in disorder. An account of this work was what the soldiers had whispered to the captain. The officer had remarked to me with a sneer : 'The insurgents are very kind to you, as no harm has been done here.'

" I was surprised on the following Wednesday morning to hear shots as of several volleys of musketry. About three hundred soldiers—infantry and cavalry—were, in fact, outside, having surrounded my house. More soon appeared under command of Captain Cerezo Martinez. In most brutal and vulgar terms he ordered all

in the house to go outside. The soldiers rushed in and dragged me out by the coat collar. My wife, with her baby, was taken out, a rifle being pointed at her breast. Eleutrie Zanabria, a negro servant, who was badly frightened, tried to hide. He was pulled to the front, and before my eyes a soldier struck him a heavy blow with his machete, cutting him deep in the head and arm, leaving a pool of blood on the floor. The wound was serious.

"An order was then given to take into custody all the men on the estate. Near a tree beyond the hill, one hundred yards from the house, I stopped, about forty paces from the others, to talk to the captain, who had been at the house the week before. At that moment a young negro, Manuel Febels, made a dash to escape. Some cavalrymen rushed after him, firing. He fell, and they mutilated his body, taking out his eyes. The officer, enraged at the negro's flight, pulled out his sabre, and shouted to the others of the party, 'Get down on your knees!' They obeyed, and he had them bound and kept in that position a quarter of an hour.

"While I was talking to the captain, my wife and five-year-old child were begging for mercy for me. The cavalrymen helped themselves to corn for their horses, and finally started. The officers told me that my nephew's life and my own were only spared because we were Americans, and they did not want to get into trouble with the United States. They then ordered me to leave San Miguel without waiting a moment.

"Their explanation of the raid was that the rebels had fired upon the troops, and that they saw one man run, as he fired, into my house, and that under the major's instructions the whole family should have been killed

My wife and children were in agony while I was away. My employees were all taken away by the troops. Their names are Tomas Linares, Ceriaco Linares, Eleuterie Zanabria, Felex Cardenas, Juan Duarte and Florencio Rodriguez.

“An officer of high rank in the Spanish army passed my place after I left, came to me here, and said: ‘I know what happened. The man in command is unfit to be an officer of Spain.’ I heard that my men had been taken to the Spanish camp, and shot while eating breakfast.”

In his report to Consul-General Williams, Casanova says that what was done could only have been conceived in madness or intoxication.

In view of the crisis in Cuba and the recent developments of an epidemic of murder there, in which laboring men are shot down on the roads and in the fields of the plantations where they are employed, it seems fit this chapter should close with some leaves from that extraordinary publication, the “Book of Blood,” whose statistical horrors are so excessive as to challenge reason; but this unparalleled record is in course of confirmation, and the production of this feature has pertinence.

This book gives a list of martyrs, 4,672 in number, under the head: “The Martyrs of Liberty in Cuba—Political Prisoners Executed Since the Commencement of the War with Cuba.” The date of publication was 1873—half way through the ten years’ war—and it is chiefly compiled from Spanish authorities. We select four pages as examples, showing the system upon which the book was prepared. The figures at the top of page 323—1,749—are the number of “rebels” ac-

counted for in the former pages. At the bottom of page 327 the figures 2,094 show the aggregate to that point.

					1,749
27	Siguanea.	Capt. Alejo Cantero, Capt. Felix Yurubide and thirteen more . . .	15	D	6 Dec.
28	Pto. Principe.	Cristobal Mendoza	1	"	8 "
29	Hatico.	Com. Manuel Torres, Pref. Emilio Tellez, Subpref. Macias, and some other officers	8	"	11 "
December.					
1	Gibara.	One who <i>smelt</i> as a rebel	1	"	18 "
4	Las Tunas.	Three rebels	3	"	31 "
6	Momones.	Juan Meneses	1	"	10 "
7	Las Lomas.	N. Rodriguez	1	"	10 "
9	Los Cristales.	Emilio Moreno and another . . .	2	"	14 "
11	Holguin.	Gen. Jose M. Aurecochea and his chief-of-staff, Facundo Cable	2	"	22 "
17	Pto. Principe.	Lope Recio Agramonte	1	"	1 Jan.
"	California.	One armed rebel	1	"	15 "
18	Remedios.	Two rebels	2	"	23 Dec.
17	Pto. Principe.	Cap. Francisco Betancourt, Emilio Estrada, Carlos Torres, Jose Molina, Francisco Benavides, Manuel Montojo and Caballero, Javier B. Varona, Martin Loynaz y Miranda . . .	8	"	1 Jan.
20	Holguin.	Manuel Zuniga, Evaristo Torres, Francisco Llaurador, Miguel Peralta, Antonio Olivo, Antolin Varela, Santiago Miranda, Antonio del Toro	8	"	27 Dec.
21	Cienfuegos.	Jose Cayetano Santos	1	"	22 "
30	El Mamon.	One rebel	1	"	3 Jan.
15 to 30	Camaguey.	Eleven shot in different excursions	11	"	15 "

 1,816

				1,816	
31	Trinidad.	A negro man.....	1	D	4 Jan.
"	"	Nicolas Fernandez.....	1	"	5 "
"	Guanaja.	Seven prisoners captured with the wife of President Cespe- des.....	7	"	14 "
—	Colon.	Antonio de Armas.....	1	"	15 "
—	Canoa.	Segundo Bejerano and Antonio Aviles.....	2	"	20 "

1871

January.

1	Santiago.	Jose Catasus, Tomas Stable and Mr. Marcetti.	3	"	7 June
"	Vergel.	Two negro rebels.....	2	"	4 Jan.
"	Cieguito.	Two rebels.....	2	"	10 "
"	Guisa.	Four rebels.....	4	"	4 "
7	Santiago.	Augusto A. Dominguez, Dr. Juan A. Corrales	2	"	14 "
9	Cienfuegos.	Mariano Guerra.....	1	"	13 "
"	Tunas.	Nineteen rebels.....	19	"	22 "
—	Camaguey.	Antonio Hernandez and two others.....	3	"	31 "
9	Holguin.	J. L. Ricardo and another... ..	2	"	10 Feb.
15	Sti. Espiritu.	Two rebels.....	2	"	15 Jan.
23	Manzanillo.	R. Guardia y Cespedes.....	1	"	1 Feb.
"	Santiago.	Felipe L. Diaz, Juan Callejas and Severo Gonzales.....	1	"	1 "
24	Santiago.	L. J. Aguilera.....	1	"	8 "
"	Consolacion.	Two rebels	2	"	25 Jan.
25	Vuelta Abajo.	Felipe Rivero, P. Santana, F. Hernandez, N. M. Naranjo, N. Napoles, C. Planas, A. Mora, A. Estevez, and Rodriguez..	8	"	28 "
"	Sti. Espiritu.	A mulatto	1	"	29 "
26	Cauto.	Pedro Marmol.....	1	"	8 Feb.
30	Esperanza.	Bernardino Valdes.....	1	"	2 "

February.		1,884		
1	Cienfuegos.	A. Rodriguez.....	1	D 2 Feb.
"	Trinidad.	M. de la C. Gomez, L. A. Jauragui.....	2	" 7 "
2	Cascorro.	Enrique Uranga.....	1	" 14 "
6	Margarita.	Eight rebels..	8	" 1 Mch.
7	Las Lajas.	A negro who fled.....	1	" 1 "
"	San Jorge.	A rebel.	1	" 1 "
"	S. Geronimo.	Two rebels	2	" 10 "
8	Joiral.	Pedro Romero	1	" 17 "
"	Tunas.	F. Prieto, N. Milanes and Miguel Marti,	3	" 23 "
12	Loreto.	A. Lopez Gutierrez	1	" 17 "
15	Ciego.	A rebel.....	1	" 1 "
16	Sti. Espiritu.	Placido Peralta.	1	" 24 Feb.
"	Jumento.	Jose Cerise.....	1	" 1 Mch.
17	Barajaguas.	A rebel.....	1	" 1 "
"	Trinidad	Leon Pena.....	1	" 1 "
"	Moron	A rebel.....	1	" 1 "
"	Sagua.	Brigido Ferrer.....	1	" 23 Feb.
19	Sti. Espiritu.	A postman.....	1	" 21 "
"	Naranjo.	A postman ..	1	" 1 Mch.
23	Camaguey.	C. Sosa, E. Miranda Provost Sergeant Callejas	3	" 12 "
"	Guaramena.	Seventeen rebels.....	17	" 17 "
26	Juan Sanchez.	Majors M. Perdomo and S. Mila, Capt. A. Paredes, Lieut. E. Rivero, J. B. Agramonte, J. Martinez, P. Ibarra, B. Leiva and F. Echemendia.....	10	" 12 "
"	Casanova.	Nine shot.....	9	" 19 "
28	San Jose.	A man	1	" 17 "
March.				
1	Trinidad.	Miguel Gollo.....	1	" 14 "
"	Balume.	Camilo Carnesoltas.....	1	" 17 "
3	Villar.	A negro.....	1	" 30 "
6	Caunao.	M. Cervantes, Jose de Jesus del Sol, Rafael del Sol, M. Hernandez and F. Rodriguez....	5	" 15 "

1,952

8 Cienfuegos.	Carlos Cerise and Salome Moya			
	Hernandez	2	D	10 Mch.
" Moron.	Fernando Estrada.....	1	"	10 "
9 Guayabal.	F. Fernandez, F. Martinez, Jose			
	Valdivia, J. Companon	4	"	11 "
" Mijial.	Fernando Perez	4	"	11 "
15 Entre Cedros.	Manuel P. Quintanilla, B. Mar-			
	ron, P. J. Tamayo and two			
	other rebels	5	"	16 Apr.
" Pico Blanco.	G. Caridad, N. Rodriguez, Ag-			
	uilar Montalvan.....	3	"	17 Mch.
" Trocha.	A rebel	1	"	" "
" Caunao.	A man shot.....	1	"	" "
" Punta.	Three rebels.....	3	"	" "
" Guillos.	A rebel.	1	"	" "
16 Tunas.	Four rebels.....	4	"	30 "
" Casanova.	Eight rebels.....	8	"	19 "
17 Maya Larga.	Luis Lavielle.....	1	"	15 Apr
" Vega Vieja.	Three rebels.....	3	"	17 Mch.
" Barajaguas.	Five rebels.....	5	"	18 "
28 Bartolome.	Leon Lara.....	1	"	30 "
" Sti. Espiritu.	Pedro Martinez, Joaquin Guijarro	2	"	30 "
" S. Joaquin.	Six rebels.....	6	"	30 "
21 La Vega.	Jose Manuel Queseda (75 years			
	old) for the crime of being			
	uncle to General Quesada....	1	"	11 Apr.
" Jicotea.	One rebel	1	"	" "
" Barrancas.	Five rebels	5	"	16 "
25 Cabrerias.	M. Zaldivar and another.....	2	"	" "
27 Trinidad.	J. Marcano and Magdaleno Po-			
	lanco	2	"	2 "
29 Nazareno	Juan de Dios Cruz.....	1	"	16 "
April.				
1 Guanaja.	Two rebels.....	2	"	" "
" "	Jose R. Ponte, Geronimo Rod-			
	riguez, P. Carmenati, F. Ca-			
	breras and a negro....	5	"	" "

		2,026		
2 Cedro.	Five rebels	5	D	16 Apr.
4 Santi Spiritus.	Arcadio Garcia	1	"	8 Aug.
6 Nicho.	Three rebels	3	"	16 Apr.
7 Montano.	Four "	4	"	12 "
" Enceibas.	Three "	3	"	30 "
" Demajagua.	Five "	5	"	30 "
8 Guaney.	Roman Hernandez	1	"	" "
11 Sama.	Three rebels	3	"	" "
13 Listas.	Six rebels	6	"	16 "
22 Santiago.	Five rebels	5	"	25 "
" Meliton.	Lieut. B. Salinas, M. Sanchez and F. Cabrera, C. Martinez, and R. Gonzalez	5	"	27 "
24 Santiago.	Roque Trujillo	1	"	30 "
25 Guadacocoa	One rebel	2	"	2 May.
" Cienega.	Captain Coronas	1	"	" "
26 Jobosi.	Miguel G. Gutierrez (member of Cuban Congress) and another	2	"	" "
25 Las Villas.	Five rebels	5	"	" "
May.				
1 Las Lajas.	One rebel	1	"	3 June.
2 La Vega.	Leon and another	1	"	14 May.
4 Guasimas.	Meliton Ramos and Jore Bitorla	2	"	9 "
3 Arroyo Blanco.	One rebel	1	"	4 "
5 Hondones.	J. M. Escancio	1	"	3 June.
9 Cascorro.	Two spies	2	"	9 "
" Babosa.	Juan Torres	1	"	25 May.
10 Salinas.	Carlos Pena and Camilo Velaz- quez	2	"	21 "
13 Nuevitas.	Enrique Flotas	1	"	" "
11 La Sagua.	Col. Pascual Beauvilliers, Capt. Antonio Bachiller, Lieuts. Pedro Lecerff and Ricardo	4	"	" "
		2,094		

We give also the leaves that contain the names of the victims of the *Virginus* massacre.

1873

2,846

April.

5 Guaimaro.	Juan Ramirez Aldama.....	1	D	16 Apr.
15 Diff. places.	Marcial Garcia and two more..	3	"	1 May
24 Gibaro.	Antonio Cruz	1	"	23 "

May.

16 Camaguey.	Hilario Mendoza.....	1	"	18 "
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June.

29 Vapor.	Three working men.....	3	"	18 July
" Tutela.	One rebel.....	1	"	24 "

July.

7 Amero.	Two rebels.....	2	"	18 "
20 Juan Criollo.	Two rebels.....	2	"	17 "

August.

5 San Carlos.	Six runners.....	6	"	9 Aug.
13 Caobillas.	Pedro Nolasco Zayas.....	1	"	30 "

September.

8 Dos Camioes.	Capt. Jose Maria Avila.....	2	"	14 Sept.
9 Cienaga.	Two rebels.....	2	"	28 "
" Ojo. de Agua.	Two "	2	"	30 "
16 Negroes.	One "	1	"	30 "
27 Gloria.	Two "	2	"	30 "

November.

4 Santiago.	GENERALS BERNABE DE VARONA AND W. C. RYAN, COLONELS JESUS DEL SOL AND PEDRO CESPEDES.....			4	"	7 Nov.
5 Santa Clara.	Two rebels.....	2	"	2	"	11 "
6 Pulgas.	Four rebels.....	4	"	4	"	15 "
7 Santiago.	Captain, Jose Fry ; Pilot, Wil- liam Baward ; Mate, James Flood ; Sailors—J. C. Harris, John Bosa, B. P. Chamber- lain, William Kose, Ignacio Duenas, Antonio Deloyo, Jose					

2,886

2,886

Manuel Teiran, Ramon Lar-
ramendi, Eusebio Gariza, Ed-
ward Day, J. S. Trujillo, Jack
Williamson, Porfirio Corvison,
P. Alfaro, Thomas Crigg,
Frank Good, Paul Khunrer,
Barney Herrald, Samuel Card,
John Brown, Alfred Haisell,
W. J. Price, George Thomas,
Ezekiel Durham, Thomas
Walter Williams, Simon Broy-
eur, Leopold Larose, A. Arci,
John Stewart, Henry Bond,
George Thompson, James
Samuel, Henry Frank, James
Read.....

37 D 15 Nov.

8 Santiago.

Arturo Loret Mola. Augustin
Varona, Oscar Varona, Guil-
lermo Valls, Jose Boitel, Sal-
vador Penedo, Enrique Castel-
lanos, Augustin Santa Rosa,
Justo Consuegra, Francisco
Porrás Pita, Jose Otero, Her-
minio Quesada.....

12 " 15 "

9 San. Manuel.

Two rebels.....

2 " " "

10 Lagunas.

One rebel....

1 " " "

" Saramaguacan.

Fernando Molino, Juan Perez,

Antonio Pages.....

3 " " "

" Caridad.

Rafael Armas.....

1 " " "

" Diff. places.

Juan Garces and two others....

3 " " "

2,945

There are lists of prisoners captured by Spaniards whose fate has never been reported.

We select two pages of this hideous bookkeeping as samples :

		483		
30 Sidonia.	Three.....	3	D	12 Sept.
— Sagua.	Eight.....	8	"	29 Aug.
September.				
1 Caguas.	More than fifty prisoners.....	51	"	10 Sept.
4 Mangas.	Twenty-four conspirators.....	24	"	8 "
6 San Cristobal.	Fifteen ".....	15	"	11 "
7 Cauto del Paso.	Thirty-seven (Boet).....	37	"	9 Oct.
20 Cardenas.	N. Macario y N. Lugo.....	2	"	26 Sept.
21 Tunas.	Juan Sancho, two more and his personal guard.....	8	"	9 Oct.
27 Jagua.	Thirteen prisoners.....	13	"	8 "
20 Las Minas.	One prisoner.....	1	"	12 "
October.				
6 Sierra Jumagua.	Com. Mendoza and others....	3	"	8 "
7 Las Lajas.	Seventy-one prisoners.....	71	"	12 "
8 Sti. Spiritus.	One prisoner.....	1	"	14 "
10 Remedios.	One ".....	1	"	17 "
" Puerto Padre.	Two ".....	2	"	26 "
12 Remedios.	Two ".....	2	"	17 "
18 Contramaestre.	Two ".....	2	"	13 Nov.
19 Pto. Principe.	Four ".....	4	"	29 Oct.
28 Puerto Padre.	Two chiefs and five more.....	7	"	23 Nov.
19 El Roble.	One.....	1	"	3 "
31 Mijialito.	One.....	1	"	11 "
— Los Negros.	Thirteen (Boet).....	13	"	5 "
November.				
1 Baguana.	Three prisoners.....	3	"	27 "
4 Tacajo.	Zaldivar and two more.....	3	"	27 "
" Moron.	Captain Carvajal.....	1	"	19 "
5 Caunao.	Three prisoners.....	3	"	14 "
6 Jobosi.	Seven ".....	7	"	10 "
8 Holguin.	Five ".....	5	"	14 "
11 El Macio.	A certain number.....	5	"	24 "
12 Caunao.	Five.....	5	"	14 "
14 Sta. Cruz.	Lorenzo Xiques y Estrada R. C.	1	"	20 "
" Tuinicu.	Four prisoners.....	4	"	24 "
15 Arroyo Blanco.	Two ".....	2	"	22 Dec.

		782		
16	Sipiabo.	One prisoner.....	1	D 20 Nov.
18	Moron.	Two ".....	2	" 26 "
	" Cabaiguan.	Cepeda R. C. and eleven more.	12	" 2 Dec.
19	Portillo.	Manuel Codina R. C.....	1	" 2 "
	" Pinos Blancos.	Three prisoners.....	3	" 22 "
20	Minas.	One ".....	1	" 28 Nov.
	" Manacas.	Five bearers of seditious procla- mations.....	5	" 21 "
22	Zayas.	Three spies.....	3	" 22 Dec.
	" Remedios.	Three rebel chiefs.....	3	" 24 "
24	Sti. Spiritus.	J. M. Abreu (incendiary).....	1	" 17 "
25	Caunao.	Two prisoners	2	" 27 Nov.
27	Holguin.	N. Ramirez, N. Sarmiento and N. Chavarria.....	3	" 14 Dec.
28	Gua.	Angel Colas, recruiting officer.	1	" 8 "
	C. de Zapata.	Ten spies.....	10	" 2 "
	December.			
12	Palmira.	Three prisoners.....	3	" 24 "
14	Velazquez.	Five ".....	5	" 30 "
	" Purial.	One ".....	1	" 6 Jan.
17	Seibabo.	Twelve ".....	12	" 26 "
21	Arroyo Blanco.	Twenty-five.....	25	" 28 Dec.
23	Bijaru.	A certain number of spies.....	5	" 30 "
	" Baez.	Five prisoners.....	5	" 26 Jan.
24	Holguin.	Bernardo Millares, Eladio Ca- brera R. C.....	2	" 15 "
27	Mataguan.	Sixty-seven prisoners.....	67	" 1 "
	" Sti. Spiritus.	Two armed rebels.....	2	" 15 "
31	Pta. de Guan.	One ".....	1	" 5 "
	" Casimba.	Four ".....	4	" 11 "
	January.			
3	Sta. Catalinai.	Four rebels.....	4	" 11 "
6	" "	Felix Ferrer.....	1	" 13 "
7	Sta. Cruz.	One rebel.....	1	" 13 "
11	Pto. del Padre.	Eight prisoners.....	8	" 25 "
12	Yaguas.	Two ".....	2	" 23 "
15	Guinia.	A certain number of prisoners..	5	" 21 "

			983		
17	Limones.	Three prisoners	3	D	25 "
20	Cauto.	Four "	4	"	11 Feb.
21	Marroquin.	One chief and three more.....	4	"	31 Jan.
"	Sta. Clara.	Three prisoners	3	"	24 "
24	Holguin.	Three "	3	"	29 "
"	Barajagua.	Some prisoners, among them the chiefs Fernando Toro and B. Perez.....	5	"	30 "
24	Palmarejo.	One prisoner. ..	1	"	5 Feb.
"	El Roble.	One "	1	"	27 Jan.
"	Cubitas.	Two "	2	"	11 Feb.
25	Caunaito.	Six "	6	"	29 Jan.
20 to 28	Pto. Princ.	Twenty-eight prisoners.....	28	"	8 Feb.
			<hr/> 1,043		

The closing pages we give complete.

CONDEMNED TO DEATH IN GAROTTE, VIL.

Antonio Fernandez Bramosio, Jacinto Valdes, Nic- olas Nin y Pons, Pedro Martin Rivero, Francisco Javier Cisneros, Ambrosio Valiente	6	March 10
Carlos Manuel de Cespesdes, Francisco Vicente Aguilera, Cristobal Mendoza, Eligio Izaguirre, Eduardo Agramonte, Pedro Maria Agüero y Gon- zalez, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt, Francisco Sanchez Betancourt, Pio Rosado, Fernando For- naris Miguel Betancourt Guerra, Jesus Rodri- guez, Jose Izaguirre, Miguel Geronimo Gutier- rez, Arcadio Garcia, Tranquilino Valdes, Antonio Lorda, Eduardo Machado, Antonio Zambrana, Ignacio Agramonte, Rafael Morales, Lucas del Castillo, Diego Machado, Ramon Perez Trujillo, Manuel Quesada, Thomas Jordan, Francisco Ruz, Jose Valiente, Jose Maria Mora, Antonio Fer-		

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nandez Bramosio, Jose Francisco Bassora, Francisco Izquierdo, Plutarco Gonzalez, Ramon Fernandez Criado, Francisco Javier Cisneros, Joaquin Delgado, Ramon Aguirre, Francisco Fesser, Ignacio Alfaro, Miguel Aldama, Carlos del Castillo, Jose Manuel Mestre, Hilario Cisneros, Leonardo Delmonte, Jose Maria Cespedes, Francisco Valdes Mendoza, Nestor Ponce de Leon, Federico Galvez, Francisco Javier Balmaseda, Manuel Casanova, Antonio Mora, Luis Felipe Mantilla, Manuel Marquez, Jose Pena and Joaquin Anido 55

		1871.	
Santiago—One hundred persons	100	D.	11 Mch.
Jose Godino.	1	"	13 July.
Sagua—Santiago Feo.	1	"	23 "
Pablo Feo.	1	"	" "
Nene Feo.	1	"	" "
Pto. Principe—Enrique Flotas and Carlos Rivero.	2	D	29 Aug.
Sta Clara—Francisco Cardenas Perez.	1	"	5 Sept.
Baldomero Cancia y Garcia.	1	"	" "
Pto. Principe—Ignacio Gonzalez y Gonzalez.	1	"	" "
Antonio Rodriguez Gonzalez.	1	"	" "
Bayama—Arcadio Remon	1	"	3 Nov.
Juan Francisco Aguirre, Martin Aguirre, Manuel Lopez Pineiro, Felix Fuentes, P. M. Rivero, J. M. Mayorga, Hilario Cisneros, R. I. Arnao, J. M. Cespedes, J. B. de Luna, F. V. Mendoza, Federico Galvez, Rafael M. Merchan, Tomas Rudriguez, Miguel Leiva Salmon, Joaquin Jaramillo, Cristobal Diaz, Pedro Bernal.	19	Official Gazette, July, 1873.	

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There is no more ghastly record in the horrors of civil war—but as the desperate struggle goes on in

Cuba there is a rapid accumulation of material for an enlarged addition of the dreadful book which has surprising support in official papers.

CHAPTER XXIII.¹

THE CAUSE OF CUBA.

Cuba is Governed by Spain for Spain—Cubans are Taxed to Protect Spain—Impolicy Prepared for Revolution—Rebellion Forced by Misgovernment—Public Papers as Testimony—A Ruler of Spain Polite to General Grant About Cuban Independence.

STRIPPED of detail, the cause of Cuba is that the government is not in the hands of the Cubans, and the powers of the authorities are not directed to promote the interests of the people who are identified with the Island. The Cubans are a secondary consideration all the time—the Spaniards the first. The present race of Cubans have no more rights a Spaniard is bound to respect, than had those naked children found four centuries ago among the flowers, living on sweet potatoes and the fruit that covered the trees and the fish that glittered in the streams almost as brilliantly as the birds whose plumage flashed in the foliage, and in the masses of radiant bloom that overhung the rivers and spread over the valleys and adorned the slopes of the mountains to their peaks. It did not enter into the spirit of the Spaniards then, that Cuba was for the Cubans, and it does not now. They have never thought of it from that day to this.

Defenses have been offered for the systems of taxation that have prevailed from time to time. Not one of them ever fulfilled the conditions of being levied by Cubans for Cubans—by the people of the Island for the

people of the Island. It is the peninsula that has had the power and has used it in Cuba for the peninsula.

The taxes are multitudinous and are searching, grasping and exacting, and vast sums of money have been raised and spent, not for schools, not for roads, not for the improvements that would have revealed untouched sources of riches, but for the enrichment and indulgence of Spain and Spaniards. If the Island had been transversed by roads as France is, if labor had been applied to the clearing of forests, the drainage of swamps, there would have been fewer fastnesses for the insurgent and hiding places for the bandit. If the cities could have received the attention to sanitary improvements that the care of the public health demands and science applies with infallibility, if even the harbor of Havana had been cleansed, if the filth of the sewage of a city for centuries had not been accumulated in one huge cesspool, the yellow fever would not have been a perpetual scourge and scare, an unquenchable fire that consumes its thousands and tens of thousands. There was a project of making a canal across a narrow peninsula that would have established a current to cleanse the Havana harbor, but of course the money had to go for fortifications and pleasure grounds, or to swell those corruption funds that have flowed in a rapid, ceaseless river from the Island to the peninsula.

The Spanish have not forgotten the fourteen million dollars and the treasure ships besides, that were captured by the English, when they wasted their own and American manhood before Havana for spoil. The political economy of Spain has, from the beginning, looted the Island, and the Cubans can make the same complaint extending through the generations that the Spaniards make

of the English for a space of time less than a year. The Spaniards remember, with a sense of injustice, that one hundred and twenty-four years have not softened, the severe government of the conqueror, Lord Albemarle. There is a gallery of portraits in the palace at Havana of the Spanish generals for nearly two hundred years, a superb array of uniforms and striking Spanish faces, and they were all stern rulers, and with few exceptions they used their great office oppressively for the benefit of the official class, regardless of the interests or the susceptibilities of the people, and they were as little moved by the protests against the sinister methods of harvesting money as Lord Albemarle and his chief of artillery were, when they used the bells of the churches to rob the clergy.

There are differences of opinion in our country as to the propriety under the laws of political economy, and the profit so far as the people at large are concerned, of customs duties imposed for revenue and for the protection of industries at home, but it is not disputed by the free-trader that it is excellent to have a country so develop mechanical skill and manufacturing art, as to be capable of asserting herself, and of a certain self-sufficiency in production that in times of trial enables the people belonging to the same political system to sustain themselves against foreign foes. It is conceded, after full acknowledgment of all the glories of commerce, that it is well to have markets at home. There are disagreements as to the better ways of the encouragement of varied industries, but that it is desirable they should be fostered, no one denies. How far they should be stimulated if at all, is one thing, but that it is important they should be established and


thrive and promote the general welfare by their diversity and profitableness, is a proposition that needs only to be fairly stated to be frankly conceded.

The Cubans have no political capacity to protect themselves. The islanders are helpless in the grasp of the peninsulars, and the policy of the peninsula is that the Island shall consume the manufactures of Spain and be doubly taxed as the goods go and come for the privilege of the exchange.

Spanish soil is not rich in the sense of being productive of grain or articles of food and luxury to enter into commerce, and the idea that prevails is that Cuba is a farm let to agriculturists, who shall not manufacture for themselves, but purchase the goods they require from the proprietors across the ocean, and be taxed for doing it. There are many taxes—there were as many as the plantations in time of peace could bear, and there are but two articles that in ordinary conditions are raised largely for export, sugar and tobacco, even the cultivation of coffee having fallen into neglect.

David Turnbull, Esq., M. A., writing of this said, in his "Travels in the West :"

It was the revolution in San Domingo which gave the first great stimulus to the cultivation of the coffee plant in the Island of Cuba. The emigrants and refugees sought shelter wherever they could find it in the neighboring islands of the Archipelago, or on the nearest points of the American continent. The greatest numbers established themselves in Cuba and Jamaica; but it has been remarked that those in less easy circumstances made their way to Cuba, while the wealthier classes preferred the protection which the British government afforded them. A sort of social revolution, affording some striking indications of national character, has since taken place in the affairs of these refugees. In the English as in the Spanish island, they have undoubtedly been the means of turning land that was otherwise useless to profitable account; of im-



COFFEE PLANTATION.

proving the culture of the coffee, as well as the mode of preparing it for the market, and of increasing its production to a very large amount. In Jamaica, however, the coffee planters of French or San Domingo origin have not been able to withstand the competition of their English rivals, and have sunk into a state of comparative insignificance; whereas in Cuba, having only Spaniards to contend with, they have succeeded in rising in the social scale, and in maintaining their ascendancy until the period which seems now to be arriving, when the coffee grower is to sink before the sugar planter, in consequence of the demand for sugar having increased in a more rapid ratio than the corresponding demand for coffee, combined with the fact that the supply of labor, although great, is still inadequate to the demand for it. Coffee can be produced more cheaply in other countries, but Cuba is likely to maintain its acknowledged ascendancy in the production of sugar.

The Cuban difficulty has been an artificial system—the interference of the government, always away over the ocean, favorable to cheap production and low figures for the two articles, sugar and tobacco, and unfavorable to home markets. Cuban industry being forced to export its products, and also to import many things that ought to be raised at home in the fields, or wrought in the shops, is taxed on exports and imports—on what is sold and what is purchased—on the sugar and the tobacco, and on machinery and clothing and food. Foreign flour and meat must be bought, and Spain, of course, discriminates in her own favor.

The corrupt Spanish custom-houses take toll both ways and that the opportunities to discriminate against honest men—those who would not give bribes—and for the bribe-givers, furnish the foundation of many fortunes, is a fact as familiar in Havana as Moro Castle.

It was never the policy of Spain that Havana should be a manufacturing city. She was expected to grow on trade exclusively—the export of sugar in bags and tobacco in bales—but, incidentally, there have been ex-

tensive tobacco manufactures, that would not have been permitted if the industry could have been transplanted to Spain, and even that is being taxed away to Key West. The Spanish policy of promoting exports of raw material, and confining plantation products for marketing to the articles that together were worth about one hundred millions a year, is a most simple system, but precisely how it works they did not seem to know very well.

It is, for example, held by the leading representatives of Spain in this country, that the prevention of the grinding of cane to make sugar did not cut down the revenues of Spain, because the export tax was small compared with other taxes, and did not yield the bulk of the money in the treasury—but it is not a far cry to the fact that the customs duties on the imports, and the imports too, have to be paid out of the produce, and that something has to be exported to get the money to pay with.

If there is no sugar and no tobacco to sell—as there will be none after this until the war is over—there is a lack of one hundred millions of dollars annually to buy things with, and the revenue of Cuba for Spain must fall off a million dollars a month. It will be seen, as this situation is studied, that it is the selfish policy of Spain that has prepared the way for this depletion of her resources. If Cuban industry had been cared for instead of strangled—if the country had been in a greater degree self-sustaining—the work of destruction by revolution would have been far more difficult. If the tyrants' wish that the people had but one neck, that he might cut it through at a single stroke with his sword, had been realized so far as the neck was con-

cerned, he might have realized that some enemy could have struck the blow, and he would have found it inconvenient to have lost at once the race that he ruled, for he should irretrievably have lost his occupation.

Spain has a tobacco monopoly—the state is the purchaser, manufacturer, and salesman of tobacco, and the unsophisticated supposition is, of course, the Spaniards help their tobacco plantations in Cuba by making purchases there; but they do not; they prefer the less restricted market of Virginia; and the Spaniards at home use a great deal and produce little sugar. Of course, they patronize always their beautiful colony, Cuba, for sugar! Oh, no!—they buy largely German beet sugar. It is not so good as the Cuban, but when money is spent by Spain for Cuban products she does not care to face the results of her own crooked regulations.

Fancy the ruling class of a country composed, age after age, of foreign born men, without any stake except office in the land governed—with no purpose but that of working places for money to go home with. When we say the revenues of Cuba are not sent direct to Spain, there should be an annotation in mind that three-fourths of the office-holders in Cuba are Spaniards, and that it is their policy to get away with savings, and that this is an impoverishment of Cuba for Spain's advantage. The one-fourth of the holders of office who are Cubans have, as a rule, small salaries, and pay commissions in Madrid to get them.

The volunteers in Cuba, now 63,000 strong, are men who serve in the Cuban militia three years to get rid of the conscription for five years in Spain. There is no show for native Cubans in this organization, or in busi-

ness comparatively, for the Spaniards rush in, and it is boasted that the Cubans are handsomely treated, because they are not coerced to perform military duty. The sharp Spaniards flock to the Island, and take service as clerks, waiters, cabmen, and all the situations sought by active young men, and with the motive of military service in Cuban towns—home guards—they consent to extremely low compensation, crowding out the natives, of course. They go home as soon as their military liability has expired, and, cutting wages in their various Cuban occupations, they are an army for Spain, maintained at the expense of Cuba—preferred to the natives—another drain upon the manhood and healthy life of the Island.

There has been much said about the representation of Cuba in the Spanish Cortes, but it has not efficacy—it is a form, and there is no healing virtue in it. Cuban votes are allowed to count for minor matters only. There is not even the shadow of self-government. The captain-general is the supreme ruler, and he is a military chieftain, whose will is the law, and whose usages are those of martial law, and this is the crowning feature of every one of the vaunted schemes of liberal reform.

There has been an endeavor to set this down with “malice toward none and charity for all,” and it certainly accounts for the frequent risings and constant agitation, that have at last resulted in the war that is overwhelming in ruin Spaniards and Cubans alike. Each effort of the Cubans to free themselves has caused the imposition of burdens until the load is beyond endurance.

The cost of the ten years’ war has been charged to Cuba by Spain, and that of itself takes half that the customs amounted to in the best of times. It is not

possible for the Island to meet further requisition. Before the present war had been determined upon, as a last resort, the planters were in a state of despondency—taxed until desperate. Those of them who entered into the rebellion say : “ We had nothing to lose—all were ruined any how. We had to conquer or die or run away.”

It may serve some suggestion of stratagem or impulse of vanity or arise from a vague reasoning that there is occasion for alarm, because Madrid has been telegraphing to Havana that the minister of colonies will put into effect the reforms of March 15th, 1895. We have seen what those adjustments are, and surely they are not acceptable.

Señor Estrado Palma has issued a manifesto regarding the pretended reforms which have been persistently pushed upon the public attention, and that which he has to say is full of striking pertinence. He writes, the “ reforms ” are unworthy consideration, and “ we are firmly resolved to listen to no compromise and to treat with Spain only on the basis of absolute independence for Cuba. If Spain has power to exterminate us, then let her convert the Island into a vast cemetery ; if she has not, and wishes to terminate the war before the whole country is reduced to ashes, then let her adopt the only measure that will put an end to it and recognize our independence.”

Now that this is the spirit and purpose of the great majority of the Cubans, may be accepted as the truth, and that which is and is to come, judged accordingly.

Señor Estrado Palma proceeds : “ We have thrown ourselves into the struggle advisedly and deliberately ; we knew what we would have to face, and we decided

unflinchingly to persevere until we should emancipate ourselves from the Spanish government. And we know that we are able to do it, as we know that we are competent to govern ourselves. Experience has taught us that as a people we have nothing to envy the Spaniards ; in fact, we feel ourselves superior to them, and from them we can expect no improvement, no better education. We are Americans ; we breathe the pure air of free institutions, and we contemplate with envy the government of the people, by the people, and for the people. We are in as good condition to rule ourselves without any fear of disorder or civil war as were the thirteen American colonies when they emancipated themselves from England, and in a superior condition to the Spanish colonies of this continent when they broke from the Spanish yoke. Slavery is over in Cuba with all its injustice and cruelties. The white man and the colored live in perfect harmony, without prejudices or resentment between them. They fight together to attain political liberty. The colored people in Cuba are superior to those in the United States. They are industrious, intelligent, and lovers of learning. During the last fifteen years they have attained wonderful intellectual development. On the other hand, thousands of white people, with all the facilities offered by their wealth, have completed their education in foreign countries, especially in the United States, where they have accustomed themselves to republican customs, and to the exercise of their rights as freemen, thus preparing themselves and preparing their sons for the exercise of those same rights in their native land when emancipated from Spanish domination."

This is delivered with the emphasis, perhaps the ex-

travagance, of enthusiasm, but it is the truth of the Cubans, and it is of the highest importance that the people of the United States should familiarize themselves with the facts, for they are the essentials to the understanding of the fundamental conditions of the settlements the future must bring forth. Señor Palma tersely states facts, when he says: "Between the present revolution and the government of Spain there is no possible arrangement not based on the recognition of Cuban independence. It is useless to speak about reforms, or even of the more liberal home rule. All that is to nurse illusions and to lose time."

The parallel that Señor Palma draws between the grievances of our revolutionary fathers, when they declared their independence, and the cause of Cuba, is a master-piece, and should be familiar to all American citizens. This is it:

We Cubans have a thousandfold more reason in our endeavor to free ourselves from the Spanish yoke than the people of the thirteen colonies when, in 1775, they rose in arms against the British government. The people of these colonies were in full enjoyment of all the rights of man; they had liberty of conscience, freedom of speech, liberty of the press, the right of public meeting, and the right of free locomotion. They elected those who governed them, they made their own laws, and, in fact, enjoyed the blessings of self-government. They were not under the sway of a captain-general with arbitrary powers, who, at his will, could imprison them, deport them to penal colonies, or order their execution even without the semblance of a court-martial. They did not have to pay a permanent army and navy that they might be kept in subjection, nor to feed a swarm of hungry employees yearly sent over from the metropolis to prey upon the country. They were never subjected to a stupid and crushing customs tariff which compelled them to go to the home markets for millions of merchandise annually, which they could buy much cheaper elsewhere; they were never compelled to cover a budget of twenty-six or thirty million dollars a year without the consent of the taxpayers and

for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the army and navy of the oppressor, to pay the salaries of thousands of worthless European employees, the whole interest on a debt not incurred by the colony, and other expenditures from which the Island received no benefit whatever, for out of all those millions only the paltry sum of \$700,000 was apparently applied for works of internal improvement, and one-half of which invariably went into the pockets of the Spanish employees.

If the right of the thirteen British colonies to rise in arms in order to acquire their independence has never been questioned because of the attempt of the mother country to tax them by a duty on tea or by the Stamp Act, will there be a single citizen in this great republic of the United States, whether he be a public or a private man, who will doubt the justice, and more than the justice, the necessity in which the Cuban people find themselves of fighting to-day and to-morrow and always, until they shall have overthrown Spanish oppression and tyranny in their country, and formed themselves into a free and independent republic?

It is a question of the highest interest and moment whether the war reopened in 1895 was avoidable, and the strongest testimony that it was not, we find in the address to the people of Cuba of the Central Board of the Liberal Autonomist party, which makes the last eloquent plea against war. The address asserted for the party that it had "worked for many years to avoid any future strife, and to prevent anything that might justify or afford pretext for it. The Autonomist party is the depository of the hopes and ideals of the Cuban people." And the further claim was made, "the only party of reasonable opposition that has ever been organized in the country, for which consideration it is now incumbent on us to make a frank statement of our position, and do our best to unite the opinions and feelings of all who have faith in our loyalty and confidence in our patriotism at this time, that while the government is making great efforts to quell the rebellion in

its beginning, the whole people and its genuine representatives must also, on their part, help to maintain order and protect the common interests."

Then followed this ornate declaration :

The trouble has started just when a new order of things had been established, to which our deputies and senators have contributed with purity and honesty of purpose. The government that presided over this work of peace is not the one that will have to put it into execution. The financial situation, which was most critical for reasons independent of the action of governments, is becoming more complex on account of the expenses and anxiety caused by the war, at the moment that a happy understanding amongst the various local parties seemed to secure in a short time for our threatened sources of wealth, that limited help which, under grave circumstances, can be obtained only from the governing powers by stimulating individual enterprise and the fruitful spirit of association, which will, in the end, affect the salvation of said wealth.

The cry of rebellion has sounded here, having been uttered from abroad at the risk of the lives and property of others, by a group of irresponsible conspirators who have spent many years away from this country, whose real condition is unknown to them, pretending to liberate it from evils which they would not suffer in common with us, in the same manner that they will also shun those that must follow their preposterous and condemnable attempt, and even perhaps the risks to which they may expose the obdurate instruments of their folly; but even in absence of such trouble that is menacing the fundamental interests and the future of this country, our central board would have made it their duty to address the people on the eve of the establishment of a new régime created with the co-operation of our parliamentary representatives in the midst of an atmosphere of benevolence and concord "as they had never met before at the metropolis," and of which they desired to make a loyal testimony in the presence of their compatriots; for as this change in the disposition of mind proves that the suspicions and obstacles which so often had interfered with colonial reforms have begun to disappear in large proportion, it is now quite proper to make it constant that the real Cuban people, in spite of said emigrant conspirators, will reciprocate such rectification in the traditional policy, if the government maintains it in the same spirit of concord and confidence under which it was originated.

But it is unquestionable that the actual disturbance primes all other affairs, and must affect every one of them. Even in the probable case that the rebellion be soon overcome with the decided concurrence of public opinion, its pernicious effects must be felt for many years.

It is apparent in this paper, which is well known in Cuba, that the gentlemen who prepared and signed it were without knowledge of the elements they were dealing with, and that the remedies they thought would cure all troubles, had no virtue, for they were inadequate to cope with the disease. The Liberal Autonomists could have no comprehension of the weaknesses of the alleged reforms, or the forces that were mustering for the rebellion.

Señor Moret, former Spanish minister of the colonies, has been talking Cuban "reform" in Madrid, professing himself a thorough Liberal, and he tells of the reforms he thinks necessary, and he would give this :

First—Economic reform. I mean by this free trade, the guarantee of all foreign capital employed in Cuba, the application of a large portion of the Cuban revenue to the public works of the Island, and unity or similarity of the banking system employed, extending to Cuba the national credit.

Precisely. But why was not this attended to some time between 1878 and 1895 ? The Spanish minister to the United States, who so ably defends his country, has the same idea of reform, but it comes too late. Señor Moret wants political reform, after "the complete pacification of the Island." But it will not be pacified, and, therefore, there is no reform possible. Señor Moret is dreaming. He even talks of a "referendum" in regard to administrative reform, but the discussion of the decoration of a house that is on fire

should be deferred. E. del Castillo, member of the Cuban Press Company of New York, writes of the recent election in Cuba :

Theoretically, Cuba is represented. Practically, she is not. There are 1,650,000 people in the Island, of whom 1,000,000 are white. Yet in the elections only 47,649 men have been allowed to vote for members of the Cortes, and of these over 20,000 were not Cubans at all, but Spaniards, officially or otherwise, resident in Cuba. Out of about forty Cuban members of the Cortes, only four represent Cuban constituencies.

Here we have in a nutshell what the so-called representation of thirty deputies and sixteen senators in the Spanish Cortes claimed by the correspondent amount to.

During the recent elections in Cuba, out of thirty odd deputies elected, there appears only one native-born Cuban, and who, by the by, is a renegade. All the others are native-born Spaniards, some of whom have never been in Cuba, and who only know of the Island from their geographical knowledge.

Señor Moret was asked :

"Does your Excellency agree with Señor Sagasta that the Spanish people, as a whole, would resent friendly overtures from the United States?"

He said :

"I do thoroughly agree with him. Spanish pride will not allow any interference from the United States. This is due chiefly to the language employed in the senate and House of Representatives."

There has been a good deal of wild talk in Congress, but if there is something said on one side of the ocean that is not statesmanlike, it is no reason why a statesman on the other side should give way to emotion and become effusive.

The good offices of the United States were offered to

Spain during the ten years' war. President Grant suggested that Spain should recognize Cuban independence. The correspondence between Secretary of State Fish and Minister Sickles, is interesting. Mr. Hitt, chairman of the House Committee of foreign relations, referred to this correspondence recently on the floor of the House, saying :

It is the very case we have in hand. That was an insurrection or rebellion in Cuba not half so extensive as the present, and it was near the beginning. Then the good offices of the United States were offered to bring the war to a close on the basis of Cuban independence, Spain to be paid an indemnity which the United States should guarantee.

The ruler of Spain was General Prim, and he received that proposition in the same friendly spirit in which it was made. There was no rupture of relations. I will not read all his answers, which are contained in, and discussed through, several despatches of considerable length, but only to show its spirit I will give a few words. They may conveniently be found by members in Senate Report 141, if anyone desires to read it. At the conclusion of his remarks, assenting to the proposition of Mr. Sickles, he said:

"I do not flatter myself that Spain will retain possession of the Island. I consider that the period of colonial autonomy has virtually arrived. However the present contest may end, whether in the suppression of the insurrection or in the better way of an amicable arrangement through the assistance of the United States, it is equally clear to me that the time has come for Cuba to govern herself; and if we succeed in putting down the insurrection to-morrow I shall regard the subject in the same light that the child has attained its majority, and should be allowed to direct its own affairs. We want nothing more than to get out of Cuba, but it must be done in a dignified, and honorable manner."

That was in response to General Grant's proposition that the independence of Cuba should be recognized and that an indemnity should be made to Spain, which would be guaranteed by the United States. General Prim, however, made a condition that the Cubans must first lay down their arms, and after that there might be a vote by the people of Cuba on the question of separation. But the Cuban people would not consent to lay down their arms.

The difficulty is one that stays. The Spaniards refuse to do anything when they propose that the Cubans shall, first of all, submit themselves to Spain. That cannot happen. The fact, however, that General Prim did not regard the American proposition a personal insult when it came from General Grant, shows that Spanish pride is not always impracticable, and one of the preliminaries to an accommodation is that Spain shall be educated by her misfortunes to understand the cause of Cuba, and consent to her independence.

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE CRISIS IN CUBA.

This War not a Ten Years' War—The Fighting too Fast and Furious to Last—The Crisis Financial, Industrial, Social, Military and Political—General Lee's Important Functions—The Policy of the Administration—Senator White's Speech—James Creelman's Story of Massacre—The Power and Duty of the United States—The Mutual Hatred of the Creole and the Spaniard, and Influence of the Abolition of Slavery.

THIS will not be a ten years' war. It is too fast and furious to last so long. The tedious struggle from 1868 to 1878 was, in its most important manifestations, confined to two provinces, and those of the extreme east and of the least importance to agriculture and commerce of the six modern divisions of the Island.

The vital parts of the country were not assailed or menaced. Sugar making, tobacco growing, cutting and curing were carried on as usual, with the exception of districts whose losses did not affect the general result. The presence of the Spanish army increased the stir in the streets and shops, the hotels and theatres of Havana. The crops brought in money year after year, and only in the infected provinces were plantation profits reduced and the course of living seriously unsettled. In the years of the wearisome skirmishing in the east end, labor was employed in the richest parts of the country. Disorders were localized.

This war is another affair. The military forces en-

gaged are three times as large on both sides as they were when they reached their maximum, before Campos succeeded in arranging the truce of Zanjón. The policy of Gomez has been this time to force conclusions, and the way he reduces Spanish resources is obvious. First, the armies of the Spaniards are, with the volunteers and the guerilla bands, nearly two hundred thousand, and they cannot live off the country as it has been swept with fire, despoiled of labor and deprived of domestic animals. The food supplies must come from abroad, and are found especially in Spain and the United States, and expenses, it is thus accountable, are greatly in excess of all former periods.

It is also the rigid order of the Spanish authorities that the soldiers shall, for their own sake, be restrained from indulgence in the tempting fruit of Cuba. The diet of beans, rice and pork may be less palatable, but is much more wholesome.

Heretofore the known riches of Cuba were a help to Spanish credit. Now it is known in all the money markets of the world that the disputed Island is mortgaged for far more than it will ever be worth, under Spanish rule, for the payment of the charges of old debts. Therefore there is a crisis as to the credit of Spain, and the war must be fought out speedily, or there will be a collapse in her finances.


The policy of Gomez has been to make the war a matter of urgency. He is, as Lord Randolph Churchill said of Mr. Gladstone, "an old man in a hurry," and he wants the fight fought before the famine comes. He responded to Spain's imposing military forces aggressively, and there were two purposes in the character he gave his campaigning. The first was to abolish the

Cuban revenues of Spain by stopping the "grinding" of cane, and at first he only fired enough cane fields to give notice that sugar production was inconsistent with the Cuban struggle for liberty. Second, the discontinuance of the ordinary occupations of labor on the sugar plantations, set free, for war purposes, multitudes of strong men, and they ground their machetes, conscripted horses and mules, and set forth, soldiers of fortune and freedom. It was with these men the celebrated raid of November last was made, and that with the aid of the ultra-Spaniards, who demanded inhumanity, overthrew Campos and introduced Weyler.

During the long march from Santiago and Puerto Principe to Pinar del Rio, the insurgents gave out to all concerned that they wanted to stop the sugar works, doing as little mischief otherwise as they could, and they often spared cane fields, burning only those of men obnoxious to the revolutionists, and not sweeping away, killing or burning the horses and carts whose reason for being was the transportation of cane to the grinding mills and furnaces.

At this time, which was about coincident with the Marin administration—Captain-General Marin filling the gap between Campos and Weyler—the understanding was that while the sugar interest was essential to the Spanish domination and must be "limited" so as not to yield revenue. The tobacco industry was, on the whole, favorable to the insurgents, in this at least, that many of the tobacco planters and merchants and manufacturers were liberal contributors to the Cuban war fund, and that was a revenue that must not be cut off.

Of course the appearance of Weyler introduced a new order of things. The Cubans who had means to



COCOANUT PALM.

keep them alive on the voyage to Mexico, South America, or other islands, or the United States, fled in thousands to avoid the dread mysterious criminality attributed to the new captain-general. The greatest panic was concerning the stringent measures anticipated from him to compel the Cubans to be active for or against Spain, and this meant persecution, confiscation, perhaps execution, and as a choice of evils exile was preferred.

It soon appeared that General Weyler held in reserve his dreadful reputation, and that the first chapter was to have some mercy and hint of conciliation in it, but the scattered Spanish soldiers were hunted up and rushed to the front. There was intelligence and energy in his administration, and the show of success in rolling back the rebels then largely in the west end, and most dangerous there—gave the general encouragement—and he congratulated himself that he was driving the enemy eastward and had them already in the southeast of Matanzas instead of in the southeast and centre of Pinar del Rio, where he had found them; and at this juncture came the hopeful anticipation that “the planters might grind,” as they phrase it in Cuba, “with safety by the 15th of March.” There was not quite a proclamation of this, but there was a positive and a confident expectation.

The insurgent's answer soon came. It was evident that the way to recruit the rebel columns was to stop work in the fields on the tobacco as well as on the cane plantations, and the war in the west took the form of a general strike—one may say a sympathetic strike—and as this was just the time for cutting tobacco which was giving signals of the coming blossoms, every hand was a treasure and each day was precious. The strike

was ruin to the tobacco men, Labor got on horseback and rode away with the raiders. Soon it became evident that, instead of the resumption of the sugar industry, there was an end to tobacco raising while the war raged.

Instead of gathering the tobacco in those far-famed regions where the leaf is good as gold and has the flavor the world knows and pays for so well, the fields were trampled and the torch was applied to the tobacco as well as the sugar houses. Maceo, instead of being "Oriented," rode from province to province for a few weeks and reappeared in the west. Then the torch answered Weyler in the sugar fields, and the fiery storm of desolation of the island by the Cubans to impoverish the Spaniards, and by the Spaniards to deprive the Cubans of shelter and food, set in, both sides succeeding. There is a crisis in the favored industries, and the gaunt wolf of hunger is at the doors of the people.

The insurgents are reinforced, and it is war to the knife and pistol as well as with the torch and rifle. The deathless tenacity with which Maceo adheres to the west end, implies understanding with him that he should be supplied by his friends in the United States with food and cartridges. The Spanish captain-general has thrown all his available battalions on the trocha at the narrowest part of the Island, a few miles west of Havana, and it is his theory that he has the insurgent leader in a trap, and the gunboats are swarming around the coast of Pinar del Rio to cut off help from the sea, while the *Bermuda* sails away at high speed, equipped for a sea fight if necessary, and we are told that the insurgent bands are moving westward to take advantage of Spanish forces on the trocha beyond Havana, de-

terminated at all hazards to make a diversion to relieve Maceo of a part of the pressure of the overwhelming force thrown against him.

There is a military crisis, therefore, coincident with that of the agricultural industries, and of the commercial interests associated with the Island, and the finances of Spain. Still more, there is the political crisis signalized by the appointment of General Fitz-Hugh Lee to be consul-general of Cuba, for this must mean something more than ordinary business. General Lee is not the consul-general merely, but truly a plenipotentiary-extraordinary. He has the situation to study on behalf of the president of the United States, particularly the military positions and prospects, and the social and political aspects. This is the confession of the president and his cabinet that they are perplexed by the conflict of testimony ; and they feel the gravest responsibility, and are anxious for the whole truth.

There has been a great deal said in Congress that was not of clear signification, and the purpose of which was evidently obscure to the orators themselves. There appeared in the Congressional Record of March 2, however, the speech of Senator White of California, which was exceptional. It was authenticated with information, and there was in its construction and tone the evidence to all students of the law and the facts, that the senator was in close touch and sympathy with the executive authority. This speech, there is no reasonable question, defined in the last week of February the conception of duty for the administration, and it has not been perceptibly modified even by the passage of the concurrent resolution of the houses of Congress, which was followed by a curiously complacent calm.

Senator White said all senators sympathized with the struggling patriots of Cuba, and would rejoice to see them govern themselves. The proceedings of Congress should be orderly, in accordance with the customs of enlightened nations, and if the subject was approached through concurrent resolution, designed to be of itself effective as a declaration of belligerency, the constitution required such resolution to be joint, not concurrent. If there was to be a declaration made announcing belligerency, it would have no effect, unless presented to the president, and it was doubtful whether it would have any effect, unless actually approved by him. We quote the senator :

I affirm that the question of the recognition of the existence of a revolutionary government is vested in the Executive. Whether this power is exclusive it is unnecessary to decide, though I shall allude incidentally to this phase. When the senator from Alabama stated that he denied the power of the Executive, unaided by Congressional action, to recognize the belligerency, it seems to me that his statement was unsupported by precedent or reason. I cannot find any other authority for it. True, Mr. President, a joint resolution, signed by the President of the United States, recognizing belligerency, would operate, if not by virtue of the action of Congress, certainly so, because it was approved by the Executive. I do not find it necessary to contend that Congress cannot pass a bill recognizing belligerency over the veto of the Executive. I can find no such instance, however. I trust that no conflict of that nature will ever arise.

What is the effect of a declaration of belligerency? Is it anything, when properly made, to which a nation has a right to take exception? Manifestly not. In such an instance we assert neutrality. The President of the United States issues his proclamation, declaring that this country will stand hands off; that we will not interfere. It is not a proclamation of war, it is a proclamation of peace; it is not an announcement of interference; it is an announcement of non-interference; it is not opening ourselves to the charge that we are attempting to injure a

friendly nation, but it means that we have concluded that there are contending parties whose armed conflict is sufficiently important to be dignified by the term war, and that we will remain impartial spectators. But, on the other hand, recognition of the independence of a revolutionary country is often the subject of vigorous protest.

It passes without saying, that no nation is rudely dismembered, save after vigorous contest and exhaustive effort. The history of our country demonstrates that we have never recognized the independence of a state which has successfully revolted without subjecting ourselves to the criticisms of the mother-country. There is much more danger, much more probability of conflict with a foreign power, in consequence of the recognition of the independence of a revolted government, than when we merely recognize belligerency. No nation can be expected to contemplate with satisfaction the loss of her possessions, and, unlike the able senator from Alabama, I regard the power to recognize independence, which he concedes to be in the Executive, as much more important than the authority to recognize belligerency, which he denies to the Executive. Said Secretary Seward, in a letter to Mr. Adams, our minister to England (1 Messages and Documents, 1861-62, page 79) :

“To recognize the independence of a new state, and so favor, possibly determine, its admission into the family of nations, is the highest possible exercise of sovereign power, because it affects in every case the welfare of two nations, and often the peace of the world.”

But if it be true that the insurgents in Cuba have the same right to procure arms and supplies under the present condition of affairs, as they would if the United States recognized them as belligerents, where is the vast importance attributed to this recognition? What privileges would they thus obtain? Outside of a certain moral advantage, the sole theoretical benefit would be a curtailment of the rights of Spain. As it is now, the insurgents have no national status, and Spain is not prohibited from coming to our ports and arming her vessels, and she may fit out military expeditions here, or take any steps competent to her in normal times. In the event of recognition Spain would be also liable under our neutrality statute. That is one advantage which would accrue to Cuba in consequence of belligerency. But, practically, what would this amount to? Spain is not engaged in fitting out expeditions in this country. There is no sympathy for her here. She can procure no men to enlist in her cause; she can obtain no aid and comfort in America. She may,

like her foes, buy supplies and arms in our markets, but that is her right in any event. Thus it will be seen that but little benefit can follow even effective action for recognition.

What potency accompanies any resolution that we may adopt? We all desire to see Cuba liberated, but how can she achieve her independence except through her own efforts? If our government were not careful in the enforcement of her neutrality laws, perhaps the insurgent cause might advance more rapidly. If these people were more carefully advised there would not, I am persuaded, be serious difficulty in getting much-needed ammunition and other war material, but expeditions cannot be fitted out here, nor can men enlist for hostile service, and arm ships in our waters for warlike enterprise. No one proposes that we shall declare war against Spain, and unless we do so the excited language daily repeated here is not appropriate.

Mr. President, our wishes are for Cuban freedom, but can we accomplish this by mere naked declaration? Senators have condemned Spain, and have criticized her policies with severity, but all this is futile. We should appreciate the truth that we cannot peaceably, or with due respect for international obligations, go further than sympathetic expression. If the president determines to announce that the Cubans in revolt are entitled to the rights of war, they will still be subject to sections 5,283-5,286 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. This would be true if Cuban independence were recognized by us, and must remain true while war lasts. Our declaration of neutrality itself implies that we will vigorously enforce the law as against all parties to the contest. We are in honor bound to do so. It is well to keep these facts before us. All should remember that in no way can we relieve the people of Cuba from the effect of our neutrality laws unless we boldly deny Spain's right, and ourselves take charge of the issue and declare war.

In the course of his remarks, the senator referred to the record of the president, December 8, 1885, with reference to the Colombian difficulty, and he quoted many passages of pertinent and instructive history, after which he proceeded:

To assert here by resolution that the Cuban people have accomplished their independence, when we know they have not accomplished it, when we know they are endeavoring to accomplish it, when we know they are

making every effort to attain to that condition, when we know that it is an unrealized hope, would be to write ourselves down as anything but reasonable men.

Certainly, a declaration of that kind would not have any satisfactory effect. It would be an announcement here in the form of a resolution of that which we should know is untrue.

Experiencing none but the kindest sentiments toward Cuba, I will not be a party to the new departure favored by the senator from Missouri (Mr. Vest), when in my judgment such conduct would be wholly unprovoked and unwarranted. A concurrent resolution, by whomsoever offered, or whatever it may contain, is nothing more than an expression of sympathy. As stated by the senator from Missouri, it will not, and as I have attempted to show, by its own force it cannot, directly accomplish anything for Cuba.

A senator who has pressed with much force the pending independence resolution, said that we might as well abandon the Monroe doctrine if we do not recognize Cuba; but if that doctrine has any application to Cuba at all, it would seem that under it we must keep our hands off, because, as I have already said, Mr. Monroe's words are, "With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered, and shall not interfere." To this declaration we have very lately given our unqualified support. . . . I shall not vote for a recognition of the independence of Cuba, first, because I do not believe that it is our function, without Executive participation, to recognize either the belligerency or independence of any nation; secondly, because I do not think that independence has been achieved within the rules mentioned, or at all, and I am unwilling to declare that a certain condition exists when I know to the contrary.

The appointment of a man of the character and attainments and environments of General Lee, two months after Senator White's speech, announces that the administration is still anxious and making inquiries, pursuing as it may the lines of investigation open to it, and sensible of the Cuban crisis that is industrial, commercial, financial, social, military, and political.

It interests many though, to seek to find an easy way of avoiding the realization of the critical state of the

Island, for they do not care to take full cognizance of the fact that a people are perishing, a once flourishing civilization on American soil, in the course of blotting itself out. The people of Cuba are not in danger of being conquered. The conditions forbid that, but they may fall into a poverty so depressing, and be ruined so completely, that a state of semi-barbarism may ensue.

The Spaniards steadily contend that the revolution in Cuba will cause a second and greater San Domingo, and point out the prominence of the Maceos as a proof that the insurrection is a negro revolt. They misrepresent the case, but it is true that the wealth that has accumulated in the Island shall pass away in fire, and that a generation may be required in restoration.

The Cubans and Spaniards, and all the enlightened people of the nations of the earth are concerned to know what we, the people of the United States, may have it in our hearts and hands to do.

There is that which is fortunate in the appointment of General Lee to be consul-general at Havana—and more, the personal representative of the president and cabinet. He is not a stranger in Cuba, having visited Havana when governor of Virginia. There is one very important aspect in which it is well that he is a Southern man, and it is not that having once taken up arms against the country of which he is now the representative, he may not be expected to regard rebels with sentimental severity, even if there is something in that ; but it is that as a man, raised in the presence and surrounded by the influences of African slavery, he has expert knowledge of colored people and their relations to the white people, and what he says of the relations and influence of that race in Cuba will have weight.

No man of greater facilities, to judge from information and inherent understanding of racial diversities, contentions and disposition, could be found; and he will be able to testify with confidence that the Cuban revolt is not a negro insurrection, and to disabuse the American mind on that subject.

James Creelman, the correspondent who denounced the butchery of the Chinese by victorious Japanese soldiers at the taking of Port Arthur, sends from Havana lists of the names of peaceable men who have been slaughtered by Spanish soldiers near Havana, and says the shock which cracked the massive walls of the palace was "the first answer of the Cuban nation to the Spanish campaign of massacre of unarmed, peaceable inhabitants of the interior."

The report of wholesale murder is made upon personal investigation, and announced with the opinion that it is impossible General Weyler could be informed, and continues: "Everywhere the breadwinners of Cuba are fleeing in terror before the Spanish columns, and the ranks of life are being turned into ranks of death, for the Cuban who has seen his honest and harmless neighbors tied up and shot before his eyes, in order that some officer may get credit for a battle, takes his family to the nearest town or city for safety, and then goes out to strike a manly blow for his country."

The witnesses of butcheries shrink and grow silent, and are dumb with fright when questioned, and if these stories are true, there never was a land of serpents and wild beasts and savages where death ever lurked so near.

While the economic questions are being considered, Mr. Creelman says: "The insurgents are turning the

Island into a waste of ashes, and the Spanish soldiers are slaughtering non-combatants." A responsible planter tells that within three weeks several laboring men have been shot by the roadside on his premises. This man is responsible in the sense of reliability—not that he would dare to tell the truth in public, for he would sacrifice his life if he did. The highway east of Havana is crowded with fugitives reporting murders—fourteen inoffensive men tied up and shot the other day near Guanabacoa and "the sentries on limits of the towns refuse to allow any outsider to go where he is likely to witness the work of the firing squad. Guanabacoa is packed with bewildered and half-starved country people. Many of them sleep in the streets."

The personal investigations of Mr. Creelman were as to "the following peaceable white men who were shot without trial at Campo Florida, near Havana, on the afternoon of April 3d."

Margarito Zarzas, aged twenty-four years, single, blacksmith and carpenter.

Ramon Castellanos, single, aged thirty-three years, poultry dealer.

Joaquin Medina, aged forty-five years, married, farmer.

Camilo Cejas, aged twenty-five years, single, fisherman.

Jose I. Cejas, aged twenty-eight years, married, fisherman.

Manuel Martinez, aged thirty-eight years, married, farmer.

Domingo Lugones, aged thirty-five, single, native of Montevideo, Uruguay.

Jesus Ochoa Rodriguez, twenty-five years, single, blacksmith.

These names are not given on the evidence of one man, for they had been communicated to the country by the United Press.

Between April 13 and 22, says Mr. Creelman, and he is the first to state the fact, the following peaceful in-

habitants were taken from their homes and shot on the Fierabras road between Campo Florida and Minas :

Margarito Verole, a farmer's boy, fourteen years old.
M. V. Collina, aged forty-four years, married, merchant.
J. Caballin, aged forty-five years, married, merchant.
Benigno Galloso, aged forty years, single, farmer.
A son of Galloso, aged twenty-five years, single.
Eduardo Sardenes, aged thirty-seven, married.
Cruz Ferrer, forty-two years, married, farmer.
Inocente Rabell, forty years, married, cheesemaker.
Florencio Rabell, thirty-six years, single, cheesemaker.
Basilio E. Rubio, forty-six years, married, farmer.
Eleno Guerra, thirty-three years, married, farmer.

The victims were all white. Their bodies were thrown into a huge sugar boiler, which lies half buried on the roadside on the land owned by J. Cabrera.

Here is a list of white men shot without trial in the same neighborhood, opposite the Jesus Maria grocery store, on the Arango estate.

Martin Sosa, single, farmer.
Andres Guillama, and his assistant, both married and farmers.
Francisco Diaz and son, farmers.
Leonardo Llerena, farmer.
Luz Gutierrez and son, farmers.
Caridad Reyes, farmer.
Francisco Ferrer, farmer.
Benito Bueno, farmer.
Julio Hernandez, father of twelve children, farmer.
Abelardo Cartaya, farmer, and three others whose names I cannot ascertain at present moment.

Most of these were taken from their ploughs. The following non-combatants were also shot without trial, and thrust into the sugar boiler on the highway in Minas :

Mr. Macho, a mulatto, seventy-one years old.

Timoteo Ceferino, son of the foregoing, aged seventeen.

Castellanos, thirty-five years, married, arrested on his way to Havana market.

Matias Darias, arrested on his way home after selling his goods.

Juan Machina, married, farmer.

This is indeed a chapter from another "Book of Blood," and this terrible story continues with the statement of an eye witness of the shooting of the eight men whose names are in the first list above; "these eight men were arrested on April 1st and 2d by Lieut. Sequi, assisted by two soldiers and a municipal guard, who has since been hanged by the insurgents. They were all innocent, hard-working people. I saw the soldiers tie their arms and take them to the police station. Margarito Zarz  s, who was arrested just after he had completed a coffin for a woman, was dragged to the station with a rope around his neck. I was told that the prisoners were beaten, but I did not see that. Next day the nine prisoners were marched to a small fort made of loose bricks on a hill overlooking the railway track. I heard that they were to be put on a train at 1.30 o'clock in the afternoon and carried to Havana, and I went to the track to see my neighbors depart. As I approached the railway I saw Lieut. Sequi and two soldiers hurrying towards the little fort on horseback.

"When I advanced I could see a double rank of Spanish soldiers of the Princesa Battalion, stretching from the foot of the hill on which the fort stands across the track to a small gully about seven feet deep. Beyond the gully is a large cedar tree, and between them was a freshly-dug trench. It made my blood run cold. I knew what the trench was for. To the right of the

gully was a line of soldiers. Presently I saw the two Cejas brothers leave the fort surrounded by soldiers. They were taken across the track between the double ranks and down into the gully out of my sight. Then I heard a volley fired in the gully. I ran home and ordered my wife to conceal the children and lock the doors of my house.

"The screaming of the prisoners in the fort, who had heard the volley, induced me to approach the track again. This time I saw Domingo Lugonez and Margarito Zarzas brought down the hill. They were tied together. Lugonez was crying. I could hear him scream again and again: 'For the sake of your own mothers don't kill me! Have pity on me! Oh, my good mother, my poor mother! For God's sake don't kill me!'

"The prisoners were driven into the gully, and again I heard a volley. After that I stayed with my children. We could hear other volleys as each of the prisoners was taken out and shot. Then the train arrived from Havana, and just before it reached the village I heard two quick volleys and two single shots. That day I left the place with my family. The troops were killing all my neighbors.

"The orders are given by the military commandant of Minas, whose name is Narciso de Fondesviela. This is a plain statement of the facts. On the next day the official reports declared that the Spanish troops at Campo Florida had ambushed a body of insurgents and killed ten of them without losing a man.

"Four days ago the soldiers shot Jose Flores, a married farmer, and Feliciano Sosa, married, carpenter, thirty-eight years old, and also threw their bodies into

the boiler. Since then the troops have been forced to dig a trench for the corpses, and the odor from the decaying bodies in the boiler prevents them from going near it.

"I have confined my despatch to one little farming district close to Havana. The same stories reach me from all parts of the Island. But I have set down nothing without investigation. Imagine the scenes in the interior. No wonder foreign correspondents are not allowed to accompany the Spanish columns and are nearly all bottled up in Havana.

"I take no sides in this war, and have no wish to harm the Spanish name. Many of the royal officers are men of fine character. But it is time to let the world know that America has an Armenia almost within sight of her shores."

While this is under my eye, I receive a letter from Havana, written by a man whose name would be known to many people in the United States as carrying with it the certainty of truthfulness—and he is not a Cuban or Cuban sympathizer—mentioning in a casual business way, news from a plantation in the vicinity of Havana, that several of the servants had been shot—among them three elderly black men, when going unarmed about the fields attending to their accustomed work. This communication, of which no correspondent in Havana has the least knowledge—it is from a source entirely independent and impartial—and is confirmation unimpeachable.

Here is the bloodiest picture that has been painted, and that there is awful truth to life and death in it can be read in the lines and between them, and this sort of thing has filled the Cubans who are not frightened into abjectness, with fighting fire, and they are giving up all

hope of preserving their homes, and are rushing into the war. The report is that eight hundred men have within a month, in the country in the Havana province and nigh the city, "gone to the insurgent army from a distance fifteen miles in circumference," and it is added, "most of them were armed, but few joined the patriot forces with nothing but heavy sticks."

It is stated that, in the first week of May, there appeared in New York a number of Havana business men seeking to deal with the Cuban junta to secure a pause in hostilities, for the purpose of seeing whether an understanding could be reached that might be enlarged to find the basis of an accommodation. This is not improbable, for disasters of the most serious nature are impending over Havana. The crisis must be near, and the rigors of military administration will be vainly exercised, for the laws of political economy are not subject to the orders of captain-generals.

The Cubans in New York warmly rejected all overtures, saying there was nothing but the recognition of the independence of Cuba that would make peace. It was claimed the Cubans were near winning the fight, and that the Spaniards had never kept faithfully their engagements. There is repeated the sharp summary of the causes of Spain against Cuba, drawn by Señor Enrique Jose Verona, ex-deputy of the Spanish Cortes.

"Spain denies to the Cubans all effective powers in their own country.

"Spain condemns the Cubans to a political inferiority in the land where they were born.

"Spain confiscates the product of the Cubans' labor, without giving them in return either safety, prosperity, or education.

"Spain has shown itself utterly incapable of governing Cuba.

"Spain exploits, impoverishes, and demoralizes Cuba."

And the business men of Havana are met with this passage of a revolutionary manifesto:

The cause of the ruin of Cuba, despite her sugar output of one million tons and her vast tobacco fields, can be easily explained. Cuba does not capitalize, and it does not capitalize because the fiscal régime imposed upon the country does not permit it. The money derived from its large exportations does not return either in the form of importations of goods or of cash. It remains abroad to pay the interest of its huge debt, to cover the incessant remittances of funds by the Spaniards who hasten to send their earnings out of the country, to pay from our treasury the pensioners who live in Spain, and to meet the drafts forwarded by every mail from Cuba by the Spaniards as a tribute to their political patrons in the metropolis, and to help their families.

Cuba pays \$2,192,795 in pensions to those on the retired list and to superannuated officials not in service. Most of the money is exported.

Also with this often repeated and undisputed disposition of Cuba revenue:

Interest on part of Spanish national debt.....	\$10,500,000
Spanish army and navy.....	6,900,000
Government of the Island.....	4,036,000
Pensions, Monts-de-Piete, etc.....	2,000,000
Justice.....	995,000
Public treasury.....	708,000
Public works.....	588,000
Public instruction (superior).....	182,200
Common schools !.....	0
	<hr/>
	\$25,909,200

Of this, it is the Cuban claim, sixty-six per cent. of the taxes in the Island goes to the peninsula, as plainly as if sent off in treasure ships in the old style.



DESTRUCTION OF RAILROAD TRAIN BY DYNAMITE

When it is considered that the Spanish "reforms," that were withheld, as we are often told, because the insurrection broke forth, were unreal—did not change the fact that the only actual authority was adjusted to remain in Spain—no true home rule even attempted, and the policy of massacre is carried out while business men confer—the impossibility of advancing peace measures is demonstrated, and the horrors of the situation appear the more vividly.

The dreadful narratives thrust upon our attention emphasize the deadly nature of the Cuban crisis. There is a culmination of horrors. The wretched fugitives from the bloody fields and country houses in ashes are hastening wildly to Havana and other cities and the towns, fleeing from murder and famine, to sleep and wander in the unclean streets, to meet the pestilence. How the carnival of blood, the massacres that are called combats, and the exterminating assassinations are to be prevented, in any way moderated, or even their increase checked, is a question as difficult as the situation is deplorable. The president is called upon to take action. It is not his duty to declare war, with Congress in session, but he must have enough evidence before him to authorize the most serious representations by our consul-general to the captain-general of Cuba, and by the minister to Spain to the government of that country; and it will not be sufficient for the Spanish general in command to discredit all the news of an unofficial character that comes from Cuba, or for the Spanish government to refuse to listen to offers of good offices from the United States, and to go on speaking of their inflexible pride and indomitable purpose.

We know enough about that. We know well that

more than forty years ago Spain was hard-pressed in the course of the Ostend conference policy, and that it did become her dignity then to decline to accept our suggestions. We are aware that it was the right of Spain to refuse to sell her last great American possession, and she could do that again without justly incurring our ill will. We are aware of the false representations that were made of the Lopez and the *Virginus* affairs by the filibusters were countenanced in this country—but that was chiefly on account of the inhumanity, the savagry of the shooting of prisoners by scores—but we remember General Prim, when ruler of Spain, treated representations from our government that his country might advantageously give up Cuba, with calm consideration, no display whatever of indignation. We know how frantic the Spaniards grow at the thought that we want Cuba, and with what insanity they assert that she is their own affair, and they will never tolerate any interference.

We beg pardon, but maybe they will! It is possible that they must. Cuba is an American island—the American island—and we, the United States are the great American power, and have some rights that are imperial, and we can assert them in a spirit of justice, and a potentiality that there is no power on the earth that can hinder. We know it is the most familiar thing outside our country in the history of this hemisphere—Spain has parted with her enormous American colonies, from Chili to California, and we speak within bounds in saying, because she was incapable of fair play to colonists. She would rule them as she has ruled Cuba, and has therefore lost the position in the world that her American possessions would have given her,

through her implacable injustice, her irrational and unappeasable greed. We know, too, that Spain gave up the Floridas to us, and that she once was the proprietor of all the ample shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and they are all gone from her but Cuba, standing a sorrowful, reproachful, solitary sentinel, the sombre, needless guardian of the gate of the lost empire. Now, shall she cling with defiant desperation forever to this final fragment of what was the Spanish world, and is now a mournful monument of misgovernment and misfortune, and assert the right to murder a people who refuse to be the servants of her servants, and jeer at us that we have no right of humanity to protest—we the nearest neighbor and predominant power—no privilege of Christianity or chivalry, to see that a race born on American soil shall not perish from the earth at the hands of carpet-baggers from over the sea, who refuse all forms of self government, to those they have oppressed for generations? Cannot some Spanish statesman rise with the will and the force to save his own country from the ruin that is impending for Spain? Shall she commit suicide because Cuba is not to be hers again?

Spain is stumbling down a dark and bloody road to her doom, and she should find in herself the manliness and wisdom to preserve her from the inevitable consequences of a relentless resolution to avenge herself upon her children, because they resent her stupid and woeful tyranny, and resist, torch and knife in hand, the policy of massacre that threatens to be the most hideous chapter of human crime and misery. There is frivolous talk in Spain of war with the United States. We would not be boastful of ability to assert ourselves, because Spain is a weak power; but we may, in a war becoming

barbarous, interpose with the preservation of our own equipoise, to command the peace; and we may close the crisis in peace, if we rise to the occasion, ready with the sword and the supreme moral force that has accepted the challenge of fate and the duty of destiny. Thus we shall impose no calamity on any one, but give relief to Spain, freedom to Cuba, and dignity and glory to ourselves. We are the true and competent America. We need shed no drop of blood—for the price of peace and honor, for us and for all in this crisis, is the courage that accepts the hazard of taking the fateful responsibility with absolute resolution.

THE CURRENCY CRISIS.

There is a currency crisis impending in Cuba. The money measure thus far has been the ounce of gold. The Spanish gold is not so fine as the American, and, therefore, United States gold there commands a premium over Spanish gold—hence the humor of buying a small article, paying in a half eagle, and getting a Spanish five dollar gold-piece and some silver change in return. Spanish gold is at a premium over silver, and there has been no paper money. The Spanish five dollar piece is the current measure. A bill in a shop or hotel is settled in Spanish gold, and if paid in American gold there is something coming on every dollar, and if the payment is in silver, a number of dollars, equal to the sum named in the bill does not go until the premium is added. The ounce of gold, 900 fine, may be styled the unit, and there are close calculations in paying bills. There has not been a scrap of paper money in circulation in Cuba, but there is to be an issue of notes, and the public are apprehensive, and not

at all pleased with the probability, as they remember that the paper floated during the last war was not redeemed at par, and that its fluctuations in value were exceedingly annoying. In the United States, where a dollar is one hundred cents, and where paper, gold, silver, nickel and copper money are absolutely on a par, many people do not realize the discomfort of a fluctuating currency. The present condition of money there should particularly interest the free silver advocates of the United States.

Nobody can tell now at what rate the paper money to be issued will pass, but it certainly will not be the same as either gold or silver.

A Havana correspondent gives this interesting article :

“The monetary unit here is the peso, which takes the form of a large silver piece, about the same size as an American dollar. It is divided into five pesetas, each presumably worth twenty centavos, or cents. The real—worth ten centavos—is the smallest silver piece in circulation, as the half reals have been withdrawn. The centavos are big, clumsy, copper coins, much larger than American cents. The smallest gold coin now issued by the Spanish mint is the centen—on which is stamped the announcement that it is worth twenty-five pesetas, five pesos. As gold is at a premium here and silver at a discount, the values do not agree. The centen is worth from \$6 to \$6.10 in silver, and as much as \$6.43 in copper money, but no ordinary man would think of getting change in copper, as he would have to hire a pack mule to take it home, and then he would have to get rid of it in driblets, as cabmen object to taking twenty cents in copper, and small merchants do likewise, preferring silver and insisting upon getting it.

"The gold centen has a premium of six per cent., and the coin passes for \$5.30 everywhere. Ten centens are always \$53 for the purchase of articles in local business houses, though importing merchants pay for their goods abroad without getting a premium. All large bills are payable in gold, and the hotels and restaurants always specify that the prices given for food and drinks are in gold. The fact is that in paying for food and drinks in cash, silver is taken; if the bill is paid at the end of the week the guest loses money. For convenience, merchants count the value of the centen as \$6 in silver; that is if you see an article in a shop window marked \$2.50 gold, that means that you pay on the basis of \$6 silver for the centen.

"The small shops get very little gold. Their prices are for silver, but when they pay the wholesaler they must get gold. The result is exchange offices all over the city—dozens of them around the markets and main centres of trade. To these Casas de Cambio men go to have their centens turned into silver. The prices of the day are usually posted on the outside, and sometimes there is a difference of a cent or two between neighboring places. In the last month the price has ranged from \$6.04 to \$6.08, varying every day, according to the demand. Money brokers all announced that they will pay more for large quantities of centens.

"Naturally, the chief sufferer is the laborer, who is paid in silver, and who loses all the way through the transaction. Prices of small things are extraordinarily high, even considering the small value of the money. For instance, Rocquefort cheese brings 80 centavos a pound, American soda crackers 45 centavos a pound box, American caramels, cheapest grade, one peso a

pound; draught beer ten centavos a glass, American, German, or English beer or ale, 35 to 40 cents a bottle, and so on all the way through. Washing is a very expensive item in a hot climate, where constant changes of linen are necessary. The hotel laundries charge 25 centavos for shirts and nightshirts, ten cents for cuffs, and five for collars.

“Money was never so scarce in Havana as it is to-day, and yet the capital suffers less in proportion than any other point on the Island. One effect of the war has been to concentrate the population almost entirely in the larger cities; whole hamlets have been deserted and laid in ruins by one side or the other for fear that the enemy would utilize the houses; rich men have become poor and homeless, workmen have been suddenly deprived of all means of earning a livelihood; the supply of provisions has been cut down everywhere, and prices of food have increased. A large proportion of the residences are offered to let, and handsome houses could be obtained now for a mere fraction of the money they formerly brought. Many large business houses have already closed their doors, and others have decreased their force of clerks, reduced the salaries of those retained, and even at the present basis find there is no profit, and contemplate giving up until times are better. Outgoing steamers continue crowded with passengers, while those that arrive are practically empty. Beggars spring up at every step in the streets, with tales of starvation and misery—one hears of nothing but poverty.”

The appearance of paper money will be regarded in Havana as another symptom that the decline of the old order has reached the falling state.

The cause of the crisis in Cuba, deeper even than the antiquated economy that discriminates against natives in their own country, or the demonstrably unjust taxation—the corrupt intolerance by the foreign office-holding class, and all the list of vindictive discrimination by the peninsular powers against the producers of the Island, is displayed in a striking characterization of the contending races, by A. Gallenger, in his work, “*The Pearl of the Antilles*,” published in London in 1873. Gallenger says :

The real bane of social life in Havana lies in the deep-seated and hardly smothered animosity of race, one and the same race, yet irreconcilably divided against itself. There is no hatred in the world to be compared to that of the Cuban for Spain, and everything Spanish. The creole conceives that he alone is entitled to breathe the balmy air of his tropical Island, and plainly intimates that he longs for the day in which he shall be rid of the Spanish, and of every other alien intruder coming here to suck the very life-blood from his veins. The peninsular or native Spaniard, who, in order to make things as he wishes, thinks that it is enough for him to declare that they are so, never mentions Cuba without calling it “this emphatically Spanish Island.” He flatters himself that he has crushed the creole, and affects to ignore him. The worst is, that to a stranger’s eye the split is nowhere apparent; the line of demarcation is not visibly drawn. The Guelph and Ghibelline go past with no outward distinction, showing no symptom of the enmity which may at every moment array them in hostile camps. There is no open insurrection within more than 100 miles of Havana; there has been no serious disturbance in the town since the bloody execution of March, 1871. But there is a vast amount of plot and intrigue fatal to all loyal, social, and even domestic, intercourse; a depth of simulation and dissimulation, of spoken and acted lies, not to be fathomed by a stranger on a mere superficial survey. The Peninsular is sure of the day; the Cuban is confident of the morrow. The Spaniard relies on brute strength; the Cuban puts his trust in superior intelligence. Between the insurgent bands in the fields, and their patriot associates in Havana, there is incessant, and by no means unenterprising, communication. The underground war is going on in every street, and almost in every house, in

this city. The Spaniard fancies he can afford to treat the creole with ineffable disdain. He taunts him with cowardice and unthrift. He looks upon him as a degenerate being, incapable of overt action, of manly resolution, and, perhaps, he is safe enough in Havana itself. But the Cuban bides his time. He reckons on the chapter of accidents, on the chronic disorders of the mother-country, on the sympathies of the American Union, of Mexico, of the Central and South American republics, where the name of Spain is as heartily execrated as in the camp of Céspedes himself; and, above all things, on the deluge that must needs ensue upon any attempt at the solution of the fatal slavery question. The creole of the city is certainly a weakly, rickety, frivolous creature, distinguishable by his long, scraggy neck and thin, fluted legs, addicted to indolent habits and enervating pleasures, trained by long schooling to abject submission, destitute of all energy; but there is, as he knows, better stuff among his brethren of the rural population. The Cuban travels and learns, and throughout the Island education is more generally spread than among the ruling race, especially among the lower classes of prejudiced and bigoted peninsular immigrants. The Spanish settlers own very nearly the mass of the landed property, and of the movable wealth of the country; they have the lion's share of the trade of Havana in their hands, partly in consequence of their superior thrift and activity, but in a great measure owing to the privileges and monopolies awarded to them by a partial, grasping, and unscrupulous administration. The fortune accumulated by the peninsular father not infrequently goes to wreck and ruin in the hands of his improvident creole progeny. Still, the base of the peninsular prosperity, both agricultural and commercial, rests on slavery; and the creole thinks, not unreasonably, that with the abolition of slave-labor a new balance of fortune will have to be established, in which all the chances will be in his own favor.

It is remarkable that at the time this was published (1873) slavery had already passed away, though the formal abolition of the institution had not been perfected. The Spanish influence exerted by Martinez Campos was for ending slavery, and, no doubt, the anticipation was that the free blacks would prefer the Spaniards to the creoles. One of Captain-General

Weyler's moves, in the first days of his supreme authority, was to invite the friendliness of the black people. The black rebels are among the bravest of the fighters for freedom, and the disappointed and angry Spaniards speak of the " negro insurrection."

CHAPTER XXV.

THE DESTINY OF CUBA.

A Personal Word—Account of a Mysterious Missionary—Comparison of Campos and Weyler—Spain has Lost Cuba—The Destiny of the Pearl of Islands is to be one of our Stars—Gentlemen are Rebels—The Volunteers as Business Men—Cubans Worthy to be our Fellow Citizens.

THE destiny of Cuba is in the darkest and deepest doubt. The problems to be solved, under afflictions the most distressing, are many and profound.

A personal word may be permitted, as I have to express convictions and judgments, and it is but fair the reader should know how they were formed. I arrived in Cuba with, perhaps, the average American information, opinions, prejudices, feelings, impressions of various degrees of inaccuracy, arising from imperfections in the sum of gathered information.

I remembered that Columbus discovered Cuba, and called the island Juana, believed it was a peninsula jutting out from the continent of Asia, and close to Cathay ; that he found a childish race of red-men, who perished in slavery, and that black slaves were introduced ; that Columbus had been sent home in chains from Hispaniola, and, dying poor, his remains were transported to the Indies he gave to the world ; that Cuba was the key of the gulf during the centuries of Spanish domination on the shores of that Mediterranean Sea ; that in this century the Island has been disturbed

by many disastrous troubles, arising from the total denial to her people of self-government.

Of course, I had shared in the American ambition of possession, in the conception of our manifest destiny, in the regretful remembrance of the tragedies of the shooting of Crittenden and of the bloody scenes at Santiago, in the wholesale execution of forty men of the expedition of the *Virginus*; and the news of the indcisive ten years' war passed under my eye as the editor of a daily paper; but I could not make out much more than a cloud of skirmishes and shadows of questions.

The fact that war broke out again in the Island in the early part of 1895, struck me rather as a revival of disagreeable memories than a topic of vital interest, and there passed dimly a procession of events: Thomas Jefferson's Louisiana Purchase; Andrew Jackson's settlements of all doubts as to the title of the United States to the mouth of the Mississippi at New Orleans, Jan. 8, 1815; Jackson's hard-handed dealing with the British subjects and Spanish officers, when he hanged Arbuthnot and Ambruster and seized Pensacola in 1817, when John Quincy Adams was, as secretary of state, his friend, and John C. Calhoun's position was at least ambiguous.

The American appetite for Cuba has long been one of the facts to be taken into account, and behind it was the history that Spain had lost the rest of her American colonies; and the logic of her colonial history was that she must part with Cuba, and we should make up our minds on the subject. The Americans have been but faintly conscious that the reinforcements of provincial troops from Connecticut, New York and New Jersey—that reached Lord Albemarle before Havana in July,

1762—decided the war when the English and “Yankees” together were the conquerors of Cuba, and in the tremendous scenes of our conflict of states and sections in which slavery passed away, we had almost forgotten the Ostend conference, that was a marvel of effrontery, designed by President Pierce to yield his administration, the glory of annexing Cuba—which would have given him rank with Jefferson in the acquisition of Louisiana, and with Polk, who moved our frontiers to the Rio Grande, and swept within our boundaries forever magnificent California.

The anxiety to join Cuba to our imperial estate just then was to maintain the latest idea of Southern statesmanship before the fatal spectre of secession arose—the balance of power between the North and South recognized as the primary, fundamental, and unavoidable grand divisions of our republic.

When I landed in Havana my mind was not clear as to what there was of evil remaining from the lately abolished institution of slavery or what was the extent of the racial differences. Of course, the white and black races in Cuba had not been arrayed in parties opposing each other for, owing to the overshadowing power of Spain, the government was that substantially of martial law, suppressing all native contentions. The question seemed open whether the majority of Cubans were black or white, and the story of the burning of cane fields, the lurid sky south of Havana, the daring march of Maceo—the heavens glowing—the broad and smoking paths of the rebel raiders—made a strong suspicion that this might be another San Domingo.

There was and there is something fascinating in behalf of Spain in the romance as well as the history of

her relations with the Americas. Cortez and Pizarro and De Soto are the early heroes of the continent that appeal with the greatest charm to the imagination ; and if Spain has been cruel in shooting and slaying the red-man, so were our fathers from New England to Michigan and Kentucky. Spain has made war horrible and is not able to separate it from cruelties. More than once she has shown herself friendly in her diplomacy. The United States recognized the confederates as belligerents before the Spaniards did ; and notwithstanding the just resentment of Spain aroused by the meeting of Buchanan, Mason and Soulé at Ostend and their proceedings there, where it was proposed to use the opportunity of the preoccupation of Europe in the Crimean war to capture Cuba—notwithstanding the singular arrogance with which our diplomats insisted while Spain herself was shaken by revolution, that she should yield to money or to force the Pearl of the Antilles to us—after all this—Spain surrendered to us the *Virginus*, and General Prim was not pyrotechnic with impassioned pride, but courteous in response to the pointed suggestion by President Grant, that the independence of Cuba should be recognized.

The sum of this to my mind was, that after all, there had been a good deal of friendly reasonableness in the course of Spain toward ourselves. So far as I could comprehend the irregular and confused news from Cuba for some months after the declaration of the war that is in progress, the character and course of it did not much differ from the familiar experiences of the ten years. There had been rumors of bribery connected with the adjustment arranged by Campos, that closed the hostilities, and also of reform, and it did not

seem to be altogether improbable that there might be another settlement, on the basis of bribery, an influence to which persistent report refers many of the shifts in the affairs of Cuba. There was not visible to the naked eye of the average citizen any striking fact warranting disbelief in the power of Martinez Campos, when he arrived in Havana with imposing pomp, to combine force of arms with persuasion, and the arrival of General Pando, with 30,000 men, reinforced the prevalent opinion that the Spaniards would win again and go on in the old way.

There was a good deal said in the American Congress and newspapers that was unworthy the nation—frantic demands for impossible things, clamors for executive action that would be not only unbecoming, but absurd; interpretations by statesmen of national reputation of international law, that would be suppressed by any enlightened committee presiding over a debate of college students. It was not our place, surely, to insist on action based upon the precedents of piracy to excuse a policy of filibustering.

That there was something far more in this war than had been evident in former struggles, was manifest when the Havana despatches told of the steady and swift advance of Gomez and Maceo into the central and western provinces. This was not what was promised by the presence of the most distinguished of Spanish generals, backed by an army of 100,000 men. The Spanish official stories, meagre and colored as they were—as is the habit and flagrant sin of military bulletins—told enough to make known that there was at last a real uprising of the Cuban people, one that swept over the breadth and length of the Island, and in the fiery

flood of which racial sensibilities, and the factions of men or politics, were submerged.

The return of Campos to Spain, discomfited and confessing failure, the friends of Spain panicky, and the Cubans exultant, appeared to announce the final failure of Spain to conquer Cuba. Then was visible the ancient bitterness of the Spaniard, his faith in the efficacy of severity, and the call for General Weyler to take command, because, in part by his friends and in part by his enemies, he had been reputed intelligent, energetic, vindictive and merciless.

At this juncture I accepted a call to go to Cuba as a newspaper correspondent, and was provided with many letters of identification and endorsements, giving assurance of a considerate reception by the official class. A visit to Washington was valuable in the acquirement of the certain knowledge that whatever might be the lack of qualification in the proceedings Congress was disposed to initiate, the executive branch of the government was in action limited by lack of the authenticities for recognition or intervention.

In Havana I found a group of representatives of the leading American journals, particularly those of New York, that are now more than ever searching the world for news. The correspondents were full of enterprise, courage, and spirit of adventure, flush with audacity, willing to risk life itself for "scoops," and armed with enormous letters of credit that they might on occasion use gold freely in news service, open or secret, and they have done more than all others to throw a fierce burning searchlight upon the bloody mysteries of Cuba in war, and the dismal oppressions of her people when their agitations are so far



DEFENSE OF A BARRICADE OF SUGAR BARRELS

suppressed that the condition of feverish repose is called peace.

My reception by the Spanish officials in Havana—this arrival was after Campos, and before Weyler—was full of politeness, and seemed something more, even cordial. The high officers of Spain are educated men, though unfortunately they are not like the Germans of the same rank, accomplished in the English language. They are, however, trained men, and there is in their answers, to every-day inquiries for news, a diplomatic reserve, showing the care bestowed in their schools upon the art of not saying too much. A letter from the Spanish minister, His Excellency Depuy de Lome, gave the responsible men about the palace to understand that I was a "serious" man, and the word serious conveys in Spanish a high compliment. I have pleasure in the acknowledgement of my indebtedness to Captain-Generals Marin, Weyler, and their respective secretaries of state, and others, for their courtesy, and for confidences as their obligations would permit; and for painstaking to be obliging.

In the distinguished consideration with which I was received, the power of the press and the potency of the country of which I was a citizen, and its ponderosity in the neighborhood, were regarded. General Weyler gave orders that I was to be admitted whenever calling between the hours of two and three in the afternoon, and I never asked him a question that he hesitated to answer, though often his replies omitted the real matter of importance. There were disadvantages in these conversations because they were carried on through interpreters, and interpretation is often too discursive or timid, and it is hard to impart the precise meanings, es-

pecially when they happen to be both delicate and of moment.

The press of Havana took some interest in me, and *La Discussion*, one of the leading and the most liberal journal of the city, interviewed me, and published a portrait, and thus it became known to the Cuban sympathizers that I was in Havana, and the extent and import of my mission were exaggerated, and after being passed along, the impression was made that much might depend upon the estimation I should form of the situation, economic, political, military and international.

One day—it was before the iron lines were drawn on all correspondents, and indeed all persons of whatever occupation, preventing movements into the doubtful country between the defined lines of the combatants—I was told, with ceremonies of mystery, that there had just arrived a man from the United States of extraordinary consequence. He had been sent by the Republican National Executive Committee to get into the insurgents' part of the country, to visit the mythical capital of the Cubans—Cubitas—to ascertain from original sources what was going on, and report to the party, so that the republicans would know from the inside what should be done in Congress and how to shape the platform at St. Louis. The confidential nature of this mission was insisted upon with a vigor that was nearly violent, and I was almost sworn not to tell under any earthly circumstances of any rumor that such a thing had ever reached me. Was this mighty missionary man in Havana? No one knew. Had he passed through the city on his way to the rebel camps? It was rumored that he had done so. I was asked whether such an enterprise would be important, and thought it would be

very important, and instituted careful inquiries as to the whereabouts of the emissary, coupled with the suggestion that I would take pleasure in meeting the great representative man and having a conversation with him. I could possibly co-operate in the good cause.

Upon this hint there was diligence among the Cubans, and after a couple of days a friend came in hastily and said : " He is here, he is here ! " " Who is here ? " " Why that republican party agent who has been sent to Cuba by the Executive Committee to get the bottom facts. He has been traced right here to Havana, and has not left the city. His name and stopping place are not known, but I shall get very close to him to-morrow."

This was encouraging ; and I was told there were only two or three persons to see before it could be managed that I might meet the representative republican person face to face. The man who knew all about it was found, and it was fixed that I was to see him, and all should be made clear. A tall gentleman, with fine figure and eyes and princely manners, was introduced, and he greeted me with the stately grace of performing a function on which the destinies of Cuba might turn.

He spoke no English, and through the interpreter I asked whether his information was definite and certain. He said with gravity it was. Did he think the matter was of so much moment as to engage the attention of Cubans ? He did. Indeed he knew it *absolumentement*. It was the thing of the day. Could I make the acquaintance of the partizan minister-extraordinary. There was a smile in the dark eyes that looked me over, and one of the men who understood Spanish sprang to his feet with an expression of disappointment, for he knew what

I was there for, and before the interpreter could speak, shouted to me, "Why, you are yourself the man!"

We were all disheartened, and I had some labor to perform before it became clear to my friend that I had not been in association with any junta or committee in New York or Washington or Havana; had no representative prerogative, or capacity to exercise, save as a newspaper man representing the New York *Journal*, and was not stable in opinions, even as to the exclusive merits of the cause of Cuba.

The disappointment and depression were general. This was a narrow escape from having greatness thrust upon one, but the advertising done in my behalf in the Island brought to me Cubans who were not reserved as to the nature of their sympathies, and represented in the strongest terms, with the support of facts, the merits of the antagonism to the pretensions of the Peninsulars to rule the Islanders.

This recitation of individual experience is to give the full force to the fact of my exceptional facilities to obtain information from Cubans and Spaniards, and it is only fair that the receptive condition of my mind should be emphasized. In Cuba I was as diplomatic as the Spaniards in stating my sentiments, and was reserved in all communications with both sides. It was easy to maintain neutrality, because it was consistent with candor.

I have been aided since leaving the Island by Cuban and Spanish partizans. The Spanish minister has kindly furnished documents to sustain his theory of the generosity of his country, and the revolutionists have taken an interest in imparting information, though offended by my pronounced advocacy of annexation. In giving

attention to the elements out of which the future of Cuba must be evolved, there is confirmed the opinion formed when the failure of Campos was confessed, that the loss of Cuba to Spain is irretrievable and absolute.

To the failure of Campos must be added the failure of Weyler, and the reason is not to be found in the men, but in the situation itself, taking into contemplation the economic and military conditions. The Cubans are as thoroughly in a state of revolt against Spain as the Virginians were in the height of the war of the early sixties against our federal government. The whole Island is in revolt, and the very province in which there is most intense sympathy with the rebellion is Pinar del Rio, the extreme west, where Maceo, with not more than ten thousand men, has held a position for more than a month within one day's march of Spanish forces, now not less than fifty thousand strong.

It is asserted that there is more food in this province than elsewhere, and therefore Maceo is in no danger of being starved out ; and if he can keep, by staying in camp in the mountains, five times his number of Spaniards occupied—the best troops on the Island and about all that can be spared from garrison and guard duty—he is doing very well indeed. Why the whole array of available Spanish battalions is not concentrated and hurled upon him instead of lingering on a fortified line, is inconceivable of American, French or German troops. Of course the Island can never be conquered by this systematic and stolid immobility.

That the destiny of Cuba must be greatly influenced by the racial questions is certain, for the Spaniards make artful use of the prominence of colored insur-

gents in the war to excite race issues ; but the census reports put to an end one bugaboo—that the majority of the people of the Island are black. The actual proportion is, in the latest thorough report, whites, 1,111,303 ; blacks, 520,684. The Spanish minister would reduce the value of these figures in removing American prejudice by saying: “In Cuba a mulatto must be a very distinctive type not to be rated as a white man, and the question who are the pure whites and the pure blacks and the mixed races was one of difficulty and delicacy in the West Indies. He much doubted whether the census figures given me were reliable in that respect, and supposed they counted the majority of people of mixed blood as white.” He is in error here, for all of “visible admixture” of negro blood are counted black, though they may be octoroons. There is a white majority in each of the six provinces, and the blacks can no more rule Cuba, politically and socially, than they can make themselves, as blacks, the masters of Kentucky. In Cuba many of them have shown high capacity, and they are in a better position than in any of the American states, and they have escaped political prejudice, for they and the whites have had sympathies in the indiscriminate lack of liberty that has united them, and the lessons cannot be lost.

The Spaniards and Cubans are of the same blood, language, literature, religion, read the same authors, pray at the same altars, have largely the same past with its traditions, its glories of race, its achievements of arms ; but grievous misgovernment has divided them. One million of the people of Cuba are white. Nothing could have separated them from the eighteen millions of Spain but the insistence that the Peninsula should

rule the Island across the Atlantic, that the Island should be the prey of pirates and the resource of profligates.

Persistent, long-continued injustice, and indifference or bitter hostility to all entreaties and demands for redress, have caused the Cubans to become conspirators, revolutionists, enemies and destroyers, all for self-government. Their affections could easily have been retained. The golden colony would have been as loyal to the mother-country now as one hundred years ago, if the Spanish ruling class had condescended to mix a little kindness with their masterful ways. It would have paid Spain well to have been occasionally gracious, for the Cubans had suffered long every form of humiliation before they were incensed to fury, and goaded into a consummate purpose of redemption and vengeance.

The last chance of Spain was to interpret liberally and generously the outlined plans of the treaty that closed the ten years' war. When they were carved and rasped away until only a mockery remained, a skeleton reminder of the original, this war broke out, and it will be the last of the civil wars in Cuba, until there are developments entirely new, because there is but one end to this conflict that is logical or possible, and it is that the Island shall be governed by its own people—it cannot be subjected through endless ages to a series of foreign satraps and their swarms of consumers of the substance of the land.

The Spaniard's fault is that he has not been able to escape from his own system. He is its slave as Cuba is its victim. Oh, the pity of it, the disaster of it! So far as Spain is concerned, the Island covered with debts

heaped upon her beyond all possibility of payment, mortgaged to the chimney pots, and scourged and bled and burned, no curse that befalls unfortunate humanity not visited upon her—the once royal and opulent Cuba is exhausted. Whatever there may be for others, there is nothing for Spain. If the peninsula and the Island should be manacled together by the old chains, both would be reduced to indigence and ignominy.

They must be freed from each other. If there are those in Spain who have read their own history with philosophy, they know this; but they are silent, for the tyrannical treatment of Cuba is necessarily associated with despotism in Spain. The Spaniards, fighting that Cuba shall not be free, have lost their own liberty, an old story told of all the nations that have perished.

France lives, and lost Hayti long before Spain's troubles began with Cuba. The only mistake the French made when they found their great West Indian island was unprofitable and must be so, was in giving up so many lives and so much gold in strife to regain the possession that was certainly no more for her than if the ocean had swallowed it. Spain herself abandoned Hayti once, the seat of her capital of the New World, and the loss was gain.

We may say there is now imposed upon Cuba the war debt that is indissoluble and irredeemable, and there is nothing to show for it. It is charged to Cuba, but it rests upon Spain, the unfortunate proprietor who looks over a beautiful estate whose future can have no income for him to dispose of. The only use of it is that of a country for the education, discipline and adventure of Spain's young men beyond the seas, and fat places for her military chieftains and their favorites,



TOBACCO PLANTATION

and the support of ungrateful and insatiable and forever swarming office-holders.

There is, no doubt, a certain convenience and blandishment in this, but it would be infinitely better for Spain if Spaniards would turn their attention to their own country—their own incomparable peninsula. Development at home is the hope of her future. She has for centuries wasted her substance in colonies, and the result is her comparative poverty, her men perishing, and her wealth in soil and labor wasted irrecoverably.

Why this war is the worst ever seen ; labor refused compensation, annihilates capital to lay the foundations of liberty in chaos. Why should Spain impoverish herself to hold a title for land that must change owners before it can yield income? Will she ruin herself for Cuba's sake? If she does, where shall she find even the shadow of compensation for her sacrifice?

We may have to take a lofty tone with Spain, but we should not insult her in the midst of her misfortunes. We owe her good-will. In the proclamation of the Monroe doctrine, she was placed apart as an exception among the European nations. That she had ancient rights was conceded. There has been a change, and the biggest fact in the whole business is that Spain has lost Cuba.

The next thing is, what are we going to do about it? How shall we recognize the fact, as Spain is not sufficiently convinced of it? The civilian rebels in Cuba are especially vigorous in their freedom of speech about the United States. They are so in their demands that we should be up and doing, and that which is their mastering desire is that we should help them to be the ruling class of the Island.

On account of the people at large of Cuba, the action taken by the United States should be pursuant to a well considered policy of annexation. It is that which is of greater importance at this moment than anything else in sight that is not of intimate, domestic concernment. We must shape our national proceedings in accordance with interpretations of current history—that Spain has no further use for Cuba, but to get out of it with as much honor and saving of reputation and minimum of sacrifices as she has the conservative statesmanship to secure.

She has lost the Island through the affliction of her own misgovernment, and, so far as she holds any part of it in military subjection, it will be at vast cost and no profit. Gomez says, in his manifesto of December 3rd, that it is all right if the Cubans have recognition of rights as belligerents, but he shall go on to free the Island, sword in hand. That is the spirit of the soldier, and a matter of fact of moment.

American statesmanship should find the way with the concurrence of nations, at least their acquiescence, and that they may consent at last we should not say too much at first, to interpose our good offices to stop the effusion of blood and the consumption of property, and save from abject misery a million and a half of people; briefly, to end the incessant troop of horrors of the hopeless war in a truce that shall become a peace, and take Cuba under our protection as a territory, to become, with the hearty help of her people, a state of the Union! Some of the resolutions before Congress, relating rather remotely to this subject, have been well suited as preliminary steps, but the full measure of the matter has not appeared in any of the offerings tenta-

tive of a public policy equal to the emergency. Congress is too strong with the strength of this great nation to employ any frivolous words of mere belligerency.

We need to shape a policy that is peaceable, politic, firm, possible and patriotic. The overhanging neighborhood and overshadowing mass of our nation impressed Cuba at large, and affected the imagination of her sons; and imagination is one of the creative forces. There has been a growth of Americanism in the Island, and the young men feel themselves Americans rather than Europeans—a fact full of promise. It is the pride and happiness and, they believe, the security of many of them to be or to become American citizens, and when we look at it closely the at first apparent artificiality of the proceeding of “making themselves Americans,” as General Weyler says, gives way to the appreciation of its naturalness and belief in its fruitfulness.

If we, the people of the United States, are Americans, in the great sense of the word, we should know from sympathy that the Cubans absorb Americanism from the atmosphere, and it is the true article. The time was when if Spain had been discomfited in or disenchanted about Cuba, the Island reduced from the control of the peninsula would have fallen a prey to home-made demagogues and imported adventurers. That danger is over. The drift of Cuban sentiment is to Americanism, and there is behind it the teaching of a generation of sorrows.

Whatever differences of opinion may exist as to the government at Havana and our relations to it, or the nature and extent of our associations with Venezuela, it is clear that the day when Americans can look with

indifference upon the passage of the Hawaiian islands into the hands of one of the powers of Europe or the parcelling of South America after the manner of Africa, is gone never to return, and it is distinct also that when Spain's grasp upon Cuba relaxes, no nation in Europe can claim the exercise of authority. No remote ruler but Spain can be tolerated, and as we are bound by international comity to respect her ancient title, that of discovery and colonization, which has been broken by the contention of internal forces, we are inevitably to take her place when she goes ; and surely the Spanish situation would be far more promising if her young men who are filling so many Cuban graves gave their lives to their own country, in the industries of home creation rather than foreign destruction.

The Venezuelan agitation has supplied the ingredient that will engage flagging attention to the waters south of us as of equal interest for us with those that unite us with and divide us from Europe and Asia. Look at Cuba on the map, and note how near she is to both Florida and Yucatan, her west end commanding the gates to the Gulf of Mexico, while eastward she slopes far down into the tropics, and dominates the Caribbean Sea. She is the most luxuriantly rich of the islands of the seas. She is almost as plainly ours in the course of nature as is Long Island. We do not undervalue the Hawaiian and Samoan groups, but it is not too much to say that Cuba is worth all the islands in the Pacific between our borders and Japan, including New Zealand.

As an American state, Cuba would be worthy her place in the splendid and immortal sisterhood ; and as a prize of peace, she would enter the Union with an endowment of the matchless prodigality of nature, add-

ing the opulence of the tropics to the magnificence we inherit in the imperial north temperate zone; and the statesmanship of this work will have rank along with that which gave us California and the two oceans for our boundaries.

On the Cuban shore the silvery surf breaks from a mighty sweep of waters, exquisite in color, reminding one of the Mediterranean embracing with crystal arms Italy, with all her gifts of beauty, but in Cuba we behold the royal palms waving over a soil surpassing Egypt in the accumulated wealth of ages; and as the arch of the western sky stands radiant over the shining waters, we cannot fail to remember that here is the American Mediterranean, and feel the thrill of an elevated ambition that of right it ought to be, and at last, with peace and honor, shall be ours.

Just when and how Cuba shall be won it is not the part of wisdom to be hasty in undertaking to say, but it is timely to declare that war with Spain should not be regarded unless in a dire complication a part of the proceeding.

Avoidance of that calamity will bear testimony to our civilization, and command more respect than military conquest.

That element in affairs which we call business more and more emerges from private transactions, and decides the destiny of nations.

There is a public power in the conservation of the general good of communities to which the prejudices of peoples and the passionate remonstrances of racial or imperial ambitions must give way, and we can already trace the tendencies that will apply this principle to the division, by natural law, of Spain and Cuba, when their

vision is clear that the iron bond of union is the cause of mutual ruin.

It has seemed to some writers fair to refer to the Cuban rebels as a rabble and a lot of barbarians, unworthy respectful attention or sympathy as representatives of a popular cause. But certainly many of those supporting the rebellion with all their hearts are gentlemen and ladies. The charge that they are ruffians and monsters is shameful, and its assertion, to turn a sentence, is mean. There are none more clever and accomplished than they. The following testimony from a Cuban "country newspaper" is more notable because it was reproduced as official news in a Havana paper :

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, Feb. 9, 1896.

In these days there have been solicited and granted a great number of passports for Venezuela, Costa Rica, Santo Domingo, Mexico and Hayti. If this emigration should continue, within a very short while we will remain without population.

The want of work is the principal cause that many people have abandoned the country.

It is said, and it appears to be certain, that in this week a good many persons have joined the rebels, some quite well known.

The line about the well-known people going over to the rebels should be marked. Insurgents resent the imputations of ruffianism and vulgarity, and of the prevalence of self-seeking foreign adventurers, saying that "the best blood of Cuba" is in the rebel raids ; that men are in their ranks who have helped to burn their own cane, using the torch upon their property in the belief that they were serving the cause of freedom.

It is the voice of ignorance and violence that denounces the Cuban rebels as a rabble of miscreants,

adventurers, mere cut-throats and incendiaries. They are Americans, and worthy to be with and of us.

There are in Cuban towns 60,000 volunteers, uniformed, drilled, armed with rifles and bayonets, and as they have no armories and supervise themselves, it is safe to say they have no masters. Each man keeps his gun and ammunition at home. The volunteers are, as a rule, native Spaniards, and have Spanish sympathies, but they are identified with Cuba, and proud of their places. They are considered by the majority of the Cuban insurgents their most determined and remorseless enemies. But the volunteers are the armed representative men of business, and they hold the balance of power. More than once they have deposed captain-generals, and they can do it again. They mean, above all, to hold their arms and positions, and the latter are departing, for business is taking to itself wings and flying away.

There are in Havana men and women who were worth millions in the old days, and are in poverty so pinching that it would be advantageous to their personal comfort to exchange places with their old servants. A man who spent not less than \$30,000 a year for thirty years, and regarded it as economical living, does not keep a servant, because he cannot pay one. His wife does the cooking, and there is little to cook, and there is not a ray of light in the darkness of the future, save the glimmering hope that something will come out of the great country to the northwest that will change the scene and give another chance.

A friend inquiring in Havana for a planter he once knew, and whose hospitality had been one of the charmed recollections of his life, was told that he was destitute

in a village near the city, and called, finding him poor indeed—plantations all gone, no sugar or tobacco to sell, and no telling when work could be done. He was on the brink of the dread abyss of despair, but the word America bade him hope. A planter still active, who has by no means yielded to gloomy fortune, whose cane has not been burned, was told by the military commandant in his neighborhood, that if he would provide for and pay the soldiers to guard his fields and buildings, they could be furnished. "But," said he, "I have no money to pay soldiers—that tax, this tax, and the other tax, has eaten up all my gains. My only chance is in the sugar fields, and you can see what that is. I have no money and cannot borrow a dollar, though I thought myself worth two millions. The end for me is not far off."

There is an impending collapse of business—to be one of the most destructive and instructive that has fallen upon a once great and prosperous community. "An earthquake could not overthrow a city with a surer blow" than the shock that must come when the war has done its worst, and the sinking of the one hundred sugar and tobacco millions is not a speculative but a verified fact.

Can the politicians, and the chambers, and boards, and committees, fail to see that the extraordinary will occur; that the unexpected, if we calculate on customary conditions, will surely happen; that what we are in the habit of calling the impossible is precisely that which is to be anticipated?

There is a business army, with the physical force to turn and overturn. The calamity that approaches announces itself in many ways to these very men. They have already felt the pinch of hardening times, and

fancy 60,000 business rifles and bayonets, between the Spaniards and Cubans, and that some day they say as one man, "It is time to stop the destruction of the Island. Stop!" When that time arrives the war must be ended, and the rest is easy. The solution will flow like a river. The ocean that is its home is Americanism, and the current will carry Cuba into the American Union as surely as the Mississippi pays tribute to the Gulf.

The volunteers, 13,000 strong in Havana, 60,000 in Cuba, are held to be the sure guarantee of the enduring supremacy of Spain, but the Providence that shapes our ends has other uses for them. The Cubans dread them, and it is understood that they, more keenly than others, antagonize the Americans and are the most fiery and relentless of all who oppose suggestions for the independence of the Island.

Every day declares the incapacity of Spain, and there is a point at which conservatism saves itself with revolution. The time is not far off when the final question of bread will be uppermost, and when the bread-and-butter question is raised there will be some improvements. It is when the existence of butter is forgotten that the bread appeal is most powerful. When business is gone from Cuba, Spain must go, for business will compel her. Business does not regard a foolish pride or deadly revenge, but takes into account the wholesome and substantial, and preaches peace with the promise of prosperity.

This is one of the ways in which Cuba may be cleared for her great future, without our intervention, and by the prevention of further blood-shed by superior force. It would be a happy solution. Hope for and help it!

The peace and prosperity of the most fertile and fairest, the largest and noblest of the American islands, demand that it shall, through pacific international processes, yield to the drift of manifest destiny, and the attraction of gravitation of the great republic, and take its place as an indestructible State of the indissoluble American Union—one of the stars of our national constellation—the United States.

The contention is that this, “consummation devoutly to be wished,” will be led up to by the procession of events in the course of a few years, and the achievement celebrated in our history as ranking with the memorable expansion of our domain, from the Mississippi to the Pacific.

The people of Cuba, when they are free, will vindicate once more the inalienable rights of self-government.

CHAPTER XXVI.

POINTS OF PICTURES.

Sugar Plantation—Tobacco Fields—Royal Palms—Cocoanut Palms—Cuban Vegetation—Moro Castle Cell—Valley of the Yumuri—Santiago—Royal Family—The Object Lesson of Cuba, and Long Island Contrasted on the Scale as to Size—The Spanish Hill-top and Car Fortifications—Cuban Pictures too Beautiful to Paint, Except with a Poetic Pen.

THE Spaniards have had a laborious year and a quarter since the war that continues broke out. They have cut many roads through jungles and constructed barricades and excavated ditches, and they have built two thousand forts for the shelter of their petty garrisons, that they may be able to stand a siege and beat off bands of insurgents in superior numbers. These forts are structures impervious by rifle shots, and are loop-holed. They are provided with water supply and food and cartridges for a few days, and in them the Spanish guards are enabled to avoid malaria and partake of their scanty rations in comparative comfort and be right in the way of hindering the roving columns of the rebels.

The forts are in commanding places, and have become a feature in the landscapes hardly second in conspicuity to the palm trees that forever dominate the scenery. The Spaniards in their snuggeries would be a forbidding feature over a vast extent of territory, if they were keen marksmen. With the range of a mile or two that the

rifles with which the Spanish soldiers are provided, half a dozen sharp-shooters in a fort would be distracting hornets' nests, and have a wide-spread influence. The terrors of the system of minor fortifications are much mitigated by the fact that markmanship is an extraordinary accomplishment among the Spanish soldiery.

The active Spaniards have also forts on car tracks for the protection of railroads. They take freight cars and plate them with iron, and loop-hole them, and place two or three with appropriate garrisons in the trains transporting troops and supplies. The insurgents have been bothered a good deal by these perambulating fortifications, but recently they have found out a way of beating the car forts, by waylaying them in railroad cuts, and firing through the unprotected roofs—a very disturbing ceremony.

The map of Cuba that we give, showing the line of march of Gomez through the Island from east to west, of the insurgent forces, is contrasted with Long Island drawn on the same scale. The line of the march should, however, be projected two-thirds through Pinar del Rio.

This map furnishes an object lesson, showing by measurement with a familiar object, how great a space the unhappy Island, whose dramatic story we relate, occupies in the American seas, where it is always summer. Long Island is always held in great esteem for her fine figure between the sea and the sound, extended from Manhattan Harbor to Montauk Point, her soil fertile except where the sand hills or the salt marshes en-

croach, her climate salubrious, the home of the sea breeze, the surrounding marshes teeming with food fishes, far surpassing those that in all the historic ages have been famous in the sea of Marmora, and the Hellespont and the Dardenelles and all the abounding waters from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

Now Cuba is twenty-nine times the size of Long Island ; indeed is longer measured across degrees of latitude, and larger in superficial area than the state of New York, and is as large as England, omitting Wales.

The forests of Cuba are full of precious wood, her mountains charged with iron, copper and coal, her soil ready to yield, under conditions of liberty and order, justice and intelligence, briefly of good government and industry, five million tons of sugar yearly, instead of one, and corn and tobacco galore ; while in translucent seas and swift rivers, there are fish innumerable and delicious, and oysters of a flavor and abundance that would be approved in New York or Baltimore ; and the turtles crawl like gorgeous and gigantic insects over the coral islands that cluster in strands of gems around the exquisite and enormous Pearl of the Antilles.

The fruit-stand in Havana shows the decorative make up of pine-apples, oranges and bananas, and also the style of portico, with massive and lofty stone pillars, that is one of the most familiar features of Havana architecture. Under the gigantic colonnades there is abundant shelter from the rain, and when the pillars are curtained and the sidewalk of stone dampened, the power of the torrid sun is gratefully modified. There

are two ways in tropical towns of building for comfort—one to use flimsy material and trust to mere shade and the free circulation of air, and the other to erect walls of extraordinary thickness, warding off the heat with masses of stones and piling ponderous arches on giant pillars. The latter is the Havana way.

Mr. M. H. Ballou, in his "Due South"—which is brightly appreciative of the beauties of Cuba—gives this picture of one of the most charming places in the world :

"The Bishop's Garden, so called because some half century since it was the residence of the bishop of Havana, is about four miles from the city, on the line of the Marianao railroad. It must have been a delightful place when in its prime and properly cared for ; even now, in its ruins, it is extremely interesting. There are a score, more or less, of broken, moss-grown statues, stone balustrades, and stone capitals lying among the luxuriant vegetation, indicating what was once here. Its alleys of palms, over two hundred years in age, the thrifty almond trees, and the gaudy-colored piñons, with their honeysuckle-like bloom, delight the eye. The flamboyant absolutely blazed in its gorgeous flowers, like ruddy flames, all over the grounds. The remarkable fan-palm spread out its branches like a peacock's tail, screening the vistas here and there. Through these grounds flows a small, swift stream, which has its rise in the mountains some miles inland, its bright and sparkling waters imparting an added beauty to the place. By simple irrigating means this stream is made to fertilize a considerable tract of land used as vegeta-

ble gardens, lying between Tulipan and Havana. The Bishop's Garden still contains large stone basins for swimming purposes, cascades, fountains, and miniature lakes, all rendered possible by means of this small, clear, deep river. The neglected place is sadly suggestive of decay, with its moss-covered paths, tangled undergrowth, and untrimmed foliage. Nothing, however, can mar the glory of the grand immemorial palms.

"The town of Tulipan, in which is the Bishop's Garden, is formed of neat and pleasant residences of citizens desiring to escape the bustle and closeness of the city. The houses are half European or American in their architecture, modified to suit the climate. Here the American consul-general has a delightfully chosen home, surrounded by pleasant shade, and characterized by lofty, cool apartments, with bright, snowy marble floors, plenty of space, and perfect ventilation. Mr. Williams is a gentleman unusually well fitted for the responsible position he fills, having been a resident of Cuba for many years, and speaking the language like a native. In his intensely patriotic sentiments he is a typical American. It is not out of place for us to acknowledge here our indebtedness to him for much important information relating to the Island."

The tower of the cathedral that is seen down the narrow street, and was built of white limestone, is the spire that we may regard as his monument, and we quote its history in "Cuba with Pen and Pencil," by Samuel Hazzard:

"The grand object of interest, however, is the 'Tomb of Columbuia,' and it is astonishing how many people there are who come to Havana that are ignorant of the

remains of Columbus being in the precincts of Havana—having been transferred from the place of his death.


“History tells us that Columbus died at Valladolid, Spain, on Ascension day, the 20th of May, 1506; that his body was deposited in the convent of San Francisco, and his obsequies celebrated with funeral pomp in that city. His remains were afterwards transported, in 1513, to the Carthusian monastery of Seville, known as ‘Las Cuevas,’ where they erected a handsome monument to him, by command of Ferdinand and Isabella, with the simple inscription, borne upon his shield, of :

A CASTILE Y LEON,

NUEVO MUNDO DIO COLON.

“In the year 1856 his body and that of his son, Diego, were removed to the city of San Domingo, in the island of Hayti, and interred in the principal chapel. But they were not permitted to rest even there; for on the 15th of January, 1796, they were brought to Havana, and interred in their present tomb, amidst grand and imposing ceremonies, participated in by the army, navy, and church officials, and an immense concourse of spectators. To use the words of a Spanish author: ‘Havana wept with joy, admiration, and gratitude at seeing enter within its precincts, in order to guard them forever, the ashes of Cristobal Colon.’

“The ashes, it is understood, were deposited in an urn, which was placed in a niche in the wall, at the entrance and to the left of the chancel of the cathedral. Over this has been placed a slab of stone, elaborately carved, in a stone frame, and representing the bust of Columbus in the costume of the time, a wreath of laurel



ATTACK BY CUBANS ON FORTIFIED RAILROAD TRAIN.

around his head, and symbolical emblems at the foot of the medallion, upon which is inscribed in Castilian :

Oh, rest thou, image of the great Colon,
Thousand centuries remain, guarded in the urn,
And in the remembrance of our nation.

“Well may the question be asked : Where then were all the muses when they inscribed such lines as these ?”

The Spanish outpost is evidently on a railroad and in an open country. There is no ambuscade in sight. There may be rebels in the hills that are far away out of rifle range. The strange old town answers the purpose of a look-out and shelter for riflemen if the enemy should make a dash. The officer in command has just received a despatch that is attracting close attention, and may announce the movement of a Spanish column or an advance of the enemy. The messenger is mounted on one of those swift, easy single-footed rackers, the clatter of whose feet on the hard roads is musical, and the delightful gait one that all the Cuban horses of good breeding have. The inevitable palm tree disputes possession of the land with a telegraph pole.

The sugar plantation, from a photograph, shows at a glance the scope of the fields on which the cane, so rich in sweets, grows with luxuriance and yields the raw material of the wealth that has made Cuba a prize to be fought for. The cane grows on year after year and when cut is carted to the machinery and furnaces marked by the towering chimney. An extensive plantation has hundreds of mules and horses and carts in

strings of fifties. In war time this equipment is important in the transportation of the baggage of the armies. When the cane is carted to the grinding machinery, the juice is pressed out, and after the second squeeze is over the pulp quickly dries in the sun—the dry season is grinding time—and serves for fuel ; and this supply is usually found sufficient. The sugar is transported in bags made of jute, each containing from three hundred to three hundred and forty pounds, the average package being three hundred and twenty pounds. The cost of the English bag is nine cents, but the duty, unless it is made in Spain, is ten cents, and the price to Cubans is twenty ; so that Spain gets the job of making the bags and the Cuban sugar makers pay twice their value and five per cent. over. The sugar production of Cuba, under conditions of peace, is one million tons per annum.

The tobacco fields are adorned with the lofty and feathery palms which distinguish the scenery and do not cast a harmful shade. The finest tobacco plantations in the world are those in Pinar del Rio, the western province of the Island, and the industry has suffered from the incursion of the insurgents, who rode through the fields and enlisted the laborers just at the critical season for cutting and curing the leaves, and the Spaniards identifying largely the rebellion with the tobacco interests, have not hesitated to make their movements also destructive.

Santiago, it will be remembered, is the scene of the *Virginus* massacre, and the beauty of the place is referred to in the farewell letter of the Cuban martyr,

Captain Fry, to his wife. The view selected displays the distant hills and waters and a quaint country house on a commanding point.

The vegetation in Cuba, stimulated by a soil of incomparable riches and wet seasons, during which the rain fall is enormous, and a sun just fiery enough to be invigorating to vegetables, whatever it might be to animals, prepares millions of ambuscades, and the tree-tops are sometimes used because the underbrush is so thick it is difficult to aim at an enemy from the ground.

There are many palms in the Cuban forests, and the tendency of the trees generally is to throw out tops resembling spread umbrellas. The insurgents are as expert in preparing places from which they can, in comparative security, fire with deadly effect upon columns of regulars, as ever the North American Indians were, and they have crafty ways of concealing themselves and giving and taking warning that certain roads are safe and others perilous.

The view of a cell in Moro Castle is in the nature of news. The journalist, Charles Michelson, who was confined there in a case of mistaken identity on a military report, and released on the intervention of Consul-General Williams, has a keen eye for details, and was able to draw his surroundings faithfully. He illustrates one of the possible embarrassments attending enterprise in seeking Cuban intelligence from original sources.

The prevalent stories of the young King of Spain are that he is a lively and self-willed child who improves in

physical condition and bids fair to be a strong man, though born after the death of his father, who was of feeble constitution, perishing of pulmonary trouble. His mother is in vigorous health, and has won the regard of the Spaniards by her modesty and wholesome devotion to her public and family affairs.

The resemblance of the boy king to his mother is evident in the family group, and the fact that he is like her is held to be of happy omen. The young king is, therefore, a little Austrian. The sisters are amiable girls of a more Spanish type than their brother.

A king squirting the garden hose on his mentor is the lively picture that a contemporary presents to us of the youthful ruler of Spain. Alfonso is now ten years old. In six years he will come of age, and will assume absolute control of the nation, which is now fighting to retain a colony as it has never had to fight before.

Maria Christina, queen regent, the mother of Alfonso, is a graceful and elegant woman, who is bringing up her boy and his two sisters with the best possible home influences. Alfonso will be educated as few Spanish rulers have been. And he is not backward in learning either. His spirit is proud, fiery, and quick, and his mental activity in studies has to be restrained rather than encouraged.

Besides squirting the garden hose and listening to reports about the Cuban rebellion, he rides the bicycle, and disports himself much as do other boys of his age.

He has passed the ordeal of his first bull fight. The custom of Spain prescribes, as a part of the education of its Christian monarch, attendance on bull fights. The queen regent, who has a horror of these barbaric exhibitions, put off her son's initiation as long as possible.

The little chap viewed the sport without betraying any enthusiasm, and departed without rewarding the successful matador, in accordance with custom. And some Spaniards, therefore, fear that he may bring discredit on his order and race by taking a stand against the national sport when he grows to man's estate.

Recently the boy king received a letter, on the occasion of his first communion, from his godfather, the Pope. He decided to answer it himself. He made six draughts, tearing each up in succession, before he was satisfied. He gave the final one to his mother to correct, and she found but one error, a misspelled word. It was sent off to the Pope.

King Alfonso XIII.'s jealousy of his rights is illustrated by his reply to a youthful friend, who said to his monarch :

“ ‘I am going to England.’

“ ‘How is that ?’ asked Alfonso.

“ ‘My papa has been made ambassador in London by Canovas de Castillo,’ was the answer.

“ ‘It is unheard of,’ retorted the miniature ruler, ‘that I was not consulted about this.’ ”

The Valley of the Yumuri, which is situated in the province and near the city of Matanzas, has the reputation of being the most beautiful in the world. It is a combination of mountains and ocean inlets and a river, and a broad plain of exquisite loveliness, and it is the scene of many romantic stories and much pathetic history.

The cocoanut palm is a glorious tree, immensely rich in leaves and fruit. It grows wild in the Island and

the green nuts each contain about a quart of palatable and nutritious water. As they get ripe the shell is hard and brown and the water precipitates its sweetness, forming the white nutty pulp, with a little milk in the centre, that the American boys and girls know so well, and of which the cocoa of commerce is made.

There are pictures that cannot be painted with the brush, but a poet's pen may impart their tints and outlines and atmosphere. The most exquisite examples are found in an old volume on the United States and Cuba, by James M. Phillippo, London.

"The splendor of the early dawn in Cuba, as in the tropical islands in its vicinity, has been referred to. The whole sky is often so resplendent that it is difficult to determine where the orb of day will appear. Small fleecy clouds are often seen floating on the north wind, and as they hover over the mountains and meet the rays of the sun, are changed into liquid gold, and a hundred intensely vivid dyes more splendid than the tints of the rainbow. During the cooler months the mornings are delightful until about ten o'clock, the air soon after dawn becoming agreeably elastic, and so transparent that distant objects appear as if delineated upon the bright surface of the air; the scenery everywhere, especially when viewed from an eminence, is indescribably rich and glowing; the tops of the rising grounds, and the summits of the mountains, are radiant with a flood of light; while the vapor is seen creeping along the valleys, here concealing the entrance to some beautiful glen, and there wreathing itself fantastically around a tall spire or groves of palm-trees, that mark the site of a populous village.

“The finest and most gorgeous sunsets occur in the West Indian Archipelago during the rainy seasons. The sky is then sublimely mantled with gigantic masses of cloud, glowing with a thousand gorgeous dyes, and seeming to collect at the close of day as though to form a couch for the sun’s repose. In these he sinks, flooding them with glory, touching both heavens and earth with gold and amber brightness long after he has flung his beams across the other hemisphere, or perhaps half revealing himself through gauge-like clouds—a crimson sphere at once rayless and of portentous size.

“The azure arch, which by an optical illusion limits our view on every side, seems here, and in the tropics generally, higher than in England—even higher than in Italy. Here is seen, in a perfection compared to which even Italian heavens are vapid and uninteresting, that pure, serene, boundless sky—that atmosphere of clear blue or vivid red, which so much contributes to enrich the pencil of Claude Lorraine. The atmosphere of Cuba, as everywhere within the tropics, except when the high winds prevail, is so unpolluted, so thin, so elastic, so dry, so serene, and so almost inconceivably transparent and brilliant, that every object is distinct and clearly defined as if cut out of the clear blue sky. All travelers agree in praising the calm depths of the intensely blue and gloriously bright skies of inter-tropical latitudes. In the temperate zone, it is estimated that about 1,000 stars are visible to the naked eye at one time ; but here, from the increased elevation and wider extent of the vault, owing to the clearness of the atmosphere, especially as seen from a high mountain chain, the number is greatly augmented. If, however,

these luminaries may not be seen here in greater numbers, they certainly shine with greater brilliancy. The different constellations are indeed so greatly magnified as to give the impression that the power of the eye is increased. Venus rises like a little moon, and in the absence of the greater casts a distinguishable shadow. . . .

“The Milky Way, which in the temperate zone has the appearance of a luminous phosphorescent cloud, and, as is well known, derives its brightness from the diffused light of myriads of stars condensed into so small space that fifty thousand of them are estimated to pass across the disc of the telescope in an hour, is here seen divided into constellations, and the whole galaxy is of so dazzling a whiteness as to make it resemble a pure flame of silvery light thrown across the heavens, turning the atmosphere into a kind of green transparency. Besides this, there are vast masses of stellar nebulæ of indefinite diversity and form—oval, oblate, elliptical, as well as of different degrees of density, diffused* over the firmament, and discoverable through a common telescope, all novel to an inhabitant of temperate climes, and recalling the exclamation of the psalmist: ‘The heavens declare the glory of God. . . . the firmament showeth forth his handiwork.’

“‘The stars

Are elder scripture, writ by God’s own hand,
Scripture authentic, uncorrupt by man.’

“An interesting phenomenon sometimes occurs here as in other islands of the West Indies, which was long supposed to be seen only in the eastern hemisphere. A short time before sunrise or sunset, a flush of strong, white light, like that of the Aurora Borealis, extends



CUBAN ATTACK ON FORT NEAR VUELTAS

from the horizon a considerable way up the zenith, and so resembles the dawn as to prove greatly deceptive to a stranger. As he watches the luminous track he sees it decrease instead of becoming more vivid, and at length totally disappear, leaving the heavens nearly as dark as previous to its appearance. This is the zodiacal light."

CHAPTER XXVII.

STATISTICAL AND DOCUMENTARY.

Organization of the Cuban Army, as reported by General Gomez—Commerce of Spain with her Colonies—The Authentic Figures of the Population of the Island, Showing the Proportion of Whites and Colored People—Official Cuban Letters and Proclamations.

THE organization, strength, color, leadership and location of the Cuban armies, as stated on good authority, is of positive and general interest. In the House of Representatives Hon. R. R. Hitt, Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, said: In Matanzas there are 8,900; in Havana, 8,160; in Pinar del Rio, 5,562; and in the armies of Generals Gomez and Maceo, 16,700. The total is 60,722 men. I will insert the whole statement:

CUBAN ARMY OF OCCUPATION.

Province of Santiago de Cuba.

Maj.-Gen. José Maceo (black).....	3,000
Brig.-Gen. Perico Perez (white).....	2,000
Brig.-Gen. Matias Vega (white).....	1,000
Gen. Augustin Coureco (mulatto).....	1,600
Gen. Carnelio Rojas (white).....	600
Gen. José Rabi (Indian).....	1,200
Gen. Manuel Capoti (white).....	800
Col. Felix Ruen (mulatto)....	800
Col. Francisco Delgado (white).....	400
Col. Carthagena (black).....	500
Col. Heabovaria (white).....	400
Col. Joaquin Planao (white).....	200
Col. Remegio Mariero (white).....	200
Col. Rodrigues (Spaniard) (white).....	400
Col. Salvo Reos (black).....	600
Col. Pedro Popa (black).....	200
Total.....	13,900

Province of Puerto Principe.

Maj.-Gen. Mayla Rodrigues (white).....	1,500
Brig.-Gen. Lope Recio (white).....	1,000
Total.....	2,500

This force serves as escort to the officials of the Cuban Republic, who, like the first congresses of America, as after the burning of Washington in the war of 1812, are compelled to move, by the exigencies of war, but they remain within a zone about equal to the area of our state of Delaware. The Marquis of Santa Lucia, president; the vice-president, Bartolo Masso; minister of war, Roloff; minister of treasury, Pinar; and all others are white.

Province of Santa Clara.

Maj.-Gen. Serafin Sanchez (white).....	2,000
Col. Roban (white).....	600
Col. Rego (white).....	1,200
Col. Cortesña (white).....	300
Col. Felipe Toledo (white).....	200
Col. Lino Perez (white).....	300
Lieut.-Col. Leon Cio Vedal (white).....	200
Lieut.-Col. Sixto Roque (white).....	200
Total.....	5,000

Province of Matanzas.

Maj.-Gen. Francisco Carillo (white).....	3,000
Brig.-Gen. Lacret (white).....	1,500
Gen. Pancho Perez (white).....	1,500
Col. Clotilde Garcia (black).....	400
Col. Joseph Roque (white).....	800
Col. Oulet (white).....	200
Col. Morijon (mulatto).....	200
Col. Demas Martinez (black).....	300
Col. (Alfred Godoy) "El Inglesito" (white).....	500
Col. Edward Garcia (white).....	400
Total.....	8,800

Habana Province.

Maj.-Gen. José Maria Aguirre (white).....	2,000
Gen. Rafael de Cardenas (white).....	2,500
Col. Juan Masso Parra (white).....	1,500
Col. Castillo (white).....	1,200
Col. Aranguerena (white).....	300
Maj. Villanueva (black).....	200
Col. Diaz Hernandez (white).....	200
Lieut.-Col. Corbo (white).....	60
Lieut.-Col. Palacios (black).....	200
Total.....	8,160

Pinar del Rio Province.

Maj.-Gen. Dionisio Gil (white).....	1,000
Gen. Perico Diaz (black).....	800
Col. Perico Delgado (white).....	600
Col. Rafael Socorro (white).....	200
Col. Frederico Alphonso (white) (recruits).....	62
Col. Olivia (white).....	300
Col. Miguel Laso (white).....	800
Col. Estaban Varona (white).....	1,500
Maj. Castillo (black).....	800
Total.	5,562

ARMIES OF INVASION.

General-in-chief Maximo Gomez (white).....	5,000
Lieut.-Gen. Antonio Maceo (mulatto).....	5,000
Brig.-Gen. Quinton Bandera (black).....	2,500
Brig.-Gen. José Miro (Spaniard, white).....	1,000
Brig.-Gen. Bruno Zayas (white).....	1,000
Gen. Estabo Tamayo (white).....	600
Col. Nunez (white).....	600
Col. Cayito Alvarez (white).....	400
Col. Roberto Bermudez (white).....	600
Total army invasion.....	16,700
Total army occupation.....	44,022
Total of all forces in arms.....	60,722

This is a table of officers commanding operating columns. Each of their separate columns is regularly offi-

cered, as in the United States army, the tables showing color and rank :

Officers.	No.	Color.			
		White.	Black.	Mulatto.	Indian
Generals	24	19	3	1	1
Colonels	34	27	5	2
Lieutenant-Colonels	4	3	1
Majors	2	1	1
Total	64	50	10	3	1

In ranks bearing arms, 40 per cent. black and 60 per cent. white.

So simple a matter as an official table showing the commerce of Spain with her colonies, is instructive :

COMMERCE OF SPAIN WITH HER COLONIES.

During 1894 :	Pesetas.*
Importations in Cuba from Spain.....	37,463,110
Exportation from Cuba to Spain.....	117,061,881
Difference in favor to export.....	79,598,771
Commerce with Porto Rico:	
Importation in the Island.....	21,580,125
Exportation from Spain.....	28,678,899
Difference in favor of export	7,098,774
Commerce with the Philippine Isles:	
Importations from the archipelago.....	1,994,838
Exportation from Spain.....	28,581,122
Difference in favor of export.....	10,586,284

The principal articles Cuba sends to Spain are:

Sugar, 12 millions pesetas; leaf tobacco, money in silver, cocoa, cigars, and cigarettes.

What Spain sends:

Cotton fabrics.....	21,000,000 pesetas.
Shoes.....	20,000,000 "
Wine.....	8,000,000 "
Oil, soap, oats, wheat, flour.....	3,000,000 "

* Twenty cents.

Preserved foods, candles, woolen goods, paper for cigarettes and wrapping, garbancos, sausage, and chocolate.

Porto Rico sends chiefly:

Coffee.....	12,000,000
Sugar.....	6,000,000
Tobacco.....	1,000,000

Spain to Porto Rico:

Fabrics.....	9,000,000
Shoes.....	3,500,000
Soap, candles, and oil.	

Constantly objections are urged to the release of Cuba from Spanish servitude, on the ground that the majority of the people are colored. The tables following give the conclusive answer to this line of observation :

SYNOPSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL CENSUSES OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA
FROM 1768 TO 1879.

Years.	Whites.	Colored Freedmen.	Colored Slaves.			Grand Total.
			Males.	Females.	Total.	
1768.....	109,415	22,740	45,000	27,000	72,000	204,155
1774.....	96,440	30,847	28,771	15,562	44,333	171,620
1787.....	96,610	29,217	32,800	17,540	50,340	176,167
1792.....	133,553	55,930	47,330	37,126	84,456	273,939
1804.....	234,000	60,000	75,000	63,000	138,000	432,000
1810.....	274,000	108,600	130,000	87,400	217,400	600,000
1817.....	276,689	119,221	137,115	102,579	239,694	635,604
1819.....	239,830	97,000	135,000	81,203	216,203	553,033
1825.....	325,000	100,000	170,000	120,000	290,000	715,000
1827.....	311,051	106,494	183,290	103,652	286,942	704,487
1830.....	332,352	113,125	208,120	102,098	310,218	755,695
1841.....	418,291	152,838	281,250	155,245	436,495	1,007,624
1846.....	425,769	149,226	201,011	122,748	323,759	898,754
1849.....	457,133	164,410	199,177	124,720	323,897	945,440
1850.....	479,490	171,733	200,000	122,519	322,519	973,742
1852.....	492,879	169,316	197,425	124,422	321,847	984,042
1855.....	498,752	185,444	222,400	137,589	359,989	1,044,185
1857.....	560,161	177,824	222,355	149,755	372,110	1,110,095
1859.....	589,777	175,274	220,999	143,254	364,253	1,129,304
1860.....	632,797	189,848	224,076	152,708	376,784	1,199,429
1862.....	793,484	232,433	218,722	151,831	370,553	1,396,470
1867.....	833,157	248,703	203,412	141,203	344,615	1,426,475
1869.....	797,596	238,927	217,300	145,988	363,288	1,399,811
1874.....	856,177	263,420	209,432	117,343	326,775	1,446,372
1877.....	963,175	272,478	112,192	86,902	199,094	1,434,747
1879.....	965,735	287,827	89,517	81,570	171,087	1,424,649

CENSUS OF CUBA, PUBLISHED DECEMBER 31, 1887.

Total population.....	1,631,687
Whites.....	1,111,303
Negroes.....	520,684

Provinces.	Whites.	Colored.	Total.	Per ct. of Col'd Race.
Havana.....	344,417	107,511	451,928	26
Pinar del Rio.....	167,160	58,731	225,891	26
Matanzas.....	143,169	116,401	259,578	45
Santa Clara.....	244,345	109,777	354,122	31
Puerto Principe.....	54,232	13,557	67,789	20
Santiago de Cuba.....	157,980	114,339	272,379	42
Totals.....	1,111,303	520,684	1,631,687	

Calculating as the average per cent. of colored, 21.

Provinces.	Inhabitants.	Square Kilometres.	Density.
Havana.....	451,928	8,610	52.49
Matanzas.....	259,578	8,486	30.59
Pinar del Rio.....	225,891	14,967	15.09
Puerto Principe.....	67,789	32,341	2.10
Santa Clara.....	354,122	23,083	15.34
Santiago de Cuba.....	272,379	35,119	7.75
Totals.....	1,631,687	122,606	13.31

The papers following have a vigor and accuracy of application that is acceptable in confirmation of their authenticity :

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF CUBA.

[Received by the Junta in New York from Señor Salvador Cisneros,
President of the Republic of Cuba.]

Nothing is more difficult at the outset of an enterprise than to maintain it uniformly deserving the world's approval. The people of Cuba are now face to

face with such a difficulty. They were born under the rule of a nation universally regarded as tyrannical and ambitious. They have never learned the lesson of governing themselves. Now, in their struggle for independence, they have not only to maintain the stress of warfare, but also to learn how to govern themselves. Being a people of advanced ideas, they naturally desire a democratic government, created of the people, by the people, and for the people. The people are the only rulers. Their wishes are above those of the men composing the government, and the latter must obey the constitution adopted by the assembly of representatives.

Those who now form the provisional government of the new republic, actuated by true patriotism, accept this obligation. They know that to establish a nation worthy of this age, and worthy of the heroic struggle of 1868, the people must be the only sovereign, and that such is the desire of all Cubans. For this reason, the provisional government, obedient to the constitution, and actuated by the exactions of common humanity, is compelled to permit a few exceptions to our last orders, which exceptions we shall now explain, in order that our countrymen, our enemies, and the world at large may know the honesty of our course.

The revolution, as is the case with all revolutions arising from popular indignation, had at its inception no other rulers than those dictated by the few military chiefs then in arms. A uniform method of procedure was impossible, on account of the different lines of action adopted by each province in rebellion. Among the dispensations of some of these chiefs are the special permissions they gave to a few sugar planters to con-

tinue grinding this year. To-day the revolution and its government permits no planters to grind, but they respect the dispensation above referred to, in accordance with Article 21 of our Constitution, which reads, "All the debts and promises of the military chiefs, from the beginning of this war to the time in which this Constitution is adopted, shall be respected as laws by the provisional government."

The government obeys the constitution, and this, then, is the only reason why some sugar estates are allowed to work during the present season; the permission is not, as our enemies say, the result of force of arms. The proprietors of these exempted estates have paid war contributions to our military chiefs, and upon no other estates is work possible.

In the beginning, when the revolution had no other government than that of the military chiefs, the commander-in-chief prohibited the importation of food by towns occupied by the enemy. Now the provisional government, considering that families of non-combatants might become the victims of such a measure, has abolished it, and we allow the entrance into Spanish towns of some articles of commerce upon payment of an import duty.

Another measure adopted at the beginning of the revolution, and now accepted by us, is that permitting the burning of buildings used by the enemy as forts. It is false that we are inspired in this by personal feelings of revenge, as the Spanish government says we are. It is only a war measure. We are uniformly humane. We set Spanish prisoners free, and despite the sanguinary conduct of the enemy toward peaceful people and Cuban prisoners, we shall not retaliate.

Nor do we accept bandits in our ranks. Those bands which were in existence before the revolution began, and came to us volunteering to fight for Cuban liberty, we have accepted, and will permit to remain with us as long as their conduct is honorable. Others, who intended to dishonor the name of Cuba's soldiery, were promptly punished. There are no bandits to-day in the Cuban camps, as there were in Cuba in the days of Spanish rule.

To be known, therefore, to all Cubans, to the enemy, and to the world at large, that a few sugar estates are grinding their crop at present, because we respect their contracts with our military chiefs, and because they pay us high taxes. Thus we prove our strength, and if unhappily, our forces, to-day victorious, should ultimately be vanquished, we shall have the courage to destroy all sugar estates rather than permit the continuance of Spanish tyranny in Cuba. Let Cuba perish if she cannot obtain her independence.

SALVADOR CISNEROS,
President of the Republic

Ciego de Najasa, January, 1896.

LETTER FROM GOMEZ.

[Received by the Cuban Delegate in New York.]

SAGUA, March 19, 1896.

THOMAS ESTRADA PALMA, Delegate of the Cuban Republic.

Dear Friend: The war continues more active and hard, on account of the fierce character which General Weyler has given to it. Our wounded are followed, and assassinated cruelly; he who has the misfortune to

fall into the hands of the Spanish troops perishes without fail. The peaceful country people only find death and dishonor. Cuba to-day, as in 1868, only presents pools of blood dried by conflagrations. Our enemies are burning the houses to deprive us, according to them, of our quarters for spring. We will never use reprisals, for we understand that the revolution will never need to triumph by being cruel and sanguinary. We will go on with this war, the ultimate result of which you need not worry about, with success for the arms of the republic. We fight when convenient to us against an enemy tired out and without faith.

My plans are well understood by my subordinates, and each one knows what to do. Give us cartridges, so that our soldiers can fight, and you can depend that in the spring campaign the enemy's army will be greatly reduced, and it will be necessary for Spain to send another army, and I do not know whether it would be rash to say that perhaps Spain has not the money with which to do it. We have a great military advantage over the enemy in the incapacity of the majority of Weyler's generals. The false official reports of supposed victories with which they cynically pretend to deceive themselves, their government and the world, contribute to the speedy triumph of the revolution. No human work, which has for a base falseness and infamy, can be either firm or lasting. Everything that Spain orders and sends to this land, that she has drenched with the blood of her own children, serves only to ruin her power. And no man so well chosen as General Weyler to represent, in these times and in America, the Spain of Philip II.

Much has been said and written about the recogni-

tion of belligerency by the American government ; this would be very advantageous to us, and is only justice, but, as when we rose against tyranny, we only counted on the strength of our arms and the firm resolution of victory, we follow our march unconcerned, satisfied that what is to happen will happen.

Your friend,

MAXIMO GOMEZ.

A DESPATCH FROM MACEO.

IN CAMP IN CUZCO HILLS, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE,
Cuba, April 14, 1896.

W. R. HEARST, *Journal*, New York :

Responding to the request of your correspondent, I have to say that I consider the battle of last Saturday, when my troops put to flight the Alfonso XIII. battalion, the most important accomplishment of the Cuban army during the war, because it taught the men confidence in themselves, and also because it gave the Spanish to understand that they have no contemptible foe to deal with. The route of that battalion will make cowards of the common Spanish soldiers who may be sent to fight us in the future. Since the battle my soldiers have been filled with desire to meet the men on trocha in combat. I can hardly restrain them, and I feel satisfied that if it was my policy to attack the trocha at this time, the Spanish army would be cut to pieces.

Nothing that I could say about the kindness of the American papers, especially the *Journal*, in the cause of Cuban liberty could adequately express the gratitude.

that fills my heart and the heart of every true Cuban. You have armed the weak, and made us strong to go on to victory. Freedom for Cuba was never closer to realization than it is now. Your correspondent informs me that doubts have been upon the victory at Pinar del Rio. Let me assure the Americans that we struck that city a heavy blow, putting the troops to flight, burning many houses, and capturing enough arms to place weapons in the hands of many of my men who had none before.

(Signed) ANTONIO MACEO.

Captain-General Weyler's idea of the limitation of the liberty of the press, according to his latest order on the subject, will interest the foreign newspapers, for journalism has become so expansive that in war time, in any part of the world hereafter, it is likely to strike a great deal of disputed territory.

DECREE.

Don Valeriano Weyler y Nicolau, Marquis of Tene-rife, governor-general, captain-general of the Island of Cuba, and general-in-chief of this army.

Under the authority of the law of public order, dated the 23rd of April, 1870.

I Order and Command,

1st. No newspaper shall publish any news concerning the war which is not authorized by the staff of officers.

2nd. Neither shall be published any telegraphic communications of a political character without the authority given by the secretary of the governor-general in

Havana, or by the civil governors in the other provinces.

3rd. It is hereby forbidden to publish any editorials, or other articles or illustrations, which may directly or indirectly tend to lessen the prestige of the mother-country, the army, or the authorities, or to exaggerate the forces and the importance of the insurrection, or in any way to favor the latter, or to cause unfounded alarm, or excite the feelings of the people.

4th. The infractions of this decree, not included in Articles first and sixth of the decree of February 16th last, will make the offenders liable to the penalties named in Article 36, of the law of the 23rd of April, 1870.

5th. All persons referred to in Article 14 of the Penal Code of the Peninsula, which is in force in this Island, will be held responsible for said infractions in the same order as established by the said Article.

6th. Whenever a newspaper has twice incurred the penalty of said offense, and shall give cause for a third penalty, it may then be suppressed.

7th. The civil governors are in charge of the fulfillment of this decree, and against their resolutions, which must be always well founded, the interested parties may appeal within the twenty-four hours following their notification.

VALERIANO WEYLER.

Havana, April 27, 1896.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

NATURAL RICHES AND NATIVE CHARMS OF CUBA.

The Cultivation of Sugar Cane—Picture of a Cuban Garden—The Southern Cross—Cuba as Eden—Sugar Making—Tobacco Raising—The Forests and Fruits—Beauty of the Nights—Cuba Compared with New York—The Precious Woods—Mountains and Rivers—Solid Encyclopædical Information—The Cry of a Poor Man.


THE cultivation of sugar cane has been the most interesting, because peculiar and important, of the industries of the Island, and there is a most pleasing account of it in "Cuba Past and Present," written by Maturin Ballou, in 1885, when cane culture was in its glory, midway between the two wars, and this picture is from his gallery.

"Sugar cane is cultivated like Indian corn, which it also resembles in appearance. It is first planted in rows, not in hills, and must be hoed and weeded until it gets high enough to shade its roots. Then it may be left to itself until it reaches maturity. This refers to the first laying out of a plantation, which will afterwards continue fruitful for years, by very simple processes of renewal. When thoroughly ripe, the cane is of a light golden yellow, streaked here and there with red. The top is dark green, with long, narrow leaves depending, very much like those of the corn stalk, from the centre of which shoots upward a silvery stem, a couple of feet in height, and from its tip grows a white fringed plume of a delicate lilac hue. The effect of a

large field at its maturity, lying under a torrid sun, and gently yielding to the breeze, is very fine, a picture to live in the memory ever after.

“In the competition between the products of beet-root sugar and that from sugar cane, the former controls the market, because it can be produced at a cheaper rate, besides which its production is stimulated by nearly all of the European states, through the means of liberal subsidies both to the farmer and to the manufacturer. Beet sugar, however, does not possess so high a percentage of true saccharine matter as the product of the cane, the latter seeming to be nature’s most direct mode of supplying us with the article. The Cuban planters have one advantage over all other sugar cane producing countries, in the great and inexhaustible fertility of the soil of the Island. For instance, one to two hogsheads of sugar to the acre is considered a good yield in Jamaica, but in Cuba three hogsheads are the average. Fertilizing of any sort is rarely employed in the cane-fields, while in beet-farming it is the principal agent of success. Though the modern machinery, as lately adopted on the plantations, is very expensive, still the result achieved by it is so much superior to that of the old methods of manufacture, that the small planters are being driven from the market. Slave labor cannot compete with machinery. The low price of sugar renders economy imperative in all branches of the business, in order to leave a margin for profit.

“A planter informed the author that he should spread all of his molasses upon the cane fields this year as a fertilizer, rather than send it to a distant market and receive only what it cost. He further said that thousands of acres of sugar cane would be allowed to rot in the



THE PRESIDENT AND CABINET OF THE CUBAN REPUBLIC.


SALVADOR CISNEROS,
President.

SANTIAGO G. CANIZARES
Interior.

RAFAEL PORTUONDO

SEVERO PINA,
Agriculture.

MARIO G. MENOCAL,
War.



fields this season, as it would cost more to cut, grind, pack, and send it to market than could be realized for the manufactured article. Had the price of sugar remained this year at a figure which would afford the planters a fair profit, it might have been the means of tiding over the chasm of bankruptcy, which has long stared them in the face, and upon the brink of which they now stand. But with a more than average crop, both as to quantity and quality, whether to gather it or not is a problem. Under these circumstances it is difficult to say what is to become, financially, of the people of Cuba. Sugar is their great staple, but all business has been equally suppressed upon the Island, under the bane of civil wars, extortionate taxation, and oppressive rule.

“The sugar cane yields but one crop a year. There are several varieties, but the Otaheitan seems to be the most generally cultivated. Between the time when enough of the cane is ripe to warrant the getting-up of steam at the grinding-mill, and the time when the heat and the rain spoil its qualities, all the sugar for the season must be made ; hence the necessity for great industry on the large estates. In Louisiana the grinding lasts but about eight weeks. In Cuba it continues four months. In analyzing the sugar produced on the Island, and comparing it with that of the mainland—the growth of Louisiana—chemists could find no difference as to the quality of the true saccharine principle contained in each.”

The delightful volume of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., author of “Two Years Before the Mast,” on his vacation voyage to Cuba and back, gives an account of sugar making, that belongs with the cane cultivation, and Mr.

Dana's book has an imperishable beauty becoming the enchantment the Island weaves about the visitors who travel from climes of snow to climes of sun. Here is a picture of a Cuban garden, that will linger in the memory, like the balm of a breeze from the sea of the Caribs, or the flavor of fruit, surely the same grown in Eden, for the original Paradise must have been far in the Southland.

"The garden contained a remarkable variety of trees, including some thrifty exotics. Here the mango, with its peach-like foliage, was bending on the ground with the weight of its ripening fruit; the alligator-pear was marvelously beautiful in its full blossom, suggesting, in form of color, the passion-flower; the soft, delicate foliage of the tamarind was like our sensitive plant; the banana trees were in full bearing, the deep green fruit (it is ripened and turns yellow off the tree), being in clusters of a hundred, more or less, tipped at the same time by a single, pendent, glutinous bud, nearly as large as a pineapple. The date palm, so suggestive of the far east, and the only one we had seen in Cuba, was represented by a choice specimen, imported in its youth. There was also the star-apple tree, remarkable for its uniform and graceful shape, full of the green fruit, with here and there a ripening specimen; so also, was the favorite zapota its rusty-coated fruit hanging in tempting abundance. From low, broad-spreading trees depended the grape fruit, as large as an infant's head and yellow as gold, while the orange, lime and lemon trees, bearing blossoms, green and ripe fruit all together, met the eye at every turn, and filled the garden with fragrance. The cocoanut palm, with its tall, straight stem and clustering fruit, dominated all the rest. Guava,

fig, custard apple, and bread-fruit trees, all were in bearing.

“Our hospitable host plucked freely of the choicest for the benefit of his chance visitors. Was there ever such a fruit garden before, or elsewhere? It told of fertility of soil and deliciousness of climate, of care, judgment, and liberal expenditure, all of which combined had turned these half a dozen acres of land into a Gan Eden. Through this orchard of Hesperides, we were accompanied also by the proprietor's two lovely children, under nine years of age, with such wealth of promise in their large black eyes and sweet faces as to fix them on our memory with photographic fidelity. Before leaving the garden we returned with our intelligent host once more to examine his beautiful specimens of bananas, which, with its sister fruit, the plantain, forms so important a staple of fruit in Cuba and throughout all tropical regions. It seems that the female banana tree bears more fruit than the male, but not so large. The average clusters of the former comprise here about one hundred, but the latter rarely bears over sixty or seventy distinct specimens of the cucumber-shaped product. From the centre of its large, broad leaves, which gather at the top, when it has reached the height of twelve or fifteen feet, there springs forth a large purple bud ten inches long, shaped like a huge acorn, though more pointed. This cone hangs suspended from a strong stem, upon which a leaf unfolds, displaying a cluster of young fruit. As soon as these are large enough to support the heat of the sun and the chill of the rain, this sheltering leaf drops off, and another unfolds, exposing its little brood of fruit; and so the process goes on until six or eight rings of

young bananas are started, forming, as we have said, bunches numbering from seventy to a hundred. The banana is a herbaceous plant, and after fruiting, its top dies ; but it annually sprouts up again fresh from the roots. From the unripe fruit, dried in the sun, a palatable and nutritious flour is made."

This from Ballou is something to dream of : " Nowhere on the face of the globe would well-directed, intelligent labor meet with a richer reward, nowhere would repose from labor be so sweet. The hour of rest here sinks upon the face of nature with a peculiar charm ; the night breeze, in never failing regularity, comes with its gentle wing to fan the weary frame, and no danger lurks in its breath. It has free scope through the unglazed windows, and blowing fresh from the broad surface of the Mexican Gulf, it bears a goodly tonic to the system. Beautifully blue are the heavens and festally bright the stars of a tropical night, where familiar constellations greet us with brighter radiance and new ones charm the eye with their novelty. Pre-eminent in brilliancy among them is the Southern Cross, a galaxy of stars that never greets us in the North. At midnight its glittering framework stands erect. That solemn hour past, the cross declines. How glorious the night where such a heavenly sentinel indicates the watches ! ' How often have we heard our guides exclaim in the savannas of Venezuela,' says Humboldt, ' or in the deserts extending from Lima to Truxill, " Midnight is past, the cross begins to bend." ' Cuba is, indeed, a land of enchantment, where nature is beautiful and bountiful, and where mere existence is a luxury, but it requires the infusion of a sterner, a more self-reliant, self-denying and enterprising race to test

its capabilities and to astonish the world with its productiveness."

It is likely to occur to the race the people of the tropics call Yankees, that to occupy and possess the prodigal resources and the exceeding loveliness of Cuba, is the one peculiar luxuriance and delight the Americans of the great republic require for its symmetry and adornment, and to round out our commerce with the products of the torrid zone.

The poetry of Cuba, though the form is prose, is in "Gan-Eden; or, Pictures of Cuba."*

The "Eden" is, in great part, yet a wilderness; its natural resources and native beauties yet untraveled.

"Less than one-third," says the author, who denies us the pleasure of her name, "of the land in Cuba is being under cultivation; large regions are as little known as the interior of Asia. From every height which the traveler attains, he may descry a horizon teeming with wonder and with fancy, out of the ignorance and silence of whose purple mystery no voice has come these hundred years. There are forests—the refuge of the wild dog and the wilder man, the fierce Maroon, the black pioneer of doom, haunting the outskirts of a tyrannous civilization. There are mountains, unmeasured and ungauged, couching, it may be, above treasures which the vengeful Cemís hid from the greedy murderers of his mild worshippers. Much of the inhabited interior, too, is as little visited as the western slopes of the southern Alleghanies. The primitive method of traveling, and the antique hospitality of the rural re-

* "Gan-Eden; or, Pictures of Cuba." Boston: Published by John P. Jewett & Co.; Cleveland, Ohio: Jewett, Proctor & Worthington; New York: Sheldon, Lamport & Blakeman, 1854.

gions, throw a charm of mediæval unreality over scenes that may be really explored.

“The magnificent vale of Mariel, fair as those outer realms of Paradise over which the eyes of Adam ranged from his ‘heaven-kissing verdurous walls;’ the romantic cliffs that mirror their wealth of flowers in the green glistening waters of the winding Canimar; the mighty steeps of the Loma de Indra, from whose heights the view sweeps to either ocean, and away to the dim blue hills of Jamaica; the endless, fragrant, palm-studded solitudes of the southwest; the picturesque ravines of the northeast, where young girls may be seen riding on the backs of oxen; the subterranean streams gushing suddenly into the moonlight from the blackness of the *sumideros*, or caverns, which honeycomb the surface of the Island; the hundred sequestered nooks, where still the *guagire* chants his rude improvisations, melodious and full of meaning as the cries of a bellman, or the songs of a gondolier, and charms, in the skilful gymnastics of the *zapateado*, groups of soft-eyed girls, graceful as the palm-trees arching overhead; all these you reach over roads that transport you to the Middle Ages.

“The great sugar estates lie in the *Vueltra Arriba*, the ‘upper districts,’ the region of the famous ‘red earth.’ The face of this region smiles with prosperity. In every direction the traveler rides astonished through a garden of plenty, equally impressed by the magnificent extent, and the profuse fertility of the estates, whose palm avenues, plantain orchards and cane fields, succeed each other in almost unbroken succession. So productive are the estates, and so steady is the demand for the planter’s crop, that the great sugar planters are,

in truth, princes of agriculture. Cholera, sweeping away troops of his slaves, the match of an envious, or the cigar of a careless montero kindling a flame that nothing can arrest, are alike powerless to interrupt seriously the prosperous career of an intelligent and enterprising hacendado.

"The ruinous practice of absenteeism, which prepared for the Brithish West Indies that sudden ruin, so often and so unjustly charged upon emancipation, is comparatively unknown in Cuba.

"The proprietors generally pass a part of the year on their estates. The master's eye keeps watch over those admirable arrangements and tasteful decorations, which make a great sugar estate so delightful to the stranger. Particularly beautiful are the estates to which a cafetal is attached. The coffee culture was introduced by the French refugees from Hayti, men of taste and refinement, who, in laying out the grounds of their new homes, took thought for the beautiful as well as for the useful. The Spaniards generally (Garcilaso to the contrary notwithstanding), seem to have done but little for the advance of landscape gardening, and the glorious opportunities offered by Cuba to the art have been little improved excepting in the cafetals. Although Brazil has quite broken down the Cuban coffee trade, these coffee estates are still numerous in the Vueltra Arriba, where they are kept up on the French models, chiefly as ornaments to the sugar estates, vegetable farms, and homes for the younger or the decrepit negroes.

"The imposing scale of the operations on a great ingenio, imparts a character of barbaric regal state to the life one leads there. The baracoon becomes a town,

the planter a feudal lord, administering hospitalities as lavish as the bounty of the climate and the soil. Living in such a region, one soon enters into the spirit of that eastern munificence and profusion which disdain limits and calculations. The singular number falls into disrepute. A kind of gorgeous superfluity seems only fit and becoming. Your thought is all 'of African and golden joys.' The luxurious seductions of the land persuade you into a charity towards men so superbly tempted.

"Looking at them simply as an entertainment, the mills of these great sugar estates are not incongruous with the easy delight of the place. Everything is open and airy, and the processes of the beautiful steam machinery go on without the odors as without the noises that make most manufactories odious. In the centrifugal process of sugar making, the molasses passes into a large vat, by the side of which is a row of double cylinders, the outer one of solid metal, the inner of wire gauze. These cylinders revolve each on an axis attached by a horizontal wheel and band to a shaft which communicates with the central engine. The molasses is ladled out into the spaces between the external and internal cylinders, and the axes are set in motion at the rate of nineteen hundred revolutions a minute. For three minutes you see only a white indistinct whirling, then the motion is arrested; slowly and more slowly the cylinders revolve, then stop, and behold! the whole inner surface of the inner cylinder is covered with beautiful crystallizations of a light yellow sugar. Watching this ingenious process, I used to fancy that somewhat in this wise, might the nebulae of space be slowly fashioning into worlds.

"But the cafetal is after all the great charm of these

northern ingenios. One of the loveliest in the island, I spent a season, the brevity of which I shall always regret. Early in the inspiring morning, my friend Don used to summon me for a drive. A dozen negroes would appear to harness one little lively horse into a light American wagon, bought by my friend for the purpose of driving over the thirteen miles of sugar and coffee estates, on which he has made good, broad roads. A whole pack of dogs started off before us, yelping, leaping and darting in all directions, and then we dashed away at a brisk pace, through the seemingly endless cane fields. The heavy dew, glittering on the waves of green, gave them a soft brilliancy; the cloudless skies, the buoyant air, beguiled the way, till we drove into the cool shades of the plantaneria, or plantain grove, the unfailing adjunct of all estates in this land, where plantain and pork are as much the staff of life to the montero and the negro, as are beef and water to the guacho or bacon and greens to the Virginian. The plantain tree, though by no means lofty or imposing—looking, indeed, more like a seedy cabbage with long leaves or an overgrown flag than like a tree—still reaches the height of twenty feet or more, and its heavy, dark green leaves nodding over the ruddy ground, make a delightful shade, a sort of cool baptistery, from which you pass into the statelier sanctuaries of the cafetal.

“There the full-leafed orange, thrifty, dark, glossy foliage of the mango, the tall elm-like aguacate, the cone-shaped mamey, cover the land on both sides as far as the eye can reach. Everywhere you see the light, shrubby outlines of the coffee plant springing up beneath the taller trees. Avenues, miles in length, lead to the different quarters of the estate, and formed, as they are,

of the full exuberant mango, or the branching aguacate, planted alternately with the towering royal palm, become forest aisles of surpassing beauty. The height of the palms is immense, many of them rising more than a hundred and twenty feet in the air. Overtopping thus the other trees, their sweeping noble arches do not exclude the sunlight, which pours through the intervals as through the windows of a cathedral, and illuminates the green solemnity of the majestic colonnades.

"The cottage of the cafetal was an elegantly proportioned little tropical mansion, cool, dark, floored with marble, wainscoted, and furnished with rich, deep-hued Indian woods. A garden, filled with heavy blooms of jasmine and roses, and the gorgeous purple Carolina, and a hundred drooping, odorous flowers, made the air faint with fragrance. A dense grove of orange trees near-by was lighted up through all its recesses by the glowing fruit. Oranges lay all about on the bright red earth, little naked negroes kicking aside, and satiated pigs disdainfully neglecting great luscious fruit, which the North would pile with pride upon salvers of silver and porcelain. Whenever we rode over to the cafetal, we always found lying on the marble tables of the saloon a heap of these superb oranges, with the morning still in their fragrance, or a huge golden pineapple. Pineapples, like poets, appear to the best advantage at home. The ripe orange from the tree has a delicate atmosphere of its own, but in substance is hardly better than a well-ripened orange from the fruiterer's shop.

"The 'lush banana' is never allowed to ripen on the tree, as it falls out of its sheltering purple glove immediately on coming to maturity.

“I have spoken of the exceeding beauty of the Cuban nights, and of the golden moon, which pours over the tropical landscape a flood of luxurious splendor, quite unimaginable by those who have but watched her climb the northern sky with a wan face, and with sad steps. Beneath the moon, too, and the stars, the night glances with living meteors. The cucullos are indeed inconceivably brilliant. ‘Watchmen of the insects,’ a lovely, quick-witted boy of four summers, the child of one of my friends, called these torchbearers when he first saw them; and flying in long lines, with their double lights, they do produce an effect similar to that of the long processions of the watch at Havana.

“The light of the cucullo is really strong enough to serve as a candle. It is also very delicate, a fine green luminousness, precisely like the effulgence which emeralds shed upon a lovely neck. But the emeralds of inca or sultan may soon be counted, and these glories are showered indifferently into the verandah of the noble and the baracon of the slave. Children delight in them, keeping them shut up by forties and fifties in little cages of reeds. They are carefully washed at morning and night, and fed with sugar-cane (if fed with sugar the saccharine particles adhere to their legs, and they fall upon each other like Kilkenney cats), and in this way may be kept alive and shining for many days. They have been carried thus to New York, and set free in New York, to the great wonderment of the Gothamites. The nature of their light I do not know. But all the under part of the body is transparent, and the light appears to be under the cucullo’s control, flashing and failing like the bottled up auroras of Prof L— at Cambridge. The calm eter-

nal stars look hardly more divine than these mortal stars; that seem to cheat us poor moths out of our

“ Devotion to something afar
From the sphere of our sorrow.”

As a money winner the Cuban tobacco ranks next to sugar, and is famous throughout the world. Up to the year 1791 the “ Commercial Company of Havana ” delivered the tobacco of Cuba to the royal factories in Spain under contracts which were renewed from time to time with the government. The establishment of a government “ *Factoria de Tobacco* ” in Havana succeeded that company. The tobacco was classified as superior, medium, and inferior, and was received from the growers at fixed prices ; in 1804 these were six, five, and two and a half dollars per arrobe [A Spanish unit of weight nominally a fourth part of a hundred weight, but with local variations from 25 to 32 pounds avoirdupois.] (\$24, \$20, and \$10 per quintal) respectively.

“ By comparing the different prices with the quantity of each class of tobacco produced, we find that the ‘ *Factoria* ’ paid an average price of \$16 per quintal for the leaf tobacco. With the expense of manufacture, the cigars cost the government seventy-five cents per pound ; snuff, fine grain and good color, 42¾ cents, and common soft, or Seville, 18¾ cents a pound, in Havana. In good years, when the crop (the product of advances made by the ‘ *Factoria* ’ to poor cultivators) amounted to 350,000 arrobes of leaf, 128,000 arrobes were manufactured for Spain, 80,000 for Havana, 9,200 for Peru, 6,000 for Buenos Ayres, 2,240 for Mexico, and 1,100 for Caracas and Campeachy.

“In order to make up the amount of 315,000 arrobes (for the crop loses ten per cent. of its weight, in loss and damage in the transportation and manufacture) we must suppose that 80,000 arrobes were consumed in the interior of the Island; that is, in the country, where the royal monopoly did not extend. The maintenance of 120 slaves and the expenses of manufacture did not exceed \$12,000 yearly; but the salaries of the officers of the ‘Factoria’ amounted to \$541,000. The value of the 128,000 arrobes of tobacco sent to Spain, in the abundant years, either in cigars, leaf or snuff, at the customary prices there, exceeded the sum of five million dollars.

“It is surprising to see in the returns of exports from Havana (documents published by the Consulado) that the exports for 1816 were only 3,400 arrobes; for the year 1823, only 13,900 arrobes of leaf tobacco and 71,000 pounds of sugar, the value of which was estimated by the custom house at \$281,000; and in 1825 only 70,302 pounds of cigars and 167,100 pounds of leaf tobacco and strips; but we must remember that no branch of the contraband trade is more active than that in cigars. The tobacco of the *Vuelta de Abajo* is more celebrated, but large quantities are exported which are produced in the eastern part of the Island. The cultivation of tobacco has been one of the most uncertain branches of industry in Cuba. Trammeled by restrictions and exactions, it was confined almost entirely to the poorer classes of the population, who were enabled to raise a scanty and uncertain crop through the advances of capital made them by the ‘Factoria.’ After the suppression of this monopoly, it has had to contend with the more popular and profitable pursuits of coffee

and sugar planting, which have successfully competed with it for the employment of the skill, capital, and labor of the Island."

The Vuelta de Abajo owes its fine and universally esteemed quality of tobacco probably as much to the physical formation of the country as to any peculiar quality of its soil. Along the northern border of the district, where the best tobacco is grown, lies the high Sierra de los Organos, gathering, in rains upon its northern slopes, the moisture borne landward by the constantly prevailing trade winds, and this, with the effect of the surrounding heated waters of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico, give to the region south of this ridge a character of climate peculiarly its own. It is in this region that Maceo's raids have been so ruinous to the industry.

The hurricanes of Cuba can hardly be regarded as a resource or beauty, and they are not attractive, and picturesque is hardly the word. They received scant attention from Humboldt, who visited the Island in the beginning of the present century, since which only two hurricanes have been experienced there. The first of these occurred on the 4th and 5th of October, 1844. It began about ten o'clock on the evening of the 4th, and continued with great violence until daylight, when the point of greatest descent of the barometer, 28.27, was observed. From that time it subsided, and the torrents of rain began to cease, but the wind continued to blow with great violence until 10 A.M. This storm passed over all the zone of the country comprised between Bahia Honda and Sierra Morena on the north, and Galafre and Cienfuegos on the south side of Cuba. One hundred and fifty-eight vessels were wrecked in

the harbors and on the coasts, and one hundred and one lives were lost.

The crops suffered severely, and 2,546 houses were destroyed. The second hurricane occurred in the following year, and was more destructive than the preceding one. It began about midnight of the 10th of October, and increased in violence, with torrents of rain and spray, until 10:30 A.M. of the 11th, when the barometer had fallen to 27.06, the lowest point it has ever been known to touch in Cuba. Its ravages extended over nearly the same extent of country with that of 1844, but its greatest violence was confined to a circle of about 40 miles radius round Havana. Two hundred and twenty-six vessels were lost, 1,872 houses were blown down, 5,051 partially destroyed, and 114 persons perished.

During both of these hurricanes the wind veered to every point of the compass, and the salt spray was carried fifteen or twenty miles inland, blackening vegetation as though fire had passed over it.

The American Encyclopædia gives these figures of the extent of the Island: "The greatest length of the Island, measured through the centre, is given by different authorities from 750 to 793 English miles; the greatest width, 50 miles west of Santiago, is about 127 miles; from Havana to the southern coast at Batabano, it is only about 28 miles across the Island. The area of the Island has been variously estimated. In 1825 it was computed by Señor Bauza, at the request of Humboldt, and found to be 3,681 square maritime leagues of 20 to the degree. This included the Isle of Pines, on the southern coast, the area of which is 98 leagues. The latest estimates of the area, converted into English stat-

ute miles, are from 42,383 to 45,277. The Isle of Pines contains besides 810 square miles, and other small islands, 970, making that of the whole territory belonging to Cuba from 44,163 to 47,057 square miles. The length of shore line on the south side is 301 leagues, and on the north, 272 leagues; that of the whole Island may be called about 2,000 English miles."

It will be observed that in dimensions Cuba closely corresponds with the state of New York. The difficulty of soldiering in this country appears in this outline sketch of the swamps and their relations to the mountains and the sea. For the most part low tracts intervene between the central elevations and the shore on either side; and in the wet season these are inundated, and rendered almost impassable by the depth of water and the tenacity of the deep black mud. From Jagua to Point Sabina on the south side, the country is a continuous swamp for 46 leagues, and the same may be said of many other less extensive tracts on the north side.

There are limestone formations in the Island, cavernous like that of such mammoth cave celebrity in Kentucky, and, that nothing may be lacking, there are true marbles and petroleum springs. Once—from 1724 to 1795—Havana was the port where the ships of Spain were built—114 vessels of 4,902 guns were constructed there—but this was stopped on the complaint that Spain must build ships at home. Cuba had too many facilities for the work to be allowed to carry it on.

On all the coasts of Cuba, but principally on the northern, are found immense deposits of salt.

The astonishing value of Cuban wood was one of the things that were discovered by Columbus. Among the woods are the *lignum vitæ*; the cocoa wood or *cocus*,

which somewhat resembles the *lignum vitæ*, and is used for similar purposes, as also for pins, and tree nails, and for turnery, making excellent flutes ; the lance wood, largely exported for carriage shafts, surveyors' instruments, and other uses. Mahogany is so abundant, and the quality of the wood is so superior, that it has been, since its first use in London, in 1724, an important item in the exports of the Island. Belonging to the same natural order is the *cedrela odorata* of Linnæus, and there much used, as also in the United States, for the inside of drawers and wardrobes. It is the material of the cigar boxes.

Humboldt, citing the several species of palm, of which he enumerates five, remarks that " we might believe that the entire island was originally a forest of palms and wild lime and orange trees." These last, which have a small fruit, are probably anterior to the arrival of the Europeans, who carried there the *agrumi* of the gardens, which rarely exceed ten or fifteen feet in height.

There was but little gold found in Cuba, but, what was much better, a great deal of coal. Cuba has but one peculiar animal, and it resembles a big rat. There is also a big snake, quite harmless, and one, not so big, that is venomous, but not numerous or deadly.

There are 200 species of indigenous birds, many of them very brilliant. The fish are abundant, and rival the birds in beauty. The oysters are delicious, and the turtles crawl abundantly over the coral islands. The forests and fruits are thus treated by the *Encyclopædia Britannica* :

"The forests of Cuba are of vast extent, and so dense as to be almost impenetrable. It is estimated that of

nearly 20,000,000 acres of land still remaining perfectly wild and uncultivated, nearly 13,000,000 are uncleared forests. Mahogany and other hard woods, such as the Cuban ebony, cedar, sabicei and granadilla, valuable for manufactures, cabinet work and ship building, are indigenous, and are exported to a considerable extent. The palm is the queen of the Cuban forests, and the most valuable tree on the Island. The most common species, the Palma Real (*Oreodoxo regia*), is found in all parts, but especially in the west. The fruits of Cuba are those common to the tropics, of which the pineapple and orange are the most esteemed. Of the alimentary plants, the plaintain is by far the most important."

And we quote the same authority on sugar, coffee and tobacco :

"The United States take about 70 or 80 per cent. of the sugar grown in Cuba, the greater part of the remainder passing to Europe. The quantity exported in 1873 from the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sagua la Grande, Remedios, Nuevitas, Santiago de Cuba, Trinidad and Cienfuegos exceeded 600,000 tons, of a value of about £12,000,000. Besides this, 242,000 tons of molasses were exported. After the 'ingenios' the 'cafetales' or coffee estates are the most important establishments. They vary in extent from 100 to upwards of 1,000 acres, or even more in the mountain districts, the number of hands employed being as high as 100 in the low country, but generally averaging fifty or sixty negroes to 1,000 acres. The first coffee plantation was established in 1748, the seeds having been brought from San Domingo. Though at one time coffee was sent out from Cuba in enormous quantities,

it does not now figure largely in the exports. Tobacco is indigenous to Cuba, and its excellent quality is celebrated in all parts of the world. The estates devoted to its cultivation are scattered over the greater part of the Island, but the finest qualities of tobacco are those grown in the country west of Havana, known as the 'Vuelta Abajo.' In 1873, 224,765,000 cigars were exported, besides nearly 13,500,000 lbs. of leaf.

"The backward state of education is one of the grievances of the Cubans.

"The Roman Catholic is the only one religion tolerated by the government. At first there was but one diocese, which included not only the whole Island, but also Louisiana and the two Floridas, all under one bishop. In 1788 Cuba was divided into two dioceses, each embracing half the Island. The eastern diocese, or that of Santiago de Cuba, was, in 1804, erected into an archbishopric, while that of Havana still remains under a bishop.

"The crown revenues of the Island are the *rentas-maritimas*, including duties on imports, exports and tonnage, and the local or municipal duties levied at some of the custom houses; the *impuestas interiores*, including the tax on home manufactures, the sale of stamped paper, the profits derived from the lottery, and the impost on cock-fights; deductions from the *rentas-ecclesiasticas*, particularly those called the royal ninths and the consolidated funds, the sinking fund, the *media annata*, and the annual and monthly revenues of the clergy; personal deductions, such as from the pay of public functionaries, and the price of exemption from military service; miscellaneous receipts, as the produce of the sale of royal lands, the rents of vacant livings

and of unclaimed estates, the produce of vendible offices, and casual receipts, including deposits, confiscations, donations, and the recovery of arrears."

Concerning the mountains, we quote the *Encyclopædia Britannica* :

"The highest part of the Island is in the range extending in the southeast from the Punta de Maysi to Cape Cruse, called the Sierra or Montañas de Maestra or Cobre, the summits of which are the Pico de Tarquino, 7,670 feet, the highest point of the whole Island ; Gran Piedra, 5,200 feet ; Yunque and Ojo del Toro, 3,500. From this Sierra a ridge of much smaller general elevation follows nearly the central line of the Island westward throughout its extent, rising to form a marked range in the extreme west of Cuba, on which the Pan de Guajaibon attains 2,530 feet. An almost isolated mass of which the Pico de Potrerillo is the summit, 2,990 feet above the sea, rises immediately behind the harbor of Trinidad, near the centre of the southern coastland.

"The rivers are necessarily short, and flow toward the north and south. The largest is the Cauto, rising in the Sierra del Cobre, and falling into the Bay of Buena Esperanza on the southern coast, after a course of fifty leagues, for twenty of which it is navigable by boats, though at low water obstructed by bars. The Sagua la Grande rises in the Sierra del Escambray, and falls into the sea in front of the Boca de Maravillas, being navigable for five leagues.

"Situated within, and near the border of the northern tropical zone, the climate of the low coastlands of Cuba is that of the torrid zone, but the higher interior of the Island enjoys a more temperate atmosphere. On a

mean of seven years, the rainfall at Havana in the wet season has been observed to be 27.8 inches, of the dry months 12.7 or 40.5 inches for the year. At Havana in the warmest months, those of July and August, the average temperature is 82 Fahr., fluctuating between a maximum of 88° and a minimum of 76°; in the cooler months of December and January, the thermometer averages 72°, the maximum being 78°, the minimum 58°; the average temperature of the year at Havana, on a mean of seven years, is 77°."

But it is fair that our readers should hear a cry from Cuba of poverty, and we find it in "Cuba and the Cubans," by Raimundo Cabrera.

"Oh, we are truly rich!

"From 1821 to 1826, Cuba, with her own resources, covered the expenditures of the treasury. Our opulence dates from that period. We had already sufficient negro slaves to cut down our virgin forests, and ample authority to force them to work. . . .

"By means of our vices and our luxury, and in spite of the hatred of everything Spanish, which Moreno attributed to us, we sent, in 1827, the first little million of hard cash to the treasury of the nation. From that time, until 1864, we continued to send yearly to the mother-country two millions and a half of the same stuff. According to several Spanish statisticians, these sums amounted, in 1864, to \$89,107,287. We were very rich, don't you see? tremendously rich. We contributed more than five million dollars towards the requirements of the Peninsular—\$5,372,205. We paid, in great part, the cost of the war in Africa. The individual donations alone amounted to fabulous sums.

"But, of course, we have never voted for our own im-

posts ; they have been forced upon us because we are so rich. In 1862, we had in a state of production the following estates : 2,712 stock farms, 1,521 sugar plantations, 782 coffee plantations, 6,175 cattle ranches, 18 cocoa plantations, 35 cotton plantations, 22,748 produce farms, 11,738 truck farms, 11,541 tobacco plantations, 1,731 apiaries, 153 country resorts, 243 distilleries, 468 tile-works, 504 lime-kilns, 63 charcoal furnaces, 54 casava-bread factories, and 61 tanneries. To-day I do not know what we possess, because there are no statistics, and because the recently organized assessment is a hodge-podge and a new burden ; but we have more than at that time ; surely, we must have a great deal more.

“For a very long time we have borne the expenses of the convict settlement of Fernando Po. We paid for the ill-starred Mexican expedition, the costs of the war in San Domingo, and with the republics of the Pacific ; how can we possibly be poor ? While England, France and Holland appropriate large sums for the requirements of their colonies, Spain does not contribute a single cent for hers. We do not need it ; we are wading deep in rivers of gold. If the fertility of our soil did not come to our rescue, we must, perforce, have become enriched by the system of protection to the commerce of the mother-country. . . . The four columns of the tariff are indeed a sublime invention. Our agricultural industries require foreign machinery, tools and utensils, which Spain does not supply, but, as she knows that we have gold to spare, she may make us pay for them very high. And since our sugar is to be sold to the United States . . . never mind what they cost. When there are earthquakes in Andalusia and inundations in Murcia, hatred does not prevent us from sending to our af-

flicted brethren large sums. . . (which sometimes fail to reach their destination).

"We are opulent? Let us see if we are. From the earliest times down to the present the officials who come to Cuba amass, in the briefest space of time, fortunes to be dissipated in Madrid, and which appear never to disturb their consciences. This country is very rich, incalculably rich. In 1830 we contributed \$6,120,934; in 1840, \$9,605,877; in 1850, \$10,074,677; in 1860, \$29,610,779. During the war we did not merely contribute; we bled. We had to carry the budget of \$82,000,000.

"We count 1,500,000 inhabitants; that is to say, one million and a half of vicious, voluptuous, pompous spendthrifts, full of hatred and low passions, who contribute to the public charges and never receive a cent in exchange; who have given as much as \$92 per capita, and who at the present moment pay to the state what no other taxpayers the world over have ever contributed. Does any one say that we are not prodigiously, enviably rich?"

CHAPTER XXIX.

THE ANCIENT RECORDS OF THE ISLAND.

The Words in Spanish and Rendered in English with which Columbus Reports the Discovery of Cuba—The Words in which he Reported the Smoking of Tobacco by the Islanders—The Account of the First Mass Celebrated in the New World.

WE reserve for a special chapter the interesting first records of the long story. They possess the greatest value, and have been accurately produced by careful investigation. The accepted account of the first mass in America is wrong. The truth is here set forth. The temple in Havana marks the spot where the first celebration occurred on the site of the city.

It was during the voyage the first mass was said that Columbus discovered Jamaica, and he sailed west as far as the Isle of Pines. A few days more would have informed him that he had found a great island, and not a continent as he believed all his life. He had been dead two years when Cuba was first circumnavigated.

Columbus saw for the first time the land of the island of Cuba in the afternoon of the 27th October, 1492, and on the following day, Sunday the 28th, entered a river on its northern coast. He called this river *San Salvador*, and to the Island he gave the name of *Juana*. He then took possession of the new territory for the king and queen of Castile, and sailed along its coast until the 5th of December, in which time he visited five har-



EL TEMPLETE, HAVANA
The Little Chapel where the First Mass was celebrated

bors named by him *Puerto y Rio de Mares, Mar de Nuestra Señora, Puerto Príncipe, Santa Catalina y Puerto Santo*.

Here is his own statement in old Spanish and with the old spelling.

“ Cuando yo llegue a la Juana segui yo la costa della poniente y la falle tan grande que pense que seria tierra firme, la prouincia de Catayo, y como no falle asi villas y lugares en la costa de la mar, salvo pequeñas poblaciones, con la gente de las cuales no podia hauer fabla, porque luego fuyan todos, andaua yo adelante por el dicho camino, pensando de no errar grandes ciudades o villas, y al cabo de muchas leguas visto que no hauia innovacion y que la costa me leuaua al setentrion, de donde mi voluntad era contraria, por que el yuierno era ya encarnado, yo tenia proposito de hazer del austro y tambien el viento me dio adelante, determine de no aguardar otro tiempo, y bolui atras fasta un señalado puerto da donde embie dos hombres por la tierra para saber si hauia rey o grandes ciudades. Andouieron tres jornadas y hallaron infinitas poblaciones pequeñas y gente sin numero, mas no cosa de regimiento, por lo qual se boluieron. Yo entendia harta de otros jndios que ya tenia tomados commo continuamente esta tierra era isla, et asi segui la costa della al oriente ciento y siete leguas faste donde fazia fin : del qual cabo vi otra isla al oriente distante de esta diez e ocho leguas, a la qual luego puse nombre la Española, y fui alli y segui la parte del setentrion asi como de la Juana, al oriente clxxxiiij grandes leguas por linia recta del oriente, la cual y todas las otras son fertilisimas en demasiado grado, y esta en extremo ; en ella ay muchos puertos enla costa dela mar, sin comparacion de otros que yo

sepa en christianos, y fartos rios, y buenos, y grandes, que es marauilla. Las tierras della son altas y en ella muy muchas sierras y montañas altissimas sin comparacion de la isla de Teneryfe. Son todas fermossissimas de mill fechuras y todas andabiles y llenas de arboles de mil maneras y altas y parecen que llegan al cielo; y tengo por dicho que jamas pierden la foja, segun puedo comprender que los vi tan verdes y tan hermosos commo son en Mayo en Spaña, y dellos stavan floridos, dellos confruto, y dellos en otro termino segun es su calidad; y cantaua el ruiseñol y otros paxaricos de mil maneras en el mes de nouiembre por alli donde yo andaua. Ay palmas de seys o de ocho maneras, que es admiracion verlas por la disformidad hermosa dellas mas assi commo los otros arboles y frutos et yeruas. En ella hay pinares a marauilla, e ay canpiñas grandissimas et ay mjel, y de muchas maneras de aves y frutas muy diversas. En las tierras ay muchas minas de metales et ay gente inestimable numero," etc.*

TRANSLATION.

"When I reached Juana, I followed its coast to the westward, and found it so large that I thought that it must be mainland, the province of Cathay; and as I found neither towns nor villages on the seacoast, but only some hamlets, with the inhabitants of which I could not hold conversation, because they all immediately fled, I kept on the same route, thinking that I could not fail to light upon some large cities or towns.

"At length, after the proceeding of many leagues, and

*The above is quoted from his *first letter* to Santangel, the chancellor of the exchequer of Aragon, dated at Lisbon, the 14th March, 1493, just on his return from his first voyage.

finding that nothing new presented itself, and that the coast was leading me northwards (which I wished to avoid, because winter had already set in, and it was my intention to move southwards ; and because, moreover, the winds were contrary), I resolved not to wait for a change in the weather, but returned to a certain harbor which I had remarked, and from which I sent two men ashore to ascertain whether there was any king or large cities in that part. They journeyed for three days, and found countless small hamlets, with numberless inhabitants, but with nothing like order ; they, therefore, returned. In the meantime I had learned from some other Indians, whom I had seized, that this land was certainly an island ; accordingly, I followed the coast eastward for a distance of 107 leagues, where it ended in a cape. From this cape I saw another island to the eastward, at a distance of eighteen leagues from the former, to which I gave the name of *La Española*. Thither I went, and followed its northern coast (just the same as I had done with the coast of *Juana*) 118 full miles due east. This island, like all others, is extraordinarily large, and this one extremely so. In it are many sea-ports, with which none that I know in Christendom can bear comparison, so good and capacious that it is a wonder to see. The lands are high, and there are many lofty mountains, with which the islands of *Tenerife* cannot be compared. They are all most beautiful, of a thousand different shapes, accessible, and covered with trees of a thousand kinds, of such great height that they seem to reach the skies. I am told that the trees never lose their foliage, and I can well understand it, for I observed that they were as green and luxuriant as in Spain in the month of May. Some were in bloom, others

bearing fruit, and others otherwise, according to their nature. The nightingale was singing, as well as other little birds of a thousand different kinds, and that in November, the month in which I was roaming amongst them. There are palm-trees of six or eight kinds, wonderful in their beautiful variety; but this is the case with all other trees and fruits and grasses. It contains extraordinary pine groves and very extensive plains. There is also honey, and a great variety of birds, and many different kinds of fruits. In the interior there are many mines of metals, and a population innumerable," etc.

On the 29th April, 1494, Columbus left La Española in order to visit the southern coast of Cuba, and two days afterwards arrived at the harbor of Guantánamo, which he called Puerto Grande. Following his voyage in another direction, he discovered Jamaica, and then returned to Cuba and reached the Cabo Cruz on the 18th May, continued his sailing westwards and found the numerous archipelago now known as El Cayo de las Doce Leguas, which he called Jardines de la Reina ("the Gardens of the Queen"). On the 22d he stopped at the largest of those islands, and gave it the name of Santa Marta.

Again going towards the coast, he entered the Hatibónico River on the 3d of June, and found a great number of natives, who gave the new comers a hearty reception. After further exploration, made westwards along the coast, and having discovered the Isle of Pines, that he called Isla del Evangelista, he sailed once more eastwards and landed on the shores of the Hatibónico on Sunday, the 6th of July, 1494.

His first action there was to thank the Almighty for

having preserved him and his men after so many dangers and tribulations they had been in. To that effect he ordered that a rustic altar be provided, and on this the first mass was celebrated on Cuban soil.

Natives in large numbers witnessed the imposing ceremonial, and were greatly and favorably impressed with the sight of it. An old man, whom all other Indians seemed to respect, was deeply moved, and, through interpreter Diego, addressed Columbus in the following words :

"It seems to me that you have just done a good thing, for you have worshipped your God. Although, as I hear, you come from foreign lands with great armaments to conquer many nations and countries, do not fill yourself with pride for that. Know you that in future life there are two different places where the souls go ; one is full of pleasures and happiness, and is reserved for those who were good ; in the other one, which is dark and horrible, the bad are to groan. If you are a mortal and fear eternal punishment, do not harm those who do not harm you, and you will surely get your reward."

Columbus also felt deeply moved by the words of the old Indian, and answered him he was glad to see that the belief of those natives was so similar to the principles of true religion ; that the king and queen of Spain had not sent him to subject people, but to further enlighten them with the teachings of true religion, and to protect them against the raids of their cruel enemies, the Caribbeans, for which reason all Cubans should look upon him as their friend and defender.

The words of Columbus and what the interpreter added in regard to the power and riches of the Castil-

ian monarchy, made the old Indian to feel so much astonishment and gladness that he wanted to sail with the Spaniards and see the European countries, but his wife and children pleaded so earnestly with him, much to his sorrow, that he finally desisted from his intended voyage.

This is the account of the discovery of the use of tobacco, as given by Father Las Casas, in his "General History of the Indians :"

"Hallaron por el camino mucha gente que atravesaban a sus pueblos, mugeres y hombres : siempre los hombres con un tizon en las manos y ciertas yerbas secas metidas en una cierta hoja seca tambien á manera de mosquito hecho de papel de los que hacen los muchachos la Pascua del Espíritu Santo, y encendido por una parte de él, por la otra chupan ó sorben ó reciben con el resuello por adentro aquel humo ; con el cual se adormecen las carnes y cuasi emborracha y asi diz que no sienten el cansancio. Estos mosquetes ó como los llamáremos, llaman ellos *tabacos*."

TRANSLATION :

"They met on the way many people who were going to their villages, both women and men ; the men always carrying in their hands a burning piece of wood and certain dry herbs rolled in a certain leaf, also dry, in the fashion of those paper tubes the boys make on the feast of the Holy Ghost, and it is burning on one end, while from the other end they puff or draw or take out with the breath from the inside that smoke with which they get drowsy and almost drunk ; and it is said that in this way they do not feel fatigue. These tubes, or whatever we may call them, they call *tabacos*."

These are the words of Las Casas. It may be added, that the name of the weed was not *tabaco*, the meaning of the word *tabaco* corresponds exactly to what we now call cigar, but the name of the manufactured article was afterwards extended to the plant producing the leaf used. The Indian name for the plant and leaf was *Cohiba*.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE SITUATION WHEN WEYLER ARRIVED.

Monotony of Military Situation—The Trocha as a Spanish Delusion—Strange Paralysis of the Army of Spain—How It Pays to Keep Full Prisons—Corrupt Sluggards—The Combats at Cacarajicara and Manzanillo—Troubles of American Correspondents—Captain-General Weyler's Personality—Gossip About Him—The Filibusters—The Strained Relations with Spain in 1873—Sickles and Fish Dispatches—Settlement of the Virginius Case.

THE journey of the author to Cuba, undertaken while General Campos was on the way from the scene of his failure to Spain and General Weyler was getting under way for the scene of his failure, Cuba, was to find and report the truth ; and the presumption was that the different commanders would produce remarkable events and influential changes.

This was in January, in the midst of the campaigning season, and now it is May, at the beginning of the rainy season, when it is excessively expensive in the health and strength and equipment of the troops to keep the field engaging in active work ; and it is the accustomed anticipations of those who have had experience of Cuban military enterprise, that the military situation will not be seriously molested for six months. It was not vividly remembered by those who expected a new captain-general to produce immediate revolutionary results, that the causes of the disorder, the character of the people, the comparative resources of the peninsula

* The events justified this calculation, except as to the surprising stay of Maceo in Pinar del Rio.



CALIXTO GARCIA.

of Spain and the Island of Cuba, would continue the elements of the conditions of the strife. The quarrel and the people are the same and habits grow stronger than the will, in men and nations.

After giving the state of the Island the closest attention of which a careful and diligent observer was capable, and seeking to subject to critical analysis that which was in the air as well as the newspapers, and there was a good deal more news atmospheric than was printed, the conviction came that the dreary struggle would be protracted until the wealth of the Island was wasted, the people utterly impoverished, the country absolutely ruined, unless there should arise from the tumultuous upheavals of the situation changes that would permit the separation of Spain and Cuba on terms that would not be dishonorable or humiliating to either, and the hopeful logic of it all was the amicable annexation of Cuba as a state to the United States.

Nothing phenomenal has happened owing to the individualities of the Weyler administration. Martinez Campos was so slow when he took command and so roughly handled at Bayamo, and General Suarez Valdes was so distinctly defeated by Gomez, that General Pando was sent over with 30,000 men; and then the insurgents were not checked, but seemed to be reinforced as fast as the Spaniards. Weyler brought reinforcements, and 10,000 good troops speedily followed, but the Island absorbed them without a symptom of result, and the aggressive forces of Spain have seemed rather to relax and recede than become alert and advance, and while there are at least 130,000 regular troops on the rolls of service in Cuba, there is nothing new to show for them. If there cannot be two armies

of 50,000 men each massed for strenuous and sweeping operations—leaving the 30,000 additional Spanish regulars and the 60,000 volunteers to do garrison duty—it may be considered a settled question there is no more hope for the military than for the political situation of the Spaniards in the Island.

Still we find the interest centering upon the alleged trocha, which has become a synonym for doing nothing, and this lunar object is near the boundary, between the provinces of Havana and Pinar del Rio. Now this military line across the Island has been the favorite scheme of the Spanish tacticians from the first, though it has never embarrassed a rebel leader, and it is obviously useless unless the insurgent forces west of it are under the necessity of crossing it for lack of supplies or are hunted from their lairs with a vehement alacrity not indicated in any quarter. The line is of no assistance to the government except to prevent the escape of the insurgents and confine them to be hunted down, and they are in no hurry if appearances and accounts are trustworthy, and the hunters are sometimes hunted.

There must be an insurmountable immobility about the Spanish troops, the lethargy established by incapacity in handling them, or something would happen in a few weeks when there are 50,000 Spaniards within twenty miles of 10,000 rebels—who have no base of operations and must live on the country and confront an enemy wherever they face the sea.

The rumors change hourly as to the disposition of the Spanish masses and Cuban cavalry that should be fighting. Why Gomez moved eastward so far in March, and for some weeks disappeared, has not been accounted for with precision, and therefore the news that

he is coming back has hardly been received with enthusiasm. The statement that he was drilling recruits and resting his men may have been true, but does not cover so much time and space as is called for. Still he does not seem to be molested as he rides up and down the country.

There are several reasons assigned for Spanish delays that are not merely of a military or political character. It is said that the Spaniards lack dash, because their leaders are sluggish and corrupt, and there is a steady shower of stories that a great deal of money is to be made continually out of an army of 100,000 men in the field, and as many more about the towns. The insurgents claim to have bought cartridges even in Moro Castle, and carried them out in market baskets, exchanging for them cigars and silver; but there are so many vivid imaginations in Cuba that no one knows, and there are many who ought to care, but do not.

The brother-in-law of Campos has the reputation conferred upon him, with endless particulars of gossip, of making millions by standing between the army and the business men who have contracts for furnishing supplies, and the specific relation of mysteries goes, that the supremely important fort that dominates Havana from the land side, and is supposed to be always ready to stand a siege, bombard the city if necessary, was found by Weyler almost destitute of arms and ammunition. These reports are steadfastly asserted, and largely believed to have many facts to rest upon, because there is corruption in all sorts of Spanish administration, and the paralysis of the army thereby accounted for; but it would make an impression of vindictiveness to charge a nation with paresis.

Walter Dygert, the young American about whose imprisonment so much has been said, gives from his own experience an explanation of the profitableness of having crowded prisons, in these terms :

“ A child may weep at brambles' smart,
And maidens when their lovers part;
But woe worth a country when
She sees the tears of bearded men.”

These lines by the poet, Scott, recurred to me when I saw aged men weeping and heart-broken at being separated from their families and shut up in this hell.

But why does the Spanish government shut up helpless cripples and non-combatants ? This is a question that puzzled me for some time, but I finally solved it, and will answer it after I have described the food and water.

A little after 6 in the morning we were, each of us, given a very small cup of coffee. The first meal of the day, if it could be called a meal, came after 9 o'clock. It consisted of a little rice, which was generally dirty; a few small potatoes, boiled with their skins on, and often partly rotten; a little piece of boiled salt beef, or beef cut up in small bits, with soup, just about half enough, and of the poorest quality. The meat was often spoiled, and unfit for anything but a vulture to eat. The second and last meal of the day came about 4 in the afternoon, and was the same as the first.

I had no opportunity to count the prisoners, but I learned that there were about 180 on the average confined there. I learned as definitely as I could, without seeing the contract, that a certain party had a contract to feed these prisoners at twenty-five cents each per day. Thus he gets \$45 a day, and I learned that the food costs him only \$7 to \$8 a day, and, as some of the prisoners did the cooking, his profit can be readily seen. On such a contract he could afford to divide with the judge and army officers to keep the prison full.

Perhaps there is money in keeping camps as well as prisons full, and in the detention of garrisons and the stick-in-the-mud strategy, but it is plain there is much rotten timber.

Walter S. Whitcomb, of Springfield, Mass., who made the most remarkable escape on record from Moro Castle a few weeks ago, happening to have money in his clothes that escaped the eyes of those who searched him, and using it judiciously in the purchase of a rope, had been for some time in the camp of Maceo, and gives, in an interview with a *Journal* reporter, a remarkably intelligible account of the insurgents:

"I was mustered into a company, and if I had been able to speak the Spanish language better I should have been given a command, for I had some military experience, having served three years with the New Hampshire state militia in Keene, N. H.

"I soon found out how badly ammunition was needed, for at that time, you know, they had scarcely any arms, and were only provided with machetes. All sorts of queer guns were carried, but only a few Mauser rifles.

"I was astonished to find four companies of women with Maceo's army. They were of ages from fifteen to forty, and were intensely patriotic and very brave. They all carried machetes, and I afterward saw them in several engagements, in which they displayed as much courage as the men, fighting right in the face of bullets and cheering on the men like demons.' Many of them were mounted on horses and mules.

"I was in this camp about five weeks. There were about twelve thousand men in all. Every morning we were called up at 5 by the trumpeter, and a few hours were spent in drilling. We had several skirmishes with the Spanish, and in nearly every case we drove them back, taking prisoners, who readily joined our ranks. General Maceo succeeded during these weeks in taking possession of the entire province of Pinar del Rio.

"The insurgents are far more familiar with military tactics than the Spanish soldiers, who seem to lack organization and are cowards of the worst sort. Why, one of the women whipped five of them one day with her sugar cane knife. They will never get possession of the Island.

"The insurgents have natural forts which the Spanish cannot approach. Many of these are reached only through the southern swamps, and here, safely ensconced out of reach of the enemy, they have their hospitals. They know the entrances to these swamps and to caves in the western part of the Island, where it would be death for a Spaniard to enter.

"Much food is sent into the insurgent camps from sources no one could guess. While I was in the camp I did not suffer for food nor for kindness. We foraged a great deal in the surrounding country, but we always obtained food from friends when it was possible. General Maceo is very courteous, and when people objected to giving food or arms, he always explained that he would regard it as a loan and that they would be repaid some day in full.

"I saw little cruelty toward the Spanish prisoners. Except in the case of spies, who were always hung, the prisoners were allowed to leave if they wished, after their arms had been taken from them. In most cases they joined us."

There are two recent Havana despatches that may mean something out of the common, and relieve the dull and dreary round of labored bulletins and lively fiction. One is that General Pando has delivered the command of the province of Santa Clara to General Pri, and is going back to Spain. The other point is

that General Weyler is making ready to leave Havana and do something himself. He ought to be ready for a start by this time. General Pando is said to be a man of whom Weyler is jealous, and, therefore, his absence from the scene would be welcome, and a movement of Weyler in the field would probably be coincident with the departure of the most conspicuous of the lieutenant-generals — who was not, it is said, allowed the troops he needed, because he, being a fighting man, might do something conspicuous, and make trouble for his superior officer. If Weyler goes out it will, of course, signify that he has made ready for a striking movement, and it could hardly be anything else than a drive at Maceo in overwhelming force, and with a quick step unprecedented on the side of the government.

That Weyler may be up to some desperate work before acknowledging himself powerless through the rainy season would be in character. Among the interesting things he said to the writer, however, was that he did not mean to regard military operations as impracticable during the wet weather. That he will have to take some personal risk in the field is certain, but there is something of that every day in the palace and on the streets of Havana. If Maceo's troopers knew he was in their vicinity, they would, no doubt, however he might be guarded, try a machete charge, and the glory of getting at him with a big knife would be very attractive. The greatest danger of the general would probably be from sharp-shooters. Rifles are of such long range now that in the hands of experts they are deadly far beyond the records on battlefields up to the day of the latest improvements in arms of precision.

An officer is not safe where a hostile rifleman can make out his uniform with a field glass.

The Cubans tell of a sharp-shooter with Maceo, who, two months ago, had killed seven Spanish officers, and they managed to keep him well supplied with cartridges! The fall of Spanish officers in numbers out of numerical proportion to the number of private soldiers killed, is frequently a feature of the reports, though it may be that one reason is the death of an important man cannot be concealed.

The recently reported heavy fighting in the west between Spanish columns and detachments from Maceo's command have, no doubt, some foundation, but there is as little question the details had been exaggerated. The reports of superhuman bravery on both sides are uncommonly copious and urgent just now, and remind us of the like literary enthusiasms in the early skirmishes of our civil war. After we had heard from the insurgents about their superb achievements, carrying everything before them, annihilating regiment after regiment, the Spaniards captured one of Maceo's forts, and we read of the "storming of Cacarajicara," in the western Cuban mountains, and there was a march "up heights under fire," and this is done by the very Inclan, the Spaniard whose column was several times destroyed in telegrams by way of Key West.

A countryman is said to have told the location of Maceo's camp. As it has been for a month within fifteen miles of the Spanish trocha, there should not have been protracted perplexity in finding it. A movement was made, and the troops pushed "forward through a scattering fire from the ambushed rebels, until they reached a pocket in the road, where a town showed and

the fortifications above. The firing was now general all along the line. Darkness found the troops in this position. They were kept awake all night under constant fire, with no food or drink. At the first sight of dawn the Spanish general ordered the guns to the front, to attack the intrenchments. The insurgents made an assault upon the artillery men with their machetes, but were "driven back forty feet from the cannon by a wall of troops. A tall, bearded man, stick in hand, urged the rebels to fall on the Spaniards, but they refused, and retreated. A bayonet charge was then ordered, and the soldiers patriotically rushed into the ditch, driving out the rebels. One of those who defended the fort, and fled with the others, was a woman." The return march, which was made immediately, "was very difficult, the enemy being scattered all through the hills, and firing from every point. The progress was slow, on account of the wounded soldiers."

Now one is called upon to have misgiving whether this was a triumphal way of returning from a conquest. Suarez Inclan made an address, thanking his soldiers for their valor, which, he said, "deserved a place in the best pages of Spanish history." He said:

The enemy was concentrated in the thick woods and high hills, and the road was well fortified with trenches at different points. Our position was most difficult.

With all these obstacles, with the superior forces united, trying to defeat and destroy us, half a brigade, formed of soldiers of the San Fernando and Baleares battalions and a section of the Fifth Mountain artillery, showed true heroism, and were ready to conquer or die for their country. They proved able to face and beat the enemy that tried to surround us in the pass of Cacarajicara on our return.

I was much pleased with the spirit of sacrifice under severe discipline. My men were under furious fire in the attacks and in marching, but our

efforts were crowned with victory, and the efforts of Maceo's forces, the most determined of the insurrection, were foiled. Those of Socarras gave way, leaving us a position that might have been impregnable. We did not cede a foot, though Quintin Bandera attacked us at night and endeavored to recapture the hill.

Maceo's big forces also tried for six hours to harrass our rear guard, endeavoring to make disorder in the column, while Pilar Rojas attacked the head and left flank. The fortifications were razed, and Socarras and Pilar Rojas were wounded. Hundreds more are dead and wounded. It was not possible for us to escape serious losses. We made a glorious sacrifice for our country.

There is an exactness in this that arouses suspicion. What was the march made for if not to hold the ground? Why is stress placed upon the furious efforts of the rebels to destroy the Spaniards? The rebels are really inadvertently credited with taking the offensive. It is vague to say hundreds of rebels were dead and wounded. It is not giving much information to say that fortifications were razed. "Serious losses," confessed in an affair where escape from a bad position was regarded as a victory, means much. This amounts to a Spanish official report that Maceo is well fortified, and is not troubled at all about the trocha.

The despatch by James Creelman, of May 6th, *via* Key West, says the battle in the mountain at Cacarajicara was a Spanish defeat; but Maceo was not there, being six miles away, looking for another attack. The fighting was severe, and sixteen wounded officers have reached Havana. This latest from this correspondent is:

"Gen. Weyler is desperate, and insists that Gen. Maceo must attack the trocha whether he wants to or not. Otherwise what is the use of having a trocha at all?

"Gen. Maceo intends to remain in the hills so that

when the rains come the Spanish in the low country will be washed out. His position is defended on all sides by well-built breastworks.

"The military situation in the Island is this: Maceo commands in the west, Garcia in the east and Gomez in the middle, with authority over all.

"Gomez is in a position to go to the support of either his eastern or western generals or to have them come to him."

Concerning the jealousies it is claimed exist among Spanish officers, preventing full and energetic employment of the troops, Captain-General Weyler has been reported to have said that it spoiled a Spanish officer in Cuba; if he reached rank above a colonelcy, he wanted a column to handle for his own convenience, and grew careless about obeying orders. A few weeks after Weyler's arrival there were statements current in Havana to the effect that several prominent officers were to be sent home. Particulars were given in the case of General Canalles, and Weyler was charged with saying of him that he "had no head" and couldn't be useful—more than that he was a devoted friend of Martinez Campos, and therefore under suspicion of unfaithfulness to the new administration.

He had a high reputation as a fighting man. The Cubans were excited over the Canalles stories and, as the general was about to sail, I called upon him and had a frank and a pleasant talk through an interpreter. I found the redoubtable general a middle-aged man, very bald and thin, and troubled with some nervous affection—and he all over looked the old campaigner. He was just taking leave and, asked if he was going away for personal or public reasons, he said he "was

called to Spain by ill health and personal misfortune," and his shaky, physical condition was plain enough. It would certainly have been a personal hardship and danger, even if practicable, for him to remain in the field; and a death had occurred in his family that deranged his home affairs and demanded his presence. He had not been removed from his command on account of differences with the captain-general, but he had been identified with the policy and the fortunes of Martinez Campos. He was an Asturian, and that meant he had no politics, but his sword was ever ready in the service of his queen and country. When an Asturian got his orders he asked no questions; and as he turned away to take the ship, that hour sailing for home, he gave me a cordial invitation, if I ever found myself in Spain, to call upon him at his home in Cordova.

This incident seems worth relating here, to show that at times the information in circulation about the relation of the captain-general and his subordinates may be in part erroneous. There is no doubt about it, however, that General Weyler's plans of campaign, and especially his attempted quick, bold strokes, have been embarrassed and thwarted by the habit of the officers of not getting their columns into motion on time and pressing to the mark with the alertness and perseverance that the profession of soldiers demands. We have two stories of personal difficulties—one that did not reach the point of assault with General Pando, who has been spoken of as the probable successor of Weyler when again the head of a commander-in-chief on the Island is demanded in Spain by those politicians who make a business of fault-finding, and do not feel happy until they are furious.

A *Herald* correspondent telegraphs from Havana, *via* Key West, which means that the letter was sent by private conveyance to a wire that is not subjected to Spanish censorship.

“Generals Pando and Bernal will leave for Spain on the next steamer. General Bernal is very angry at the report made by General Weyler about General Suárez Inclán’s recent fight with Maceo’s troops in Pinar del Rio province. He says it was impossible for him to join Inclán’s forces in the time specified, and he objects to being made a scapegoat.

“Bernal had angry words with Weyler, and declared his intention to go to Spain at once. General Weyler tried to dissuade him. Report says that Bernal told his superior if he were not the captain-general he would have to fight a duel. It is said Bernal intends to force Weyler to fight when the captain-general returns to Spain. Bernal is a leader of the republicans in Barcelona, and the government prefers to have him in the field than at home.”

The *Journal* has this from Frederick M. Lawrence—his last despatch from the seat of war—as he was compelled to leave the Island, as two more correspondents, Mr. Creelman, of the *World*, and Mr. Lawrence, have been expelled from Havana for “calumniating the Spaniards,” the inevitable offense of violating Weyler’s newspaper articles placing handcuffs on the press:

“General Bernal felt that Weyler had removed him from the command of the column in Pinar del Rio through feelings of personal enmity, and had used the alleged failure of Bernal to take his column to the assistance of General Inclán at the battle of Cacarajicara as a pretext for paying up an old score.

“The enmity between the men goes back to the days when both were fighting for preference in Spain. Bernal was instrumental in keeping Weyler from attaining higher honors than he has reached, and Weyler has never forgiven him.

“It is supposed that General Inclan was jealous of Bernal's superior military ability, and knowing Weyler's hatred, concocted the plan whereby it was to appear that Bernal was remiss in his duty at Cacarajicara with the intention of giving Weyler an opportunity to remove Bernal from his command.

“Inclan's plan worked well. He reported Bernal's failure to Weyler, and the captain-general lost no time in humiliating Bernal.

“Weyler sent a heliograph order to Bernal to report immediately in Havana. Bernal evidently guessed what was in store for him, for upon his arrival in Havana he changed his military uniform for the dress of a private citizen. In this garb Bernal went to the palace. He was received with every outward show of courtesy by Weyler, and two orderlies, who were conversing with Weyler, were asked to step aside, and they retired to a corner of the room out of reach.

“Weyler then asked Bernal why he appeared before his superior in civilian garb. Bernal's answer was:

“‘I expect in a few minutes to have no use for my uniform, and desired to save myself the inconvenience of changing my dress later on.’

“Weyler then requested Bernal to give his version of the failure of the battle of Cacarajicara. What Bernal told is not known.

“What is known is that General Bernal, at the end of a few minutes, arose from his chair and said:

“‘I understand then that I am to return to Spain and am no longer your subordinate officer.’

“At the same time General Weyler arose and replied : ‘That is my order.’

“Bernal took one step backward, folded his arms and looked Weyler square in the eyes.

“‘If that is the case we meet on level ground, and I desire to inform you that in your conduct of the war you have shown yourself to be nothing less than a traitor to your country. If Cuba is lost to Spain, it will be because of your misconduct, and whether it was through ignorance or design, it was none the less treason. Permit me also to say that my personal estimation of you is that you are a liar and a poltroon.’

“Weyler was white with rage. His orderlies, who heard what Bernal had said, when, through anger, he raised his voice, started up from their seats and hurried across the room.

“They saw Weyler draw his arm back as though to strike Bernal, but the general was too quick for him.

“Bernal raised his hand, and disdaining to strike with his clinched fist, he delivered a stinging smack with the palm of his right hand upon Weyler’s left cheek.

“The captain-general staggered back, but recovered himself instantly and sprang at Bernal. He seized the younger general by the throat, and so savage was the attack that Bernal was forced half way across the room. By this time the orderlies had seized Bernal, and with a jerk they tore him from Weyler’s grasp.

“The captain-general recovered his senses instantly and waved his arm to Bernal. He told the orderlies to take him away. The orderlies started from the room, and Weyler walked back to his desk.

"Before Bernal and his custodians had reached the door, Weyler commanded them to stop. He then ordered the two officers to retire again out of earshot, and, walking up to Bernal, Weyler stood in front of him with arms folded, his whole body trembling with emotion, and for fully a minute the two men glared into each other's eyes.

"General Weyler said something in a low tone to Bernal, who was heard to reply :

"'In Spain, sir, I shall be very happy to grant the favor you ask.'


"General Weyler returned to his desk, beside which he stood for a moment, looking at Bernal, and then he made a profound bow. In return Bernal bowed very low.

"'Is this interview at an end? Have I your permission to retire?' asked Bernal.

"'You may retire, sir,' said General Weyler. 'I have nothing more to say.'

"Again the two men bowed very low, and Bernal left the room. He went straightway from the palace, and Weyler has not seen him since."

There is a certain verisimilitude about this that, supported by consistency at all points with the known facts, is convincing that there is substantial accuracy in the statement. The personal quarrel develops public facts. It displays that the inside Spanish view of the battle of Cacarajicara was a defeat of the Spanish troops, and not the victory of the official proclamations. It was a defeat of the Spanish at their sore point, it being the first serious effort made by the captain-general to use his celebrated trocha as a guard for offensive operations. The Spanish, with the sea at



CUBANS REPULSING AN ATTACK AT ALTO SONGO

their disposition and a line drawn across the Island, have Maceo surrounded in theory, and the test of possession was made in hurrying converging columns to capture the insurgents' stronghold in the mountains.

If Maceo would not attack the trocha, why the trocha must attack him, and the result was the combat from which the Spaniards retired sorely harrassed with heavy losses, and meriting, as their commander said in his official report, "one of the best pages in Spanish history." There were two circumstances especially obnoxious to the captain-general. One was, Maceo himself was not in the fight, but six miles away, and rebel success was won by a subordinate. There was a sting in this that struck deep and rankled. The other provoking point was, that the Spanish column that was ordered to support the one that suffered heavily, was not on time, and certainly there could be nothing better calculated to provoke the fierce resentment of the commander-in-chief, and indeed to justify it entirely. Whether he picked up the right man for a victim, or selected one according to his personal proclivities, we have not testimony for decision. There is other evidence that the Spaniards were hurt in their venture into the mountains occupied by Maceo.

They have not—if they had the successes they claim—followed them up, but have lingered about their block houses and along the ditches. The Cacarajicara affair seems to have revealed a fatal flaw in the Spanish system, to have exposed its deficiency, and it may be even as grave as a condition of demoralization that results in tardiness and insubordination. That Weyler has many enemies in the Spanish army there is no question. Mutterings were heard early in March

when he cleared the high officers from their comforts in the hotels of Havana and forced them to the field. Some of them may find no more handy method of doing the business of malice than personally seeing to it that the military combinations shall, at their most critical stage, fail of success—and there is no way so easy to manage this as by the contrivance of delays.

It is reported from Havana that Gen. Weyler has made efforts to induce five thousand of the Havana volunteers to hold a section of the trocha and allow a like number of regulars to be freed for field service. There has been no more delicate and dangerous operation undertaken than this. The volunteers are independent in an important sense. They keep their guns day and night in their hands, and they are not subjected to the direct orders of the captain-general, except with well understood and carefully guarded limitations. Perhaps the volunteers may flinch from going to the field, even to the extent of managing the trenches. They may very much prefer their twice-a-day parade in Havana with music and clean dry clothes, to muddy ditches and the chance of hearing the wild tramping of horses and the war-cry "machete, machete;" and they may ask such an incisive question as this. "Why not place us as guards of the forts of Havana?"—especially those on the hills that were constructed to command the town rather than to defend it.

The captain-general should refuse. Why? Because in the present juncture he would not dare to place the keys of the capital city in any hands but those of the chosen regulars of Spain. Such a slip would promote the issue that must be met some day, but that it is Spanish policy to defer. The attempt to use the vol-

unteers on the trocha may, however, precipitate the time for balancing the books. When it becomes perfectly known in Cuba, Havana in particular, that the cause of Spain is hopeless—and that the continuance of the war means the total bankruptcy of the business men—the obliteration of the money-making along with the end of sugar making and the devastation of the tobacco fields, there will be a true crisis. And whether the Spaniards fight or wait, dig or march, they do not succeed in accomplishing results that change the disastrous conditions of the Island.

What is the reason the Spaniards do nothing decisive with their two hundred thousand men? The general explanation is that the answer must be perplexing and uncertain. On the contrary, it is plain and easy and conclusive. The Cuban patriots on the Island have a majority over those who favor the Spanish cause of over a million. The Spaniards are not children or cowardly or imbecile. Numerous and strong, and drilled as they are, they are confronted by an awful array—a million people fighting in blood and ashes to the death, with knife and torch!

General Weyler said to the *Herald* correspondent that he expelled Creelman because the story of a massacre he sent was "false, absolutely false," and he added: "I refused to permit it to be transmitted from here. I suppose it got to the United States by way of Key West or Tampa."

The general was asked: "May there not be instances of cruelty; instances of shooting innocent persons in a force as large as that which you command?"

The general replied: "Such things may occur, as for example, the other day, when a rebel shot at some

Spanish troops, who were passing, crying at the same time, 'Vive Cuba Libre,' the troops fired at a house whence the shots came, and in which non-combatants were at the time. My troops supposed, naturally, that all those within were rebels, and fired. Under such circumstances innocent persons may be hurt."

The general said as to threats that he was to be assassinated and his habit of going about unattended: "I go out regularly at night unattended. I now receive practically no personal threats. When I first assumed office I received threats from the United States. One letter said that a woman would come here and kill me. Since then I have received every woman who called."

"Young ladies?"

"Yes, when they have come I have seen all."

And the general told the *Herald* he was going to be on the offensive all summer. A sugar broker in Havana, commenting on General Weyler's latest declaration that the rebellion will be put down in two years, says Cuba will be "a mere cinder path" before that time, and he added:

"It has been said that the work of the torch must end somewhere, but fires continue to crackle merrily all over the Island, and the end is not yet. An inevitable result of this form of campaign has been the levying of blackmail by minor chiefs. A wealthy man informed me yesterday that he had been notified by the insurgents in charge of the district where his property is located that it would be spared for the consideration of \$6,000. As the buildings cost more than \$250,000, the owner would gladly pay the \$6,000 if he knew that he would receive protection. He fears, however, that if he pays, the rebel officer will be transferred

to some other section of the Island and his successor will immediately apply the torch. Something of that kind recently happened in Matanzas province, where a building was burned after \$500 had been paid to protect it.

Another result of the war may be the practical extermination of the Cuban breed of horses that are not unlike Texas mustangs in appearance, small, wiry and very strong. Horses have always thrived here, and there was an enormous number of them on the Island when the war began. Since then the slaughter has been going on, Spaniards and insurgents alike killing all those found in the country that they could not use themselves, to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy.

It is this destructiveness going on with accelerating vindictiveness that is joined to the ferocity with which the people, trying to save themselves by neutrality, are assailed that mark for the worse the progress of the war. A letter from Cuba Libre, dated in camp Aline, April 16th, from Mariano Torres, in which he made this reference to General Gomez: "I am now at the head of the Cuban forces in this rich and important part of Las Vilas, and I had the pleasure a few days ago of receiving a visit from the commander-in-chief." M. Torres writes, the Spaniards "have decided to ruin and devastate the country, and kill all the peaceful, harmless, and defenseless people they find in the way," and the letter proceeds with the account of half a dozen massacres.

A Santiago de Cuba despatch gives his accounts of the capture of Spanish trains—the most important affair being at Manzanillo, April 21st. The Spanish column

was "taking a large convoy to Venecia. A bloody engagement began, and lasted an hour and a half. As the insurgents occupied excellent positions, they succeeded in disorganizing the column completely, and nearly the whole convoy fell into their possession. They took twenty wagons drawn by oxen, ten carts drawn by mules, and eighteen mules. The articles captured were Mausers, cartridges, clothes, medicines, and provisions.

"In the combat the rebels had a captain and twenty-eight soldiers killed and fifty-seven wounded. The Spaniards had seventy killed and 107 wounded, among the latter Captain Castelví, of the *Veguita Guerillas*."

Now this is the most definite and certain account of a fight we have had for a long time.

The Spaniards with their slow ships are avoided at sea as their slow columns are evaded on land. The *Bermuda* is faster than the Spanish cruisers, and if she has succeeded, as often reported, in throwing into the insurgents' hands machine guns, with abundant ammunition and expert American gunners, the rebels will become aggressive.

The Spanish official reports unconsciously pay the tribute to the rebels that they did not permit to the Havana newspapers, or to pass over the direct line of wire—this account of the *Bermuda* in her latest expedition, which, however, receives full confirmation :

"The *Bermuda* landed two Gatling guns, 1,000 rifles, most of them Mausers, 500,000 rounds of ammunition, and 1,000 pounds of dynamite. It is Vidal's intention to report at General Maceo's headquarters immediately. The ammunition is for Maceo's army, and, at his request, the cartridges are designed for the Mauser rifles,

with which the insurgents in Pinar del Rio are now very well supplied. On account of their superior penetrating power, it is Maceo's intention to use them against the numberless small forts which General Weyler has established along his military trocha between Mariel and Majana.

There is threatened a case closely resembling that of the Lopez and *Virginus* captures and executions of citizens, and arising from the same line of indiscretion or policy on the part of the Autonomists of Spain. The Cuban insurgents and their unqualified sympathizers above all things hope for affairs that will cause hostile relations between the United States and Spain. If a little American blood could be shed so as to have the desired effect, it would be regarded far more important than a bloody engagement going against the Spaniards. That there are expeditions on the sea and in course of preparation to bear recruits and munitions of war to the Cubans, is not denied. It is a matter of advertising ; it is proclaimed by the press through the Associated Press and the United Press agencies, and is exploited by special correspondents. When a ship gets through, the warlike character of the crew and cargo is celebrated ; and when one is captured, the innocence of all parties is proverbial.

It is the better way to tell the facts from the beginning, and it becomes a great nation to be candid and thoroughly truthful. The ill-fated Lopez expedition sailed from New Orleans as if enjoying a triumph; and was met on the coast of Florida with decoy letters, by which the unfortunate men were lured to their doom. The Spaniards had received from the United States full information. The filibusters left little for the spies

to report. The claim of the officers of the *Virginus* was that she was an innocent American ship, and was taken in neutral waters with regular papers, and the people on her were warned; and yet the pleas were rather technical than actual, for the ship was loaded with fire-arms that were thrown away in the chase. Then the men were slaughtered as we have related, American citizens along with the rest, but the law and the facts made a complication such that President Grant, Secretary Fish and Minister Sickles extricated the country by a vigorous course of action that approached war, and accepted concessions so as to secure peace.

The crew of the American schooner, *Competitor*, have been tried by court-martial at Havana and condemned to death. There is a clear case of an American citizen among the condemned; not one of those referred to by the Spaniards, in the most merciless spirit as "Cubans, self-made American citizens, for the sole purpose of sedition in Cuba," hoping, if caught, to be protected by the United States or to stir up war between the two nations. There are so many American citizens provided with naturalization papers in Florida, as a part of equipment for aiding war against the Spaniards, that there is a perceptible interference with the defense of citizens who are undoubtedly Americans without sinister purpose.

It has been a complaint against Consul-General Williams that he has invented the classification of American citizens into actual and professional Americans. He may not have done this, but he has had a large and instructive experience with American citizens whose titles they could not always read clear, and one

of the curiosities of taking an obligation in Havana, "On my word of honor as a native American, I tell you"—and there were those who considered this rather more binding than an average oath. (It should be understood that this is not given as an example of humor, but as a statement of fact; and upon this my word of honor as a native American is given.)

The following information has been telegraphed from Jacksonville, Florida, to the secretary of state of the United States:

Owen Milton, who was captured by the Spanish authorities on board of the *Competitor* and condemned to death, left Key West as a newspaper correspondent, hoping to consummate plans for furnishing reliable news to the correspondents of the *Florida Times-Union* at Key West, who in turn were to transmit such reports by cable to the Southern Associated Press and United Press through the medium of this paper. He must have had with him, at the time of his capture, credentials showing his connection with the *Times-Union* as its duly authorized representative. Such a letter was furnished him by me.

I send you this information to assist you in your efforts in behalf of young Milton.

T. T. STOCKTON,
General Manager *Florida Times-Union*.

It is not certain that credentials as a newspaper man will aid Mr. Milton in producing a good impression on the captain-general, whom I found in a bad humor with correspondents. When asked why correspondents should not go through the lines and report the facts about the rebels, if they were as badly off as he thought, as it would be worth something to his cause to have his opinion confirmed, he said, "all these Cubans are editors or correspondents, and if I granted the permission suggested to newspaper men, I would have the Cuban cavalry riding through our positions on the

press passes." Indeed, he insisted that correspondents were much worse than editors—that the editors were deceived by false information given by letter writers.

The law that is supposed to protect American citizens from trial by martial law is this in our treaty with Spain :

No citizen of the United States, residing in Spain, her adjacent islands, or her ultramarine possessions, charged with acts of sedition, treason, or conspiracy against the institutions, the public security, the integrity of the territory, or against the supreme government, or any other crime whatsoever, shall be subject to trial by any exceptionable tribunal, but exclusively by the ordinary jurisdiction, except in the case of being captured with arms in hand.

The secretary of state of the general government of Cuba, the Marquis Palmerola, said the statement of the *Competitor's* men proved they had arms in their hands, but Milton's case was "different from the others."

This acknowledgment of difference we may trust will be very important. Milton is the only one of the captured crew who is an American citizen. It was believed Captain-General Weyler determined to have the condemned men shot, because he held it was important to prevent the filibusters from returning upon expeditions under the impression they are picnics, and it happens that the very New York papers that give the news of the sentence of death upon the *Competitor's* crew, have accounts of two other expeditions—one starting from New York—this the *Laurada*. The Junta disowns the *Competitor's* expedition. The sailing of the *Competitor* was from Key West, on the night of April 20th. The *Herald's* Key West correspondent says :

"General Weyler has been anxious from the outset

to make an example of the filibusters, in order to deter other similar expeditions from trying to land on the Cuban coast. Captain Ladorde and his companions are the first filibusters caught in this war.

"It is believed that Weyler objects to following the advice received from Spain, not to execute the foreign citizens captured on the *Competitor*, even if found guilty.

"The cases have already been the subject of lots of diplomatic correspondence. Captain Laborde asserts that he has been treated cruelly by the Spaniards. He showed me his wrists when I called on him in his cell in the arsenal. They were encircled by festering sores.

"He says that after his arrest a stout string was tied to his wrists, and an iron bar placed in the middle and twisted until the string cut into the flesh around the wrists, in an effort to make him confess. He declares that when he announced that he was an American, the Spaniards threatened to shoot his companions and himself immediately. They had previously shot at the mate when the latter attempted to raise the Stars and Stripes. The mate's arms are badly lacerated by ropes which were tied around the biceps."

The question over the disposition of the *Competitor's* men is the most serious that has occurred between the governments of the United States and Spain during the Cuban war. The insurgents have the intensest solicitude that something very serious may happen, and we are told the secretary of state is in a condition of threatening excitement on the subject, and that the president is angry and very determined. There is too much actual gravity in the situation to permit us to believe in

melodramatic demonstrations by the highest officers of the government.

The fact that Washington and Madrid are in communication with Havana insures full if fast consideration. That which is done on either side will be upon perfected intelligence, with a full sense of responsibility. At the moment the secretary of state of the United States, and the prime minister of Spain, and the captain-general of Cuba have this matter in hand, and are in communication by cable, we are entertained by the news that the *Bermuda* has been heard from again at Honduras, and the *Laurada* is off from New York, and there is no sort of question as to the character of these vessels. At the same time it is proposed, with Jingo vigor, that the American fleet is concentrating in New York to make a demonstration at Moro Castle and the Spanish palace; but the yellow fever and the pestilential harbor forbid the appearance of our fleet there on any lesser errand than the bombardment of Havana.

There are so many points of resemblance between the *Competitor* case and that of the *Virginus* that the public will be pleased by the refreshment of recollection in the production of despatches that passed in 1873 between Secretary of State Fish and Minister Sickles. These communications are highly instructive as to the attitude of our country regarding the rights of persons who sail under the national flag, and show they will find it well to have the right to the use of the flag, and be able to prove it.

There is a great deal said in the United States of the attitude of this country toward Cuba at this most interesting juncture, and we present the most pertinent of the official papers :

UNITED STATES LEGATION IN SPAIN,

MADRID, NOV. 14, 1873. (Rec'd Dec. 11.)

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a note this day passed to the minister of state, in which, in obedience to your instruction of the 12th inst. by cable, I have protested against the summary execution of the captain and thirty-six of the crew of the *Virginus* and sixteen others, by order of the Spanish authorities at Santiago de Cuba. You were advised in my telegram of last evening that Mr. Carvajal, in your interview of yesterday, confirmed the report published in the Havana papers.

I am, etc.,

SICKLES.

MADRID, NOV. 15, 1873.

Received an ill-tempered note to-day from minister of state, rejecting protest, and saying Spain would, nevertheless, consider and decide questions according to law and her dignity.

SICKLES.

MADRID, NOV. 18, 1873.

Minister of state informs me, in note of this date, that the reports mentioned in your cable of 15th are not confirmed, and that, on the contrary, as soon as the captain-general could submit to Santiago the orders sent by this government on the 6th, the executions were suspended.

SICKLES.

MADRID, NOV. 19, 1873.

Popular feeling runs high here against United States and this legation. Press violent and abusive, advising government to order me out of Spain. Last night a mob was collected to attack and sack the legation. The authorities interfered and preserved the peace.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, NOV. 20, 1873.

Instructions sent yesterday by cable authorize you to defer closing legation in order to allow a reasonable time to Spanish government to ascertain facts in response to their request through minister here, presented on the 18th inst. No other postponement has been agreed to, and minister was informed that a satisfactory settlement would be expected by the 26th.

FISH.

MADRID, NOV. 20, 1873.

Have received rejoinder of minister to my reply to his note in answer to our protest. Neither this nor either of the three communications in writing so far received, contains any expression of regret or disapproval of the capture or the slaughter at Santiago. The press approves the whole business, and denies that any censure or regret has been expressed by this government. The ministerial journals acquiesce. SICKLES.

MADRID, NOV. 21, 1873.

Constant efforts are made by this cabinet to conciliate England. Castelar is every day at British legation. The press has received an official hint to contrast the moderation of England with our impatience. I suspect overtures have also been made to Germany for her good offices. SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, NOV. 23, 1873.

Have telegraphed to Rome for authority to Italian minister to take custody of library and property. Spanish government, through minister here, proposed arbitration, which has been declined, on the ground that the question is not one for arbitration, the subject being one of national honor, of which the nation must be the judge and custodian. FISH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, NOV. 25, 1873.

If upon the close of to-morrow no accommodation shall have been reached in the case of the *Virginus*, you will address to the foreign office a note expressing regret at the delay of the reparation asked for, and stating that, in conformity with instructions from your government, you were under the necessity of withdrawing from Madrid, for which purpose you request the usual passport for yourself, your family and suite. If, however, the accommodation desired should be brought about in the course of to-morrow, either here or in Madrid, you will, until otherwise directed, abstain from addressing the note adverted to. Should a proposition be submitted to you to-morrow, you will refer it here, and defer action until it be decided upon. A telegram has just now been read to me by Admiral Polo, which gives reason to hope for a satisfactory accommodation. You will, therefore, allow the whole of to-morrow to pass before addressing your note. FISH.

MADRID, Nov. 25, 1873.

Layard says Granville has expressed his sense of the justice and moderation of the reparation we have demanded, and this has been communicated to Castelar. England reserves her reclamation for the present, and endeavors to promote a settlement of the question pending between the United States and Spain.

SICKLES.

MADRID, Nov. 26, 1873.

At half-past two this afternoon, half an hour after I had asked for my passports, I received a note, dated to-day, from minister of state, in which he says :

First. If it appear, on or before the 25th of December next, that the *Virginius* rightfully carried the American flag, and that her documents were regular, Spain will declare the seizure illegal, salute the flag as requested, and return the ship with the surviving passengers and crew.

Second. If it be proved that the authorities of Santiago de Cuba, in their proceedings and sentences pronounced against foreigners, have essentially infringed Spanish legislation or treaties, this government will arraign those authorities before competent tribunals.

Third. Any other reclamations growing out of the affair, which either of the respective governments may have to present, will be considered diplomatically, and, if no agreement be reached, they will be submitted to the arbitration of a third power, named by mutual consent.

Fourth. If the 25th day of December shall have expired without the Spanish government having resolved, in so far as comes within its province, the questions arising out of the demand for reparation, it will hold itself bound to accord such reparation the same as if the right of the United States to receive it were recognized, and such reparation will be given in the form specified in the first and second paragraphs.

SICKLES.

MADRID, Nov. 28, 1873.

Last night it was agreed here informally that, accepting my declaration of the nationality of the *Virginius*, reparation would be made in accordance with our demand of the 15th inst. This was ratified by the council of ministers at 3 this morning, and I was promised an official communication in that sense to-day. I am now informed in a note from minister of state that yesterday you authorized the Spanish minister in Washington to convey to this government a different proposition on the part of the United States, and that it has been accepted, of which you have been

notified through Admiral Polo. Please let me know whether this statement is true. The only instruction I have had from you since my four telegrams of the 26th, is a copy of the Senate resolutions passed in fifty-six.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 29, 1873.

Remain at post. Further instructions soon. Settlement being effected here.

FISH.

MADRID, Dec. 15, 1875, 4:30 P.M.

(Received 3:20 P.M.)

President Castlear called at the legation this afternoon and informed me that the *Virginus* and survivors had been surrendered to those authorized to receive them on the part of the United States.

SICKLES.

MADRID, Dec. 20, 1873, 12:30 A.M.

(Received Dec. 20, 10:20 A.M.)

It is stated here by authority that in consequence of a communication this government has received from that of the United States, in which it appears the *Virginus* is not an American ship, a reclamation will be made by Spain for the restoration of the vessel and passengers.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 20, 1873.

(Sent 11:20 A.M.)

Official advices received of surrender of survivors from *Virginus*.

FISH.

MADRID, Dec. 26, 1873.

(Received Dec. 26, P.M.)

My resignation having been accepted, I now respectfully renew my request for the publication of the correspondence relating thereto, comprising my telegrams of the 6th, 16th and 20th inst., and your replies of the 6th, 17th and 20th. I beg that this request may be submitted to the President.

SICKLES.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, Dec. 31, 1873.

SIR : On the 26th ult., General Sickles' No. 893, arrived at this department during my absence for the holidays. In it he states that it was informally agreed, on the night of the 27th of November last, that on a declaration made by him of the American nationality of the *Virginus*, the vessel and surviving passengers and crew would be delivered

up, the flag saluted, and the other measures of reparation accorded in conformity with our demands of the 15th inst. It is greatly to be regretted that General Sickles did not state with whom this informal agreement was made.

The note of Mr. Carvajal, minister of foreign affairs, which accompanies General Sickles' despatch, does not convey the idea that he had been a party to that agreement, but does intimate that he would have discussed some of the points raised in General Sickles' note but for the arrangement which was made here.

General Sickles further says, that at noon on the 28th of November, Mr. Carvajal sent him a copy of a telegram from Admiral Polo, containing what purported to be a fresh proposal from me respecting the *Virginus*, which General Sickles appears to have supposed was in conflict with the informal arrangement of the previous evening.

Without more accurate information concerning the person with whom the informal arrangement was made, I cannot permit myself to think that the Spanish government receded from any undertaking which it had once assumed.

So far, however, as General Sickles' statement may be supposed to affect this government, it is proper to say that the changes from the original demands of the United States, which were agreed to in the protocol of the 29th of November, were adopted on the suggestion of the Spanish government, under the belief that they did not affect the principles upon which our demands were founded, and were calculated to promote a peaceful settlement of the unfortunate differences which had arisen between the two powers.

Spain having admitted (as could not be seriously questioned) that a regularly documented vessel of the United States is subject, on the high seas, in time of peace, only to the police jurisdiction of the power from which it receives its papers, it seemed to the president that the United States should not refuse to concede to her the right to adduce proof to show that the *Virginus* was not rightfully carrying our flag. When the question of national honor was adjusted, it also seemed that there was a peculiar propriety in our consenting to an arbitration on a question of pecuniary damages.

This happy adjustment of the difference between two sister republics, on a basis honorable to both, fortunately makes the matters referred to by General Sickles of little importance. I have thought it right, however, to correct the misapprehensions under which his despatch seems to have been written. I am, sir, etc.

HAMILTON FISH.

Spain did not long remain a "sister republic," and it made no difference to Cuba whether she was or not. Cuba never had any rights Spaniards were bound to respect.

President Grant had so far made up his mind that war might occur, growing out of the attitude of Spain, that he directed observations and studies to be made of the fortifications of Havana, and ordered officers to obtain certain information looking to operations by land and sea. But he did not love war, and accepted peace with alacrity.

Nov. 12, 1877, the house of representatives called for a report from the secretary of state on the *Virginius* indemnity, and received the following :

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, NOV. 14, 1877.

The secretary of state, to whom was referred the resolution of the house of representatives of the 12th inst., requesting him to "inform the house, if not compatible with the public interests, what amount of indemnity has been paid to this government by the government of Spain on account of the execution of General Ryan and others, at Santiago de Cuba, Nov. 4, 1873, and what disposition has been made of such funds as may have been received," has the honor to report to the president that the amount of indemnity paid by the government of Spain on that account was 80,000 Spanish dollars, yielding, less exchange, the sum of \$77,794.44 in coin ; that claims thereon have been settled and paid to the amount of \$38,102 ; that a claim for \$2,500 has been settled, but is not yet paid ; and that the unexpended balance of the *Virginius* indemnity is invested in 5 per cent. registered bonds of the United States. The secretary of state has also to state that, as the heirs of General Ryan failed to prove that he was a citizen of the United States, nothing has been paid to them from said indemnity funds.

Respectfully submitted.

WM. M. EVARTS.

To the President.

CHAPTER XXXI.

OUTLINE HISTORY OF CUBA FROM MAY, 1896, TO JANUARY,
1897.

A Memorable Year—A Long Period of Spanish Stagnation—The Rainy Season Recess—Maceo Disturbs Peace in Pinar del Rio—Weyler's Policy—Bird's-eye View of Cuban Provinces—Resemblance to New England—The Famous Trocha—Conflict of Testimony—Common Carelessness as to Truth—The Death of Maceo, and Variety of Fiction Founded on It—Dr. Zertucha a Sinister Character—Two American Correspondents with the Spaniards Give Interesting Information—The Story of a Fight at Sea—Fantastic Falsehoods—Castelar's Political Poetry—No Spanish Reform—Cleveland and Congress—Importance of Diplomatic Form and Dignity.

THE year 1896 will be forever memorable in the history of Cuba. In the first month of it the fact that there was a greater war in the Island than ever before—a war with torch and knife, and a fierce resolution on both sides to fight it out to the bitter end—became known to the world ; but there were many particulars wanting to enable the public opinion of nations to be certainly grounded as to the merit of either the political and economic differences or the military situation, every point of fact being ferociously disputed. There was, however, enough obvious to inform all spectators that the insurgents had adopted a more destructive method of warfare than had appeared in the ten years' contest, and that the armed forces of the rebel-

lion were more numerous and their policy more adventurous than on former occasions. The demonstration of this was in the march of Gomez with fire and sword from the Eastern through the Western Provinces, which had in all former experiences been exempt from invasion. It was when the burning cane-fields reddened the sky in the Provinces of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, and the ruddy glare was discerned from the streets of Havana and the decks of steamers on the Gulf, that the great military chieftain and pacificator of Spain, Martinez Campos, who had hastened to the scene of former exploits to close up the insurrection at once, was recalled ; and this seemed, to thoughtful men, to declare beyond dispute the loss to Spain of the Island. The successor, after a short interval, of Campos (Weyler) has occupied about the same time with substantially the same results. Spain has made terrible sacrifices, and the insurrection continues.

It was hardly possible to invent charges that were not made against Campos, but the most effective of the many accusations was, that he was too moderate and considerate and tender toward rebellious Cubans, and did not display the higher order of military strategy, enterprise and energy. Weyler was announced and denounced as a man of another stamp, uniting untiring vigor with unrelenting severities. He began cautiously, with the view of disproving the horrible stories circulated of him, and proceeded vigorously and hopefully, as has been recorded, assuming in conferences with business men that he would soon be able to pacificate the sugar regions, so that the most important of the industries of the Island could be resumed ; and it was avowed his purpose was to complete the con-

quest of the West End and confine the flagrancy of rebellion to the east end, in which it originated.*

It was in the month of February that the Weyler administration began, and now it is December—ten months passed—and we hear again that the Captain-General is about to suppress the insurrection in Pinar del Rio and Havana and Matanzas Provinces, in the order in which they are named, and then there is to be sugar-grinding, Spanish reform, and a rule of beneficence ; but the reports, so far as they are intelligible and within the limitations of reasonable authenticity, do not prepare us for the immediate appearance of the repeatedly promised results. The two great features of the Cuban war have been the raid of Gomez, taking the Island lengthwise last year, and the fight of Maceo this year in the Western Province. The Spanish nation has made great sacrifices, sparing neither men nor money. Indeed, the power and persistence displayed by Spain have been remarkable, and show a greater vitality than we were prepared to observe. The army now in Cuba, with the volunteers, still fifty thousand strong—the whole two hundred thousand men—

* In order to get a bird's-eye view of Cuba we should remember it is about the size of the State of New York and eight hundred miles long, divided into six provinces, answering closely in comparative proportions to the New England States. Stretch New England out in tropical seas, with Maine East and Connecticut West, let East Massachusetts answer to the Province of Havana, and Boston to the great Cuban city, and the least luxuriant part of the Cuban country is Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont, corresponding to Santiago de Cuba, Puerto Principe and Santa Clara, where revolution has been organized and is most obstinate. Until this war the Spaniards have been able to prevent the disorganization of Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and this would locate the scene of Maceo's struggles for nine months in Connecticut, and the place of his death in Rhode Island—the trocha being a military line drawn to separate Connecticut (Pinar del Rio) from the rest of the Island. This "diagram" fails in many particulars to parallel the map ; but it is instructive, if not pursued too closely and far.

would be formidable in the fields of Europe, but seems as a rule helpless in the deep mud roads and terrible jungles, and the swamp and mountain ambuscades of Cuba, especially in the rainy season, which is two-thirds of the time. It is a foolish error to undervalue the Spanish troops. They are not of a bad quality, are well armed, fairly drilled, clothed and fed, and the officers are devoted, many of them very intelligent, and it is a stupid falsehood to say they are cowards; yet they seem to be the victims of a mysterious immobility. But the mystery is mitigated when we realize the absence of roads, and the fatal system that is expressed in the trocha—that of fortifying lines across the narrow Island, separating it into districts with military fences. Upon these the Spaniards have insisted, as though the art of war was building pens, and they have labored as if aggressive campaigning consisted in the construction of extended fortifications, and after all pains taken the Cuban chieftains hold in contempt, and cross the line when they please, as Gomez did in his celebrated western march, and as Maceo did just before he found death in a skirmish.

The construction of the trocha is thus described :

The forest and dense underbrush were cut down, leaving an opening, varying from one hundred to eight hundred yards wide. A platform of palm-boards eight feet wide was built through the swamp, following the eastern bank of the big ditch.

Forts or block-houses were erected about every five or eight hundred yards. They are very elaborate affairs, built of logs cut in the neighboring woods, and covered outside with dressed lumber. A narrow opening runs around the fort to permit firing, and a few feet above is an opening about three feet in height to allow a free circulation of air within. A galvanized zinc roof covers the yellow painted forts, and this is surmounted by a small sentry-box, which also serves as a ventilator. Piles

were driven to give a solid foundation for the buildings. Each fort has a garrison of about one hundred men, commanded by a sub-lieutenant, whose duty it is to patrol the platform. The Spanish soldiers never leave the forts or bridge to explore the swamp, and any person seen near the line is considered an insurgent and fired on.

The way the insurgents pass this line in the swamp is stated as follows by one who made the passage :

Passing the trocha in the swamp is not so dangerous as it is disagreeable. The insurgents are generally from one to four days in crossing, and have to wade through mud, slime, and water up to their waists for more than twelve miles. A misstep causes them to sink up to the neck. Arriving near the platform, an opportunity is waited for, and then a quick dash is made while the sentinel is at the further end of the beat. About half a minute is consumed in swimming the ditch, and jumping over or diving under the bridge. Little fear of being hit by a bullet is entertained by the Cubans, as the Spaniards are famed for bad shooting. The jungle on the other side once reached there is no fear of pursuit, as the Spaniards will not hazard a chase through the swamp.

Major Raul Marti, the first Cuban to cross the line with despatches from Gomez to Maceo, had a trying time. Twice he was attacked by the alligators that infest the southern part of the swamp, and could only defend himself with his machete, as the report of a rifle would have disclosed his presence to the enemy. The sentries were very vigilant, and he and his three companions were compelled to wade through the water, with only their heads out, until they arrived at the bridge. As the unsuspecting sentry passed they pounced on him and ran him through with a machete from behind, and the poor fellow dropped without a sound. The Cubans then noiselessly made their way across.

Major Sainz, who crossed with one hundred and fifty men, left such a large trail behind, and made such a noise in crossing that the Spaniards were at last convinced that it was a comparatively easy matter to pass. A fort was immediately built at the point where Sainz crossed. The day that the fort was completed I, with nineteen companions, crossed under cover of dusk. We had been two days inside the swamp, without food, and slept with half our bodies under water. The crossing was made with a great amount of noise, and although we could hear the soldiers talking and singing inside the fort, we were not discovered.

We must take note that the country lends itself wonderfully to partisan warfare. The growth of trees, and shrubs and vines and bushes, and grasses—and all the rank vegetation that is caused by enormous quantities of moisture and perpetual summer—with the paths deluged for months and the sun flaming forth, after the profuse rains—the endless impedimenta check the operations of Spanish columns, and provide myriads of lurking-places, and every bit of woodland is an almost impregnable fortification. Roughly estimated there are three times as many insurgents, who have taken up arms now, and twice as many Spaniards in the field, as during the ten years' war. On both sides there is hotter passion and more desperate resolves than in other troubled times ; and there have been greater losses of life and more widespread devastation during the eighteen months since the present conflict began than for all the time from 1868 to 1878.

It is a continuing misfortune that there is extreme difficulty in obtaining from Cuba the true news. We positively do not get it in official form from Havana. The official mind of Spain cares a great deal for form, but not much for the facts as facts. The bulletins of the Spanish officers in Cuba might as well be made out on blanks prepared at Madrid. Even the details of " battles "—the number of insurgents slain, and of Spaniards wounded and of horses captured and hats picked up—are familiar. It is the news that will not pass the censor, unless it is colored red and yellow. The Cuban headquarters—excepting the civil government and the camps—is at Key West. The Havana and Tampa steamers touch there, and each boat, whatever secret dispatches may be carried, has a cargo of

rumors—and this possession is not of information, but out of the imagination. There seems, also, to be a literary bureau, whose business it is to work fancies into attractive despatches to telegraph over the world; the primary purpose being not to tell what passes, but to contrive something to help the Cuban cause. No doubt the cause would be the better of more robust truth-telling.

The death of Antonio Maceo was denied in a fury—just as was the early fall, in a skirmish, of José Martí, the man who organized the rebellion and was one of the first martyrs. When the fall of Maceo could be no more disputed, there was a writer of fiction so hardy as to charge that the famous chieftain had been “lured” by the Spaniards to present himself, under a flag of truce, to treat for peace—a thing so out of character for him that it was incredible. He was a man whose policy was always war to the knife; and we may be sure he did not depart from it at his death. There is, however, a mystery about that tragedy. Dr. Zertucha gives only a show of the truth—surely not all that is true—and then theorizes as to matters of which he has knowledge and evidently **avoids**. When Maceo was killed he had crossed the trocha, and was at the head of five hundred men in the Province of Havana, and within an hour’s rapid ride of the city. Just as he said things were “going well,” he fell as if struck by lightning. Young Gomez had an old wound, and being again struck, refused to be helped from the fatal spot until the General was carried away. The Spaniards swept over the ground, but were swiftly driven back—and Maceo was found stripped and Gomez stabbed and his skull cleft. Now the doctor does not account for his

own conduct in surrendering ; and he wanders; making fair weather for the Spaniards, paying for the distinction with which he is treated by them. His tale that he swore he would serve with Maceo only is not credible, and his declaration that Maceo was in despair and threw away his life, for the reason he had aroused jealousies and was persecuted because he was of mixed blood, and not well supported, and therefore wanted to die—all this cannot be accepted. There is a Key West story that accuses Zertucha of systematically betraying Maceo to the Spaniards, and sending them secret intelligence of the location of hospitals. A letter is attributed to one of Maceo's aides, saying he heard firing near Punta Brava, and Zertucha had ridden off to one side of the road and galloped back crying, "Come with me—come with me—quick, quick!" and

Maceo at once put spurs to his horse and, followed by his five aides, rode swiftly after the physician, who plunged into the thick growth on the side of the road.

The party had ridden only a few hundred yards, when Zertucha suddenly bent low in his saddle and swerved sharply to one side, galloping away like mad.

Almost at the same moment a volley was fired by a party of Spanish soldiers hidden in the dense underbrush, and Maceo and four of his aides dropped out of their saddles mortally wounded.

The single survivor—the writer quoted here—managed to make his way back to his own men and brought them up to the spot of the tragedy. The five dead bodies of Maceo and Gomez and the three other aides still lay on the ground. The Spaniards had disappeared.

This seems to have been produced to meet the demand. There is no reason to believe it save so far as it may be corroborated. At any rate it disposes of the flag of truce. It is clearly not impossible that Zertucha is a traitor and betrayed Maceo. He was at the trouble



DEATH OF MACEO.

to say that the Cuban insurgents in Pinar del Rio were reduced to desperation—and we have to conjecture whether there is a considerable measure of truth in this—and that Maceo was really disheartened and desperate, or simply impatient at the long delay of Gomez in marching west, and resolved to go and seek him, at the same time dispersing his command in bands of sixty, as is known to have been his purpose if assailed by overwhelming forces; and it is to be thought of that Zertucha is in the hands of the Spaniards, and is not at liberty to speak, save in a way to please them.

Dr. William Shaw Bowen, correspondent of the *World*, has the distinction of seeing that which passes before him in a way that is kindly toward the Spanish side; and the reputation of this friendliness caused the Captain General the other day to issue a permit to Mr. Bowen to travel in the Province of Pinar del Rio, on the condition—an easy one—that he should not communicate with any of the insurgents. As the doctor promised and proceeded and reported, he says the outlook was astounding. We quote him:

As the train passed through the rich farming region there were few signs of a rebellion. The fields were under cultivation. The men appeared to be pursuing their ordinary avocations. The women and children were on the road as usual.

There were block-houses about the little villages, and a few soldiers were seen about them. Where were the terrible vestiges of war that have been reported? Where was the reign of terror?

At Guira de Melena we passed the church which was held by volunteers against Gen. Gomez's forces last January, the ruins of the houses he burned and the remains of the railway station-houses. They were the only visible evidences of the raid between Guira and Artemisa.

Finally the train, crawling along at the rate of ten miles an hour, reached Artemisa, now a garrison town only, and the famous trocha

was in sight. This trocha is a line of earthworks, dotted with tiny block-houses. It stretches across the level country, north and south, as far as the eye can see.

The town is filled with Spanish soldiers. They have nothing to do since the death of Maceo.

The soil is a rich clay, like that of Virginia; and the doctor says, of the hills that Maceo occupied so long:

They are scarcely high enough to be called mountains, but are thickly wooded and seamed with deep ravines which offer a splendid refuge for the insurgents, who, warned by the pacificos, are able to double easily and elude their Spanish pursuers, whose search is prosecuted in a hostile country.

I passed the place where Maceo camped in October, when he conducted his last military operations there. The camp was made of little huts of palm-leaves and grass thatched so as to offer a protection against the heavy rain. These huts were scattered about irregularly. There was no pretense of military regularity about them. Back of them was a thicket, a dense undergrowth, in which the Cubans could take refuge if attacked. It was a splendid vantage-point for guerrilla soldiers.

Westward of this region the country grows poorer, and is only used for grazing. To my intense surprise I found large herds of cattle here grazing as quietly as if a war in Cuba had never been known.

A desolate town was struck, however, at Palacio, and the famous Vuelta Abajo region, where the finest tobacco in the world is grown. Tobacco has been planted this year a little later than usual, it is true, and the green fronds may be seen waving in the sickly breeze as far as the eye can see. I saw no field in which tobacco had been planted in the past which is not under cultivation now.

General Mulquiso had just returned from a fortnight's expedition, and said most of the rebels had hidden their arms and were posing as pacificos, and remarked of Maceo that his death was a terrible blow to the rebellion, and

His black followers sacrificed their homes in their devotion to him. His white adherents are worthless as fighting men. I found much suffering among the people of the hills. In many cases young children

brought into camp were so nearly starved that they could not retain solid food.

The plan of compelling the families of rebels to go to the towns is wise from a military standpoint. Your Sheridan swept clean the Shenandoah Valley, not because he wished to, probably, but from a military necessity. I presume the time is not distant when the regular Spanish troops will abandon Pinar del Rio, leaving order to be restored by the civil guard and volunteers.

The doctor returned to Havana on a train packed with sick officers and men going back towards the capital city, and possibly towards home. The most prevalent complaint was chills and fever, but some who had yellow fever were taken on.

The most interesting matter communicated by the doctor is that he saw tobacco-fields in good condition, and herds of cattle. This is a surprise. There are certain verities avow themselves—and making allowances for the required friendliness toward Spain that permitted Mr. Bowen to go to the disputed territory, and have his dispatch passed—there remains a good deal of matter-of-fact of value.

A correspondent of the *Herald* was permitted to accompany Gen. Weyler to the field, and interviewed him in his tent on the day before Christmas. This was in the midst of a camp of 10,000 men at the foot of the Ranzil Hills. The correspondent says the General is approachable and unpretending, and said, "the complete pacification of the Province is a matter of a few days." The General thought the rebels had hidden their guns and were posing as pacificos, and many would come in and surrender, if they had not heard he would kill them all. He declared of the insurgents willing to lay down their arms:

I know that they have held meetings with the idea of coming in as presentados, but have been told that I would murder them all, which

is absurd, is it not? Certainly I shall not harm them; but, not knowing that, they hope to throw away their arms and pose as pacificos still.

"When the presentados begin to come in crowds, and the rest find that they are not killed there will be a general rush to surrender."

Much was not heard of General Riviera. Speaking of his force, General Weyler said :

"I have twenty-six battalions, ranging from eight hundred to a thousand men each, occupying all the hills of the Province. These columns have destroyed everything in sight, and have been able to subsist on the cattle of the insurgents, which were found grazing in the hills, and with whose destruction died their remaining hope of sustenance. They must either starve now or submit, and some may prefer to do the former, owing to their remarkable apathy."

Gen. Weyler invited the *Herald* man to dinner, and at the sound of the bugle the troops were called to get an extra ration of wine. There was a supply store with 100,000 rations kept for an emergency. There are two further passages of importance in this letter, as follows :

I arrived in San Cristobal December 23d, after a seven hours' journey in the train from Havana. We met troops all along our route. Trains with troops are arriving here every hour, and troops filled the road between each station. Half the passengers in the train were officials. From the train windows we could see all the roads clouded by large masses of soldiers. Cavalry columns were everywhere seen moving toward Pinar del Rio by all roads leading to that city.

Everything looks sombre here for the insurgents. The friends of the insurgents here say that the rebels, although well equipped, are desperate on account of lack of food, and that if General Weyler follows the plans he proposes the insurgents on this side of the trocha will have either to fight and be killed in battle or starve. Unless assistance from General Gomez or Calixto Garcia comes to them, they will have to cross the trocha in small bands.

The willingness of the Spaniards to allow the correspondents to see the inside of the Province where

Maceo so long maintained himself, argues that they feel very sure of being in complete command of that part of the country. But the representatives of Cuba strenuously deny any approach to pacification in the west, and say there is an insurgent army of six thousand intrenched on the hills, provided with provisions and armed with dynamite guns, and if that is so, Weyler has another tedious campaign before he can proclaim order and move east. The cause of Cuba ought not to be trifled with, as it is by the "news" Bureau at Key West, but it will go on in competition with the Spanish official romances, and the provocation given by the military censorship. Here is an example of the Key West production :

ALMOST CAUGHT WEYLER—INSURGENTS SURPRISE THE SPANISH CAPTAIN-GENERAL—HE WAS FOUND ON THE ARTEMISA MILITARY ROAD WITH A SMALL ESCORT—SAVED BY THE ARRIVAL OF CAVALRY.

KEY WEST, FLA., Dec. 25.—Havana news indicates that Gen. Weyler is having more trouble in the Pinar del Rio section than he expected.

As he was traveling the military road from Artemisa to San Cristobal, the second day of his arrival, with a smaller escort than usual, an attack was made on him, and but for the sudden and unexpected appearance of a company of Spanish cavalry he would have been captured.

This road is one that Weyler keeps strongly guarded, but on that day a part of the troops was on another portion, and where Weyler was traveling the force was small. While crossing a bridge over a small creek, ambushed Cubans poured in a sudden fire, killing nearly half his escort.

Weyler's horse shied and ran off, carrying his rider out of range. Dozens of Cubans pursued on foot. They fired at him, hoping to disable his horse and effect his capture.

The sound of firing brought up a squadron of cavalry that was passing to Artemisa, and Weyler plunged into their midst in somewhat undignified haste. The skirmish was continued for half an hour, but, finding that they were outnumbered, the insurgents withdrew. Since that Weyler has not gone out, except when guarded by a large force.

There was no foundation whatever for this story, and it is a folly to invent that sort of thing to be pumped into the country through the wires. There can be no mistake about it. The case is one of falsification, descending to particulars of elaboration.

Señor Palma, the head of the Cuban Junta, refers effectively to Dr. Zertucha's letter, saying :

"It is a sufficient indication of the man's character that he surrenders to the enemy, under the conditions in his case, and that he is treated in such a kindly manner by the Spaniards.

"What more natural than that he, in combination with Spanish diplomacy, should be the instrument by which the revolution should be discredited? He certainly knows that this interview will ultimately be sent to Cuba, where it cannot be received by the Spaniards otherwise than with demonstrations of gratitude.

"I know from letters received from General Antonio Maceo personally, as well as from a person of our mutual confidence, through whom we frequently communicated, that Maceo was not in the desperate straits depicted by Zertucha. The following extract from a letter lately received will show that Maceo was well satisfied with the condition of affairs :

ANTONIO MACEO'S LETTER.

"General Maceo wrote, under date of November 14th, as follows :

"The active operations of the campaign have prevented me, much against my wishes, from answering immediately your welcome communications of the 19th and 25th of October.

"General Rius Reviera happily disembarked with all the war material sent, which was well employed in a series of hard combats which we sustained against our enemies, but which were all most signal victories for us. The object of Weyler was to imprison our army between two fortified lines, and make us suffer a tremendous defeat by means of simultaneous attacks by forces previously placed in those positions ; but the most brilliant success crowned our efforts—six of the enemy's columns which tried to impede our progress, after our saving the expedition of General Rius Rivera, being destroyed."

It is also responsibly stated that Maceo, on the day

before his death, referred with confidence to the rebel troops in Pinar del Rio.*

Señor Palma says :

“General Maceo was loved and supported by all men struggling for Cuban independence, whether in a military or civil capacity. If a man was ever idolized by his people, that man was General Maceo. Dr. Zertucha knows that, but perhaps he has an object in making his false assertions.”

This sort of statement has the power of moderation, and the malice of Dr. Zertucha in dragging in the race question is manifest.

M. Caronado, formerly editor of *La Discusion*, of Havana, knew Maceo well, and says of him :

Maceo was a natural politician in that he had the genius of divining popular opinion, and taking the leadership of popular movements. He was in Havana at that time sounding men and scheming for the present revolution. He was always of the sunniest disposition, closely attaching all people to him—a man of the strictest moral integrity ; he never drank wine, he never smoked, and that in a land where tobacco is as common as potatoes in Ireland ; and he never played cards. He had a great abhorrence of men who drank to excess, and would not tolerate them about him.

He always dressed when in Havana in the most finished style. His massive frame—he was about five feet ten inches in height and unusually broad-shouldered—was displayed to advantage always in frock coat, closely buttoned, and he usually wore a silk hat. He was neat even to fastidiousness in his dress. He usually carried a cane.

When Maceo took the field, however he roughed it with his men, and dressed accordingly.

In active service he was habitually armed :

with a long-barreled 38 calibre revolver with a mother-of-pearl handle, and carrying a Toledo blade made in the form of a machete. The han-

* Of course there is a weekly story that Maceo is alive—an effort to utilize his ghost.

dle of this machete was finely wrought silver and turquoise shell, and had four notches in it, into which the fingers could easily fit. Maceo always had three horses with him on his marches, the favorite being a big white one.

ANTONIO MACEO.

Stern and unyielding, though others might bow to the tempest ;
 Slain by the serpent who cowered in hiding beneath thee,
 Slumber secure where the hands of thy comrades have laid thee ;
 Dim to thine ear be the roar of the battle above thee.
 Set, now, is thy sun, going down in darkness and menace,
 While through the thick-gathering clouds one red ray of vengeance
 Streams up to heaven, blood-red, from the place where thou liest.
 Though the sword of Death's angel lies cold on thy forehead,
 Still to the hearts of mankind speaks the voice of thy spirit,
 Still does thine angry shade arrest the step of the tyrant. V. B.

—*N. Y. Sun.*

There is a Key West dispatch, December 24th, stating that " Gen. Riviera is moving out of his intrenchments, and reports indicate that a battle may be fought soon ; " but if he has an army in a strong position, he will of course wait right there for Weyler, and they will not fight it out. The old policy is plenty of time.

However, the word battle is habitually used in reference to the Cuban combats as descriptive of very small affairs. If Riviera had ten thousand good men, there might be a chance for a decisive battle ; but the Junta claims that his force is six thousand strong. The story of the naval engagement is an example of the waste of words in picturesque writing. It seems a filibuster boat, whose reputation is well known — *The Three Friends*—encountered a Spanish launch and gunboat when attempting to land rifles and artillery and ammunition at the mouth of the San Juan river, on the south coast of Cuba, two hundred miles east of Havana, and there was considerable firing into the water, but no one

hurt, and yet we read of "a sea fight," a "victory," for the boat that fled, and "a naval engagement," that should startle the world. Why, the story of the battle of the Nile was never printed in such colors as this fake fight, which simply shows the recklessness of filibusters, who made a narrow escape from furnishing the raw material for another *Virginus* case. The only thing of importance is the proof furnished of the long-known and formally denied business of the vessel whose crew and passengers boast that they fired on the flag of Spain, and "whipped up the sea" with their bullets.

The *Journal* has a characteristic proclamation from the eloquent, poetic Spanish statesman, Castelar, who writes in and is cabled from Madrid.

And as Cleveland has acted, so will McKinley. As a Republican, he will perhaps do even more than would a Democrat to discourage jingoes who advocate a war, bound to be equally fatal to victor and vanquished, breaking the bonds of association which bind the Old World to the New.

I see in Mr. Cleveland's message all the splendor of international humanity, and I deduce from it that he will stand as defender of his own theory not to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans, least of all to accord their independence or approve of intervention, even peaceful intervention—to say nothing of intervention by force of arms, since he feels that the eyes of the world are on him at this moment.

It is necessary that liberty should walk hand in hand with peace; for cruel war overthrows all principles of justice, crushing the laws of human nature, by putting force against force, violence against violence, despotism against despotism.

From external conquest it is but a step to internal oppression. That would be to do away with the work of Washington, and substitute for it the power of the Cæsars, whose inevitable establishment drives and hastens us towards slavery and barbarism.

I do not know whether my country will approve of my statement that its honor will be heightened by a continuance of economic reforms that seem even more dangerous than seemed in its time, the emancipation of

the slaves in Cuba, thus inaugurating a system of reforms that would strengthen our government in both the Antilles.

With patriotism such as ours no egoistic influence can overlook the interests of our country, and no privileges engendered by protection should disturb a peace that menaces our sovereignty over Cuba, or our national honor.

A liberal government like ours, conceived by great men and progressive statesmen, even in the lines that have distinguished the United States above nations, cannot learn from outsiders its faults in governing the Antilles or submit to a mediator.

President Cleveland, like myself, was obviously persuaded of the truth when he wrote his message, completely favorable as it was to Spain. What surprises me is the senseless proposition, so favorably received by the Senate, recommending the acknowledgment of Cuban rebels as belligerents—recommending the independence which is impossible, and which would be a frightful aggravation to the Spanish people and a violation of international courtesy.

They tell me that conflict is inevitable. It will be as uncalled for an aggression on the part of the United States as was that of Napoleon in 1808, when he invaded our territory. We have listened to menaces with the stoic disdain of the just and true. We have done everything possible to avoid a war—everything but humiliate ourselves before the strong and sully our national history with indignity.

But if the United States do, we cannot believe that the Americans, the humane, the progressive, will declare it.

As for ourselves, we will do everything we can to avoid this sad interference—without pride, but also without timidity.

EMILIO CASTELAR.

As Cleveland has announced, the time must soon come when the United States shall not give the first place to her recognition of the sovereignty of Spain, it seems that the Spanish statesman may have been more complacent in his rhetoric than he suspected. We may put aside three things that persistently appear and reappear in dispatches, with a brief remark for each :

1. There will be no European intervention on behalf

of Spain, if we should take a part in the Cuban struggle and command the peace.

2. Spain will not accept our good offices on any terms, or consent to an assertion of rights on our part to be interested in the great American Island. She has gone beyond that state of mind.

3. There is nothing to regard as possible in any of the reforms the Spaniards are promising with much animation, and to which they ascribe the greatest excellence, to take place after the insurgents have surrendered their arms. Spain is, as always, incapable of changing her fatal colonial policy, that never has been or can be reformed.

The idle talk caused by the President's respectful reference to the alleged autonomy of Cuba in his message is disposed of by Señor Palma in these words :

Autonomy would mean that the Cuban people will make their own laws, appoint all of their public officers, except the Governor-General, and attend to the local affairs with entire independence, without, of course, interference by the metropolis. What, then, would be left to Spain, since between her and Cuba there is no commercial intercourse of any kind? Spain is not, and cannot be, a market for Cuban products, and is moreover unable to provide Cuba with the articles in need by the latter. The natural market for the Cuban products is the United States, from which in exchange Cuba buys with great advantage, flour, provisions, machinery, etc. What, then, I repeat, is left to Spain but the big debt incurred by her, without the consent and against the will of the Cuban people? We perfectly understand the autonomy of Canada as a colony of Great Britain. The two countries are closely connected with each other by the most powerful ties—the mutual interest of a reciprocal commerce.

The Constitutional question of the comparative powers of Congress and the President in recognition of new nations is not of applicable importance to the

Cuban questions. The discussion may be instructive, and prepare the way for the enlightened action of the incoming administration. Considering the summary of Secretary of State Olney, we remark the force and accuracy of it. The Secretary says :

From every accessible indication, it is clear that the present rebellion is on a far more formidable scale, as to numbers, intelligence, and representative features, than any of the preceding revolts of this century ; that the corresponding effort of Spain for its repression has been enormously augmented ; and that, despite the constant influx of fresh armies and material of war from the metropolis, the rebellion, after nearly two years of successful resistance, appears to-day to be in a position to prolong indefinitely the contest on its present lines.

There will speedily be developments in Pinar del Rio that will show whether the force of the insurgents has been exaggerated in the general acceptance ; and if Gomez is at the head of the army he has been occupied with so long, he must hasten to meet Weyler, who claims to have conquered the West End, and is certain, if he can make a plausible show of pacification there, to march eastward with his whole available force. Here we have the true test of the strength of the Cuban cause. Spain has done her utmost, as she is situated, with a rebellion on her hands in the Philippine Islands ; and if the army and navy in and around Cuba cannot suppress the rebellion, it must succeed. Gomez is an old man, and the brunt of battle had fallen to the fortune of Maceo for six months before he was killed, but the imputation that Gomez is disheartened or disloyal is a story that accords with the climate, prepared to arouse Cuban suspicion and jealousy. Now is the campaigning time, and Weyler means business in the field. This is the critical struggle. If the insurgents hold their

own until June, they must unquestionably win; and unless torn by factions and jealous incompetents, they will do that. It is a true case of "freedom's battle, once begun, bequeathed from bleeding sire to son, though baffled oft, is always won." There is no reason to conclude that the insurgents will not be able, in the Middle and Eastern Provinces, to protract the war indefinitely—a state of things that will force the recognition of independence. The United States will be constrained, on the precise grounds stated by Secretary Olney, to inform the Spaniards that our good offices in relation to Cuba will be tendered in 1897, as they were by President Grant in 1869—for the reasons then stated by Secretary Fish, and respectfully considered by General Prim, and must now be accepted. It is absurd to say, in the face of the civilized world, that the great American power has no interest in the great American Island. We have material interests there of great proportions, and the right to interpose to check a savage warfare that the Christian nations of Europe have, but do not exercise, at Constantinople. The cause of Cuba is not best served by those who are most forward and loud. We should tender our good offices to Spain, and relieve her from the embrace of death in which she is entangled; but we should do it decently and in order, for her sake as well as Cuba's. Our responsibilities are so clear, and the situation so grave, and our power so compelling, we should disregard all frivolous fabrications intended to precipitate our action as unworthy the cause abused, and proceed with the dignity becoming the predominant power of the American hemisphere to Americanize American islands.

CHAPTER XXXII.

SPANISH FINANCIAL CRISIS AND AMERICAN POLICY.

Fighting in a Cloud—A Mystery of Horror—The Situation after Twenty-eight Months of War—How the Spanish Army is Wasted—Cuba in Congress—Belligerency Resolution—Policy of the Administration—The Foresight of Gomez—Fortunes of East and West Cuba—Crisis in Spanish Finance—Spain Agitated—Prospect for Peace—General Woodford Minister to Spain.

THE interest in Cuba abides, though the continuing tragedy crawls on until there is monotony of the horrible and the hopeless. The call for the third edition of this Story of Cuba, comes in the third of the rainy seasons since the outbreak of the war, which has lasted nearly two years and a half, and become to Americans almost mysterious—for the fight is in a cloud. The fall of Maceo proved to be a disaster of the first magnitude to the insurgents, and this was followed by the defeat and capture of his successor, General Riviera. The effect has been to give the Spaniards a preponderance in the Western Provinces, and to some extent justify the official assurances that Pinar del Rio has been "pacified." The insurgents there have indeed become an organization of guerillas, who have ceased to devastate the plantations, and railroad communication and tobacco-growing have been, to a considerable extent, resumed. The Spanish system of building a multitude of small forts, and garrisoning them with groups of soldiers, often not exceeding half a dozen, lends itself to the partial protection of those who are willing to

work in the fields ; and there has always been in Cuba a feeling that while sugar-making counted for Spain, tobacco-raising was especially a Cuban industry. While the West End of Cuba has been generally overcome by the Spaniards, in the East End the rebellion outside the garrisoned towns is successful, and the Central Provinces are disputed territory, where the sugar plantations not devastated pay taxes to both governments, and private requisitions to the officers of both. The most distressing feature of the war is, the concentration of the Cuban small farmers within the Spanish military lines, where they are perishing of famine and pestilence. Captain-General Weyler invented the policy of making the peasantry leave their humble homes and fields and put themselves under the protection—that is, within the power—of the Spanish forces, because the assistance the country people gave the insurgents was constantly obvious. A Spanish column could not move an hour's march without full reports reaching their enemies, with endless facilities for ambuscades, while it was impossible for the regular troops to get news of rebel movements. No persuasions or threats could prevail with the islanders to aid by giving information to those attempting their subjugation. This fact is itself proof of the desperate resolution of the Cubans to fight Spain to the last. They feel that Spanish rule is intolerable—that it is martial law modified by corruption, and not, under any conditions, to be endured. The information of the terrible sanitary conditions of the camps in which the Cubans are penned, reached President McKinley very early in his administration. Special reports were ordered from all our representatives in the Island, and these confirmed the

narratives of the privation and perishing of those children of Spain who would not serve her and aid in extinguishing their own hopes of liberty. The consular reports contained much about the hardships of American citizens, and an exaggerated idea of their numbers in the squalid camps was formed. Many Cubans, having no protection under the Spanish law as citizens—being in a condition much worse than to have no country—and looking naturally to the great Northern Republic for sympathy at least, and hoping for help, have taken advantage of our policy making naturalization easy, to become citizens of the United States. They are very proud and pleased to be American citizens, and swift to tell of the possession of that dignity—placing upon it, as a rule, an extreme estimation. There is something pathetic in the testimony they bear in this way to our greatness—but it is not one of their cardinal virtues to be moderate and judicious—and there are curious American citizens discovered during the agitations of civil warfare. The rights of naturalization have indeed been abused, and there are point and pith in the anecdote related of Consul-General Williams, that when a correspondent made representations that seemed doubtful as to the purpose for which he wanted his passport, the serious and able old functionary swore him on his “honor as a native American citizen,” and found at last even this remarkable oath not regarded. The President was moved by the reports of the sufferings of Americans under the harsh rule of Weyler, and sent a special message, asking an appropriation of \$50,000 for the relief of our citizens with food or medicine or transportation to this country. It was reported that the Americans were nearly all workingmen, who

had been employed on sugar plantations, but there have not been as many genuine American citizens found for relief as was expected.

During the year the Captain-General has made many journeys in the course of the operations he has been pleased to "order and command," and has not come to harm from the sharpshooters who seek his life. His favorite method of travel has been by steamer, and there are portions of the coast with which he has become familiar, but his journeys by rail and on horseback have also been extensive. However, the immobility of the Spanish columns continues to puzzle the observer, and the wonder grows how, with so important an army—for the available Spanish troops, according to the pay rolls, are more than a hundred thousand strong*—there has not been much fighting—only a few scattering skirmishes—and the casualty lists are small, indeed, when the expenditure of ammunition and money is considered. There have been many accounts of "battles" in the Spanish official reports and the Key West dispatches, but there has not been a "battle" in Cuba that in the least changed the face of affairs for more than a year. The pacification of the Island goes on, according to the authorities, and yet—it is Madrid news—more troops are wanted. Spain has made surprising efforts and sacrifices, but the results certainly do not warrant the continuance of the war. We hear regularly from Key West of splendid successes by the rebels, but if there is any fact at all behind the stories, it is shadowy. The favorite rebel feat of arms is the march of Gomez on Havana, which is romance—fiction barely founded on fact. If there was a considerable percentage

* Not counting those in the forts.

of truth in the accounts of battles given by either side, the truth would commend itself to the American people, but the grand talk of small matters only excites contempt.

The Cubans have been intensely anxious, from the first of the war, as to the position of the United States, and had hopes that our presidential election in 1896 would turn upon the Cuban question. The form in which the policy of the islanders has been presented in Congress and through the organs of the sentiments of the insurgents, has been that of obtaining recognition of their rights as belligerents, but the real question has been whether the rebellion should be aided by our action. Senator Morgan's joint resolution, so warmly debated, in May, in the Senate, is in these terms :

Resolved, etc., That a condition of public war exists between the government of Spain and a government proclaimed, and for some time maintained by force of arms, by the people of Cuba, and that the United States of America shall maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.

It was anticipated that this resolution, vehemently discussed, would make necessary a declaration of the Cuban policy of the McKinley administration. The leadership of the movement was in the hands of the Southern Democratic senators, aided by the Populists, and a few Republicans took advanced ground on the same side, passing the resolution May 30th. The vote was: yeas, 41; nays, 14; not voting, 33.

It was the strenuous contention of the advocates of the resolution that it meant only to show the Cubans fair play, but the deeper significance of the proposal to grant belligerent rights was not stated with precision. Cubans, with the joint resolution a law, would have

a shadowy credit for bond issues and a chance to send out privateers attacking Spanish commerce ; and the Spaniards have the right of search of our ships off Sandy Hook. These things, taken together, surely threaten war with Spain. As the Spanish army in Cuba is fed with imported food, we would have only to blockade the Island to force the capitulation of the forces of Spain and their evacuation of the Island ; but we could not blockade Spain, and her cruisers would inflict great losses on our commerce—if not otherwise, through the rise in the rates of insurance—and the war, without firing a gun, would cost us \$500,000,000. It was noticeable that the senators favorable to the unlimited coinage of silver in legal tender form without limit were for the most radical and passionate course in Cuban affairs ; and there was, apparently, an idea that if we should find ourselves at war with Spain we would be speedily forced to a silver basis, a situation devoutly desired by the majority of the supporters of the belligerency resolution. The open policy of the administration was first to be sure of the facts. This was the part of wisdom, because the conflict of assertions as to the real situation in Cuba has been remarkable, and it was evident the President would not permit his hand to be forced. It was a surprise when Senator Fairbanks of Indiana, well known to be in close relations with the President and his advisers, made a speech—his first in the Senate—proposing the following amendment to the resolution of Senator Morgan of Alabama, striking out all after the resolving clause and inserting :

That the Congress of the United States views with deep solicitude the deplorable civil strife in the Island of Cuba, which is so destructible to life and property, and which is embarrassing and destroying the com-

merce of the United States with Cuba. The highest motives of humanity and public interest require the cessation of hostilities and the establishment of peace, and that the President shall, in a friendly spirit, tender the good offices of the United States to Spain, to the end that bloodshed may speedily cease, and that honorable and permanent peace may be established in the Island of Cuba ; and further,

That the President, in a spirit of amity, tender the good offices of the United States to Spain, in an endeavor to secure the independence of Cuba upon terms alike honorable and just to all powers concerned. And if the President shall be unable, by such friendly intercession, to secure the independence of Cuba within a reasonable time, he shall communicate the facts to Congress, with his recommendations thereon.

In the course of his speech, Senator Fairbanks said:

A new administration is in power, not yet three months old—an administration charged with great responsibility. Shall we act in this grave matter regardless of its views or policies respecting foreign affairs? Shall the Congress take one position and the Executive another upon a question of such moment and obvious delicacy? If so, what will be the effect, not only upon the fortune of Cuba, but upon our domestic affairs, sensitive and unsettled as they are?

Mr. President, if I correctly apprehend those who favor the resolution of the Senator from Alabama, one of the chief purposes to be accomplished by the recognition of belligerency is to legitimize the war in Cuba; it is to change barbarous warfare into civilized warfare. The immediate purpose is not to stop the war, but to alter its character.

Sir, I hold to the opinion that all war is barbarous. I am against war, civilized or uncivilized, except it be necessary to redeem people from oppression, or be for national defense, or to sustain the national honor in the protection of American citizenship. I preferred a reference of the joint resolution to the Foreign Relations Committee, that it might determine whether under all the facts, according to the official information in the possession of the government, it could not report a resolution which will accomplish what the resolution offered by the Senator from Alabama fails to secure, and that is, peace and the independence of Cuba.

Upon the recognition of belligerent rights, Mr. President, we do not stop the war; we merely dignify it. When will it cease? How much longer will the slaughter continue? How much longer will the sword and torch devour? No one can tell; no one can measure the loss,

I would prefer a policy more certain, more direct. Let us come out into the open and be for war or against it. If a great moral responsibility rests upon us, as I believe it does, let us discharge it squarely and fairly.

Sir, I would forthwith tender the good offices of this government to the Spanish cabinet, to the end that war cease. And further, I would open amicable negotiations to secure the independence of Cuba, which, under the providence of the Almighty, is its manifest destiny. If these peaceful and honorable methods fail and the war should continue, I would have no hesitancy in reaching out the mighty arm of this government and saying, "This war shall cease." But, sir, such an extreme measure will not be necessary to accomplish an honorable peace.

Some of the distinguished Senators who belong to the party which holds my loyal allegiance have professed to support the resolution of the Senator from Alabama because, as they hold, it is in consonance with the platform adopted at St. Louis. I heard the distinguished Senator from Nebraska [Mr. Thurston], who presided over the deliberations of that great congress of American citizens assembled at St. Louis with such conspicuous ability, read the platform this morning and declare his approval of it. With due deference to the honorable Senator, I must utterly and entirely repudiate the suggestion that the resolution proposed by the Senator from Alabama is in accord with the Republican platform, for, in my judgment, it is against it. The platform upon the Cuban question declared that—

From the hour of achieving their own independence the people of the United States have regarded with sympathy the struggles of other American people to free themselves from European domination. We watch with deep and abiding interest the heroic battle of the Cuban patriots against cruelty and oppression, and our best hopes go out for the full success of their determined contest for liberty.

The government of Spain having lost control of Cuba, and being unable to protect the property or lives of resident American citizens, or to comply with its treaty obligations—

Note carefully what follows—

we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island. This language is free from ambiguity. Its meaning is not involved in the slightest doubt. Peace and independence are to be obtained through the active agency of the United States.

There is a good deal of disparagement of Gomez, but his idea, reported by Mr. Dawley, that the old chieftain's policy is to keep up Spanish expenses, at as light cost as possible to the Cuban cause, is the wisest thing that can be done. It shows that Gomez is far more than a bushwhacker. He has been moving westward within a few weeks, and a correspondent of the *Sun*, writing from Cardinas, Province of Matanzas, July 7th, gives a striking example of the characteristics of Cuban warfare, a study of which will answer many questions as why the Spaniards with their great superiority of forces fail.

A long distance away the approach of a Spanish column sounds like the coming of a large herd of belled cattle. In addition, the flock of vultures above the column, which in Cuba, as throughout the tropics, always follows crowds of men moving through the country, is infallible evidence that the Spaniards are near at hand.

The river Hanabana, called also Jatibonico, is the south boundary line between the provinces of Matanzas and Santa Clara. I reached it on June 27, near sunset, but could not cross because the Spanish column of Vizcaya, 5,000 strong, was encamped on the north side in Matanzas. We were three miles from the town of Amarillas, and I and my guide concealed ourselves a mile from the town in a thick manigua or forest, from where we could easily and safely watch the movements of the Spaniards. During the night we slept soundly. Next morning at five o'clock the Spanish trumpets calling every man to his place, or *diana*, as the Spanish say, awoke us. The column was four hours crossing the river to Santa Clara province on the railroad bridge. An hour later we also crossed the same bridge with our horses. When we reached the other side the column was disappearing toward the northeast. The men of Vizcaya were going to meet Gen. Gomez, and a few moments after the last Spaniard had disappeared from view we saw the first scouts of Gen. Francisco Carillo, commander of Gomez's vanguard, coming from the southeast. One of them, recognizing us, advised me to wait there. Over 200 Cuban cavalry crossed the river into Matanzas, and an hour later Carillo's force, 1,100 men, nearly all cavalry, arrived.

Gen. Carrillo would not be recognized now by those who saw him in New York in 1895. He is twice as fat as he was then, and wears a long

beard. Shortly after Carrillo arrived, Maximo Gomez, with a force of only 500 cavalrymen, also reached the bridge.

I could not speak to Gomez until late in the evening.

With regard to help from the United States, Gen. Gomez said :

"I have no great hopes of the interference of the American government in our favor. According to my information, President McKinley is inclined toward the home rule solution, which is no solution at all. This is a war to the death for independence, and nothing but independence will we accept. To talk of home rule is to idle away time. But I have hopes that the United States, sooner or later, will recognize our belligerency. It is a question of mere justice, and, in spite of all the arts of diplomacy, justice wins in the long run. The day we are recognized as belligerents I can name a fixed time for the end of the war.

"With regard to paying an indemnity to Spain, that is a question of amount. A year ago we could pay \$100,000,000, and I was ready to agree to that. Now that Spain owes more than \$400,000,000, we will not pay so much.

Here, again, the old chieftain is clearly well-informed and resolute, and he knows where the tender spot of the Spaniards is. They are vulnerable in their finances. A clever and valuable contribution to the history of the Cuban war is a paper by Thomas Gold Alvord, in the July number of the *Forum*. He refers to the multitude of little forts that swallow up the Spanish army. It is estimated that more than one-half the Spaniards are cooped in these pens, and "the balance of the forces not doing clerical or staff work is divided into columns which march to little purpose from one of the little fortified towns to another." As to the state of the Island, Mr. Alvord says :

The two eastern provinces, Santiago de Cuba and Puerto Principe, are already "Cuba Libre." There the new government is discharging all its functions almost without annoyance. In the other four provinces, the rebels are practically the rulers outside the large cities. For more than two years, with a maximum strength of scarcely 30,000 indifferently armed guerilla soldiers, the insurgents have, on a narrow island, suc-

cessfully waged war against 235,000 well-armed troops, assisted by militia, supported by a navy, and maintained by constant supplies.

There appears here, as in all reliable testimony, the fact of the division of the Island—the east end Cuban, the west end Spanish. Mr. Alvord says:

General Gomez never has more than 300 or 400 men with him. His favorite camp is near Arroyo Blanco, on a high plateau, difficult to approach, and covered with dense thicket. He posts his outer pickets at least three miles away, in the directions from which the enemy may come. The Spaniards, whenever possible, march by road; and, with these highways well guarded, Gomez sleeps secure. He knows that his pickets will be informed by some Cuban long before the Spanish column leaves or passes the nearest village to attack him. A shot from the farthest sentry causes little or no excitement in Gomez's camp. The report throws the Spanish column into fears of attack or ambush, and it moves forward very slowly and carefully. Two pickets at such a time have been known to hold 2,000 men at bay for a whole day. If the column presses on, and General Gomez hears a shot from a sentinel near by, he will rise leisurely from his hammock and give orders to prepare to move camp. He has had so many experiences of this kind that not until he hears the volley-shooting of the oncoming Spaniards will he call for his horse, give the word to march, and disappear, followed by his entire force, into the tropical underbrush, which closes like a curtain behind them, leaving the Spaniards to discover a deserted camp, without the slightest trace of the path taken by its recent occupants.

Sometimes Gomez will move only a mile or two. The Spaniards do not usually give chase. If they do, Gomez takes a keen delight in leading them in a circle. If he can throw them off by nightfall, he goes to sleep in his camp of the morning happier than if he had won a battle. The Spaniards learn nothing through such experiences. Gomez varies the game occasionally by marching directly toward the rear of the foe, and there, reinforced by other insurgent bands of the neighborhood, falling upon the column and punishing it severely. While his immediate force is only a handful, the General can call to his aid, in a short time, nearly 6,000 men.

The Cubans are almost entirely cavalry, and they are not good marksmen, though they have a grand con-

fidence in themselves. The Spaniards have the splendid Mauser magazine rifles, and do not take care of them, knocking off the sights because they tear clothes. The way business is done is displayed in this relation by Mr. Alvord :

In one province, the *commandante militar*, when ordered by General Weyler to purchase several hundred horses in the neighborhood, and to pay for them with due-bills on Spain, informed the horse-owners that they need not give up their valuable animals for a worthless \$50 draft, but that they could arrange the matter with his secretary. One of the horse-owners paid at the rate of \$100 for every horse he was asked to furnish, and was told that horses good enough for the service would be bought in New Orleans or Mexico to make up his quota. The secretary of this *commandante* was said, by a bank clerk who keeps his account, to have deposited \$40,000 within three months. The amount of the account of the *commandante* was not learned.

That a great deal of inefficiency of the Spanish forces arises from the corruption that is found in both civil and military administration, there is reason to believe. The recent arrest of many of the leading business men of Havana, without apparent cause, and the sudden dismissal of the cases, goes to show the distrust those who profit by the war, soldiers as well as merchants, have for each other. However, the theory the writer in the *Forum* so freely quoted leads up to, that the Captain-General and those highest in his confidence do not want the war closed in complete victory for the Spanish arms, cannot be accepted, because, if Weyler should succeed, no honors in his country could be refused him. He would be the hero of his day and generation in Spain.

Mr. George Bronson Rae, after many experiences in Cuba, wrote for the *Herald* a comparison between Cuban and Indian warfare that may throw light upon the inability of the Spaniards to overcome all opposition. He says :

The Cubans fondly believe that their present tactics are a revelation to military authorities the world over, but most of our army officers are fully acquainted with such methods.

Our Indian wars furnish probably the best comparison that can be made. Just imagine that the Spaniards are our regular army and the Indians the Cubans. I know that this comparison is a rather poor one, judged by the relative merits of the different sides, as our army is infinitely superior to the Spanish, and the Indians are far more sagacious and astute and are better shots than the Cubans.

But the Indians and Cubans alike, having a perfect knowledge of every trail, river and water hole in their respective habitats, rarely travel on the high roads or principal thoroughfares that the troops are accustomed to march over, but roam around through the hills, forests and out-of-the-way places with impunity.

The history of our Seminole War in the Florida everglades is precisely in point.

Gomez, it is reported, is changing the scene of his operations into Matanzas; and he may do so, as the Spaniards did not imagine he would undertake to be aggressive in the rainy season. He has issued a proclamation stating that he will thank the forces of liberation in the Havana province for what they have done there at the gates of the Capital! There has appeared in the West a new leader of the insurgents, Arango, of aristocratic Cuban family, who has a mass of black men, all infantry, and a new system of intrenching himself, that is said to trouble the Spaniards.

The Cuban cause has been morally damaged by the policy of the torch, and by the literary bureau at Key West, run in exactly the wrong way, to counteract the Spanish official fictitious reports, because it is but one side of a competition in misrepresentation.

The sugar crop of Cuba has been very largely destroyed, and this has taken from the supply of the world nearly one million tons a year of sugar, and yet the

price has not increased. Indeed, it has slightly declined. Simply the beet-sugar industry has been augmented, and the visible wealth of Cuba, upon which the securities of an independent government would rest, has vanished. This is rather cutting off the resources of Cuba than of Spain.

After all that is said by Weyler and Gomez, and in Madrid, Washington, Key West and Havana, there is no probability of a material change in the military or political situation in Cuba. The Spaniards will remain in the forts and towns, and the columns march inconsequently. The insurgents must remain in small bands that they may subsist on the country, and there will be neither conquest nor other "pacifications." The mighty rains will, until the last month of the year, drench the deep soil of the Island, and the sun flame upon the tropical vegetation. There will be skirmishes—a few of them bloody—and expeditions—but nothing revolutionary—Spain losing time and money. The general gain will be by the insurgent. He recuperates swinging in his hammock while it rains. The Spanish reforms will not receive attention. All Cubans know, and one would think the Spaniards might be aware, there can be no paper promise of reform worth examination. In a recent talk, as in many proclamations and interviews, Gomez says :

Spain might better stop all preparations she may be making to grant reforms to Cuba. We will accept neither reforms nor home rule. We have had enough of Spanish promises during 400 years of oppression. Spain must know that this war is only for independence, and that the Cubans will rather die than yield to any other solution. The day we again lifted our flag of liberty we wrote on it, "Independence or death."

These words fairly express the facts, but the boast of

the old warrior, that he will appear at the gates of Havana, need not be regarded, for if he should even draw near that city, as he did in the time of Campos, the movement would be bravado rather than business, as when Hannibal threw his javelin over the walls of Rome.

It is the manifest destiny of Cuba to gain her independence through the collapse of the resources of Spain, and with the sympathy and humane and peaceful aid of the United States. Gomez is right when he touches the expenses of Spain as consuming her credit and forcing her submission to circumstances. There has been evidence for two months of a profound agitation in Spain—a quiet struggle, because there is great agony in it, and a despairing effort that the worst shall not be known. The project of sending 20,000 more men to Cuba has distressed the Spanish people, and the *El Pais* says :

MADRID, July 1st.

This is too much. Spain cannot acquiesce in this. After having suffered so much, the country has decided not to make any more fruitless sacrifices. "Not one more soldier, not one more cent," is now Spain's motto.

The government's conduct toward patriotic Spain is monstrous. Our rulers should compare the attitude of the Spanish people with that of the French and Italians, who seriously objected to sending reinforcements to the armies in Madagascar and Eritrea. How can the men who govern us continue to demand the sacrifice of our youth and money, which our industry and agriculture so sorely need? The country is tired of war and will not renew its efforts to continue the present war, much less to undertake another one, with the United States, for instance.

What a mockery! Scarcely a month ago Cuba was said to be pacified. All that remained to do was to extinguish several bands of ruffians scattered throughout the Island. Suddenly the scene changes, and Señor Canovas himself confirms the news that we have met new disasters in Cuba. He adds that we must prepare to send a new army corps to the Island!

Before Spain had sent 200,000 soldiers to Cuba and exhausted her treasury, war with the United States could have had the support of the nation. But there is no reason why we should now make more efforts. We have neither money, credit nor men to sacrifice. Let us finish at once, whatever the end may be.

There is a crisis in Spain, because her credit is gone. In order to raise money, it was absolutely necessary she should have for the wars in the Philippine Islands and in Cuba, she has pledged the customs in the Philippines, and has extended, to get Cuban war-money, the contract with the Rothschilds for the famous Almaden Quicksilver Mines. A writer in the *Sun* says of them :

From 1870 to 1896, according to the official reports of the Spanish Ministry of Finances, Spain has derived from the mines \$36,000,000, the product of the small percentage which, according to the terms of the contract with the Rothschilds, has been given to the Spanish government.

It was only hard necessity that caused the pledging of this great natural source, which is simply putting up collateral to sustain the national bonds.

The Paris edition of the New York *Herald* of June 18th, contained a remarkable letter from Madrid, dated June 15th, headed, "Spain's Finances in a Very Bad Way." The incident that was celebrated was "the alarming news" that the Spanish government was resolved to charge in gold for telegrams sent to foreign countries. The Spaniards regarded this as a case of tampering with the currency in Spain itself, as they have in Porto Rico and Cuba. The silver coinage of Porto Rico was deliberately debased two years ago. The Madrid correspondent of the Paris *Herald* says : "Every month of the war in Cuba swells the already colossal Spanish deficit by seven million dollars, and besides this, owing to the disingenuous attitude of the authorities, it is

impossible to accurately ascertain what arrears of pay are owing to the Spanish soldiery." This comes with the greater force from the *Herald*, as it has shown a very proper sensibility as to the correct treatment of the financial difficulties of Spain. It is in the financial condition of Spain that the Cubans have the best hope of soon winning their independence.

The funded debt of Spain, bearing interest at 4 per cent. per annum, is \$1,200,000,000, and of this sum \$400,000,000 is held outside of Spain, principally in France. Spain has also an unfunded floating debt of \$200,000,000, and a Cuban guarantee debt of \$350,000,000, bearing interest at 5 and 6 per cent., originally issued at from 80 to 95, and now selling at from 63 to 65. The funded and unfunded debt of Spain is \$1,750,000,000—that is to say, with something less than one-fourth of our population, Spain's debt is more than twice as large as ours. The debt of Spain is \$73.85 per capita; that of the United States, \$14.63. The Spanish debt is not only crushing in proportions, but in a condition that discloses exhaustion threatening general disaster. The \$200,000,000 floating debt is money spent in the Cuban war, and the \$350,000,000 Cuban guarantee is charged to Cuba, but Spain is responsible, so that there are \$550,000,000—the sum almost two-thirds of that of the funded debt of the United States—an overwhelming burden that would be cast upon Cuba in case of Spanish military triumph. Mark the course of the Cuban guarantee bonds in the market. The bonds (6 per cents.) were issued at 95, or 5 per cent. below par, though bearing 50 per cent. more interest than the \$1,200,000,000 of Spanish 4 per cents. The charges on the bonds (Cuban guarantee) are \$6 a year for the face of

\$100, and only yielded 95, and have fallen to 65, a loss of 30 per cent. to the investor, or \$105,000,000 decline in the market value of the bonds since they were placed.

Is it any wonder that efforts of the Spanish government to obtain a large loan in Paris have for two years been unsuccessful? Here is a loss of more than one hundred millions of dollars on the Cuban guarantee—the 6 per cents. standing in the market 35 per cent. below par. Six millions of dollars have already been obtained by pledging the Philippine customs, and the Rothschilds will advance thirty-four millions on the renewal of the contract for the quicksilver mine that they have held for twenty-seven years, and that has been enormously profitable to them. This mine is the richest natural resource of Spain. It is reported that the Rothschilds' profit on it has been three millions a year, and they are lending money on it that may keep the Spanish forces in Cuba a few months longer. Such is the gloomy outlook of the Spanish financial year opening July 1, 1897.

They have gold coin in Spain and silver coin, and both are legal tender, but the only silver coin that is legal tender is the five-peseta piece, the issue of which is limited. The floating bank paper is redeemable in silver. The whole income of Spain from Cuba for the year 1893, published in the 1897 book, shows 24,000,000 pesos income, but only twelve of that for customs duties. The interest, at five per cent., on the present war debt of \$350,000,000 is largely in excess of the whole customs duties pledged, showing that Spain has overpledged to the public the Cuban revenues for interest on the war debt. To convert the floating bank notes payable in pesetas into sterling exchange they are figured at a con-

siderable discount from the coinage value of silver ; that is to say, they take them at about fourteen cents apiece, because the floating paper is not actually redeemed ; it is reissued from time to time as received by the banks. Spain has done something more than overpledge the revenues of Cuba. She has attempted to load the people of the Island with a debt that is impossible ; and the Money Power of the world has, by refusing Spanish bonds without collateral, condemned the war upon Cuba, and forbidden that it shall go further on the national credit of Spain. That is the Spanish crisis ; and the only way money can be raised for the Cuban war is by the Spaniards, as individuals, taking the bonds of their country at some figure, and by the pledging of the last natural resources and the income of the monopolies that oppress the people.

Thus the credit of Spain more and more departs. Those who have the responsibility in Spain of finding money to go on with the most horrible war, pestilence and famine in Cuba, are appalled by the financial situation, and hence the commotion about cabinets at Madrid and Captain-General Weyler's statement at Santiago de Cuba, that important operations could not be carried on in the rainy weather—and these are the days of the Cuban deluge—strike the Spaniards with despair. We may be sure, whatever is their irritability, that they will soon feel they must escape from the Island that consumes their men and money. This is the time that will find President McKinley informed, and anxious to make a peace in Cuba that will preserve the honor of Spain as a military nation, and save her blood and gold for home rule and service.

There is much in the history of that which is going on

in Spain that one cannot call witnesses to prove. The most serious testimony we have about the state of affairs in Cuba—and we may extend the remark in special senses to Spain—comes from those who must be inconspicuous, and in proportion to the import of the information they give is the necessity (for it is a matter of life and death) that they shall be unknown.

There is a class of persons in Cuba who are not partisans of either the Spaniards or of the Cuban insurgents, and they are rarely, if ever, mentioned in the papers. They have the real news from both sides, and they do not deal in it habitually, and are slow in giving confidence. Usually these silent and capable observers are those who have something besides their lives to lose, and intelligence is conveyed by them that can only be told in outline—omitting names and places—and they will never be called before any committee. There is a certain community between the business men in Spain and Cuba, and the situation is as thoroughly known in Havana outside as inside official circles, and in some respects the outsiders have the advantage.

The business men's information from the inside is that the banks through which money had been obtained represented that there were no results bearing proportion to the military force employed, and that money could not be found for the year beginning July 1st; hence the necessity of looking events in the face, and this forced the renewal of the quicksilver contract. In the midst of the flurry appeared and disappeared the figure of Campos, who said, when he left Havana nearly a year and a half ago, that Cuba could not be conquered by sheer force. He is a financier as well as soldier. Whatever money Spain raises must come from

the French and Belgian bankers. Her loans cannot be placed in England, Holland or Germany. It is the evidence of things seen that what the Rothschilds say in these transactions is the voice of the money power of Europe, and that this house has called for "collateral" before making a loan, in the stress of the struggles of Spain, plagued as she is with war in the Philippines and agitations at home, is one of the sinister signs of failure, the arrival of the time when it is the part of dignity and honor to take conclusive steps to end the colonial wars.

There is an example of business-men's news in this striking communication from a source that is responsible, but must remain unknown.

Information from Spanish sources indicates that the situation at Havana is more serious than General Weyler is willing to admit.

This state of facts grew out of the recent arrest of a large number of Spanish merchants, who, while loyal to Spain, have been making money out of the insurrection.

This agitation threatens to make trouble among the volunteers serving with the Spanish army, who have not been paid for months, and who, with poor clothing and empty stomachs, are not in very good shape for serious work.

The situation in Spain is most interesting. The announcement that additional troops would be sent to Cuba aroused the clerical party, and they are now agitating, and, it is said, even preaching, against sending more soldiers to Cuba. This agitation naturally encourages the Carlists, who are not contemplating any serious action, but it gives an element of unrest that is very painful to all supporters of the present dynasty.

The agitation of the Republicans is not as yet serious in its nature, but may become so at any time. With the unrest and threats against the reigning dynasty, the government and all loyal Spaniards are more ready than ever before to see the return to Spain of the large number of soldiers now so ineffectively engaged in Cuba.

The above situation, taken in connection with the financial difficulties

of Spain, gives the government and the Queen Regent plenty of subject for thought.

Señor De Lome has open to him one of the grandest opportunities of a lifetime. With his great ability and influence with the Queen Regent and the government at home, and the confidence of the Spanish public, he can do more at this time than any living man to maintain the monarchy and the dignity of Spain.

Señor De Lome can render an unparalleled service to his Queen and country, and at the same time put an end to the horrible condition of affairs in Cuba, if he should avail of the present situation to recommend, or to allow others to bring about, subject to his approval, an adjustment of the Cuban question upon the commercial basis.

I am informed, also, through Spanish sources, the facts obtained from letters just arriving from Cuba, written by loyalists there, that many of the most intensely loyal Spaniards in Cuba, who a year ago would not even listen to a suggestion of autonomy, have reached the conclusion that the military operations of Spain cannot be successful, and in the event of an insurgent success, they believe the Cubans incapable of giving a stable government, and, consequently, "look forward with *anxiety* and *interest* to some form of intervention in the affairs of Cuba by the United States."

This conclusion is reached, not because their loyalty to Spain has diminished, but because they recognize the existing situation in Cuba, and know that their property and the interests of humanity will be best conserved by a termination of the struggle in the Island at the earliest possible moment.

The instructions given to General Woodford will, of course, have a decisive bearing on this situation, but it is a misfortune that Señor De Lome does not grasp the situation, and secure for himself the prestige and the great advantages to Spain which would follow an adjustment of this matter on a commercial basis before General Woodford reaches Madrid.

We, the people of the United States, will be called upon to define our Cuban policy. It will not do to say we have no business in Cuba. We have much business there. The Cuban mark is in our history as plainly as the Island appears on the map of the Americas. President McKinley has given a great deal of attention to

Cuban conditions, and there is no one who has studied the whole case with more assiduity and anxiety. He has held as of serious purpose, and the nature of a law, the St. Louis platform upon which he received the nomination for the office he holds. This platform says :

The government of Spain having lost control of Cuba * * * we believe that the government of the United States should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the Island.

There are perhaps four courses the administration can pursue :

1. Wait inactively.
2. Recognize Cuban belligerency.
3. The Grant-Fish-Sickles policy, which was the tender of good offices to restore peace, proclaim liberty, and establish independence—Cuba to pay Spain, secured, if it were the pleasure of Congress, by the guarantee of the United States—and when this proposal was made and Field-Marshal Prim wanted to know how much money would be forthcoming, Sickles said presumably there might be \$125,000,000 for Cuba and Porto Rico! Doubtless there would be strong objection to our going Cuba's security to compensate Spain; and, naturally, we turn to seek some other way.
4. There remains a project that has received respectful consideration, because it was prepared with a friendly and patriotic purpose, and after close examination of the commanding circumstances. It has not been lost sight of by the President in his exclusive investigations, and certainly offers the advantages of a system of pacification, not costing us anything, or committing us to any policy but that of peace, freedom and inde-

pendence : all required being the consent of the parties to the war and an enabling act by Congress, conferring extraordinary powers upon the Executive. The scheme is the relinquishment of Cuba by Spain, and the complete evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish army and navy ; the recognition of the present Cuban government of the Island for purposes of negotiation ; \$100,000,000 to be paid by Cuba to Spain in cash or negotiable paper, the money to be raised by the issue and sale of \$150,000,000 face value of four per cent. Cuban bonds ; the \$6,000,000 a year interest to be received and applied by American agents, acting under the authority of Congress, in the Cuban custom houses. The bonds would be sold below par, as usual in Europe, and the Cubans would need some money at the start.


Perhaps this proposition looking to the pacification, liberty and independence of Cuba may be bettered in the course of time, but it is the best up to date, and if the administration could find its policy within these lines, and Congress also, there might soon be peace, General Stewart L. Woodford, Minister to Spain, is a lawyer and soldier and a student, a gentleman of courtesies and excellent form in literature. He felt that it was his first duty to master the case of the relations of the United States with Spain and Cuba, and his mission is of the highest importance, equally delicate and difficult. The Queen Regent signifies her sense of the importance of the attitude of the United States by consenting to receive the American minister in her summer home at St. Sebastian. There are reasons for hope that with peace, which is his mission, there may be united liberty and honor.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN

Review of the Course of the War—Failures of the Captains-General Campos, Weyler and Blanco—Under Spain's Colonial System Autonomy of Cuba Impossible—Significance of the President's Annual Message—"Intervene with Force"—De Lome Incident—His Representative Character—The Tragedy of the *Maine* in Havana Harbor—Captain Sigsbee's Despatch—List of Dead of the *Maine*—The President Refuses to Recall General Lee at Spanish Suggestion, and \$50,000,000 are appropriated for National Defense—There's a War Cloud on the Horizon.

It was upon the claim well sustained that the treaty that closed the ten years' war in Cuba from '68 to '78 had not been faithfully kept by the Spaniards, that the present war was organized, and broke out in February, 1895. The Spanish defense has been that the insurgents sold out in '78, and no doubt some of them did. The Cubans, who honestly believed they had guarantees of substantial reform, were deceived by the pomp of the language of Spanish law and decree and treaty makers, a literary characteristic that distinguishes with vague splendor, the writings official and other on behalf of alleged autonomy. Martinez Campos, who ended the ten years' war and gained great credit for it, whatever happened to his country and to Cuba, sailed from Spain to repeat his famous rôle as pacificator as soon as the situation in the Island became serious, and encountered



UNITED STATES BATTLE-SHIP MAINE.

a more revengeful and destructive hostility than he had experienced on the former occasion. He labored under the disadvantage of the impracticability for some months of arousing in Spain an understanding of the extent of the insurrection, and the peril in which the Spanish cause was placed. Campos made a gallant fight, and tried the policy of concessions and humanity. Spain was frightened by his calls for troops, and the Spaniards in Cuba blamed him for the possession of the weaknesses of humanity, and likened him to General McClellan in the war of the American States. He was, in their view, too cautious and tender, and wanted too many reinforcements, whereas the thing needful was, in their opinion, a more vindictive energy. The Volunteers are the representatives of the true Spanish spirit in Cuba, and they put their faith in severities. For a time Campos was sustained by his great reputation and the home feeling that his discomfiture would be the final defeat of the cause of Spain. Nearly a year of his administration had passed when he found public opinion going against him in Madrid and Havana, and he was recalled, Captain-General Marin succeeding until General Weyler, who had been gazetted for the position, could arrive.

The war had lasted within a few days of a year when the landing of Weyler took place. Gomez had been carrying on hostilities with knife and torch—and his march of nearly five hundred miles from the Eastern Provinces that are the fertile soil of rebellion, to Pinar del Rio, was marked by burning cane and the suspension of industry. He had taken the risk of a San Domingo reputation by reddening the famous indigo skies with the flaming cane-fields, and was proceeding to destroy

tobacco also. His object was to cut off resources, and also by throwing laboring men out of employment to drive them into the insurgent army. A good deal of cane was spared when liberal assessments were paid by the proprietors to the Cuban authorities. As there was martial law on both sides, it would be correct to say the military authorities. The peasantry of Cuba, white and black, are, with rare exceptions, faithful to the Cuban cause. Each country store was a reservoir of articles useful to the rebellion. There was no village in which the rebels were not welcomed and fed with the best, the richest of islands afforded. There was not a horse not taken at will by the enemies of Spain, or a herd of cattle or hogs or flock of sheep, a grove of fruit trees, a potato patch, that did not supply food to those fighting against the tyranny of the peninsula. The Spanish columns moved about as if blindfolded. They could not get information on the plantations or in the villages, as to the presence of rebels; and the rebels were thoroughly informed day and night of the movements of the Spaniards. If a Spanish column was marching, it found nothing in the road to guide it, while the stones on the paths signalled to the insurgents the operations of their foes. The rebels always knew, and the Spaniard never, when they came to cross roads—the way to go to meet or to avoid opposing forces. It was out of these conditions that proceeded Weyler's orders. He emptied the stores, confiscated domestic animals, endeavored to force open declarations from Cubans as to their sympathies—and then came the burning of villages, the slaughter of cattle, the orders for concentration around the garrisoned posts, the military objects being the desolation of the country so that it could not

afford subsistence to the armed and organized foes of the government.

The horrors of the war were the logical results of the state of the country—and not entirely, as usually understood, blood-thirstiness, violence and vengeance. The use of the torch by Gomez countenanced the incessant Spanish accusation that the revolt against Spain in Cuba must be crushed in the name of order and civilization, or the Island would be an enlarged San Domingo, far gone in barbarism. The charge is not true, and it was a capital error to give a color to carry it. The same causes of the devastation of the country forced the Spaniards into a method of war fatal to themselves, because it consumed their troops in an ineffectual defensive. There is one cane plantation in Cuba now, guarded by forty little Spanish forts and a squad of cavalry, and the trochas or barriers of fortification across the Island detain the Spanish forces from actual activities—providing a pretense of doing something that occupies many thousands to no purpose. If the Spaniards had taken a small percentage of the money of which they have wrongfully deprived the Cubans, and built roads—a good one lengthwise the island, as near the centre as possible, with branches to the seaports, so that troops could have been moved easily, swiftly and with system, the enormous army that has not crushed the rebellion would have deprived the insurgents of all their strongholds and worn them out. Indeed, if the Spanish troops had been used as road builders instead of trocha constructors for the last two years, there might have been some prospect or chance for decisive military successes in behalf of the Peninsula, for there would have been roads offering facilities for warfare.

General Weyler's victories were those of a destroyer. He made deserts and solitudes and called the work pacification. He showed the true spirit of Spanish conquest, and represented the real policy of Spain, as Campos did not, and Blanco does not. The retirement of Weyler was because Canovas was assassinated, and he was the victim, not of Cuban patriots, but of Spanish anarchists, who have also vowed to deal with Weyler, because he was merciless to the murderers of Barcelona, who threw bombs into a theatre and also a religious procession. The bomb that was exploded in the Havana palace in Weyler's time was not a Cuban, but an Anarchial, shell.

When Weyler sailed for Spain he made arrogant claims to have progressed in his task, but such work as was accomplished was rather by fire, fever and famine than by military force. It was time for a change, as the resources of Spain, both in men and money, had been wastefully expended, until her exhaustion was supplemented by her desperation. The failure of Weyler was more marked than that of Campos, and demonstrated at least that cruelty could not save the cause of Spain.

General Blanco, it is only fair to say, has put upon Cuban autonomy, which is the pith of his policy, a liberal construction, and there is no doubt he has sought to humanize the conflict which is gnawing the bones of the people and has squandered the blood and gold of his country. But he forgets the Cubans well know that autonomy with the war debt of \$500,000,000 means poverty and slavery forever, and that there is nothing in a Spanish reform that leaves the Captain-General to rule under martial law—nothing in an autonomy that does not abolish the office of Captain-General, the cen-



GENERAL, BIANCO.

tral and commanding authority in the tyranny that was at the beginning, and will abide to the end, of Spanish dominion.

President McKinley was from the first profoundly impressed by the seriousness of the Cuban situation, and anxious to preserve "peace with honor." He has been painstaking in procuring information, and his influence has been constantly conservative. His solicitude to perform humane offices has been conspicuous. His first official act in the affairs of Cuba was to ask an appropriation to buy medicines and food and transportation out of the land for Americans stranded there. He has availed himself fully of consular reports and the observations of travelers in whom he had confidence. He has refused the call in Congress for the full reports of consuls, for if they were written with a view to immediate publicity their value would be destroyed. He has studied every phase of all the questions involved. He has witnessed with clear intelligence the efforts of the filibusters to involve this country in a war with Cuba, that they might appropriate the usufruct of the conflict. We presume that he understands perfectly that there are two classes of American citizens in Cuba—one the actual Americans, who were engaged in various Cuban industries that have been annihilated by the war; and the other the Cubans, who have sought American citizenship for the purpose of using it in their political relations. These are people who, having no country of their own, seek protection under the wing of the Great Republic, but are not well instructed as to the distinction between the proper and the illegitimate exercise of the rights acquired by naturalization. The Spaniards reserve their keenest hatred for this class of American citizens, and the con-

suls always have their hands full of trouble arising from this difficult line of citizenship, because the more doubtful the title of American, the more eager the assumption of its privileges.

The Cubans themselves are not agreed as to the use they would make of their independence if they should find themselves in possession of the Island. Some are for heading a Cuban League under European patronage; others want the United States to become responsible for their protection. The more active and ambitious wish to administer the natural riches of the soil and climate, as the Spaniards have been doing. Those who desire, first and last, plain and speedy annexation to the Great Republic are not prominent in proportion to their numbers, but they have usually been students or travelers, or both, in the United States. The important planters, not violent Spaniards, want a strong government like ours—one that recognizes the rights of labor and secures the employment of capital. All would gladly see this country drive out Spain. The rest, they feel, would be easy, and they have no fears about the people of Cuba governing themselves as they have been taught wisdom in schools of sorrow.

The administration has been under filibuster fire from the first. It seemed to the President to be his duty to assume that Spain was a civilized nation, and that if we were forced into war with that country it would be on such grounds that she could not find friends to protest against our action or interfere with it, even with a demand for arbitration. The instructions to General Woodford were drawn to assert our natural interest without offending Spanish sensibility, and the influence of our minister to Spain has been assiduously for peace.

The President confidently took a hopeful view of the change in Spain that withdrew General Weyler and substituted General Blanco, with his proclamations of autonomy and efforts to gain the confidence of Cubans.

Any form of Spanish rule would be Cuban submission, and the killing of General Ruiz, who sought to treat with the insurgents for peace on the autonomist platform, declared the implacable antagonisms engendered by the war as conducted by Weyler and Gomez. It seemed to the President that if General Blanco could in a humane way pacify the Island, he should have reasonable time, and our disturbing intrusion would be unfortunate; at the same time, our interests in Cuba were enormous, and we certainly had a right to put out the fire, if it did not speedily burn itself out. In his first annual message to Congress, the President candidly declared himself—gave impressively the record of our relations with Cuba—spoke plainly of the peculiar horrors of war in the Island, and indicated that the time might come when we must interfere.

This, the announcement of an ultimatum, was in terms that were without asperity and without date, and yet had in them the substance of things known to both parties. The President closed his recital of the Cuban situation in his message, after stating efforts would be continued to bring about a peace honorable and enduring, with these words: "If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity, to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part, and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world."

Such were the lines that framed the very earnest and strong presentation of the historical facts that lead up to the point that we may have to "intervene with force," that caused the unhappy excitement of the Spanish minister, Senor Enrique Depuy De Lome, in the course of which he wrote the letter that closed his career in this country. Sagasta, the prime minister, said of it :

"The Spanish government was in ignorance that there existed differences between its representatives and the chief of that state."

"Since when did Depuy De Lome's attitude change?"

"I think since the reading of McKinley's message."

The filibusters have never seemed to know that the message of the President was a document of the first class, but the Spaniards perfectly understand it, and the De Lome letter was an expression of chagrin. The President's message was fair warning that the De Lome representations could but a little while be accepted as sufficient. His letter never reached the editor of the *Heraldo*, to whom it was addressed ; for it was stolen by a young man engaged by the editor in Havana. This confidential person, seeing the marks of the Spanish legation on the envelope, thought it might have value, thrust it in his pocket, and busied himself to place it in the hands of the Cuban Junta. They gave it out for publication, and sent the original to our State department. The letter was in the newspapers before Assistant Secretary Day received it, and De Lome got in his resignation in time to have it accepted. His letter was bitterly insulting to the President, calling him a "low politician," who catered to the rabble ; and he said as to the annual message, "I consider it bad." He wanted the question of commercial relations agitated, "even though only for



EX-MINISTER DE LOME.

effect," and he desired an important man to start a propaganda among senators with. These passages imputed insincerities to the Spanish government, and that had to be explained.

De Lome said further, that "without military success nothing could be accomplished;" and there has been no considerable military success on either side. The insurgents must win if the aggressions of Spain are all failures. The season rapidly passes when military operations on a large scale are practicable, and the fourth year of the war promises a continuation of inconsequent effort, but it is reported that reinforcements of several thousand Spaniards are on the way over the sea. Both sides are feeling that a crisis is at hand, and claiming to do more fighting than usual, but all the reports are unreliable, and the war drags on tediously, and if it were possible for Spain to conquer Cuba, it would be at the expense of her own ruin.

The last news the ex-Spanish minister heard before he sailed for England was that the *Maine* had been blown up, with great loss of life, in Havana Harbor. There is no doubt that De Lome served his country ably and effectually. He was almost fanatical on the subject of Spain, and regarded those who did not agree with his views as against him and his country and, animated by hostile feeling, the product of ignorance. He was believed to have promised the Queen Regent that while he was Spanish minister to the United States this country would not intervene in Cuba. He was much disturbed by our extraordinary newspapers, and said he could not see how an editor could be a ruffian in his office and a gentleman at home. He was understood to deprecate Weyler's policy, and to constantly demand

military success. His private letter, which has had so much publicity, confirms this impression as to his position. Still he once said, if it had not been for his diplomatic position, he could trouble Secretary Sherman by quoting the orders of General Sherman and reciting his record during the march to the sea, and from Savannah to Alexandria, and the devastation of the valley of Virginia by Sheridan. One of his sayings was, that we of the United States should "beware of the tropical Yankee," as he would be an element of disturbance. De Lome's policy was to play for time, and urge that the only hope was in Spanish military success. The time he gained was not improved, and to his successor has been assigned an impossible task. He cannot fail to be depressed by the gloomy fortunes of his country.

American citizens are now more thoroughly awakened than ever before as to our critical relations with Spain, arising from the unquestionable sympathy we have with the freedom and independence of Cuba, and the attraction of gravitation we exercise on the island, but will not entirely understand the situation, if they do not contemplate the presence here and in Cuba of a filibuster party, the object of whose existence is to bring about a war between Spain and the United States. The extravagances of the filibusters have harmed, in the judgment of all enlightened people, the cause of Cuba. One of the most frequent and the loudest outcries of the filibuster was that we should have a ship of war in Havana, and the pretense was to protect American citizens. The real object to get a ship there was always to increase the chances of war, by causing a sharper friction between the Spanish and American officials.



CAPTAIN SIGSBEE IN HIS CABIN ON BOARD THE MAINE — FROM A PHOTOGRAPH LOANED BY MRS. SIGSBEE.

The desperadoes of Havana, if disposed to assassinate Americans, could not be deterred by a ship or ships in the harbor, miles away from the scene of bloodshed, and the bombardment of a stone city like Havana would consume a great deal of ammunition without doing much damage. I had an interview with General Weyler as to a visit by a ship of war, and he said a civil call by one of our ships of war would, of course, be cordially responded to. An objection to keeping ships—hot and crowded ironclads—in Havana Harbor, is the horrible pollution of the place. The harbor is more than half filled with the sediment that has been accumulating there for centuries, and causes the yellow fever all the year round. The tide, which rises only about a foot in the gulf, hardly ruffles the water of the harbor. We would sacrifice many lives by making a naval station of Havana. This is a fact that could not force an impression upon the public mind until recent experiences imparted information. There was no end of the clamor for a war ship, but it was disregarded until the turbulent elements in Havana became riotous against the Blanco administration. The hostility the disorderly people manifested was divided about evenly between the Autonomists and the Americans. It was essentially a manifestation of the implacable character of the volunteers, who have been guilty of bloody work that has darkly stained Cuban history.

These disturbances marked the degeneracy of the rioters and the decadence of the fortunes of Spain. A reactionary revolution was narrowly escaped, and the *Maine*, ordered to Havana, was received by the Spanish officials with every formality of respect. The firing of salutes by the forts attracted great crowds to

the water front, and later the *Maine* ran up the Spanish royal ensign and saluted the flagship with thirteen guns. In response the *Alfonso* hoisted the Stars and Stripes and returned the salute, gun for gun. There was a great deal of feeling behind the show of civilities, and the exertion of politeness only emphasized the fact of strained relations. The Spaniards were at once active in naval demonstrations, sending the *Vizcaya*, one of their best ships, to make a call at New York, where the first news she got was the explosion of the *Maine*; and the policy of sending the strong ships of Spain to Havana has been pressed ever since. There can be no question that this would have been done long before, if it had not been feared that a muster of the Spanish battleships in West India waters might be construed by the United States as an invitation to do likewise. Spain needs her war boats at Havana because their big guns could sweep the streets in case of mobs. It would be wise though, to remember the precedent that when Lord Albemarle and General Isaac Putnam captured Havana, in 1762, a Spanish fleet of fourteen sail of the line was part of the spoil.

It was on the night of Feb. 15th, before ten o'clock, that the great tragedy of the *Maine* occurred, and Capt. Sigsbee cabled to the secretary of the navy this memorable communication :

Secretary of the Navy—

Washington, D. C.

Maine blown up in Havana Harbor at nine forty to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward line steamer. Send Light House Tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water. None had clothing other than that upon him. Public



THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BATTLE-SHIP MAINE — HARBOR OF HAVANA — FEB. 15, 1898.

opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for.* Many Spanish officers, including representative of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.

SIGSBEE.

It was this despatch that President McKinley was aroused at 3 o'clock in the morning of the sixteenth of February to read. The President was deeply moved, and instantly recognized the great qualities of the officer who, in the midst of scenes of horror, could sketch at once in few words the proportions of the event, and give the word to the world that was the statesmanship of the hour. It is said the President remarked after studying the despatch, "Ah, there is a man—a great man," and whatever comes or goes, the country will believe in the heroism and irreproachable conduct of the captain whose ship was lost by no fault of his. Out of the cloud of disaster he comes with radiant reputation. The true glory of duty done shines through misfortune.

Of the conduct of American officers and seamen, Capt. Mahan, the Historian of Sea Power, worthily said :

"The self-control shown in the midst of a sudden and terrible danger, of which not one of the men on board knew, showed to his mind that in battle, with known dangers about them, and expecting every minute the fate that might overtake them, the fellow sailors of the men of the *Maine* would stand to their guns and their ship to the last. It was evident that the old naval spirit existed, and that the sailors of the new navy were as good as those who manned the old-time ships."

A passenger on the *City of Washington*, moored 300 feet from the *Maine* half an hour before she was blown up, says :

* Hastening to the points where duty called, these gallant officers were lost. They are accounted for on the roll of honor imperishable.

"Capt. Sigsbee was the last man to leave his ship. We could see his figure clearly outlined against the flames of the super-structure, and his voice rang out clear as a trumpet."

When the British man-of-war *Captain* was lost on the Bay of Biscay, all the officers and crew perishing, there was placed in St. Paul's Cathedral, on tablets of brass, the full list of the men who perished, and thus death conferred upon the ship's company immortality. The list of the lost on the *Maine* should be written in bronze, and with august ceremony placed in the Memorial Hall in the National Capitol.

LIST OF THE DEAD OF THE *MAINE*.

Michael Malone,	John Bookbinder,	C. A. Hamilton,
Thomas Caine,	G. C. Moss,	T. F. Kinsella,
B. Anguland,	James Drury,	J. Pinkney,
J. B. Lewis,	J. E. Wickstrom,	D. P. Rice,
M. Cochrane,	John Kelley,	N. Rising,
M. Lanahan,	John Hamilton,	H. McGonigle,
T. J. Quigley,	A. Keskell,	Thomas Clark,
F. Boll,	William Lambert,	P. Grady,
U. Kelley,	A. B. Hennekes,	E. P. Graham,
C. Todoresco,	Frank B. Tigges,	R. Perry,
Michael Griffin,	C. F. J. Fadde,	R. White,
Joseph Reilly,	W. J. Lee,	A. Wilson,
N. T. Mudd,	F. C. Phillips,	Y. Kitigata,
Joseph Seery,	G. W. Wilbur,	J. E. Marshall,
James H. Mason,	C. M. Nolan,	John Matza,
Daniel Leene,	R. Grupp,	J. H. Ziegler,
D. J. Tehan,	William Cosgrove,	H. J. Keys,
T. J. Jones,	T. Magaminie,	Charles Jennings,
O. Sheridan,	K. Suzuki,	John Wallace,
J. Scully,	P. C. Johansen,	Edward Burns,
J. F. Walsh,	James O. Connor,	J. J. Shea,
Bernard Lynch,	William J. Tinsman,	Martin Tuohey,
J. J. McManus,	John Foujerem,	F. Page,
Rudolph Falk,	L. L. Barry,	Walter S. Sellers,

W. J. Horn,	Michael Kane,	George Miller,
J. M. League,	A. Conroy,	George Whiten,
Thomas Troy,	T. J. Harty,	Leon Bonner,
C. Kronyak,	E. Harris,	F. E. Kinsey,
J. W. Loudon,	E. Mattsen,	Carl Evanson,
G. Lieber,	J. Palmgren,	John Martensen,
T. Finch,	J. H. Shillington,	W. H. Gorman,
B. H. Herriman,	C. E. Lowell,	Charles Hauch,
Walter Cameron,	R. B. Hawkins,	J. F. Gordon,
W. A. Greer,	F. Fisher,	G. D. Faubel,
C. Murphy,	E. M. Meilstrup,	P. D. Hughes,
M. Stevenson	C. P. Quinn,	Edward Lawer,
Gustav Holm,	P. J. Shea,	J. F. Furlong,
C. F. Hassell,	Thomas M. Cole,	S. Lees,
B. Fountain,	Hugo Kruse,	L. J. Dancaster,
William Robinson,	John Merz,	John P. Etts,
A. Anfindsen,	J. J. Lorenzen,	Matthew Lynch,
William Montfort,	Henry Gross,	F. Bloomberg,
Frank Gardner,	Robert Wilson,	George Mobles,
C. O. White,	Daniel Lewis,	W. R. B. Caufield,
C. A. Scott,	B. L. Marsden,	G. C. Ordning,
Thomas Shea,	K. Christianson,	Charles Laird,
Arthur Brofeldt,	H. Brinkman,	J. P. Barry,
Frank Sutton,	S. Neilson,	T. J. O'Hagan,
Prank Andrews,	William Lund,	W. C. Hanrahan,
J. A. Graham,	J. C. Clarke,	A. C. Bruns,
J. P. Aitken,	H. M. Carr,	L. H. Moore,
John Powers,	George Thompson,	John R. Bell,
Henry Auchenbach,	M. F. Harris,	A. Simmons,
William Noble,	William Donoughy,	M. Flaherty,
William Coleman,	Peter Roos,	J. T. Adams,
H. A. Anderson,	Charles Curran,	William J. Fuer,
William Hough,	D. Dahlman,	W. Coleman,
G. Leupold,	William Hamburger,	M. E. Salmin,
J. C. Neilson,	H. O'Regan,	C. H. Jenks,
John Warren,	F. H. Kniese,	George Edler,
I. Sugasaki,	John A. Kay,	C. W. Feirmann,
Thomas J. Gardner,	John Porter,	Patrick O'Neil,
John A. Hallberg,	Robert Burkhardt,	D. O'C. Harley,
William Rushworth,	Elden H. Mero.	F. Butler,

M. Ohye,	C. E. Safford,	William S. Miller,
O. Ishida,	A. J. Fisher,	Jacob Becker,
S. Chingi,	W. A. Rieger,	F. Kihlstron,
P. Geffney,	August Schroeder,	J. T. Liden,
Patrick Flynn,	Henry S. Baum,	John H. Moss,
Charles F. Just,	L. M. Fleischman,	James Boyle.
Charles Franke,	G. Lapiers,	

The word from Captain Sigsbee that public opinion should be suspended as to the cause of the murderous wreckage of the *Maine* was of importance to the country. It was known that the civilities of the Spaniards regarding the presence of the *Maine* at Havana were not to be taken as friendliness, but as politeness merely—that thousands of them, hating the United States, and charging all their Cuban sorrows to us, held the arrival of the *Maine* to be intrusive, and a deliberate insult that ought to be resented—and the natural impulse of Americans was to ascribe the massacre to the malice of Spain. This was repelled by the launching of boats from the neighboring Spanish ship-of-war to save the wounded, and the imposing ceremony with which the remains of the dead were escorted to and buried in the beautiful cemetery of Havana. The President seconded the weighty suggestion of Captain Sigsbee, making for the indication of public expression until full investigation could be had, the statement, upon information, that he was impressed the loss of the ship was accidental; and he hoped to have that opinion confirmed.

Fortunately, the romancers of Key West were so eager to prejudge and anxious to rush the country into war, that they put forth the specific invention, on the day when they thought the divers would begin



CAPTAIN SIGSBEE ON THE DECK OF THE MAINE.

operations, that the discovery was made of a hole eight inches in diameter, by a percussion torpedo, that penetrating the ship, had exploded her forward magazine; and thus was the mystery of the *Maine* solved at once by those frantic to let slip the dogs of war. The inventor of the percussion torpedo story gave no one a chance to believe it, for within a few hours the fact appeared that the divers had not made a descent, and all informed persons knew that the theory of an eight-inch torpedo hole was opposed to all experience—that if a ship was struck and penetrated by such a missile the wound would certainly be more, rather than less, than eight inches wide.

The second war-cry fiction was rather more incredible than the first. A wounded man on the watch had seen a strange craft making toward the doomed ship just before the explosion. It was a torpedo that displayed a light and emitted a smoke! This marvelous conception had barely touched the ship when the shock occurred. The American people were thus doubly cautioned, and the court of inquiry proceeded in order with decency and dignity, and there was no giving out of statements bearing the official stamp—the incessant promulgation of rumors and romances steadily losing credit. Maps were published in the journals most enterprising in the border regions, where facts and fakes are mingled, until neither is acceptable, showing that Havana Harbor was mined, and that the Spaniards had moved the *Maine* where mines were thickest. It was improbable that there was a mine in the harbor, for the entrance is so narrow and already obstructed by the wreck two years ago of a man-of-war of Spain, that the closure could be made complete in a few hours. In addition,

was the fact of a mass of hideous sediment in the harbor—more mud, the accumulation of centuries, than water—and the first theory did not prevail. It was conceded that the Spanish Government could not have had any direct connection with such a tremendous treachery, and that there were no harbor mines. It was remembered the *Maine's* boiler-room and the magazines for the ten-inch guns and the coal bunkers, were much crowded—only a steel wall a quarter of an inch thick between the magazine and the boiler-room, and that there had been combustion of coal in the bunkers of the *Cincinnati* discovered by a smoke from the magazine itself, and that the instantaneous execution of the order to flood it was all that saved the ship. There were other incidents showing that there should be no deep surprise if it were shown that the *Maine* blew up from the interior, and therefore that Spaniards should be acquitted of the execution of a horrible plot. When the wreck as it first appeared was photographed, there were indications of the exertion of an awful force from beneath on the port side.

There was something startling in the expression of the ragged mass of steel, and a report, identified with a respectable name, had universal circulation that some of the outer plates of the bottom of the ship, painted green, were above the surface of the water! The twist and trend of the rags of steel plates pointed below to find the origin of disfigurement; and the investigation proceeded so far as to show that some of the ship's ammunition, believed to have wrought the ruin, was not exploded. Unquestionably the first torpedo stories and the mine maps were unworthy of credence, but since there has been a war, with the exception of that between

Japan and China, there have been developed high explosives with startling possibilities—agencies of destruction of enormous power, in proportion to the space occupied ; and the great harbor of Havana, with boats flitting about continually, might have been the scene for the labors of a band of conspiring malignants, to have planted a dynamite shell, probably something simple as a small steam boiler, near the *Maine*. It could have been trailed under the water, wired, and let go, and the wires sunken and buoyed.

All this is not impossible, and we must not insist that common sense is to be found only in the commonplace, for there has been enacted in Havana one of the most frightful nightmare tragedies of the world's history ; and there can be found nothing in accounting for it more mysterious and dreadful than the event. Dynamite has been freely used in the Cuban war, and Havana abounds in desperate characters ready for any hazard and expert in all devices of devastation.

There has been this line of thought in the public mind. The President cared so much for the passing opinion of the people, that he gave out at midnight the opinion on information that the blowing up of the *Maine* was an accident ; and there must be overbearing reasons why he should be still, or he would not be silent if the intelligence from the wreck supported his original judgment that the *Maine* disaster was accidental.

We cannot conceive that the President has not knowledge of the findings, unofficial, yet almost, if not altogether, conclusive, of the investigations.

If he could say the hatreds of Spain played no part in the great murder of American seamen, and the

danger was over, he would say it surely. There has been a perceptible augmentation of the gravity of the situation between the United States and Spain. The President's message meant all that was said, and the full scope of the phrase "intervene with force."

It must be as prominent in Washington as in Madrid and Havana, that the failure of Blanco is as positive as that of Campos and of Weyler.

It is clear that the Spaniards are, in their course of falling fortunes, becoming infuriated, and that, taking counsel of their pride, they may challenge war with us, for there is not the least doubt that the public opinion of Spain holds us responsible for the horrors of Cuban warfare. They have intense feeling and vanity on the subject, to them quite sacred, of the honor of their arms; and the official world would save the dynasty, while the people rather prefer the Boy King to the foreign disturber Don Carlos; and they deliberately brave the path that leads to war.

The tone of the Madrid journals is very fiery, and the complacency with which the Spanish war-cries advocate giving the United States a lesson on land and sea, gives us the limitation of their intelligence, and the extent of their abnormal animosities. More than this, they have hopes, if they fight, there will be powers in Europe demanding the fate of Cuba should be settled by arbitration. They would like a court of honor of kings.

They have been borrowing money in France, and believe the French would stand for their credit. Their Queen Regent is of the royal family of Austria, and the Austrian and Spanish navies combined would be an array worthy our best efforts to dissolve. The Emperor of Germany has been fond of showing the flag of the



CONSUL-GENERAL, FITZHUGH LEE.


Empire in the West Indies, and he is not fond of republics. The ex-Minister, De Lome, though a blunderer at last in diplomacy, represents the general proclivity of Spanish sentiments, and he thought of having General Sherman's orders in Georgia cabled from Havana, signed Weyler, in order to strike Secretary Sherman when in the senate, and get him to commit himself in that body to denouncing his own brother, thinking he was assailing Weyler ; and just now he is in touch with Madrid, and his hand has in all probability touched the button requesting the recall of General Lee, the Consul-General at Havana. The mind of the President of the United States is placed in a clear light before the country by the fact that he did not have a Cabinet meeting to take the matter into consideration, but after a few minutes' conversation with Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary of State Day, cabled to Gen. Woodford at Madrid—through whom Spain's request for Lee's withdrawal had been sent—that the services of Gen. Lee at Havana were indispensable, and his removal could not be considered. Gen. Lee is a man of heartiness of disposition, full of geniality, a good comrade, belongs by natural gifts to the thirty-second degree of the order of good fellows. The often strained word chivalric would not be misapplied in his case. He does not scare and is firm, but courteous.

The President was in this matter equally prompt and peremptory, but civil, and the stronger for that, and then it was revealed that Spain had not demanded the removal of Lee, but had offered a suggestion. For this the government of Spain must answer to Weyler and De Lome.

The course of the President is like that of the patient

Lincoln in 1861, when there was a steady drift into war, and it was the policy of Lincoln that his antagonists should be the peace-breakers. He is patient, too, as President Grant was, under such provocation as the shooting of fifty-three filibusters at Santiago de Cuba, when the negotiations proceeded so far that the Spanish Government proposed arbitration, and consented to surrender the ship and pay an indemnity to the families of American citizens who had been shot. The patience of President McKinley is akin to firmness easily developed and absolutely asserted, as in the case of the proposed dismissal of Lee—a most grave matter, however glossed.

The close of this incident does not remove the fact that Spain had the purpose of smoothing the way of DeLome by causing Lee's retirement. The hardihood of Spain is thus in evidence, and the questions of peace and war hang on slender threads. There have been efforts by Spain to match us in fighting ships, but they cannot do it without buying all that the builders have for sale, and Spanish money is scarce. The President has in hand an appropriation of \$50,000,000 for the defense of the country, and we can buy or build all the additional ships wanted, if any, to crush the Spanish navy. If this is a peace movement, as is the official interpretation at Washington, it will be because Spain accepts the warning which could not be given in a form better adapted to her understanding. If Spain had the money she would fight, and it is the experience of nations that poverty often stimulates the spirit of war. There are two shocks to come soon—one when the *Maine* case comes up for final adjustment, the other when "intervening with force" occurs—for as there is



ASSISTANT-SECRETARY DAY.

no hope for Spain to do her part to preserve peace, the remedy of intervention is inevitable.

It is the plain path of wisdom to persevere in patience until the ways of peace are no longer the paths of honor, and then our shield, the coast defenses, should be invulnerable, and our sword, the navy, ready to assert the Sea Power of the Indies, in the waters where Spain, England and France, contended for supremacy through centuries ; and we will then make good the promise of the President, that when we go to war it will be with the sympathy of the civilized world.

